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CCP LEADERS

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how the situation has changed in the age of "reform and opening to the outside world." Insofar as the original works of CCP leaders are concerned, the archives storing them, especially Beijing's Central Archives, remain inaccessible to most scholars (both

culation only," it is not difficult for scholars outside of China to gain access to them. For

example, the Yenching Library and the library of John K. Fairbank Center at Harvard University, the East Asian Library at Columbia University, the East Asian Library at Stanford University, the East Asian Library at Toronto University, the Asian Section of

Chinese and Western). If one carefully Library of Congress, and many other East

examines the contents of the selected works of CCP leaders that have been compiled and published since the early 1980s (especially the editions "for internal circulation only"), however, it is easy to find that the policy of "reform and opening to the outside world" has made its stamp on them. Put simply, the "selected works" compiled and published in the 1980s and 1990s are more substantial, and, so far as their texts are concerned, more reliable than previous collections. To make this point clear, I will introduce and examine several major "selected works" compiled and published during this period.

1. Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee). This documentary collection covers the period from 1921 to 1949 in two different editions: A fourteen volume internal edition published in the mid1980s, and an eighteen volume open edition published in the early 1990s.2 Both editions contain many previously unpublished materials. The open edition contains almost fifteen percent more documents than the earlier internal one (however, a few “sensitive documents" that were included in the internal edition disappeared from the open edition). The "quality" of some of the documents is impressive. For example, the Central Committee's "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs,” dated 18 August 1944, clearly reveals the CCP leadership's perception of international affairs as well as its calculation on how the Party should best deal with the perceived situation. These documents provide scholars with valuable information for understanding important decisions by the CCP leadership.

2. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic of China).3 The publication of this series began in late 1987, with eight volumes published by 1995, covering the period from October 1949 to December 1959. Although these volumes are marked "for internal cir

Asian libraries in North America have collected various volumes of this set.

The documents published in this collection are of high historical value. They cover, among other things, such important events as Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union in 1949-1950; China's participation in the Korean War in 1950-1953; Mao Zedong's direction of the "Three-Antis” and “Five-Antis" Movements in 1951-1952; Mao's and the CCP leadership's management of relations with the Soviet Union in the mid- and late 1950s; Mao's management of the Taiwan Crisis and the potential confrontation with the United States in 1958; Mao's handling of the "Anti-Rightist Movement" and the "Great Leap Forward" in 1957-1958; and Mao's presentations at the Lushan Conference in 1959. In many places, the documents published in this collection confirm the innerParty statements and instructions by Mao divulged during the "Cultural Revolution" years.4 But the majority of the documents contained in this collection have never been released in the past. Most of the documents are published in their entirety; some, however, are published only in part. The quality of the eight published volumes is uneven. The first volume, which covers the period from October 1949 to December 1950, is one of the best. It offers, among other things, a quite detailed coverage of Mao's visit to the

Soviet Union, as well as how the CCP leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War.5 Volume Four, covering the 19531954 period, is, compared with other volumes, extremely thin. As a whole, this collection provides scholars with much fresh information (compared with what we knew in the past) and, therefore, must be regarded as a basic reference for the study of Mao

Zedong, the Chinese revolution, and the history of the People's Republic of China.

3. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Mao Zedong)6 and Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers, 6 volumes).7 Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan, published in

the early 1980s, contains many previously unknown inner-Party instructions and telegrams by Mao, especially the telegraphic communications between Mao and Chinese field commanders during the early stage of China's military intervention in Korea (October-December 1950). Its circulation was highly restricted at first; after the mid-1980s, however, it became available to scholars outside of China through several channels, especially after it had been reprinted by a publisher in Hong Kong. The six-volume Mao Zedong junshi wenji was published in December 1993, on the 100th anniversary of Mao's birthday. Its coverage is extraordinarily uneven. The first five volumes, which cover the period from the late 1920s to 1949, include many documents released only for the first time. The sixth volume, which covers the period from 1949 to 1976, contains almost nothing new compared with the previously published Mao Zedong junshi wenji and Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. In actuality, many documents concerning Mao's military activities during this postrevolution period published in the other two collections are deleted from this volume. This is a great disappointment for scholars who are interested in Mao's activities during the PRC period.

4. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong),8 This collection focuses on Mao's diplomatic and strategic activities, emphasizing the post1949 period. Some of the documents published in this volume are of high historical value. For example, it has long been known to scholars that in the summer of 1958, a major dispute emerged between Beijing and Moscow in the wake of Moscow's proposal to establish a joint Chinese-Soviet submarine flotilla. However, it has been unclear to scholars how this dispute developed. The minutes of a talk between Mao Zedong and P. F. Yudin, the Soviet ambassador to China, on July 22, 1958, published in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, reveal the Chinese attitude, including Mao's reasoning underlying it, toward this question.9

5. Mao Zedong wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Papers). 10 This collection publishes Mao's speeches, instructions, and telegrams not included in Mao Zedong xuanji. Among the quite impressive documents released are those about the CCP leadership's handling of the Xian Incident of 1936.

6. Mao Zedong nianpu (A Chronicle of

Mao Zedong, 3 volumes).11 Published in December 1993, the 100th anniversary of Mao's birth, it offers a quite detailed day-today account of Mao's activities up to 1949. It releases many previously unknown important documents, going beyond the coverage of other Mao collections. For example, it publishes for the first time Mao Zedong's telegram to the CCP's Nanjing Municipal Committee dated 10 May 1949, in which Mao established the principles for Huang Hua to meet with John Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador to China who remained after the Communist takeover of Nanjing,12

7. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai).13 This is a collection of minutes of internal talks, instructions, statements, and speeches related to Zhou Enlai's diplomatic activities. This collection includes some interesting documents, such as the Chinese minutes of Zhou Enlai's talk with K.M. Pannikar, Indian Ambassador to China, early in the morning of 3 October 1950. During this meeting Zhou Enlai issued the warning that if the American forces crossed the 38th parallel in Korea, China would "intervene" in the conflict. 14

8. Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai). 15 This chronicle, like Mao Zedong nianpu, covers the period up to 1949. It offers a day-to-day account of Zhou Enlai's activities, from his early years to the time of the nationwide victory of the Chinese revolution. The Collection includes complete texts of several important documents relating to Zhou Enlai.

9. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3 volumes). 16 As China's most important leader after Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping played a central role in China's "reform and opening to the outside world" period. This collection offers researchers, as well as the general public, a window through which to study Deng Xiaoping's thoughts. The most important volume of this collection is the third volume, which covers the period from 1982 to 1992, when Deng was indisputably China's paramount leader (although he never assumed that title). Among the documents published in the volume is the talk Deng gave after the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, in which Deng explained his reasoning for opening fire on the demonstrators on Beijing's streets.

10. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai).17 As the PRC's defense minister in the 1950s and the commander of the Chinese Volunteers in Korea, Peng Dehuai played an important role in developing China's military and security strategies. This volume publishes some of Peng's most important military papers, including his correspondences with Mao during the early stages of the Korean War.

In addition to the above listed collections, other "selected works" that have been published since the 1980s include ones by Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Shaoqi, Nie Rongzhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, and Zhu De.18

III

Compared with the "selected works" published earlier, the above list of "selected works" published in the 1980s and 1990s have several distinctive features. First, contrary to the earlier practice of making extensive excisions from, or even revisions in, the original documents for the sake of publication, the compilation and editing of most of the volumes published in the past decade are more faithful to the original text of the documents. For example, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjianxuanji and Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao clearly indicate at the end of most documents that they are printed according to the original texts of the documents. In some cases, photocopies of original documents are provided. This practice significantly increases the reliability and historical value of these publications.

