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suffered from historical idealism. Some of sugar plant while discussing Stalin's mis- have such a ruler (in your history] who might his behavior, such as going to extremes, takes concerning us, we feel it inappropriate take it well even when people cursed him fostering personal myth, and embarrassing to make them public. There are other issues right in his face. The capitalist society has others, are by no means [forms] of material- involving conflicts and controversies. taken a step ahead of the feudalist society. ism.

Generally speaking, the Soviet Union is The Republican and Democratic Parties in Before I met with Stalin, I did not have good. It is good because of four factors: the United States are allowed to quarrel with much good feeling about him. I disliked Marxism-Leninism, the October Revolution, each other. reading his works, and I have read only "On the main force (of the socialist camp), and We socialist countries must find [betthe Basis of Leninism,” a long article criti- industrialization. They have their negative

industrialization. They have their negative ter] solutions. Certainly, we need concencizing Trotsky, and “Be Carried Away by side, and have made some mistakes. How- tration and unification; otherwise, uniforSuccess,” etc. I disliked even more his ever, their achievements constitute the ma- mity cannot be maintained. The uniformity articles on the Chinese revolution. He was jor part of their past] while their shortcom- of people's minds is in our favor, enabling us very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his ings are of secondary significance. Now that to achieve industrialization in a short period heart with others and treated others as equals the enemy is taking advantage of the criti- and to deal with the imperialists. It, howwhereas Stalin liked to stand above every cism of Stalin to take the offensive on a ever, embodies some shortcomings, that is, one else and order others around. This style world-wide scale, we ought to support the people are made afraid of speaking out. can be detected from his works. After I met Soviet Union. They will certainly correct Therefore, we must find some ways to enwith him, I became even more disgusted: I their mistakes. Khrushchev already cor- courage people to speak out. Our Politburo's quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin rected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. comrades have recently been considering was excitable by temperament. When he They are already aware of Wang Ming's these issues. became agitated, he would spell out nasty mistakes, although in the past they were Few people in China have ever openly things.

unhappy with our criticism of Wang Ming criticized me. The Chinese] people are I have written altogether three pieces They have also removed the "half-hearted tolerant of my shortcomings and mistakes. praising Stalin. The first was written in Tito” [label from me), thus, eliminating alto- It is because we always want to serve the Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday (21 gether (the labels on) one and a half Titos. people and do good things for the people. December 1939-ed.], the second was the We are pleased to see that Tito's tag was Although we sometimes also suffer from congratulatory speech (I delivered) in Mos- removed.

bossism and bureaucracy, the people believe cow (in December 1949—ed.), and the third Some of our people are still unhappy that we have done more good things than bad was an article requested by Pravda after his with the criticism of Stalin. However, such ones and, as a result, they praise us more than death (March 1953—ed.). I always dislike criticism has positive effects because it de- criticize us. Consequently, an idol is crecongratulating others as well as being con- stroys mythologies, and opens[black)boxes. ated: when some people criticize me, others gratulated by others. When I was in Moscow This entails liberation, indeed, a “war of would oppose them and accuse them of to celebrate his birthday, what else could I liberation.” With it, people are becoming so disrespecting the leader. Everyday I and have done if I had chosen not to congratulate courageous that they will speak their minds, other comrades of the central leadership him? Could I have cursed him instead? as well as be able to think about issues. receive some three hundred letters, some of After his death the Soviet Union needed our Liberty, equality, and fraternity are slo- which are critical of us. These letters, howsupport and we also wanted to support the gans of the bourgeoisie, but now we have to ever, are either not signed or signed with a Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that fight for them. Is (our relationship with false name. The authors are not afraid that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. Moscow] a father-and-son relationship or we would suppress them, but they are afraid That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the one between brothers? It was between father that others around them would make them Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I and son in the past; now it more or less suffer. did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal resembles a brotherly relationship, but the You mentioned “On Ten Relationfeelings and treat him as the leader of a shadow of the father-and-son relationship is ships."17 This resulted from one-and-a-halfsocialist country. Therefore, that piece was not completely removed. This is under- months of discussions between me and thirtyrather vigorous whereas the other two came standable, because changes can never be four ministers (of the government). What out of (political] need, not my heart, nor at completed in one day. With certain open- opinions could I myself have put forward my will. Human life is just as contradictory ness, people are now able to think freely and without them? All I did was to put together as this: your emotion tells you not to write independently. Now there is, in a sense, the their suggestions, and I did not create anythese pieces, but your rationality compels atmosphere of anti-feudalism: a father-and- thing. Any creation requires materials and you to do so.

