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ences. We will comply with the commonly but it was mainly Stalin's responsibility. For God's sake, we fought wars for twentyaccepted principles, especially the nine prin- [We] have had three grievances (against two years; we fought in Korea for three ciples stated in the "Moscow Manifesto."40 Stalin). The first concerns the two Wang years! Let (me ask] the Central Military We ought to learn from all the experiences Ming lines. Wang Ming was Stalin's fol- Commission to prepare some materials conwhether they are correct or erroneous. The lower. The second was (Stalin's) discour- cerning (our war experiences) and give them erroneous lessons included Stalin's meta- agement of and opposition to our revolution. to Comrade Yudin, of course, if he is interphysics and dogmatism. He was not totally Even after the dissolution of the Third Inter- ested. metaphysical because he had acquired some national, he still issued orders claiming that, We did not speak out on some (controdialectics in thinking; but a large part of his if we did not strike a peace deal with Jiang versial] issues because we did not want to (thoughts) focused on metaphysics. What Jieshi, China would risk a grave danger of cause problems in the Sino-Soviet relations. you termed as the cult of personality was national elimination.42 Well, for whatever This was particularly true when the Polish one (example of his metaphysics). Stalin reason, we are not eliminated. The third was Incident broke out. When Poland demanded loved to assume the greatest airs.

during my first visit to Moscow during which that all of your specialists go home, ComAlthough we support the Soviet Union, Stalin, (V.M.]Molotov, and [Lavrenti]Beria rade Liu Shaoqi suggested in Moscow that we won't endorse its mistakes. As for the personally attacked me.

you withdraw some. You accepted [Liu's] differences over) the issue of peaceful evo- Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar [to suggestion which made the Polish people lution, we have never openly discussed [these China) to read my works?43 Was it because happy because they then tasted some freedifferences), nor have we published [them] Iso lacked confidence that I would even have dom. At that time we did not raise our in the newspapers. Cautious as we have to have you read my works? Or was it problems with your specialists [in China) been, we choose to exchange different opin- because I had nothing to do myself? Not a because, we believe, it would have caused ions internally. I had discussed them with chance! [My real intention) was to get you you to be suspicious that we took the advanyou before I went to Moscow. While in over to China to see with your own eyes tage (of your crisis situation) to send all the Moscow, (we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to whether China was truly practicing Marxism specialists home. We will not send your raise five (controversial] issues. We won't or only half-hearted toward Marxism. specialists home; we will not do so even if openly talk about them even in the future, Upon your return (to Moscow]you spoke Poland does so ten more times. We need because our doing so would hurt Comrade highly of us. Your first comment to Stalin Soviet aid. Khrushchev's (political position). In order was "the Chinese (comrades) are truly Marx- Once I have persuaded the Polish people to help consolidate his [Khrushchev's] lead- ists.” Nevertheless Stalin remained doubt- that (we all) should learn from the Soviet ership, we decided not to talk about these ful. Only when (we entered) the Korean War Union, and that after putting the anti-dog(controversies), although it does not mean did he change his view (about us), and so did matism campaign at rest, [they] ought to that the justice is not on our side.

East European and other brotherly parties advocate a “learn from the Soviet Union” With regard to inter-governmental re- drop their doubts [about us).

slogan. Who will benefit in learning from lations, we remain united and unified up to It appears that there are reasons for us to the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union or this date which even our adversaries have be suspect: “First, you opposed Wang Ming; Poland? Of course, it will benefit Poland conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that second, you simply insisted on carrying out more. is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have your revolution regardless of (our) opposi- Although we shall learn from the Soviet objected to all the major criticism that the tion; third, you looked so smart when you Union, we must first of all take into account revisionists and imperialists have massed went all the way to Moscow desiring Stalin our own experiences and mainly rely on our against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union to sign an agreement so that (China) would own experiences. has so far done the same thing (for us). regain authority over the [Manchurian] rail- There should be some agreed limits on

When did the Soviets begin to trust us road." In Moscow it was [I. V.] Kovalev who the terms of (Soviet) specialists. For inChinese? At the time when (we) entered the took care of me with [N.T.) Fedorenko as my stance, there have never been restrictions on Korean War. From then on, the two coun- interpreter. 44 I got so angry that I once your chief advisers in (our) military and tries got closer to one another (than before] pounded on the table. I only had three tasks public security branches, who can come and and as a result, the 156 aid projects came here (in Moscow), I said to them, the first was go without even notifying or consulting with about. When Stalin was alive, the Soviet] to eat, the second was to sleep, and the third us in advance. Presumably, if you leave aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade was to shit.

