attitude of

the Government.

blood and treasure in a hopeless and needless conflict. Changed The attitude assumed by our Government throughout the later negociations has been in strict accordance with the views of the great majority of the English people. The state of opinion was accurately reflected in Lord Derby's despatch to Sir Henry Elliot, of September 5, 1876. The account,' he says, ' of outrages committed by the Turkish troops upon an unresisting population, has aroused an universal feeling of indignation in all classes of English society, and to such a pitch has this risen, that, in the extreme case of Russia declaring war on Turkey, Her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire.

Terms proposed to Porte.

'Such an event, by which the sympathies of the nation would be brought into direct opposition to its treaty engagements, would place England in a most unsatisfactory, and even humiliating position. The speedy conclusion of peace becomes, under these conditions, a matter of urgent necessity.'

The terms proposed by our Government were :— 1. The status quo, speaking roughly, both as regards Servia and Montenegro.

2. Administrative reforms, in the nature of local autonomy 1 for Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

1 Local autonomy was not to be construed as meaning a condition of independence, like that of Servia or Roumania, but rather a system, under which the people of the country should have a voice in the management of their own affairs, and reasonable security against arbitrary acts on the part of the administration.

3. Guarantees against the future mal-administration of Bulgaria.

The Austrians objected, on the grounds already stated, to the proposals of autonomy, either for Bosnia or Bulgaria. The Russians were equally decided in advocating that it should be conceded. The despatches of our own Foreign Office were in truth not wanting either in energy or in candour. Sir Henry Elliot was instructed to demand a personal audience of the Sultan, and to communicate to him the substance of Mr. Baring's report.

schemes of

The ministers of the Porte excused themselves for Turkish not consenting to an armistice, on the ground that they reform. had no idea of the conditions of peace which they were to be asked to accept. An attempt was made to evade the demands of the Christian powers by the publication of an Imperial Hatt, by Sultan Abdul Hamid II., promising extensive reforms in the usual vague terms. Christians were to be appointed governors. The people, through the provincial councils, were to have a voice in the administration of the provinces. The police were to be selected both from Christians and Turks, and no longer to be employed in the collection of taxes. The tax for military exemption was no longer to be levied upon Christian children. In regard to the tenure of property, the Christians were to be put on a footing of perfect equality with the Mussulmans. These liberal and comprehensive schemes were solemnly put forth in an imperial firman, containing the accustomed platitudes, of which the following is a

How British interests may be affected.

specimen :- The greatness, the glory, and the security of States can only be maintained by the integrity and justice of the executive powers, by the obedience of all to the established laws, and by the strict observance, by great and small, of the rights and functions of everyAll those who in our States shall act in conformity with these principles shall be the recipients of our Imperial favours, while those who despise these same principles will suffer just punishment.'

The Russian Government, growing impatient at the refusal of the Turks to yield to diplomatic appeals, proposed the employment of material force. Bosnia was to be occupied by Austrian, and Bulgaria by Russian troops, while the combined fleets were to enter the Bosphorus. The British Government, while declining to adopt such energetic measures, continued to urge the Porte to agree to the terms of peace, which had received the adhesion of all the Powers.

It is, perhaps, premature to conjecture how, and to what extent, British interests may be affected by the result of the present lamentable conflict; but the subject is important, and it is not difficult to realise some of the alternatives which may be submitted to a conference. We must assume that victory will, sooner or later, incline towards Russia, and that Russia will claim compensation for the immense sacrifices which the war has entailed. Proposals of annexation in Europe would meet with the disapproval of the European powers. It is therefore in Armenia, if anywhere, that Russia must look for accessions of territory.

We are interested in preventing annexation of Turkish territory by Russia, only in so far as it is essential to us to maintain our position in India. The advance of the Russian frontier in Asia is not to be apprehended as tending to facilitate the movements of an army despatched from Russia-in-Europe to invade India. Immense distances, thirsty plains, and inaccessible mountains, render such an expedition impracticable. Neither are the territorial encroachments of Russia to be apprehended, as if our own communications might thereby be intercepted. On the last occasion when the conveyance of troops to India by land was under official consideration, it was pronounced to be undesirable and unnecessary, if not indeed impracticable to send them by railway. This declaration was elicited by a debate in the House of Commons on a proposed guarantee from the British Government for a line through the Euphrates Valley, from Seleucia, by Aleppo, to Bagdad and Bassorah. The scheme was referred to a Select Committee, of which Sir Stafford Northcote was chairman. The feasibility of the railway was clearly demonstrated; but a letter to the Committee from the Indian Government put an end to their deliberations.

The views of the Government of India on the subject of the Euphrates Valley Railway scheme were

embodied in the following letter :

SIMLA: June 2nd, 1871.

To his Grace the Right Hon. the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

In continuation of our despatch in the Foreign Department, No. 215, of 15th October last, we have now the honour to report our further consideration of the subject of the project for a Euphrates Valley Railway, as modified by Colonel Herbert's proposed adoption of the Tigris Valley Route. To this, in order to complete the subject for consideration in all its bearings, must be added the allied project of a line from Constantinople, the whole forming a system of railways between the Continent of Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean.

The length of the lines in question we understand to be about the following:

Miles.

820

490

290

1,600

280

1,880

Supposing these lines to be constructed on a gauge wider than 3 feet, and on the most economical scale otherwise, we believe their cost would not exceed on the average 8,000l. per mile, or 15 millions sterling for the whole system of 1,880 miles.

The advantages to England and to British India from the construction of these lines would be chiefly in the rapid conveyance of the mails, in the security given to the telegraph lines, the opening out of trade with the interior of Asiatic Turkey and Persia, and in the facilities they might afford to the conveyance of troops under special circumstances. To send the mails through Europe, and by Constantinople to Bussorah, would, we calculate, even at a very moderate rail