son relationship is giving way to a brotherly factories. However, I am no longer a good Now that Moscow has criticized Stalin, relationship, and a patriarchal system is be- factory. All my equipment is out-of-date, I we are free to talk about these issues. Today ing toppled. During (Stalin's) time people's need to be improved and re-equipped as I tell you about the four mistakes committed minds were so tightly controlled that even much as do the factories in Britain. I am by Stalin, but, in order to maintain relations the feudalist control had been surpassed. getting old and can no longer play the major with the Soviet Union, (we) cannot publish While some enlightened feudal lords or role but had to assume a minor part. As you them in our newspapers. Since Khrushchev's emperors would accept criticism, (Stalin] can see, I merely played a minor role during report only mentioned the conflict over the would tolerate none. Yugoslavia might also this Party's National Congress whereas Liu

ary 195719

Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping18 and fuses to establish diplomatic relation with us. At present there exist some controversies others assumed the primary functions. The longer you drag on [these issues), the between China and the Soviet Union. Their

more debts you will owe us. The longer the ways of thinking, behavior, and historical 2. Speech, Mao Zedong, “On Sino-Ameri- issues linger there, the more unreasonable traditions differ from ours. Therefore, we can and Sino-Soviet Relations,” 27 Janu- you will appear, and the more isolated you must try to persuade them. Persuasion is

will become both domestically and in face of what I have always advocated as a way to Source: Mao Zedong Waijaio Wenxuan, international public opinion. I once told an deal with our own comrades. Some may 280-283

American in Yanan that even if you United argue that since we are comrades, we must

States refused to recognize us for one hun- be of the same good quality, and why in the (Let me) talk about U.S.-China rela- dred years, I simply did not believe that you world is persuasion needed among comtions. At this conference we have circulated United States could refuse to recognize us in rades? Moreover, persuasion is often ema copy of the letter from (Dwight D.) the one hundred and first year. Sooner or ployed for building a common front and Eisenhower to Jiang Jieshi. This letter, in later the U.S. will establish diplomatic rela- always targeted at the democratic figures22 my view, aims largely at dampening the tions with us. When the United States does and, why is it employed toward communist enthusiasm of Jiang Jieshi and, then, cheer- so and when Americans finally come to visit party members? This reasoning is wrong. ing him up a bit. The letter urges (Jiang) to China, they will feel deep regret. It is be- Different opinions and views do exist even keep calm, not to be impetuous, that is, to cause by then, China will become completely within a communist party. Some have joined resolve the problems through the United different (from what it is now]: the house has the party, but have not changed their mindset. Nations, but not through a war. This is to been thoroughly swept and cleaned, “the Some old cadres do not share the same pour cold water (on Jiang). It is easy for four pests"21 have altogether been elimi- language with us. Therefore, [we) have to Jiang Jieshi to get excited. To cheer (Jiang] nated; and they can hardly find any of their engage in heart-to-heart talks with them: up is to continue the hard, uncompromising “friends.” Even if they spread some germs sometimes individually, sometimes in policy toward the Chinese] Communist [in China), it will have no use at all.

groups. In one meeting after another we will Party, and to hope that internal unrest would Since the end of the Second World War, be able to persuade them. disable us. In his [Eisenhower's] calcula- every capitalist country has suffered from As far as I can see, circumstances are tion, internal unrest has already occurred instability which has led to disturbance and beyond what persons, even those occupying and it is hard for the Communist Party to disorder. Every country in the world is high positions, can control. Under the pressuppress it. Well, different people observe disturbed, and China is no exception. How- sure of circumstance, those in the Soviet things differently!

ever, we are much less disturbed than they Union who still want to practice big-power I still believe that it is much better to are. I want you to think about this issue: chauvinism will invariably encounter diffiestablish diplomatic relations with the United between the socialist countries and the impe- culties. To persuade them remains our curStates several years later than sooner. This rialist countries, especially the United States, rent policy and requires us to engage in is in our favor. The Soviet Union did not which side is more afraid of the other after direct dialogue with them. The last time our form diplomatic relations with the United all? In my opinion, both are afraid (of the delegation visited the Soviet Union, (we) States until seventeen years after the Octo- other], but the issue is who is afraid more. I openly talked about some (controversial] ber Revolution. The global economic crisis am inclined to accept such an assessment: the issues.23 I told Comrade Zhou Enlai over the erupted in 1929 and lasted until 1933. In imperialists are more afraid of us. However, phone that, as those people are blinded by that year Hitler came to power in Germany such an assessment entails a danger, that is, lust for gain, the best way to deal with them whereas Roosevelt took office in the United it could put us into a three-day-long sleep. is to give them a tongue-lashing. What is States. Only then was the Soviet-American Therefore, (we] always have to stress two (their) asset? It involves nothing more than diplomatic relationship established. [As far possibilities. Putting the positive possibility 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of as I can anticipate), it will probably wait aside, the negative potential is that the impe- coal, and 80 million tons of oil. How much until when we have completed the Third rialists may become crazy. Imperialists al- does this count? It does not count for a thing. Five-Year Plan 20 that we should consider ways harbor malicious intentions and con- With this asset, however, their heads have forming diplomatic relations with the United stantly want to make trouble. Nevertheless,