your post, is it all right that another ambasKhrushchev later added a few more.41

There was a [Soviet) adviser in (our sador be sent (to China) without discussing We have held no secrets from you. military academy who, in discussing war it with us? No, absolutely not! How much Because more than one thousand of your cases, would only allow (the Chinese train- information could your advisers to our minexperts are working in our country, you are ees) to talk about those of the Soviet Union, istry of public security obtain if they merely fully aware of the state of our military, not China's, would only allow them to talk sit there totally uninformed by their Chinese political, economic, and cultural affairs. We about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army, colleagues? trust your people, because you are from a not (ours) in the Korean War.

Let me advise you (and your specialsocialist country, and you are sons and Please allow us to talk about these cases! ists) to pay more visits to each of our provdaughters of Lenin.

(Can you imagine] he wouldn't even allow inces so as to get in touch with the people and Problems have existed in our relations, us to talk about our own war experiences)! obtain first-hand information. This have I

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mentioned to Comrade Yudin many times: Indeed, it was (your) proposition for

this regard. if not ten thousand times, at least one thou- establishing a “cooperative" on nuclear sub- Certainly [the arrangements) will be sand times!

marines which led to these remarks. Now totally different in war time. Your army can With some exceptions, though, most of that we've decided not to build our nuclear operate in our [land), and our army can move the (Soviet] specialists are of a good quality. submarines, we are withdrawing our request to your places to fight. If your army operates We have also made mistakes before: we did [for obtaining submarines from the Soviet on our territory, however, it must be comnot take the initiative to pass on information Union). Otherwise, we would have to let manded by us. When our army fights in your to the Soviet comrades. Now we must cor- you have the entire coast, much larger areas land, as long as it does not outnumber your rect these mistakes by adopting a more ac- than (what you used to control in) Lushun army, it has to be directed by you. tive attitude [toward the Soviet comrades). and Dalian. Either way, however, we will These remarks of mine may not sound Next time (we) ought to introduce to them not get mixed up with you: we must be so pleasing to your ear. You may accuse me China's general line. If the first time (we] independent from one another. Since we of being an nationalist or another Tito. My fail to get the information through, [we) will will in the end build our own flotilla, it is not counter argument is that you have extended try a second time, third time, and so forth. in our interest that (we) play a minor role in Russian nationalism to China's coast.


MAO ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: viet treaty of 1950—the very text on which printed below) is as difficult to interpret for Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador the relationship between the two Commu- historians today as it must have been for nist states was built.

Moscow Center 35 years ago. 1960 was the Introduction by Odd Arne Westad

To Mao, more than to most CCP lead- year when the Sino-Soviet split broke into

ers, Khrushchev's speech was a golden op- the open, first with newspaper polemics in Soviet Ambassador to the People's Re- portunity not only to restate China's past and the spring, and then the recall of all Soviet public of China Pavel Yudin's two conver- present relationship with the Soviet Union,

present relationship with the Soviet Union, advisory personnel from China in July. sations with Mao on 31 March (printed be- but also to sanction his and the party's turn Meetings between the two sides had been low) and 2 May 19561, form some of the best to more radical policies since the start of

to more radical policies since the start of increasingly frosty, even if the compromises evidence we have on the Chairman's reac- 1955. These policies, including the sweep- reached on some issues during the meeting tion to Khrushchev's secret speech at the ing collectivization of agriculture which had

ing collectivization of agriculture which had of Communist parties in Moscow in the fall February 1956 CPSU 20th Congress. The just been completed (of which the Soviets momentarily reduced the intensity of the conversations provide a fascinating insight had been rather critical) and the further steps confrontation. into how Mao Zedong manipulated history in speeding up the revolutionary process Mao had not met Chervonenko earlier and the myth of his own role in the Chinese which Mao contemplated (fueled in part by

which Mao contemplated (fueled in part by in the year, but in this meeting he seemed to Communist Party (CCP). They also show a nascent concern about the lack of revolu- be eager to depreciate his own role in Chithat Mao's concrete views on the “Stalin tionary fervor within the CCP), could now nese policymaking, and thereby in the eissue" in the spring of 1956 were much be advanced without too much interference

be advanced without too much interference sponsibility for the split. Granted, Ma's different from those to which the Chinese from Moscow. Since the CPSU had, in

from Moscow. Since the CPSU had, in description of his political status is not in party later subscribed.

effect, repudiated much of its own past, it tally inaccurate; in the wake of his disastrous In his long monologues to Yudin—with could no longer insist on having a monopoly

could no longer insist on having a monopoly economic experiments in the late 1950s, hu whom he was on personally friendly terms on theoretical guidance. Mao could—in a had not of his own free will taken less Mao gave vent to three decades of frustra- dual sense—liberate himself from Stalin's

dual sense—liberate himself from Stalin's part in day-to-day governance than before. tions with Stalin's China policy-frustra- ghost.

