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mediate deployment of troops at the already CH'ONGJU, to cut off the Second Army Sent on 09/29/50 at 20:23 p.m. prepared fortifications there.
Group composed of 7 divisions. Seoul fell. Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 14:45 KIM IL SUNG asked me, how do you There are no standby troops ready to render p.m.
consider (the situation), will the adversary any serious resistance to the enemy advancReceived at the 8D/GS on 09/30/50 at cross the 38th parallel northward?
ing to the 38th parallel.
I replied that it was not clear yet, but that New military units being formed in the Deciphered by Vakushin on 09/30/50 at they had to undertake urgent measures to set North advance to the frontline very slowly 15:50 p.m up defenses along the 38th parallel.
because the railroads in fact do not function Distribution list - 12 copies:
KIM IL SUNG reiterated his earlier due to the demolished bridges and ruined Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, stated desire to unify the country by his own railway stations, while automobile transport Beria - 1, Mikoyan -1, Kaganovich - 1, means, he stated that he wanted to form 15
is scarce. Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1, 8 MDGS - 1, divisions and to continue the struggle, but it These new units lack armaments. The MFA - 1, on file - 1.
was not clear for him whether the adversary newly formed units and groupings desig
would cross the 38th parallel or not. Should nated to defend CHEMULP'O, HAEJU, To: MOSCOW
the enemy cross the 38th parallel, they (the WÓNSAN, and CH’ÓNGJIN have weapMinistry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR North Korean leadership - AM] would be ons designed for training purposes only. To Comrade GROMYKO
unable to form new troops and they would The political situation is also getting Instantsia (Highest Authority) have no means to render any serious resis- more and more complicated. tance to the enemy.
The enemy stepped up its activity of On 29 September 29 I met KIM IL In this connection, he would like to ask dropping paratroopers into the territory of SUNG upon his request.
my advice regarding his letter to Comrade North Korea with the task of gathering intelPAK HÓN-YONG was present at the STALIN. They discussed this idea and want ligence on what deliveries are being shipped meeting. In the beginning of the conversa- to send the letter.
from the Soviet Union and to conduct subtion KIM IL SUNG asked me whether I was I responded that I could give no advice versive activities. Reactionary forces are aware of the military situation at the front. on this matter. At that moment, PAK HÓN- raising their heads in North Korea.
I replied that I did not know the latest YONG joined the conversation and said that one. they had already drafted a letter, that the
SHTYKOV Then KIM IL SUNG briefly ex- WPKs Political Council had discussed it, 30.IX.50 plained to me the predicament of his troops and they wanted to familiarize me with its No. 1340 on the basis of the report of the Front Com- content.
Typed by Lobyseva on 09/30/50 at 16:55 mander and asked my advice as to what one I dodged the reading by saying that it p.m. could do in order to improve the situation at was up to the Political Council what its the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the members were going to write in their letter. (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, wake of the enemy's having occupied the On 28.9.50, [A.I.] SHABSHIN, a mem- listy 46-49) Syarye mountain range and moving into the ber of MATVEYEV'S group, told rear of the Second Army Group the front MATVEYEV and myself that at a chance situation is becoming particularly trouble- meeting with PAK HÓN-YONG the latter Document 6: Ciphered Telegram, some. Earlier they hoped that they would be told him that the Political Council had dis- DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South able to withdraw troops in an organized cussed and adopted a text of the letter ad- Korean Communist leader Pak Honmanner. But because of their poor disci- dressed to comrade Stalin, containing a re- Yong to Stalin (via Shtykov), 29 Seppline and failure to fulfill orders, the enemy quest to aid Korea with air support.
tember 1950 managed to cut off the First Army Group PAK informed SHABSHIN that they and is moving to cut off the Second Army had dispatched a letter in reply to MAO CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600308/sh Group by its breakthrough toward P’UNGGI ZEDONG which contained a hint about aid.
. [BUNKEI) and JIJYON (TISEN).
It was obvious that they (Kim and Pak - Sent from Pyongyang by wire on 09/30/50 The situation in Seoul is also murky. AM] were not satisfied with my earlier reply
at 20:35 p.m. His orders notwithstanding, CH’OE and they did not know what to do with their Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 23:32 YONGGÓN does not report anything, de- letter to Comrade STALIN.
p.m. spite the fact that a line of communications KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YONG Arrived in the 8 MDGS on 09/30/50 at with him is available. are nervous. In the present difficult situation
23:30 p.m. I replied that it was hard for me to one can feel some confusion and hopeless- Deciphered by Mikhaylenko on 10/01/50 advise anything regarding this matter be- ness.
