網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

strength up to more than ninety percent. At the critical junctures [of our revolution], he wanted to hold us back and opposed our revolution. Even after [we] achieved victory, he remained doubtful about us. At the same time, he boasted that it was because of the direction of his theories that China's [revolution] succeeded. [We] must do away with any superstition about him. Before I die, I am prepared to write an article on what Stalin had done to China, which is to be published in one thousand years.

(Yudin: The Soviet central leadership's attitude toward the policies of the Chinese central leadership is: it is completely up to the Chinese comrades how to resolve the Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese comrades who understand the situation best. Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and arrogant to judge and assess whether or not the CCP's policies are correct, for the CCP is a great party.)

Well, [we] can only say that we have been basically correct. I myself have committed errors before. Because of my mistakes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and two other campaigns.47 I will be very content if I am refuted as being basically correct, because such an assessment is close to reality.

Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will be built is a policy issue: only China is in a position to decide whether we should build it with your assistance or it should be "jointly owned." Comrade Khrushchev ought to come to China [to discuss this issue] because I have already visited him [in Moscow].

[We] should by no means have blind faith in [authorities]. For instance, one of your specialists asserted on the basis of a book written by one [of your] academy scholars that our coal from Shanxi [province] cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an assertion has despaired us: we therefore would have no coal which can be turned into coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit!

Comrade Xining [transliteration], a Soviet specialist who helped us build the Yangtze River Bridge [in Wuhan], is a very good comrade. His bridge-building method has never been utilized in your country: [you] never allowed him to try his method, either to build a big or medium or even small sized bridge. When he came here, however, his explanation of his method sounded all right. Since we knew little about it, [we] let

him try his method! As a result, his trial achieved a remarkable success which has become a first-rate, world-class scientific invention.

I have never met with Comrade Xining, but I have talked to many cadres who participated in the construction of the Yangtze Bridge. They all told me that Comrade Xining was a very good comrade because he took part in every part of the work, adopted a very pleasant working style, and worked very closely with the Chinese comrades. When the bridge was built, the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from him]. Any of you who knows him personally please convey my regards to him.

Please do not create any tensions among the specialists regarding the relations between our two parties and two countries. I never advocate that. Our cooperation has covered a large ground and is by far very satisfactory. You ought to make this point clear to your embassy staff members and your experts so that they will not panic when they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criticized [Soviet leaders].

I have long before wanted to talk about some of these issues. However, it has not been appropriate to talk about them because the incidents in Poland and Hungary put your [leadership] in political trouble. For instance, we then did not feel it right to talk about the problem concerning the experts [in China].

Even Stalin did improve himself: he let China and the Soviet Union sign the [alliance] treaty, supported [us] during the Korean War, and provided [us] with a total of 141 aid projects. Certainly these achievements did not belong to him but to the entire Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we do not want to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes.

Part III. China's Request for Soviet Military and Material Support48

7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. Bulganin, 12 December 1956 Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

On 30 April 1956, our government proposed to the USSR that [China] would order a total of 890 million rubles worth of military supplies [from the USSR] for the year of 1957. As large areas [of China] have suf

fered severe flood this year thus encountering a shortage of material supplies, however, [we] have to reallocate materials that have originally been designated for export so as to meet the needs of our domestic supply and, therefore, to reduce our export for next year. In order to maintain the balance between our import and export for the year of 1957, we have no other alternatives but to reduce purchases of foreign goods. As we have calculated, however, we cannot afford to cut down such items as complete sets of equipment and general trade items so as to avoid casting an adverse effect on the ongoing capital construction. Therefore, we have decided that our original order worth 890 million rubles of materials from the USSR for 1957 be reduced to that of 426 million rubles.

We understand that our reduction of purchase orders of Soviet military materials will cause the Soviet Government some problems. But [our request for the change] is an act against our will. [We] wish that the Soviet Government will accept our request. Provided that you accept our request, we will dispatch Tang Tianji,49 our representative with full authority in military material orders, to Moscow for the purpose of conducting negotiations with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. We will also submit a detailed list of orders which are reduced and verified to the Soviet Economic Office to China soon. We look forward to hearing from you.