But here he overstated his case and he did so tions which up to 1956 he could neither It was not until, first, half a year later, to the Soviet ambassador. In addition, when present fully to the Soviets nor share openly after the Polish and Hungarian events in

after the Polish and Hungarian events in it came to the Sino-Soviet conflict, we know with his Chinese colleagues. In terms of October-November 1956, that Mao's con- that Mao had been fully in charge, evin CCP history, Mao's spring 1956 version cern with the political effects of de- during this period. was not radically different from what had Stalinization came to the fore. The disinte- So what was Mao's purpose? To bebeen dogmatically accepted in the party since gration of Communist authority in Eastern have civilly to a well-wisher bringing birth1945, with the major exception that Stalin's Europe frightened the Chinese leaders and day greetings? To give away as little as role had been filled in. In this version, the compelled them to adopt a much more cau- possible about how he really felt about Sinomajor “mistakes” which almost destroyed tious attitude to the "Stalin issue," including Soviet relations? Or to position himself so the party before Mao took the helm were an indirect criticism of the Soviets for hav- that in case his game with real or perceived ascribed not only to the CCP leaders who ing gone too far in their revision of the enemies within his own party went against implemented the policies (Li Lisan, Wang Communist past. (For revealing insights him, he could still play the “Soviet card” to Ming and others), but to Stalin, who had into the causes of Mao's change of heart, see strengthen his hand? As of yet, we still do inspired and abetted "the mistakes.” Like- Bo Yibo's and Wu Lengxi's recent mem- not know. wise, the resistance to Mao's "correct” lead- oirs.)

Translations of the two documents folership since the late 1930s could again be Mao's conversation with the somewhat low below: traced back to Stalin's errors, which even startled Soviet ambassador S.V.

continued on page 164 influenced the negotiating of the Sino-So- Chervonenko on 26 December 1960 (also

It was Comrade Khrushchev who had military codes were basically to guide opera- encounter considerable problems; the same eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before tions on flatlands, and as Fujian (province] is true with us: if you undermine our (politihis death, Stalin demanded the right to build had nothing but mountains, the Soviet codes cal] positions, we will be in trouble. a plant to manufacture canned food in our were not entirely applicable [to Fujian's re- In wartime, you can utilize all our naval country. My response was that (we) would ality). Very upset at hearing this, ports, military bases, and other [facilities). accept (the demand) as long as you provide Petroshevskii immediately responded: “You [In return) Our (military] can operate in your us equipment, help us build it, and import all have insulted the great military science in- places including your port or bases at the products (from us]. Comrade vented by the great Stalin!" His remarks Vladivostok and shall return home when Khrushchev praised me for giving (Stalin) a made everyone at the meeting very nervous.) war is over. We may sign an agreement on good answer. But why in the world do (you Some of the above-mentioned (contro- wartime cooperation in advance which does Russians) want to build a naval “coopera- versial] issues have been raised [by us] be- not have to wait until war breaks out. Such tive" now? How would you explain to the fore, some have not. You have greatly aided an agreement must contain a stipulation that rest of the world that you propose to build a us but now we are downplaying your [role]; our [forces) can operate on your territory; naval "cooperative"? How would you ex- you may feel very bad about it. Our relation- even if we might not do so, such a stipulation plain to the Chinese people? For the sake of ship, however, resembles that between pro- is required, because it involves the issue of struggling against the imperialists, you may, fessor and student: the professor may make equality. In peacetime, however, such an as advisers, train the Chinese people. Oth- mistakes, do not you agree that the student arrangement cannot be accepted. In peaceerwise, you would have to lease Lüshun and has to point them out? Pointing out mistakes time, you are only to help us construct (miliother (ports) for ninety-nine years, but your does not mean that the (student) will drive tary) bases and build armed forces. "cooperative” proposal involves the ques- the professor out. After all the professor is a We would not have accepted (your) tion of ownership, as you propose that each good one.