Second, in the pre-1980 period, the editing and publication of "selected works" were generally controlled and conducted by party cadres who always put the party's interests over everything else and who had had, at best, only inadequate knowledge of China's modern history. In the past decade, increasing numbers of professional historians, many of whom have B.A., M.A., or even Ph.D. degrees in modern history, the history of the Chinese revolution, and modern Chinese politics, have joined the editorial teams responsible for compiling and editing the "selected works." Although these scholars still must follow the general directions of the Party in conducting their work, their professional training makes them less willing than their predecessors to alter the documents. As a result, the documents selected are of better “quality” and the annota

tions are more useful to researchers. Indeed, the footnotes of several important collections, such as Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, and Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, contain much important documentary information.

Third, some of the collections, especially those for "internal circulation only," have broken many “forbidden zones” in the writing of the CCP history. For example, scholars who are interested in the CCP's management of the Xian Incident will find that the information offered by the documents in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, Mao Zedong nianpu, Zhou Enlai nianpu, and Mao Zedong wenji differ from the Party's propaganda in the past, indicating that the CCP leadership's attitude toward Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) had been strongly influenced, or even defined, by the Comintern. Also, the documents offered by Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao reveal that, different from the description of the official Party history, one of the considerations behind Mao Zedong's decision to shell the Nationalist-controlled Jinmen Islands in August 1958 was to assist the people in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, in their struggles against the U.S. imperialists.19

However, one should not exaggerate the utility and significance of the historical documents released in "selected works." The documents that have been included in the "selected works" of the 1980s and 1990s are only a small portion of the entire body of original documents, and the criteria used in their selection remain highly dubious. In reality, through other sources, we know for certain that many documents, which in the eyes of the editors have the potential of harming the image of the CCP and its leaders being "generally correct," have been intentionally excluded from the selections.

An example of this practice is a telegram Mao Zedong sent to Peng Dehuai on 28 January 1951. Let me first give some background introduction. After Chinese troops entered the Korean War in October 1950, they waged three offensive campaigns from late October 1950 to early January 1951, driving the American/UN troops from areas close to the Chinese-Korean border to areas south of the 38th parallel. However, the Chinese forces exhausted their offensive potential because of heavy casualties, lack of air support, and the overextension of

supply lines. Therefore, when the American troops started a counteroffensive on 25 January 1951, Peng Dehuai, the Chinese commander, proposed a temporary retreat in a telegram to Mao on January 27. Mao, however, overestimated China's strength. In a telegram to Peng the next day, he ordered Peng to use a Chinese/North Korean offensive to counter the American offensive. He even argued that the Chinese troops possessed the capacity to advance to the 36th parallel.20 Mao's instructions contributed to the military defeat of the Chinese troops on the Korean battlefield in spring 1951. This telegram is certainly important because it revealed Mao's strategic thinking at a crucial point of the Korean War, and reflected the goals he hoped to achieve in Korea-driving the Americans out of the Korean peninsula, thus promoting China's reputation and influence in East Asia while at the same time enhancing the Chinese revolution at home. However, this telegram also makes it clear that sometimes Mao's judgment of the situation could be very poor. Although a few Chinese authors with access to classified documents have cited the telegram in its entirety, this important telegram is excluded from Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao and Mao Zedong junshi wenji.21 This, of course, is only one of many, many such cases.

The end of the Cold War makes it possible for scholars to gain access to documents from the former Soviet Union. Many of the Russian documents that have recently become available display discrepancies compared to what has been revealed by Chinese documents. In some cases these discrepancies expose the limit to which truth is revealed in the documents published in "selected works" in China. Here is another example. All the Chinese documents about the Korean War published in the first volume of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao indicate that the Beijing leadership made the decision to enter Korean War in early October 1950. In a telegram dated October 2, Mao formally informed Stalin that the CCP leadership had made the decision to send troops to Korea. 22 However, Russian documents on the Korean War (which Russian President Yeltsin gave to South Korean President Kim Young-sam in June 1994) tell a different story. According to these documents, Mao Zedong informed Stalin on 3 October 1950 that China would not

send troops to Korea, and it would take great efforts from Stalin to persuade the Chinese that it was in China's basic interest to prevent the war from reaching China's northeast border. (See the article by Alexandre Mansourov in this issue of the Bulletin.) Why does this discrepancy exist? What really happened between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950?