stantly want to make trouble. Nevertheless, gotten really big. How can they be commuStates. In other words, it will take eighteen it will not be that easy for the imperialists to nists [by being so cocky]? How can they be or even more years [before we do so]. We start a world war; they have to consider the Marxists? Let me stress, even ten times or a are not anxious to enter the United Nations consequences once war starts.

hundred times bigger, these things do not either. This is based on exactly the same (Let me) also talk about Sino-Soviet count for a thing. They have achieved nothreasoning as why we are not anxious to relations. In my view, wrangling [between ing but digging a few things out of the earth, establish diplomatic relations with the United us] will continue. [We shall] never pretend turning them into steel, thereby manufacturStates. The objective of this policy is to that the Communist parties will not wrangle. ing some airplanes and automobiles. This is deprive the U.S. of its political assets as Is there a place in the world where wrangling nothing to be proud of! They, however, turn much as possible, so that the U.S. will be does not exist? Marxism itself is a wran- these [achievements) into huge burdens on placed in an unreasonable and isolated posi- gling-ism, and is about contradiction and their back and hardly care about revolutiontion. It is therefore all right if [the U.S.) struggle. Contradictions are everywhere, ary principles. If this cannot be described as blocks us from the United Nations and re- and contradictions invariably lead to struggle. being blinded by lust for gain, what else could this be? Taking the office of the first (1) In my view, the mistakes of the to encourage him. However, in open talks, secretary can also become a source for being Soviet Communist leadership arise from er- they refused to admit this. blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for roneous thinking. They often set the inter- Khrushchev and Bulganin claimed that one to be out of one's mind. Whenever one ests of the Soviet Communist Party ahead of as members of the third generation (of Sois out of his mind, there must be a way to their brotherly parties; they often set their viet] leadership, they could not do anything bring him back to his senses. This time own interests as the leaders ahead of those of to persuade Stalin or prevent his mistakes. Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained the party. As a result, they often fail to During (my visit] this time, however, I a modest attitude but quarreled with them overcome subjectivity, narrow-mindedness, stressed the ideological and social roots of and, of course, they argued back. This is a and emotion when they think about and Stalin's mistakes, pointing out that the other correct attitude, because it is always better to resolve problems; they often fail to link leaders had to assume some responsibility make every (controversial] issue clear face together the interests of the above-stated for the gradual development of Stalin's misto face. As much as they intend to influence sides in an objective, far-sighted, and calm takes. I also expressed our Chinese Party's us, we want to influence them too. However, fashion. Although they may correct one conviction that open self-criticism will do we did not unveil everything this time, be- mistake, they are not free of making others. no harm to, but will enhance, the Party's cause we must save some magic weapons (in Sometimes they admit that they made mis- credibility and prestige. Before getting out reserve). Conflict will always exist. All we takes; but it does not mean that they fully of the car at the (Moscow) airport, hope for at present is to avoid major clashes come to grips with their mistakes for they Khrushchev explained to me that they could so as to seek common ground while reserv- merely take a perfunctory attitude toward not conduct the same kind of self-criticism ing differences. Let these differences be these mistakes.

as we do; should they do so, their current dealt with in the future. Should they stick to For instance, the dispatch of their troops leadership would be in trouble. the current path, one day, we will have to to Warsaw was clearly interference with the About the Poland question.26 It is crysexpose everything.

internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed tal-clear that the Poland incident was a result As for us, our external propaganda must forces, but not an action to suppress counter- of the historical antagonism between the not contain any exaggeration. In the future, revolutionaries. They admitted that they Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of we shall always remain cautious and mod- had committed a serious mistake, and they [the Second World] War, many (outstanding est, and shall tightly tuck our tails between even stated in our meetings this time that no and potential] conflicts have yet to be approour legs. We still need to learn from the one should be allowed to interfere with other priately resolved. The recent [Soviet] disSoviet Union. However, we shall learn from brotherly parties' internal affairs; but in the patch of troops to Warsaw caused an even them rather selectively: only accept the good meantime, they denied that their interven- worse impact in Poland). Under these cirstuff, while at the same avoiding picking up tion in Poland) was a mistake.

cumstances the Polish comrades have good the bad stuff. There is a way to deal with the When we had a general assessment of reason not to accept the policy of “following bad stuff, that is, we shall not learn from it. Stalin, analyzing the ideological and social the Soviet leadership.” The Polish comAs long as we are aware of their mistakes, roots of his (mistakes), they kept avoiding rades, however, admitted that they had yet to [we) can avoid committing the same mis- any real discussion. Although they seem- build a whole-hearted trusting relationship take. We, however, must learn from any- ingly have changed their view) in measur- with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, thing that is useful to us and, at the same ing Stalin's achievements and mistakes, to [Wladyslaw] Gomulka27 is trying his best to time, we must grasp useful things all over the me, such an alteration was to meet their retrieve the losses and reorient the Polishworld. One ought to seek knowledge in all temporary needs, not the result of profound Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing parts of the world. It would be monotonous contemplation.

any anti-Soviet acts (in Poland). Regardif one only sticks to one place to receive We immediately sensed this shortly af- less, however, the Soviet comrades remain education.

ter our arrival in Moscow. At the dinner unwilling to accept the criticism that they]

party hosted by Liu Xiao25 on the 17th (of practiced big-power politics (in resolving 3. Report, "My Observations on the So- January], Khrushchev again raised the Stalin the Polish crisis). This kind of attitude does viet Union,” Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong issue. Spelling out a good deal of inappro- not help at all to convince the Polish comand the Central Leadership, 24 January priate words, however, he made no self- rades. 1957 (Excerpt)24

criticism. We then pushed him by pointing It is safe to say that although every Source: Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de out that, given the development of Stalin's public communiqué [between the Soviet zhuoyue fengxian (Remarkable Achieve- authoritarianism, ossified way of thinking, Union and) other brotherly states has repeatments and Contributions of Zhou Enlai] and arrogant and conceited attitude over edly mentioned what the 30 October (1956) (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, twenty years, how can those comrades, es- declaration 28 has announced as the prin1993), 302-305

pecially those [Soviet] Politburo members, ciples to guide the relationship among broth

who had worked with Stalin, decline to as- erly parties and governments, [the Soviets] Having already spoken considerably sume any responsibility? They then admit- seem to recoil in fear when dealing with about the achievements of the Soviet Com- ted that Stalin's errors came about gradu- specific issues and tend to be inured to munist leadership in public, now let (me) ally; had they not been afraid of getting

ally; had they not been afraid of getting patronizing others and interfering with other illustrate again the major mistakes it has killed, they could have at least done more to

killed, they could have at least done more to brotherly parties and governments’ internal made:

restrict the growth of Stalin's mistakes than affairs.

(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Fac- the union among the Soviet Union, China for us not to persuade them to make changes); ing a (common) grave enemy, the Soviet and India, as well as (about) possible Sino- it is, however, equally inadvisable for us to comrades have ardent expectations about Soviet collaboration on the production of be impatient in changing them. Therefore, Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opin- atomic and hydrogen bombs. We regarded changes on their part can only be achieved ion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly these statements as swashbuckling, which is through a well-planned, step-by-step, perconvinced by our argument; nor have the not good, and they were finally deleted from sistent, patient, long-term persuasion. differences between us disappeared com- the communiqué. As a result, we did not use pletely. For instance, many leaders of the the Soviet draft. The published communiqué Part II. Disputes over Long-wave Radio Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised was largely based on our draft.