proposition for building a naval “cooperaside will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday You are assisting us to build a navy! tive” even it had been during Stalin's time. I you made me so enraged that I could not Your (people) can serve as advisers. Why quarreled with him in Moscow! sleep at all last night. They (pointing at would you have to have fifty percent of the Comrade Khrushchev has established other CCP leaders present) are not angry. ownership? This is a political issue. We plan his credibility by having the (previous] “coOnly me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my to build two or three hundred submarines of operative" projects eliminated. Now that sole responsibility. this kind.

such an issue involving ownership is raised (Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unani- If you insist on attaching political condi- again, we are reminded of Stalin's positions. mously agreed upon these points.)

tions (to our submarine request), we will not I might be mistaken, but I must express my If we fail to get our messages through satisfy you at all, not even give you a tiny opinion. this time, we may have to arrange another (piece of our] finger. You may inform Com- You explained (to me) yesterday that meeting; if not, we may have to meet every rade Khrushchev that, if [he] still [insists on] [your proposition) was based on the considday. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to these conditions, there is no point for us to eration that (Russia's coastal] conditions Comrade Khrushchev; or we can invite Com- talk about this issue. If he accepts our re- were not as good for nuclear submarines to rade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to quirement, he may come [to Beijing]; if notfunction fully as China's, thus hamstringing clarify every issue.

he does not have to come, because there is future development of nuclear submarines. (Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet De- nothing for us to talk about. Even one tiny You can reach (the Pacific) Ocean from fense Minister Malinovsky cabled me re- condition is unacceptable (for us]!

Vladivostok through the Kurile Islands. The questing to build a long-wave radio station When this issue is involved, we will condition is very good! along China's coast to direct the [Soviet] refuse to accept your aid for ten thousand What you said (yesterday) made me submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As years. However, it is still possible for us to very uneasy and displeased. Please report the project will cost a total of 110 million cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 mil- that we would break up. We will, from you must tell him exactly what I have said lion and China will pay 40 million.)45 beginning to the end, support the Soviet without any polishing so as to make him

This request is of the same nature as the Union, although we may quarrel with each uneasy. He has criticized Stalin's (policy) naval “cooperative” proposal which (we) other inside the house.

lines but now adopts the same policies as cannot explain to the people. (We) will be While I was in Moscow, I once made it Stalin did. put in a politically disadvantageous position clear to Comrade Khrushchev that you did We will still have controversies. You if (we) reveal these requests to the world. not have to satisfy every one of our requests. do not endorse some of our positions; we

(Peng Dehuai: Petroshevskii (a Soviet Because if you hold back your aid from us, cannot accept some of your policies. For military adviser] also has a rude attitude and (you) in effect would compel us to work instance, your [leadership) is not pleased at rough style. He is not very pleased because harder (to be self-reliant); should we get our policy regarding "internal contradicsome of our principles for army building do everything from you, we will end up in an tions among the people,” and the policy of not completely follow the Soviet military disadvantageous position.

"letting a hundred flowers bloom and a huncodes. Once at an enlarged CMC meeting, It is, however, extremely important for dred schools of thought contend.” when Comrade Ye Fei from the Fujian Mili- us to cooperate politically. Because, if we Stalin endorsed the Wang Ming line, tary District46 pointed out that, as the Soviet undermine your political positions, you will causing the losses of our revolutionary strength up to more than ninety percent. At him try his method! As a result, his trial fered severe flood this year thus encounterthe critical junctures (of our revolution), he achieved a remarkable success which has ing a shortage of material supplies, however, wanted to hold us back and opposed our become a first-rate, world-class scientific [we) have to reallocate materials that have revolution. Even after we achieved vic- invention.

originally been designated for export so as to tory, he remained doubtful about us. At the I have never met with Comrade Xining, meet the needs of our domestic supply and, same time, he boasted that it was because of but I have talked to many cadres who partici- therefore, to reduce our export for next year. the direction of his theories that China's pated in the construction of the Yangtze In order to maintain the balance between our [revolution) succeeded. (We) must do away Bridge. They all told me that Comrade import and export for the year of 1957, we with any superstition about him. Before I Xining was a very good comrade because he have no other alternatives but to reduce die, I am prepared to write an article on what took part in every part of the work, adopted purchases of foreign goods. As we have Stalin had done to China, which is to be a very pleasant working style, and worked calculated, however, we cannot afford to cut published in one thousand years.