To answer these questions (and many other similar questions) scholars need full access to Beijing's archives. "Selected works" are useful, but only in a highly limited sense. This is particularly true because even in the age of "reform and opening to the outside world," the writing of Party history in China remains a business primarily designed to enhance the legitimacy of the Party's reign in China. This means that materials released through "selected works" are often driven by intentions other than having the truth known, and, as a result, can be misleading.

Therefore, while it is wrong for China scholars to refuse to recognize the historical value of materials contained in "selected works," it is dangerous and unwise for them to rely completely or uncritically on "selected work" sources. While using them, scholars must double check "selected works" materials against other sources, including information obtained from interviews. In the long run, scholars must be given full and equal access to Chinese archives to tell the story of the Chinese Communist revolution and China's relationship with the outside world.

1. An earlier draft of this article was presented to an international symposium on "Local Chinese Archives and the Historiography of Modern China" at the University of Maryland, College Park, 5-7 October 1995. 2. Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee, internal edition, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 19831987, 14 vols.; open edition, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1989-1993, 18 vols.).

3. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987-1994, 8 vols.).

4. For English translations of these previously released documents, see Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

5. For English translations of these documents, see Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1995), Part II.

6. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: Soldier's Press, 1981).

7. Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993, 6 vols.)

8. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994).

9. Ibid., 322-333.

10. Mao Zedong wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Papers, Beijing: People's Press, 1993, 2 vols.). 11. Mao Zedong nianpu (A Chronicle of Mao Zedong, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents and People's Press, 1993, 3 vols.).

12. Ibid., 3:499-500.

13. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1990).

14. See ibid., 25-27.

15. Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1989).

16. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing: People's Press, 1993, 3 vols). 17. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1989).

18. Chen Yun wenxuan (Selected Works of Chen Yun, Beijing: People's Press, 1984, 2 vols.); Hu Qiaomu wenji (A Collection of Hu Qiaomu's Works, Beijing: People's Press, 1993-94, 3 vols.); Liu Shaoqi xuanji (Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Beijing: People's Press, 1982, 2 vols.); Nie Rongzhen junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Nie Rongzhen, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1992); Wang Jiaxiang xuanji (Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang, Beijing: People's Press, 1984); Zhang Wentian xuanji (A Collection of Zhang Wentian, Beijing: People's Press, 1993-94, 3 vols); Zhu De xuanji (Selected Works of Zhu De, Beijing: People's Press, 1984).

19. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7: 391-392. 20. For a more detailed description of the contents of Mao's telegram, see Chen Jian, “China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-1951,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1:1 (Spring 1992), 31-33.

21. My interviews with researchers at Beijing's Academy of Military Science, who were responsible for editing Mao Zedong junshi wenji, in summer 1991 confirmed that this telegram would not be included because of its "improper" content.

22. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 2 October 1950, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1:549-552.

Chen Jian is associate professor of history at Southern Illinois University (Carbondale) and is the author of China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

CORRECTION

The Bulletin regrets that, due to production errors, a number of errors were introduced into the footnoting of Mark Kramer's article in the Spring 1995 issue on "The 'Lessons' of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations." A corrected version will appear in the next issue.

