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during the meeting.
to their advantage. Therefore, China will nals of the United Nations and its special Please consider our above-stated propo- from now on refuse to participate in any organizations. sitions. The Chinese side wishes to know the international organizations or conferences 3. With regard to those international Soviet Government's response.
involving such a situation. China will also conferences already having certain relations
consider withdrawing from those interna- with the United Nations or its special orga10. Memo, (PRC] Ministry of Foreign tional organizations, such as the Interna- nizations which China considers participatAffairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 4 tional Law Association, at an appropriate ing, our policy is as follows: September 1958 moment.
a. China will support any resolutions of Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, For those overseas Chinese individuals the conferences which only generally mendelo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, who participate in the international organi- tion the United Nations Charter. China will Moscow
zations or conferences which have already not comply with any resolutions of the con
invited Chinese delegates, [we) will decide ferences which have a good deal to do with (1) As China's influence in the interna- by looking at these (overseas Chinese indi- the United Nations or its special organizational community rises day by day, the US viduals') attitude toward politics. If they do tions. However, if these resolutions are imperialists' policy of disregarding the Chi- not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but favorable to world peace and friendly coopnese people and not recognizing but shutting represent their [residential] countries, (we] eration (among all the nations), China will out the Chinese (Government) from interna- will not treat them as complicating the "two- not oppose. tional life is getting increasingly difficult China” issue. However, [we) must not relax b. China will not attend any sessions (of and losing support of the peoples (all over our vigilance because they might disguise the conferences] which are designated to the world). In order to extricate itself from their appearance but in effect carry out con- discuss the United Nations or its special such a difficult position as well as to assure spiratorial activities (related to the creation organizations. continuous control of Taiwan, (the US Gov- of “two Chinas”).
c. China will refuse to attend any sesernment] has stepped up the realization of its 3. With regard to the situation in which sions where United Nations representatives "two-China" conspiracy.
an international organization which has al- speak in the name of conference advisers or (2) The following is the Chinese ready had the Jiang representatives, or its as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese Government's counter-measure against the branch organization, invites us to attend [delegates) listen to United Nations repre[US] "two-China" plot:
conferences even if Jiang Clique's delegates sentatives' report or presentation. However, 1. With regard to the situation in which are not invited. Such a situation definitely Chinese delegates will be allowed to particiChina's delegation and Jiang (Jieshi] constitutes a "two-China” reality. More- pate in sessions where United Nations repreClique's “delegation” join the same interna- over, it will leave others with a wrong im- sentatives participate in or give speeches as tional organization or attend the same inter- pression that China is anxious to participate ordinary participants. If UN representatives national conference. Facing this situation, in the activities of those international orga- deliver speeches or remarks to insult or the Chinese side will resolutely demand to nizations. Therefore, China will not be part slander China, Chinese delegates will have have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If of these organizations or conferences. to refute them right on the spot and then [our request is) rejected, China will not co- (3) Controlled by the United States, the leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are operate with such an organization or confer- United Nations and its Special Organiza- included in the UN delegation, Chinese delence and, thus, will have to withdraw with tions have generally retained Jiang's repre- egates must point out that this ignored China's no hesitation. In the past year China has sentatives and kept rejecting the restoration interests and then, protest and refuse to paralready done this many times, including of China's legitimate positions [in these ticipate. withdrawing from the Nineteenth World international organizations). The following d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to Convention of the Red Cross. (China) has are our counter-measures.
express any opinion on whether China will recently decided not to recognize the Inter- 1. China will not dispatch any represen- establish, in some fashion, a consultative national Olympic Committee. From now tatives (either of the Chinese Government or relationship with the United Nations or its on, China will resolutely refuse to partici- of other organizations) to participate in any special organizations. If any international pate in any international organizations or conferences organized by the United Na- conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese conferences which invite or tolerate the par- tions and its Special Organizations. No delegates cannot but abstain from the votticipation of the Jiang Clique's representa- individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a ing. tives.