very closely with the Chinese comrades. down such items as complete sets of equip(Yudin: The Soviet central leadership's When the bridge was built, the Chinese ment and general trade items so as to avoid attitude toward the policies of the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from casting an adverse effect on the ongoing central leadership is: it is completely up to him). Any of you who knows him person- capital construction. Therefore, we have the Chinese comrades how to resolve the ally please convey my regards to him. decided that our original order worth 890 Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese Please do not create any tensions among million rubles of materials from the USSR comrades who understand the situation best. the specialists regarding the relations be- for 1957 be reduced to that of 426 million Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and tween our two parties and two countries. I rubles. arrogant to judge and assess whether or not never advocate that. Our cooperation has We understand that our reduction of the CCP's policies are correct, for the CCP covered a large ground and is by far very purchase orders of Soviet military materials is a great party.)

satisfactory. You ought to make this point will cause the Soviet Government some probWell, (we) can only say that we have clear to your embassy staff members and lems. But (our request for the change) is an been basically correct. I myself have com- your experts so that they will not panic when act against our will. [We) wish that the mitted errors before. Because of my mis- they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criti- Soviet Government will accept our request. takes, [we) had suffered setbacks, of which cized (Soviet leaders).

Provided that you accept our request, we examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and I have long before wanted to talk about will dispatch Tang Tianji,49 our representatwo other campaigns.47 I will be very con- some of these issues. However, it has not tive with full authority in military material tent if I am refuted as being basically correct, been appropriate to talk about them because orders, to Moscow for the purpose of conbecause such an assessment is close to real- the incidents in Poland and Hungary put ducting negotiations with the Soviet Minisity.

your [leadership) in political trouble. For try of Foreign Trade. We will also submit a Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will instance, we then did not feel it right to talk detailed list of orders which are reduced and be built is a policy issue: only China is in a about the problem concerning the experts [in verified to the Soviet Economic Office to position to decide whether we should build China).

China soon. We look forward to hearing it with your assistance or it should be “jointly Even Stalin did improve himself: he let owned." Comrade Khrushchev ought to China and the Soviet Union sign the fallicome to China (to discuss this issue) because ance) treaty, supported (us) during the Ko- 8. Memo, PRC Foreign Ministry to the I have already visited him (in Moscow). rean War, and provided (us) with a total of USSR Embassy to Beijing, 13 March 1957

[We) should by no means have blind 141 aid projects. Certainly these achieve- Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, faith in [authorities). For instance, one of ments did not belong to him but to the entire delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, your specialists asserted on the basis of a Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we Moscow book written by one (of your) academy schol- do not want to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes. ars that our coal from Shanxi (province]

The Chinese Government asserts that, cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an Part III. China's Request for Soviet although generally acceptable, the draft paassertion has despaired us: we therefore Military and Material Support48 per on a review of Far Eastern economic would have no coal which can be turned into

development, compiled by the Soviet) Far coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit! 7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. East Economic Committee has made sevComrade Xining (transliteration), a So- Bulganin, 12 December 1956

eral errors on China's economic developviet specialist who helped us build the Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, ment. Yangtze River Bridge (in Wuhan), is a very delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, (1) The sentence that “[China's) agrargood comrade. His bridge-building method Moscow

ian collectivization has encountered peashas never been utilized in your country:

ants' opposition," under the section of (you) never allowed him to try his method, On 30 April 1956, our government pro- "Speedy Advance toward Socialism” (page either to build a big or medium or even small posed to the USSR that [China] would order 1), does not correspond with reality. The sized bridge. When he came here, however, a total of 890 million rubles worth of mili- speed of our country's agricultural collechis explanation of his method sounded all tary supplies (from the USSR) for the year of tivization, which has been fully explained right. Since we knew little about it, (we) let 1957. As large areas (of China] have suf- by Liu Shaoqi in his report to the (National]

from you.

People's Congress, completely refutes such year plan only includes the main part of amount of technical experts and aides; an assertion. In discussing (China's) price economic and cultural Centertaining and edu- (5) invite and dispatch on a reciprocal problem, the draft paper deliberately dis- cational] construction, whereas the total of basis experts and delegations for the purpose torts and obliterates our basic achievements (China's) capital construction during 1953- of on-site inspection, participation in conwhich are clearly presented in Li 1956 covers much wider grounds.

ferences, delivery of research reports, and Xiannian’sso report (to the People's Con- 4. The session on "Development Plans" short-term internships; gress), and instead, exaggerates our isolated notes that the Second Five-Year Plan origi- (6) establish frequent contacts on scienweakness and mistakes. Given this fact, nally set 98.3% as the soverall] increase tific research and production conditions in therefore, the paper could not help but draw objective, but Premier Zhou (Enlai] in his [each side's) national defense industry; erroneous conclusions (page 20).