THE SECOND HISTORICAL

ARCHIVES OF CHINA:

A Treasure House for Republican China Research

by Gao Hua

translated by Scott Kennedy

After arriving at Nanjing's 309 Zhongshan East Road, passing the police stationed at their post and going through a routine check-in, researchers face a classical Chinese edifice-the famous Second Historical Archives of China (SHAC).1

Established in February 1951, SHAC has one of the largest historical collections in China. The former tenant at the archive's address was the "Committee for Compiling GMT [Guomindang] Party Historical Records." After the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over management of the Committee as well as the archives from the original "National History House." Soon after, large quantities of documents concerning the GMT regime housed in Guangzhou (Canton), Chongqing (Chungking), Chengdu, Kunming, Shanghai and Beijing, as well as the archival records stored in Beijing on the Northern Warlords Government, were all moved to Nanjing, and together make up the foundation of SHAC's collection.

At the heart of SHAC's collection are the original records of the central organs of the various regimes in existence during the Republican era (1912-1949), namely: 1) the Nanjing Provisional Government (JanuaryApril 1912); 2) the Northern Warlords Government (April 1912 - June 1928); 3) the various GMT regimes, first centered in Guangzhou and Wuhan, and then as a national government in Nanjing (1927-1949); and 4) the various puppet regimes of the Japanese (e.g., Wang Jingwei's Nanjing regime). The archives provide a detailed account of policy and actual conditions-at the central and local levels-on foreign policy, military matters, commerce and finance, culture and education, and even social customs. However, the materials of greatest number and value collected at SHAC are those archives concerning the GMT rule in Nanjing from 1927-1949.

From 1951 to 1979, SHAC's doors remained closed to the public. During those years, the only significant work done was

the compiling of a collection of archival documents, Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Materials on Chinese Modern Political History]. The project, launched in 1956 with a directive from the CCP Central Committee Political Research Office, consumed SHAC's entire energies for three years. Only 100 sets of the 244 volume, 21 million character collection were printed. They were then distributed to central party and political organs as well as some universities to be used as a research reference. At present, this important collection is the largest and richest set of materials concerning China's domestic situation during the Republican era.

Since 1979, SHAC has made public a large number of documents one after another and published three major archival document sets: Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Republican China History Archival Records], Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao conkan [A Series of Republican China History Archives], and Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao congshu [A Collection of Republican China History Archives]. Finally, in 1985, SHAC launched the quarterly, Minguo dang'an [Republican Archives].

SHAC has been a resource on issues where historical questions influence current policy questions. Since 1986, Minguo dang'an has published a large number of documents concerning relations between Tibet and central government authorities. SHAC has also cooperated with Beijing's "China Tibetan Studies Research Center" to publish three volumes of historical materials on Tibet. The journal has also published materials concerning China's claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. SHAC provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with materials concerning China's Republican-era relationship with Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. They recently allowed Taiwanese scholars to view documents concerning the 2-28 Incident (a massacre of Taiwanese by the GMT on 28 February 1947). Finally, geologists and policymakers involved in the planning of the controversial proposed Three Gorges dam have relied on SHAC for materials on relevant Republican-era research.

SHAC has formally been open to scholars for the past 14 years. Apart from the dossiers of various individuals, some judi

cial archives, and those which "involve national interest," scholars are free to utilize all of SHAC's files. Procedures for foreign scholars have also been dramatically simplified. However, due to the effects of economic reform, SHAC has also increased its fees for those scholars who have yet to use its services. SHAC is also planning to install an air-conditioned reading room as another service to foreigners, but, of course, you'll have to pay.

A Chinese-language reference book which is helpful to users of the Second Archives is Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan jianming zhinan [A Brief Guide to the Second Historical Archives of China], (Archives Publishing House, 1987), a well-organized introduction to each of the categories under which all of SHAC's documents are stored. Also useful are Dangdai zhongguode dang'an shiye [China Today: Archival Undertakings] (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House, 1988); and Minguoshi yu minguo dang'an lunwenji [Republican History and Collected Essays on Republican Archives] (Archives Publishing House, 1991).

1. Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan.