representative or a staff member of other (4) China asserts that [its) participation 2. With regard to the situation in which international organizations, is permitted to in international conferences and organizaChina's delegation or individual and Jiang contact or conduct negotiations with the tions is only one way to establish contacts Clique's individuals participate in the same United Nations and its special organiza- and relations in the international commuinternational organization or international tions.
nity, which may bring about some results in conference. Such a situation, although in 2. China will not provide the United terms of enhancing China's visibility and formality constituting no "two-China," will Nations or its special organizations with any obtaining some information on how certain in effect impress upon the (international] materials or statistics, nor will China en- specific [international) projects progress. community that "two Chinas" co-exist, and dorse that (our) brother countries publish However, no or minimum participation in is very likely to be used by (our) adversaries any materials concerning China in the jour- the international conferences or organizations will not keep China from developing vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese people from getting acquainted or making friends with other nations; no or minimum participation in some international conferences or organizations does not mean that China adopts a negative or protective attitude toward (international] cultural exchange activities. [In regard to these activities), China may take part in other fashions. On the other hand, China's non-participation may put so much pressure on these conferences or organizations that they will have difficulties in organizing activities thus making them discontented with the United States. As a result, more and more criticism and condemnation of the "two-China" policy may be aroused. In short, China remains willing to cooperate with those international conferences and organizations which are in China's interests [and] have no intention to impair China's sovereignty.
[We are certain) that, as long as we have the Soviet-led socialist countries' support, our just cause of smashing America's "two-China" conspiracy will achieve a complete success.
10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia's first ambassador to to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time 1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from on 30 June 1955.
January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five 11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan. still lacked a common name. He became their great After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227,Chinggis report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership, established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The and Soviet parties. Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressive- 25. Liu Xiao was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet ness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was Union from February 1955 to October 1962. certainly present in Chinggis.
26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland. 12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved population.
Zhou's Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to 13. The “War to Resist America and Assist Korea" Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a describes China's participation in the Korean War from formal state visit in India): “The Polish ambassador October 1950 to July 1953.
visited us, mentioning that their congress election is 14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon. Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 There exists the danger that the United Workers' Party December 1953. These principles—(1) mutual respect might lose the majority support. He hoped that China for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non- would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Comaffairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful rade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why coexistence—were later repeatedly claimed by the Chi- it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the nese government as the foundation of the PRC's foreign trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already policy.
invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time 15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip. Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugosla- Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one vian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 between the United Workers' Party and other parties October 1949, four days after the PRC's establishment. (with bourgeoisie character) over attracting votes from 16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon. and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet But if the United Workers' Party loses control, it would Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet am- be disadvantageous (to the socialist camp). Therefore, bassador to China from 1953 to 1959.
we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to 17. “On Ten Relationships” was one of Mao's major Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship be- a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the tween industry and agriculture and heavy industry and trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it light industry, between coastal industry and industry in is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should the interior, between economic construction and na- visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will tional defense, between the state, the unit of production, allow you to have four to five days to have the Sinoand individual producers, between the center and the Soviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can regions, between the Han nationality and the minority travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also nationalities, between party and non-party, between issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help.” revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right (Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de zhuoyeu fengxian, 299and wrong, and between China and other countries. For 300). an English translation of one version of the article, see 27. Wladyslaw Gomulka was the leader of the Polish Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People Communist regime. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83.
28. This refers to the “Declaration on Developing and 18. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Counthe Party's Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and tries” issued by the Soviet government on the evening Zhou were elected the Party's vice chairmen, and Deng of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian the Party's general secretary.
crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its 19. This was part of Mao Zedong's speech to a confer- relations with other communist countries and promised ence attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges secretaries.
with them in the future. 20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, 29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP the year of completing the third five-year plan would be Politburo and published in the name of the editorial 1968.
board of Renmin ribao (People's Daily) on 29 Decem21. The elimination of the "four pests” (rats, bedbugs, ber 1956. flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a na- 30. Peng Dehuai, China's minister of defense, submittional hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and ted this report in the context of the emerging dispute late 1950s.
between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of estab22. “Democratic figures” is a term used by Mao and the lishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or 18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union's communist sympathizers in China.
defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai: 23. This refers to Zhou Enlai's visit to the Soviet Union, In order to command the Soviet Union's subPoland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou marines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high Enlai's report on the visit, see the next document.
command urgently hopes that between 1958 24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will
1. The content of this conversation suggests that it
52. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier, chairman of State Planning Commission.