8. Memo, PRC Foreign Ministry to the USSR Embassy to Beijing, 13 March 1957 Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

The Chinese Government asserts that, although generally acceptable, the draft paper on a review of Far Eastern economic development, compiled by the [Soviet] Far East Economic Committee has made several errors on China's economic development.

(1) The sentence that "[China's] agrarian collectivization has encountered peasants' opposition," under the section of "Speedy Advance toward Socialism" (page 1), does not correspond with reality. The speed of our country's agricultural collectivization, which has been fully explained by Liu Shaoqi in his report to the [National]

People's Congress, completely refutes such an assertion. In discussing [China's] price problem, the draft paper deliberately distorts and obliterates our basic achievements which are clearly presented in Li Xiannian's50 report [to the People's Congress], and instead, exaggerates our isolated weakness and mistakes. Given this fact, therefore, the paper could not help but draw erroneous conclusions (page 20).

(2) The draft paper has also made errors merely by comparing our published statistics which are, indeed, to serve different purposes. There are several such errors:

1. The section titled "Speedy Advance toward Socialism" mentions that "[China] plans to raise the percentage of handicrafts [as an industry] in the nation's GNP up to 15.3% in 1956, whereas the First Five-Year Plan has originally planned to have [the handicrafts] reach 9.4% in 1957" (page 4). In actuality, the former [figure] refers to a combined output of "handicrafts factories" and "handicrafts individuals" while the later [figure] only reflects the percentage of "handicrafts individuals' outputs" in GNP.

2. The section on "National Income and Capital Accumulation" asserts that "[China] in one way or another exaggerates its [per capita] increase, given the [Chinese] statistics on the nation's per capita increase from 1953 to 1956, that is, 1953, 127 yuan, 1954, 137 yuan, 1955, 141 yuan, 1956, 154 yuan. This is because, according to Liu Shaoqi's report, the increase of industrial production during 1953-1956 is no higher than 90.3%, whereas the above listed figures seem to assume that the increase would be 104%" (page 5). The 90.3% increase mentioned in Liu Shaoqi's report covers all industrial increase including modern [heavy] and factory industries, and individual production, while Bo Yibo's51 reported 104% increase only refers to the increase of production by modern [heavy] and factory [machinery] industries.

3. The section on "National Income and Capital Accumulation" also points out that the total of [China's] capital construction during 1953-1956 exceeds the five-year budget's 42.74 billion yuan by 1%, but State Planning Commission Chairman Li Fuchun's52 report [to the People's Congress] only states that [China] will by 1956 complete up to 87.6% of the planned capital construction (page 7). In fact, the amount of capital construction as designed by the five

year plan only includes the main part of economic and cultural [entertaining and educational] construction, whereas the total of [China's] capital construction during 1953[China's] capital construction during 19531956 covers much wider grounds.

4. The session on "Development Plans" notes that the Second Five-Year Plan originally set 98.3% as the [overall] increase objective, but Premier Zhou [Enlai] in his report on the Second Five-Year Plan reduces this objective to 90.3% (page 23). There is indeed no reduction of the original increase objective. Because the former [figure] excludes the outputs of individual production whereas the latter includes the outputs of individual production, thus becoming 90.3%. Since there are detailed explanations and illustrations as to exactly what the above mentioned figures cover when these reports are publicized, there exists no excuse why such errors have been committed. Other than the above listed mistakes, [the draft paper] still contains minor errors which are of no significant concern [of ours].

9. Memo, Embassy of the PRC in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 December 1957

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 3, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet cooperation and close links regarding national eration and close links regarding national defense industry, the Chinese Government proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commission in charge of national defense industry be established which, consisting of several delegates from each side, is to meet once or twice annually.

The joint commission's major responsibilities include:

(1) exchange published and unpublished books, journals, handbooks, directories, technical criteria, or other materials both sides deem appropriate;

(2) discuss such issues as standardization of weaponry, technical conditions, specifications, and national criteria, and commonly acceptable differences of weaponry production;

(3) discuss standardization of [technical] specifications, and provide [each other] with standard products and measuring apparatus;

(4) discuss invitation and engagementincluding procedures, terms limits, and

amount (5) invite and dispatch on a reciprocal basis experts and delegations for the purpose of on-site inspection, participation in conferences, delivery of research reports, and short-term internships;

of technical experts and aides;

(6) establish frequent contacts on scientific research and production conditions in [each side's] national defense industry;

(7) discuss the exchange and provision of teaching guides, textbooks, or other materials on national defense industry training, or materials necessary to enhance national defense industry personnel's techniques and skills;

(8) exchange lessons and experiences of employing new machinery, new facilities, and new technology as well as new applications of research results to weaponry production;

(9) study the issue of warranties for technical materiel [one side] provides [the other side] for production;

(10) discuss other issues concerning national defense industry that both sides deem necessary.