at 0:35 a.m. cause I did not know the predicament of the The military situation has worsened dra- Distribution list - 12 copies: KPA troops and their location, however, I matically lately. The adversary managed to Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, would consider it expedient for KIM IL cut off the entire First Army Group com- Beria -1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, SUNG to take urgent steps to organize de- posed of six divisions and two brigades, as Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1. fense along the 38th parallel, including im- well as, by advancing to the vicinity of
Extremely Urgent restore its prestige and to implement by any can aggression ultimately will be successful.
means its long-held plans of conquering In order to provide troops with all the MOSCOW
Korea and transforming it into its military- necessary supplies and to feed the frontline To Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the strategic bridgehead, on 16.9.50, the U.S. without any interruption, first of all, we need USSR
performed an assault landing operation and to have an appropriate air force. But we do Comrade GROMYKO
landed a considerable number of troops and not possess well-trained pilots.
armaments in the vicinity of Inch'ón after Dear Comrade STALIN, we are deterI herewith relay the text of a letter ad- having mobilized almost all its land, naval, mined to overcome all the difficulties facing dressed to Comrade STALIN which I re- and air troops deployed in the Pacific ocean. us so that Korea will not be a colony and a ceived from KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN- The enemy took over Inch'ón and is engaged military springboard of the U.S. imperialYÓNG (translation from the Korean). in street combats in the city of Seoul itself. ists. We will fight for the independence,
This letter was handed over to me by The military situation became perilous. democracy and happiness of our people to PAK HÓN-YÓNG in person.
The units of our People's Army hero- the last drop of blood. Therefore, with all ically fight against advancing assault land- our energy we are taking decisive measures
ing units of the enemy. However, we con- for the formation and training of many new SHTYKOV sider it necessary to report to You about the divisions with the aim of using more than
emergence of very unfavorable conditions 100,000 troops mobilized in South Korea No. 1351 for us.
[captured in South Korea - AM) in the most
The enemy's air force numbering about advantageous operational areas, as well as Enclosure: 4-page letter.
a thousand airplanes of various types, facing arming the entire people so as to be prepared
no rebuff from our side, totally dominate the to fight a protracted war. This letter was cabled to Comrade Stalin air space and perform air raids at the fronts This notwithstanding, if the enemy does on 10.01.50 at 12:50 p.m.
and in the rear day and night. At the fronts, not give us time to implement the measures
under the air cover of hundreds of airplanes which we plan, and, making use of our Typed by Shcherbakova on 10/01/50 at the motorized units of the enemy engage us extremely grave situation, steps up its offen1:45 a.m.
in combat at their free will and inflict great sive operations into North Korea, then we losses to our manpower and destroy our will not be able to stop the enemy troops armaments. Moreover, by freely destroying solely with our own forces.
railroads and highways, telegraph and tele- Therefore, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, Moscow, Kremlin.
phone communications lines, means of trans- we cannot help asking You to provide us
portation and other facilities, the enemy's with special assistance. In other words, at DEEPLY RESPECTED Iosif air force impedes the provision of supplies to the moment when the enemy troops cross Vissarionovich STALIN.
our combat units and bars maneuvers by our over the 38th parallel we will badly need
troops, thereby making their timely rede- direct military assistance from the Soviet On behalf of the Workers' Party of ployments impossible. We experience this Union. Korea, we express to You, the liberator of difficulty on all fronts.
If for any reason this is impossible, the Korean people and the leader of the Having cut off all the communications please assist us by forming international working peoples of the entire world, our lines of our troops and joined the assault volunteer units in China and other countries profound gratitude for compassion and as- force that landed in Inch'ón with the units of of people's democracy for rendering milisistance which You constantly provide to their southern front that broke through our tary assistance to our struggle. our people struggling for the freedom and frontline, the adversary has a real opportu- We request Your directive regarding independence of its Motherland.
nity to take over the city of Seoul com- the aforementioned proposal. In this letter, we would like to brief You pletely. on the current situation at the fronts of the As a result, the units of the People's Respectfully, The CC of the Workers' Party liberation war of our people against the Army that are still fighting in the southern of Korea American aggressors.
part of Korea have been cut off from the Prior to the assault landing at Inch'ón northern part of Korea, they are torn into KIM IL SUNG, PAK HÓN-YONG (Chemulp'o) one could not judge the situa- pieces and cannot receive munitions, armation at the fronts as unfavorable to us. The ments, and food rations. Moreover, some 29 September 1950 adversary, suffering one defeat after an- units do not have any communication with other, was cornered into a tiny piece of land each other, while some of them are sur- (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, at the southern-most tip of South Korea and rounded by enemy troops.
listy 41-45] we had a great chance of winning a victory After taking over Seoul completely, the in the last decisive battles.