Zhang Shu Guang is associate professor at the University of Maryland at College Park and author, most recently, of Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Chen Jian is associate professor of history at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale and author of China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
jointly construct a high-power long-wave ra- assistance? Or (do you mean) that we should jointly
36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who
38. Xibaipo was tiny village in Hebei Province where 31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai's the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document. from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin, 32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of Mikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo from 31 January to 7 the CCP Central Committee and China's vice premier; February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account Committee, and China's vice premier in charge of of Mikoyan's visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian), financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a mem- "With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese ber of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi Interpreter,” Chinese Historians 5:1 (Spring 1992), 45was a member of the CCP Politburo, China's vice 56. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting Ledovsky, “Mikoyan's Secret Mission to China in in February 1958).
January and February 1949," Far Eastern Affairs (Mos33. Words in italics were added by Mao.
cow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to 34. Following Mao Zedong's instructions, Peng Dehuai note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June are in accord. 1958: “The Chinese government agrees to the construc- 39. Mao Zedong attended the Moscow conference of tion of high-power long-wave radio stations, and wel- leaders of communist and workers' parties from socialcomes the technological assistance from the Soviet ist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the 40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet 40. The “Moscow Manifesto” was adopted by the Union after the completion of their construction. There- Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workfore, it is necessary for the governments of the two ers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957. countries to sign an agreement on the project.” On 11 41. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement China's first five-year plan, focusing on energy develto construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did opment, heavy industry and defense industry. not understand the nature of Beijing's concern over 42. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin's telegrams to the having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which insisted that the stations should be constructed and Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause Chinese responded with several suggestions for revi- "the danger of national elimination." sion: China would take the responsibility for construct- 43. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to ing the station and its ownership belongs to China; dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao's China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China help construct the station; after the station's comple- from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October tion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet 1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao Union.
Zedong's works. 35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in 44. I. V. Kovalev, Stalin's representative to China from the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950; N. T. submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase in Beijing. new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 45. See note 30. June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting 46. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District. that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance 47. Mao commanded these military operations during for China’s naval buildup, especially the designs for the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934. new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called 48. Documents in this group are found in Russian on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev's name, Yudin Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chitold Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type 49. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People's submarines. Because China had a long coastline and Liberation Army's General Logistics Department. good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China 50. Li Xiannian was a member of CCP Politburo and and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flo- China's vice premier and finance minister. tilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: “First, 51. Bo Yibo was then alternate member of CCP Politwe should make clear the guiding principle.[Do you buro and China's vice premier, chairman of National mean that) we should create (the flotilla) with your Economic Commission.
MAO'S CONVERSATIONS the orientation to the Guomintang, having ample, a deviation, that in the Soviet regions continued from page 157
viewed it as a united front of the revolution- of China which were blockaded by the
ary forces of China. Stalin said that it is Guomintang even the petty trading bourDocument I:
necessary to depend on the Guomintang, to geoisie was liquidated and all kinds of interMao's Conversation with Yudin,
follow after that party, i.e. he spoke directly nal trade was stopped. As a result of this 31 March 1956
about the subordination of the Communist policy the Chinese Red Army, which in
Party of China to the Guomintang. This was 1929 was comprised of 300,000 fighters, From the Journal of
a great mistake which had held back the was reduced by 1934-35 to 25,000, and the P.F. Yudin
Copy No. 1
independent work of the Communist Party of territory which made up the Soviet regions "5" April 1956
China on the mobilization of the masses and of China was reduced by 99%. CPC organiNo. 289
on attracting them to the side of the Commu- zations in the cities were routed by the nist Party
Guomintang and the number of Commu
Through the Comintern, Mao Zedong nists was reduced from 300,000 to 26,000 RECORD OF CONVERSATION
continued, Stalin, having become after the people. The Soviet regions were totally with Comrade Mao Zedong
death of V.I. Lenin the de facto leader of the isolated from the remaining part of the coun
Comintern, gave to the CC CPC a great try and remained without any products, even 31 March 1956
number of incorrect directives. These mis- without salt. All this caused serious discon
taken and incorrect directives resulted from tent among the population of the Soviet Today I visited Mao Zedong and gave
the fact that Stalin did not take into account regions. him Comrade Khrushchev's letter about the
the opinion of the CPC. At that time Van As a result of the ultra-leftist policy of assistance which the Soviet Union will pro
Minh, being a Comintern worker, met fre- Van Minh, the more or less large regions vide: 1) in the construction of 51 enterprises quently with Stalin and tendentiously had
which remained under CPC leadership were and 3 scientific research institutes for mili
informed him about the situation in the CPC. mostly in North China (the provinces of tary industry, 2) in the construction of a
Stalin, evidently, considered Van Minh the Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia), to which Van railroad line from Urumqi to the Soviet
single exponent of the opinion of the CC Minh's power did not extend. Van Minh, Chinese border. Mao Zedong asked me to CPC. .