During the period when the joint commission adjourns, the Chinese Government will authorize the Second Machinery Ministry and the Commercial Office of the PRC embassy [in Moscow] to take charge of communications and contacts regarding routine affairs and issues of national defense industry. Whichever agency [of the Soviet side] will be in charge [during this period] is left to the Soviet Government to decide.

Before every meeting of the joint commission, each side is to provide the other side with a memorandum containing the agenda [and] schedule as well as supplementary materials.

All minutes and records of the joint commission's meetings are to be prepared respectively in Chinese and Russian languages and co-signed by the representatives of each side's delegation to the joint commission.

All results of the joint commission's discussions are to be references for each Government which, if deemed necessary, will authorize certain agencies for their implementation.

All costs of organizing the joint commission's meetings will be charged to the Government where the meeting is held, whereas each Government will be responsible for expenditures of its own delegation.

during the meeting.

Please consider our above-stated propositions. The Chinese side wishes to know the Soviet Government's response.

10. Memo, [PRC] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 4 September 1958

Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

(1) As China's influence in the international community rises day by day, the US imperialists' policy of disregarding the Chinese people and not recognizing but shutting out the Chinese [Government] from international life is getting increasingly difficult and losing support of the peoples [all over the world]. In order to extricate itself from such a difficult position as well as to assure continuous control of Taiwan, [the US Government] has stepped up the realization of its "two-China" conspiracy.

(2) The following is the Chinese Government's counter-measure against the [US] "two-China" plot:

1. With regard to the situation in which China's delegation and Jiang [Jieshi] Clique's "delegation" join the same international organization or attend the same international conference. Facing this situation, the Chinese side will resolutely demand to have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If [our request is] rejected, China will not cooperate with such an organization or conference and, thus, will have to withdraw with no hesitation. In the past year China has already done this many times, including withdrawing from the Nineteenth World Convention of the Red Cross. [China] has recently decided not to recognize the International Olympic Committee. From now on, China will resolutely refuse to participate in any international organizations or conferences which invite or tolerate the participation of the Jiang Clique's representatives.

2. With regard to the situation in which China's delegation or individual and Jiang Clique's individuals participate in the same international organization or international conference. Such a situation, although in formality constituting no "two-China," will in effect impress upon the [international] community that "two Chinas" co-exist, and is very likely to be used by [our] adversaries

to their advantage. Therefore, China will from now on refuse to participate in any international organizations or conferences involving such a situation. China will also consider withdrawing from those international organizations, such as the International Law Association, at an appropriate

moment.

For those overseas Chinese individuals who participate in the international organizations or conferences which have already invited Chinese delegates, [we] will decide by looking at these [overseas Chinese individuals'] attitude toward politics. If they do not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but represent their [residential] countries, [we] will not treat them as complicating the "twoChina" issue. However, [we] must not relax our vigilance because they might disguise their appearance but in effect carry out conspiratorial activities [related to the creation of "two Chinas"].

3. With regard to the situation in which an international organization which has already had the Jiang representatives, or its branch organization, invites us to attend conferences even if Jiang Clique's delegates are not invited. Such a situation definitely constitutes a "two-China" reality. Moreover, it will leave others with a wrong impression that China is anxious to participate in the activities of those international organizations. Therefore, China will not be part of these organizations or conferences.

(3) Controlled by the United States, the United Nations and its Special Organizations have generally retained Jiang's representatives and kept rejecting the restoration of China's legitimate positions [in these international organizations]. The following

are our counter-measures.

1. China will not dispatch any representatives (either of the Chinese Government or of other organizations) to participate in any conferences organized by the United Nations and its Special Organizations. No individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a representative or a staff member of other international organizations, is permitted to contact or conduct negotiations with the United Nations and its special organizations.