Stations and the Joint Submarine our article “Another Comment on the His- (4) In spite of all of the above, however,

Flotilla torical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictator- Sino-Soviet relations are far better now than ship."29 Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, during Stalin's era. First of all, facing the 4. Report, Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have [common) grave enemy, both sides have and the CCP Central Committee, 5 June never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, realized and accepted the necessity of pro- 1958 (Excerpt)30 when we discussed with them the part of the moting Sino-Soviet unity and mutual sup- Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 634 article concerning criticism of Stalin, they port, which had been taken as the most imsaid that this was what made them dis- portant principle. Second, now the Soviet With regard to Soviet Union's request for pleased (or put them in a difficult position, Union and China can sit down to discuss

Union and China can sit down to discuss establishing long-wave radio stations in our I can't remember the exact words). issues equally. Even if they have different country, the Soviet side insists on the origiTherefore, I believe that some of the Soviet ideas on certain issues, they must consult nal idea that the construction should be jointly leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude with us. The articles by the Chinese Party are invested by the two sides. They also propose toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, having some impact on the cadres and people to dispatch experts to China in early June to at the last day's meeting, I decided not to in the Soviet Union, and even on some [So- conduct such activities as selecting the proper raise our requests concerning the abolition viet) leaders. Third, the previous dull situa- location, making investigations and preparof the long-term supply and purchase con- tion in which the brotherly parties and states ing for the design work, and drafting an tracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] could hardly discuss or argue with one an- agreement. It seems that the Soviet side will experts, and (Soviet) aid and [Sino-Soviet) other no longer exists. Now, different opin- not quickly accept the opinion of our side. In collaboration on nuclear energy and missile ions can be freely exchanged so that unity order not to hinder the investigation and development. About these issues I didn't and progress are thereby promoted. Fourth, design work, [we) may permit the Soviet say a word. It was not because there wasn't the majority of the Soviet people love China experts to come to China to conduct some enough time to do so, but because I wanted and feel happy for the Chinese people's technical work, leaving the question conto] avoid impressing upon them that we achievements and growth in strength. Their cerning investment and operation to be solved were taking advantage of their precarious admiration and friendship with the Chinese as the next step. position by raising these issues. These people are being enhanced on a daily basis. issues can be raised later or simply dropped. However, while (Russian) arrogance and self- 5. Remarks, Mao Zedong, concerning the

(3) In assessing the international situa- importance have not been completely elimi- Soviet Request on Establishing a Special tion, I am convinced that they spend more nated, an atmosphere lacking discipline and Long-wave Radio Station in China, 7 June time and effort on coping with specific and order is spreading. This time the [Soviet 195831 isolated events than on evaluating and an- leadership) gave us a splendid and grand Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 316ticipating the situations thoroughly from reception which indicated its intention to 317 different angles. They explicitly demon- build a good image in front of its own people strate weakness in considering and discuss- and the peoples all over the world. Fifth, on For the eyes of Liu (Shaoqi), Lin Biao, ing strategic and long-term issues. As far as the one hand, extremely conceited, blinded (Deng] Xiaoping, Zhou (Enlai), Zhu (De), tactics are concerned, on the other hand, by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and Chen [Yun), Peng Zhen, and Chen Yionly;32 lacking clearly defined principles, they tend knowing little the ways of the world, some of return to Comrade Peng Dehuai for file: to be on such a loose ground in handling their leaders have hardly improved them

I specific affairs that they will fail to reach selves even with the several rebuffs they This can be implemented as (you have) satisfactorily the strategic goals through re- have met in the past year. On the other hand, planned. China must come up with the solving each specific conflict. As a result, it however, they appear to lack confidence and money to pay for [the financial cost) which is very likely that some worrisome events suffer from inner fears and thus tend to cannot be covered by the Soviet side. may occur in international affairs. For in- employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in stance, this time they conceded to our con- handling foreign affairs or relations with Mao Zedong viction that in today's world there existed other brotherly parties. Although they did two camps and three forces (socialist, impe- sometimes speak from the bottom of their 7 June rialist, and nationalist) and agreed to our hearts while talking with us, they neverthe- If they try to put heavy pressure on us, analysis. But the communiqué drafted by less could not get down from their high (we] shall not respond and shall let it drag on them included only vague statements about horse. In short, it is absolutely inadvisable for a while, or (we) may respond after the

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central leadership discusses it. This issue obtain (them) simply by sending a cable (to tion. You (Russians) have often stated that must be settled through an agreement be- Moscow).

the Europeans looked down upon the Rustween the two governments.