enemy is likely to launch a further offensive Document 7: Ciphered Telegram, Such a situation considerably damaged into North Korea. Therefore, we believe that
into North Korea. Therefore, we believe that Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador the military authority of the United States. if in future the above-mentioned conditions in Beijing (N.V. Roshchin) with message Therefore, in those conditions, in order to unfavorable to us continue, then the Ameri- for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950
CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 3172
The Ambassador of the USSR to the
DPRK Comrade Shtykov has reported that Coded, only by wire
as a result of air bombardments by the U.S. Submitted at 23:45 p.m. on 07/05/50 118. Telegram from Comrade Matveyev # Air Force many enterprises of the DPRK Distribution List - 3 copies: Stalin - 2, 1298.
have been ruined and are not in operation. At Molotov - 1
the present time, Koreans do not intend to To BEIJING, (SOVIET) AMBASSA
The attached draft of the reply to Com- rebuild these factories and plants. DOR
rade Matveyev regarding his telegram #1298 In this situation Comrade Shtykov conhas been approved.
siders it expedient to send some of the Soviet
specialists back to the Soviet Union and asks Re Your ciphered telegrams ## 1112
to be given the right to dispatch the Soviet 1126
SECRETARY OF THE CC experts back to the USSR regardless of the
length of their stay in Korea upon consultaTell Zhou Enlai the following:
tions with the government of the DPRK. 1. We agree with the opinion of Chi
Comr. Shtykov also requests that he be nese comrades regarding the Indian inter- Attachment to the Decision of the Polit- permitted, at his judgement and upon conmediation in the matter of admitting the
buro #78 on #118
sultations with heads of the Soviet organizaPeople's [Republic of) China into the UN PYONGYANG
tions in Korea, to evacuate some of their membership
To MATVEYEV (ZAKHAROV] personnel working in Korea without whom 2. We consider it correct to concentrate
RE: # 1298
they can still continue to do their work. immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the
The Ministry of] F[oreign] A[ffairs of Chinese-Korean border for volunteers' ac- We consider correct the decisions the] USSR considers it possible to recall tions in North Korea in the event of the adopted by Kim Il Sung at his meeting with some of the Soviet specialists from the DPRK enemy's crossing the 38th parallel. We will You, in particular, regarding the combining only if the initiative for their return to the do our best to provide the air cover for these of the duties of the Supreme Commander-in- Soviet Union were to come from the governunits.
Chief and Defense Minister in the hands of ment of the DPRK. 3. Your report about the flights of the Kim Il Sung, the establishment of the Staff at As far as Comr. Shtykov's suggestion Soviet aircraft over the Manchurian terri- the office of the Supreme Commander-in- about the evacuation of the personnel of the tory has not been confirmed. But we have Chief, the formation of six divisions and Soviet organizations from the DPRK, the issued an order not to permit such over- withdrawal of manpower reserves from South MFA (of the] USSR proposes that we mainflights. Korea.
tain the existing procedures according to The formation of six divisions must be which the recall of personnel is to be done FILIPPO V STALIN] accelerated. Necessary armaments, ammu- via the MFA of the USSR upon consulta
nition, and other materials will be supplied tions with appropriate ministries and organi373/sh from October 5 to October 20.
zations of the USSR. 5.7.50 [5 July 1950)
As far as the question about the expedi- A draft (cable to Shtykov - AM] is Typed by Stepanova at 0:55 a.m. on 071 ency of recommending that Kim Il Sung ask
the Chinese friends to dispatch drivers to I request Your consideration.
Korea, You may give such advice but with(Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 331, out citing Moscow.
A. GROMY KO list 79]
Upon the directive of Instantsia 30 September 1950
# 182-sh Document 8: Draft Telegram, Chan Fu
CHAN FU [STALIN]
(Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827,
TOP PRIORITY # P78/118 09/30/50
Document 9: Memorandum Gromyko To PYONGYANG, To: Cmrds. Malenkov, Bulganin,
to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft To SOVIET AMBASSADOR Vasilevsky cable from Gromyko to Shtykov
In connection with the present situation Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR the evacuation of the Soviet specialists from the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC
Korea may take place only when the initia
tive for the return of any such specialists Army Groups' Commands failed to imple
Army Groups' Commands failed to imple- them out. They must leave heavy weapons comes from the government of the DPRK. ment Kim Il Sung's order for the withdrawal behind and try to get to the north by all You should not display any initiative of your of troops northward, which allowed the U.S. means, by using the cover of night and the own in raising the issue of the evacuation of troops to cut them off and surround them. areas unoccupied by the enemy yet. You Soviet specialist before the Koreans do. Our Korean friends have no troops capable have the possibility of rescuing thereby the
The return of the personnel of the Soviet of resistance in the vicinity of Seoul. Hence, most valuable asset, that is, the cadres. organizations working in the DPRK to the one needs to consider the way toward the Take all the necessary measures to Soviet Union should be done in the previ- 38th parallel wide open.
implement this directive. ously-established order, that is, via the MFA I think that if in the current situation you Telegraph the fulfillment. of the USSR upon consultations with appro- consider it possible to send troops to assist priate ministries and organizations of the the Koreans, then you should move at least
CHAN FUSTALIN) USSR.
five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at 2 October 1950 You should inform the MFA of the once so as to give our Korean comrades an USSR about each case of pending return of opportunity to organize combat reserves (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, the Soviet specialists from Korea well in north of the 38th parallel under the cover of list 64) advance.
your troops. The Chinese divisions could be
considered as volunteers, with Chinese in A. Gromyko command at the head, of course.