report on the Second Five-Year Plan reduces (7) discuss the exchange and provision (2) The draft paper has also made errors this objective to 90.3% (page 23). There is of teaching guides, textbooks, or other matemerely by comparing our published statis- indeed no reduction of the original increase rials on national defense industry training, tics which are, indeed, to serve different objective. Because the former (figure] ex- or materials necessary to enhance national purposes. There are several such errors: cludes the outputs of individual production defense industry personnel's techniques and

1. The section titled "Speedy Advance whereas the latter includes the outputs of skills; toward Socialism” mentions that “[China individual production, thus becoming 90.3%. (8) exchange lessons and experiences plans to raise the percentage of handicrafts Since there are detailed explanations and of employing new machinery, new facili(as an industry) in the nation's GNP up to illustrations as to exactly what the above ties, and new technology as well as new 15.3% in 1956, whereas the First Five-Year mentioned figures cover when these reports applications of research results to weaponry Plan has originally planned to have the are publicized, there exists no excuse why production; handicrafts) reach 9.4% in 1957" (page 4). such errors have been committed. Other than (9) study the issue of warranties for In actuality, the former (figure) refers to a the above listed mistakes, (the draft paper] technical materiel (one side) provides (the combined output of “handicrafts factories” still contains minor errors which are of no other side) for production; and “handicrafts individuals" while the later significant concern (of ours).

(10) discuss other issues concerning [figure] only reflects the percentage of

national defense industry that both sides "handicrafts individuals' outputs" in GNP. 9. Memo, Embassy of the PRC in Moscow

deem necessary. 2. The section on “National Income and to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 Decem- During the period when the joint comCapital Accumulation" asserts that “[China) ber 1957

mission adjourns, the Chinese Government in one way or another exaggerates its (per Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, will authorize the Second Machinery Miniscapita) increase, given the [Chinese) statis- delo Russian Foreign Ministry archives, try and the Commercial Office of the PRC tics on the nation's per capita increase from Moscow

embassy [in Moscow] to take charge of 1953 to 1956, that is, 1953, 127 yuan, 1954,

communications and contacts regarding rou137 yuan, 1955, 141 yuan, 1956, 154 yuan. In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet coop- tine affairs and issues of national defense This is because, according to Liu Shaoqi's eration and close links regarding national industry. Whichever agency (of the Soviet report, the increase of industrial production defense industry, the Chinese Government side) will be in charge (during this period) is during 1953-1956 is no higher than 90.3%, proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commis- left to the Soviet Government to decide. whereas the above listed figures seem to sion in charge of national defense industry be Before every meeting of the joint comassume that the increase would be 104%" established which, consisting of several del- mission, each side is to provide the other side (page 5). The 90.3% increase mentioned in egates from each side, is to meet once or with a memorandum containing the agenda Liu Shaoqi's report covers all industrial twice annually.

[and] schedule as well as supplementary increase including modern [heavy) and fac- The joint commission's major responsi- materials. tory industries, and individual production, bilities include:

All minutes and records of the joint while Bo Yibo'sS1 reported 104% increase (1) exchange published and unpublished commission's meetings are to be prepared only refers to the increase of production by books, journals, handbooks, directories, tech- respectively in Chinese and Russian lanmodern [heavy) and factory [machinery] nical criteria, or other materials both sides guages and co-signed by the representatives industries. deem appropriate;

of each side's delegation to the joint com3. The section on “National Income and (2) discuss such issues as standardiza- mission. Capital Accumulation” also points out that tion of weaponry, technical conditions, speci- All results of the joint commission's the total of (China's) capital construction fications, and national criteria, and com- discussions are to be references for each during 1953-1956 exceeds the five-year monly acceptable differences of weaponry Government which, if deemed necessary, budget's 42.74 billion yuan by 1%, but State production;

will authorize certain agencies for their implePlanning Commission Chairman Li (3) discuss standardization of (techni- mentation. Fuchun's52 report (to the People's Con- cal] specifications, and provide (each other] All costs of organizing the joint gress) only states that (China) will by 1956 with standard products and measuring appa- commission's meetings will be charged to complete up to 87.6% of the planned capital ratus;

the Government where the meeting is held, construction (page 7). In fact, the amount of (4) discuss invitation and engagement, whereas each Government will be responcapital construction as designed by the five- including procedures, terms limits, and sible for expenditures of its own delegation

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