Gao Hua, a specialist on Republican era history and modern intellectual history, teaches in the history department at Nanjing University and the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for American and Chinese Studies. He is currently a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and is working on a study of the origins of the Yanan Rectification Campaign and its influence on the development of Maoism. Scott Kennedy is a research assistant in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings

Institution and a doctoral candidate in the

political science department of George Washington University.

RUSSIAN HISTORIANS
TO PUBLISH STUDY

Two Russian historians who have conducted extensive research in Russian and U.S. sources have completed a study of Soviet leaders and the early Cold War: Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders From Stalin to Khrushchev, is scheduled for publication by Harvard University Press in March 1996.

THE EMERGING DISPUTES BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW: TEN NEWLY AVAILABLE CHINESE DOCUMENTS, 1956-1958

Translators' Notes: In February 1950, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two "brotherly" Communist countries, would last forever. However, serious problems soon emerged between the Chinese and Soviet parties and governments. Starting in 1960, the two parties became engaged in an increasingly heated polemical debate over the nature of true communism and which party represented it. By the late 1960s, the relationship between the two countries had deteriorated to such an extent that a major border war erupted between them in March 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union change from allies to enemies? What problems caused the decline and final collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to answer these questions, scholars need access to contemporary documentary sources, and these translations of the newly available Chinese documents provide a basis for beginning to answer these questions.

The documents are divided into three groups. The first group includes two speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the Chinese Communist view on such important questions as Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin, the general principles underlying the relations among "brotherly parties and states," and their perception of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Chinese revolution. Particularly interesting is Mao Zedong's repeated reference to the "unequal" relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Union during Stalin's era. Through these documents one is able to sense some of the deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group includes three documents reflecting the CCP leadership's response to the Soviet proposals in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet submarine flotilla in 1958. In his long

Translated and Annotated by
Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian

conversation with the Soviet Ambassador P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to a series of more general questions concerning the overall relationship between the two countries, revealing comprehensively (often in cynical tones) his understanding of the historical, philosophical, and political origins of the problems existing between Beijing and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again emphasized the issue of “equality,” emphasizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow's treatment of the CCP as a junior partner. The third group includes four Chinese documents from Russian Foreign Ministry archives, which demonstrate the extent to which China had been dependent upon the military and other material support of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. These documents make it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet relations from another perspective.

Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences

1. Minutes, Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, [undated] September 19561 Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993), 251-262

We welcome you to China. We are very pleased at your visit. We have been supported by you, as well as by other brotherly [Communist] parties. We are invariably supporting you as much as all the other brotherly parties. In today's world, the Marxist and Communist front remains united, whether in places where success [of Communist revolution] is achieved or not yet achieved. However, there were times when we were not so united; there were times when we let you down. We listened to the opinions of the Information Bureau2 in the past. Although we did not take part in the Bureau's [business], we found it difficult not to support it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you

as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we kept silent on the resolution [condemning you], although we published articles to criticize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should not have done that; we should have discussed [this issue] with you: if some of your viewpoints were incorrect, [we should have let] you conduct self-criticism, and there was no need to hurry [into the controversy] as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: should you disagree with us, you should do the same thing, that is, the adoption of a method of persuasion and consultation. There have not been that many successful cases in which one criticizes foreign parties in newspapers. [Your] case offers a profound historical lesson for the international communist movement. Although you have suffered from it, the international communist movement has learned a lesson from this mistake. [The international communist movement] must fully understand [the seriousness of] this mistake.

When you offered to recognize new China, we did not respond, nor did we decline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have rejected it, because there was no reason for us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we did not say no to it. How could we find any excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist country?

There was, however, another factor which prevented us from responding to you: the Soviet friends did not want us to form diplomatic relations with you. If so, was China an independent state? Of course, yes. If an independent state, why, then, did we follow their instructions? [My] comrades, when the Soviet Union requested us to follow their suit at that time, it was difficult for us to oppose it. It was because at that time some people claimed that there were two Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the other in China, even if no one passed a resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that [they] suspected that I was a half-hearted Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito

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