Document 12: Ciphered telegram from
I have not informed and am not going to Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov (Stalin), (Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, inform our Korean friends about this idea, 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October listy 123, 125]
but I have no doubt in my mind that they will 1950 message from Mao to Stalin
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION Document 10: Ciphered Telegram,
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and
SOVIET SOVIET ARMY Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199 Transmitted to Bulganin 1 October 1950 On 1.X.50 [1 October 1950) at 3:00 a.m.
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin Ciphered Telegram listy 97-98]
From BEIJING Received 12:15 To BEIJING, SOVIET AMBASSA
Document 11: Ciphered Telegram, (For immediate transmission to MAO Chan Fu (Stalin) to Matveyev
TOP PRIORITY T ZEDONG and ZHOU ENLAI.) (Zakharov), 2 October 1950
TO FILIPPOV (STALIN] I am far away from Moscow on vaca
Ciphered Note (by wire) tion and somewhat detached from events in
I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG Korea. However, judging by the informa- To PYONGYANG
to your (telegram] No. 4581: tion that I have received from Moscow to- MATVEYEV (ZAKHAROV] (transmit- “I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 day, I see that the situation of our Korean
ted by ciphered telegram)
October 1950). We originally planned to friends is getting desperate.
move several volunteer divisions to North It was on 16 September already that We constantly point out to You the Korea to render assistance to the Korean Moscow warned our Korean friends that the exceptional importance of the withdrawal of
exceptional importance of the withdrawal of comrades when the enemy advanced north landing of the U.S. troops at Chemulp'o troops out of the encirclement. In this mat- of the 38th parallel. [Inchon) had great significance and was ter, the crucial point is to bring the man- However, having thought this over thoraimed at cutting off the First and Second power and commanding officers back to the oughly, we now consider that such actions Army Groups of the North Koreans from north.
may entail extremely serious consequences. their rear in the North. Moscow admonished In the current situation, without delay In the first place, it is very difficult to them to withdraw at least four divisions you must give instructions to the soldiers resolve the Korean question with a few divifrom the South immediately, to set up a and officers who are still fighting in the sions (our troops are extremely poorly frontline to the north and east of Seoul, and south to retreat by any means, in groups or equipped, there is no confidence in the suclater to gradually pull out most of the troops person by person, to the north. There is no cess of military operations against Amerifighting in the South northward, thereby continuous frontline. These troops are fight- can troops), the enemy can force us to reproviding for the defense of the 38th paral- ing on their own territory, so the population treat. lel. However, the 1 [First] and 2 (Second] feels compassion toward them and will help In the second place, it is most likely that need peace). .
this will provoke an open conflict between peaceful construction will be completely ru- our preliminary telegram, we wish to conthe USA and China, as a consequence of ined, and many people in the country will be sult with you. If you agree, then we are ready which the Soviet Union can also be dragged dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the immediately to send by plane Comrades into war, and the question would thus be- people by the war have not yet healed, we ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacacome extremely large (kraine bol'shim).
tion place, to talk over this matter with you Many comrades in the CC CPC (Cen- Therefore it is better to show patience and to report the situation in China and tral Committee of the Communist Party of now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] Korea. China] judge that it is necessary to show actively prepare our forces, which will be We await your reply. caution here. .
more advantageous at the time of war with Of course, not to send out troops to the enemy.
2.10.50" render assistance is very bad for the Korean Korea, while temporarily suffering decomrades, who are presently in such diffi- feat, will change the form of the struggle to 1. In our view MAO ZEDONG's anculty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but partisan war.
swer is indicative of a change in the original if we advance several divisions and the We will convene a meeting of the CC, at position of the Chinese leadership on the enemy forces us to retreat; and this more- which will be present the main comrades of Korean question. It contradicts the earlier over provokes an open conflict between the various bureaus of the CC. A final decision
various bureaus of the CC. A final decision appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed USA and China, then our entire plan for has not been taken on this question. This is in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with
MAO TО ЅTАLIN, 2 OCTOBER 1950: THE RUSSIAN VERSION