2. China will not provide the United Nations or its special organizations with any materials or statistics, nor will China endorse that [our] brother countries publish any materials concerning China in the jour

nals of the United Nations and its special organizations.

3. With regard to those international conferences already having certain relations with the United Nations or its special organizations which China considers participating, our policy is as follows:

a. China will support any resolutions of the conferences which only generally mention the United Nations Charter. China will not comply with any resolutions of the conferences which have a good deal to do with the United Nations or its special organizations. However, if these resolutions are favorable to world peace and friendly cooperation [among all the nations], China will not oppose.

b. China will not attend any sessions [of the conferences] which are designated to discuss the United Nations or its special organizations.

c. China will refuse to attend any sessions where United Nations representatives speak in the name of conference advisers or as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese [delegates] listen to United Nations representatives' report or presentation. However, Chinese delegates will be allowed to participate in sessions where United Nations representatives participate in or give speeches as ordinary participants. If UN representatives deliver speeches or remarks to insult or slander China, Chinese delegates will have to refute them right on the spot and then leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are included in the UN delegation, Chinese delegates must point out that this ignored China's interests and then, protest and refuse to participate.

d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to express any opinion on whether China will establish, in some fashion, a consultative relationship with the United Nations or its special organizations. If any international conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese delegates cannot but abstain from the voting.

(4) China asserts that [its] participation in international conferences and organizations is only one way to establish contacts and relations in the international community, which may bring about some results in terms of enhancing China's visibility and obtaining some information on how certain specific [international] projects progress. However, no or minimum participation in the international conferences or organiza

tions will not keep China from developing vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese people from getting acquainted or making friends with other nations; no or minimum participation in some international conferences or organizations does not mean that China adopts a negative or protective attitude toward [international] cultural exchange activities. [In regard to these activities], China may take part in other fashions. On the other hand, China's non-participation may put so much pressure on these conferences or organizations that they will have difficulties in organizing activities thus making them discontented with the United States. As a result, more and more criticism and condemnation of the "two-China" policy may be aroused. In short, China remains willing to cooperate with those international conferences and organizations which are in China's interests [and] have no intention to impair China's sovereignty.

[We are certain] that, as long as we have the Soviet-led socialist countries' support, our just cause of smashing America's "two-China" conspiracy will achieve a complete success.

1. The content of this conversation suggests that it occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the CCP's Eighth National Congress was in session. 2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform), which was established in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau announced that it was ending its activities in April 1956.

3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union and a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that Wang Ming committed "ultra-leftist" mistakes in the early 1930s and “ultra-rightist" mistakes in the late 1930s.

4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas. 5. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress. He was China's second most important leader.

6. The Chinese Communist party's eighth national congress was held in Beijing on 15-27 September 1956.

7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian communist, was the Comintern's secretary general from 1935 to 1943.

8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935, during which the "international section," of which Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and vice chairman of the PRC.

10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia's first ambassador to the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time on 30 June 1955.

11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes still lacked a common name. He became their great organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Chinggis established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressiveness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was certainly present in Chinggis.

12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese population.

13. The "War to Resist America and Assist Korea" describes China's participation in the Korean War from October 1950 to July 1953.

14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 December 1953. These principles―(1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence-were later repeatedly claimed by the Chinese government as the foundation of the PRC's foreign policy.

15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugoslavian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 October 1949, four days after the PRC's establishment. 16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet ambassador to China from 1953 to 1959.

17. “On Ten Relationships" was one of Mao's major works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship between industry and agriculture and heavy industry and light industry, between coastal industry and industry in the interior, between economic construction and national defense, between the state, the unit of production, and individual producers, between the center and the regions, between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities, between party and non-party, between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right and wrong, and between China and other countries. For an English translation of one version of the article, see Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83. 18. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At the Party's Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and Zhou were elected the Party's vice chairmen, and Deng the Party's general secretary.

19. This was part of Mao Zedong's speech to a conference attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal secretaries.

20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, the year of completing the third five-year plan would be 1968.

21. The elimination of the "four pests" (rats, bedbugs, flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a national hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and late 1950s.

22. "Democratic figures" is a term used by Mao and the Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or communist sympathizers in China.