Well, your navy's nuclear submarines sians. I believe that some Russians look Peng (Dehuai) ought to pay attention to are of a stop] secret advanced technology. down upon the Chinese people. the section about the conversation where The Chinese people are careless in handling At the most critical juncture (of the Mao has added some comments.

things. If we are provided with them, we Chinese revolution), Stalin did not allow us II might put you to trouble.

to carry out our revolution and opposed our China must shoulder the responsibility The Soviet comrades have won victory carrying out the revolution. He made a huge of capital investment for this radio station; for forty years, and are thus rich in experi- mistake on this issue. So did (Grigory Y.] China is duty-bound in this case. (We) may ence. It has only been eight years since our Zinoviev. have to ask for Soviet comrades' help with victory and we have little experience. You Neither were we pleased with [Anastas] regard to construction and equipment, but therefore raised the question of joint owner- Mikoyan. He flaunted his seniority and all the costs must be priced and paid in cash ship and operation. The issue of ownership treated us as if we were] his sons. He put on by us. (We) may share its use after it is has long before been dealt with: Lenin pro- airs and looked very arrogant. He assumed constructed, which ought to be determined posed the system of rent and lease which, the greatest airs when he first visited Xibaipo by an agreement between the two govern- however, was targeted at the capitalists. in 194938 and has been like that every time ments. 33 This is China's position, not purely China has some remnant capitalists, but he came to China. Every time he came, he the position of mine 34

the state is under the leadership of the Com- would urge me to visit Moscow. I asked him

munist Party. You never trust the Chinese! what for. He would then say that there was 6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao You only trust the Russians! [To you] the always something for you to do there. NevZedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July Russians are the first-class (people) whereas ertheless, only until later when Comrade 195835

the Chinese are among the inferior who are Khrushchev proposed to hold a conference Source: Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 322- dumb and careless. Therefore (you] came to work out a resolution [concerning the 333

up with the joint ownership and operation relationship among all the communist par

proposition. Well, if (you) want joint own- ties and socialist states) did [I go to MosAfter you left yesterday I could not fall ership and operation, how about have them cow].39 asleep, nor did I have dinner. Today I invite all—let us turn into joint ownership and It was our common duty to commemoyou over to talk a bit more so that you can be operation our army, navy, air force, indus- rate the fortieth anniversary of the October (my) doctor: (after talking with you), I might try, agriculture, culture, education. Can we Revolution. Up to that time, as I often be able to eat and sleep this afternoon. You do this? Or, (you) may have all of China's pointed out, there had existed no such thing are fortunate to have little difficulty in eating more than ten thousand kilometers of coast- as brotherly relations among all the parties and sleeping.

line and let us only maintain a guerrilla because, (your leaders) merely paid lip serLet us return to the main subject and force. With a few atomic bombs, you think vice and never meant it; as a result, the chat about the issues we discussed yester- you are in a position to control us through relations between the brotherly) parties can day. We will only talk about these issues asking for the right of rent and lease. Other be described as between father and son or here in this room! There exists no crisis than this, what else [do you have) to justify between cats and mice. I have raised this situation between you and me. Our relation- (your request]?

issue in my private meetings with ship can be described as: nine out of ten Lüshun [Port Arthur) and Dalian Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades. fingers of yours and ours are quite the same [Darinse) were under your control before. They all admitted that such a father-son with only one finger differing. I have re- You departed from these places later. Why relationship was not of European but Asian peated this point two or three times. You (were these places) under your control? It is style. Present were Bulganin, Mikoyan, and haven't forgotten, have you?

because then China was under the [M. A.) Suslov. Were you also at the meetI've thought over and again of the issues Guomindang's rule. Why did you volunteer ing? From the Chinese side, I and Deng that were discussed yesterday. It is likely to leave? It is because the Communist Party Xiaoping were present. that I might have misunderstood you, but it had taken control of China.

I was unhappy with Mikoyan's conis also possible that I was right. We may Because of Stalin's pressure, the North- gratulation speech which he delivered at our work out a solution after discussion or de- east and Xinjiang became [a Soviet) sphere Eighth National Congress and I deliberately bate. It appears that (we) will have to with- of influence, and four jointly owned and refused to attend that day's meeting as a draw (our) navy's request for (obtaining] operated enterprises were established. 37 protest. You did not know that many of our nuclear-powered submarines [from the So- Comrade Khrushchev later proposed to have deputies were not happy with [Mikoyan's viet Union). Barely remembering this mat- these (settlements) eliminated, and we were speech). Acting as if he was the father, he ter, I have acquired some information about grateful for that.

regarded China as Russia's son. it only after asking others.36 There are some You (Russians) have never had faith in China has her own revolutionary tradiwarmhearted people at our navy's head- the Chinese people, and Stalin was among tions, although China's revolution could not quarters, namely, the Soviet advisers. They the worst. The Chinese (Communists) were have succeeded without the October Revoasserted that, now that the Soviet nuclear regarded as Tito the Second; [the Chinese lution, nor without Marxism-Leninism. submarines have been developed, we can people) were considered as a backward na- We must learn from the Soviet experi

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