23. This refers to Zhou Enlai's visit to the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou Enlai's report on the visit, see the next document. 24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation

to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January 1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan. After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership, summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese and Soviet parties.

25. Liu Xiao was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union from February 1955 to October 1962. 26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland. This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved Zhou's Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a formal state visit in India): "The Polish ambassador visited us, mentioning that their congress election is scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon. There exists the danger that the United Workers' Party might lose the majority support. He hoped that China would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Comrade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip. Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one between the United Workers' Party and other parties (with bourgeoisie character) over attracting votes from the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon. But if the United Workers' Party loses control, it would be disadvantageous [to the socialist camp]. Therefore, we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will allow you to have four to five days to have the SinoSoviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help.” (Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de zhuoyeu fengxian, 299300).

27. Wladyslaw Gomulka was the leader of the Polish Communist regime.

28. This refers to the "Declaration on Developing and Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries" issued by the Soviet government on the evening of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its relations with other communist countries and promised that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges with them in the future.

29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP Politburo and published in the name of the editorial board of Renmin ribao (People's Daily) on 29 December 1956.

30. Peng Dehuai, China's minister of defense, submitted this report in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of establishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On 18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union's defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai:

In order to command the Soviet Union's sub-
marines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high
command urgently hopes that between 1958
and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will

jointly construct a high-power long-wave ra-
dio transmission center and a long-wave radio
receiving station specially designed for long
distance communication. In terms of the fund
that is needed for the construction of the two
stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger
portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller
portion (30%).

The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a matter related to China's sovereignty and integrity. Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and to have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 112-113.)

31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai's report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document. 32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China's vice premier; Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and China's vice premier in charge of financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a member of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi was a member of the CCP Politburo, China's vice premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting in February 1958).

33. Words in italics were added by Mao.

34. Following Mao Zedong's instructions, Peng Dehuai sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June 1958: "The Chinese government agrees to the construction of high-power long-wave radio stations, and welcomes the technological assistance from the Soviet Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union after the completion of their construction. Therefore, it is necessary for the governments of the two countries to sign an agreement on the project." On 11 July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement to construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did not understand the nature of Beijing's concern over having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft insisted that the stations should be constructed and jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese responded with several suggestions for revision: China would take the responsibility for constructing the station and its ownership belongs to China; China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to help construct the station; after the station's completion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union.

35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance for China's naval buildup, especially the designs for new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev's name, Yudin told Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type submarines. Because China had a long coastline and good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: “First, we should make clear the guiding principle. [Do you mean that] we should create [the flotilla] with your

assistance? Or [do you mean] that we should jointly create [the flotilla], otherwise you will not offer any assistance?" Mao emphasized that he was not interested in creating a Sino-Soviet "military cooperative." (Source: Han Nianlong et al. Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, 113-114.) The next day, Mao discussed the proposal with Yudin at length.

36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who were present during this discussion.

37. In March 1950 and July 1951, the Chinese and Soviet government signed four agreements, establishing a civil aviation company, an oil company, a nonferrous and rare metal company, and a shipbuilding company jointly owned by the two countries.

38. Xibaipo was tiny village in Hebei Province where the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin, Mikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo from 31 January to 7 February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account of Mikoyan's visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian), "With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese Interpreter," Chinese Historians 5:1 (Spring 1992), 4556. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission to China in January and February 1949," Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit are in accord.

39. Mao Zedong attended the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. 40. The "Moscow Manifesto" was adopted by the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957. 41. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for China's first five-year plan, focusing on energy development, heavy industry and defense industry. 42. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin's telegrams to the CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause "the danger of national elimination."

43. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao's works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October 1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao Zedong's works.

44. I. V. Kovalev, Stalin's representative to China from 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950; N. T. Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.

45. See note 30.

46. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District. 47. Mao commanded these military operations during the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934. 48. Documents in this group are found in Russian Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chi

nese.

49. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People's Liberation Army's General Logistics Department. 50. Li Xiannian was a member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier and finance minister.

51. Bo Yibo was then alternate member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier, chairman of National Economic Commission.

52. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier, chairman of State Planning Commission.

Zhang Shu Guang is associate professor at the University of Maryland at College Park and author, most recently, of Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Chen Jian is associate professor of history at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale and author of China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

« 上一頁繼續 »