backed by the Comintern, essentially mansend his deep gratitude to the CC CPSU and
Van Minh and Li Lisan, who repre- aged it so that the 8th and 4th armies rethe Soviet government.
sented the CPC in the Comintern, tried to moved themselves from subordination to Further I said that I had wanted to visit him (Mao Zedong) in the very first days in their own hands. They tried to present all concentrate the whole leadership of the CPC the CC CPC.
Van Minh and his successors saw the following my return to Beijing and to tell
the Communists who criticized the mistakes Guomintang as the “young power," which about the work of the 20th Congress of the
of Van Minh and Li Lisan as opportunists. absorbs all the best and will be able to gain CPSU and, in particular, about Comrade
Mao Zedong said, they called me a right a victory over Japan. They spoke against the Khrushchev's speech at the closed session
opportunist and a narrow empiricist. As an independent and autonomous policy of the regarding the cult of personality. Mao
example of how the Comintern acted incor- Communist Party in the united front, and Zedong responded that because of his ill
rectly in relation to the Communist Party of against the strengthening of the armed forces ness he had found it necessary to put off the
China, Mao Zedong introduced the follow- of the CPC and revolutionary bases, against meeting with me. Mao Zedong said that the ing.
the unification of all strata of the population members of the CPC delegation who had
Under the pretext that the Third Plenum around the policy of the CPC. Van Minh's attended the 20th Congress had told him
of the CC CPC, while considering the coup- supporters tried to replace the genuinely something about the work of the Congress plotting errors of Li Lisan, had not carried the revolutionary program of the CPC, which and had brought one copy of Comrade
successive criticism of these mistakes to its consisted of 10 points, with their own sixKhrushchev's speech regarding the cult of conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the point program, the author of which was Van personality. That speech has already been
mistakes of the Third Plenum of the CCCPC, Minh, although this was, in the essence of translated into Chinese and he had managed the Comintern after 3-4 months had sent to the matter, a capitulationist program. In to become acquainted with it.
China two of its own workers - [Pavel] Mif conducting this whole program Van Minh, During a conversation about I.V.
and Van Minh - charged with the task of backed by the Comintern and in Stalin's Stalin's mistakes Mao Zedong noted that
conducting the Fouth Plenum of the CPC. name, spoke as the main authority. Stalin's line on the China question, though Nonetheless the decisions of the Fourth Ple- Van Minh's supporters, taking advanit had basically been correct, in certain peri
num of the CC CPC made under the pressure tage of the fact that they had captured a ods he, Stalin, had made serious mistakes.
of Mif and Van Minh, were in fact more majority in the Southern bureau of the CC In his speeches in 1926 Stalin had exagger
ultra-leftist that Li Lisan's line. In them it CPC in Wuhan, gave incorrect directives to ated the revolutionary capabilities of the
was stated that it is necessary to move into the army and to the local authorities. So, for Guomintang, had spoken about the
the large cities, to take control of them, and example, once, to our surprise, said Mao Guomintang as the main revolutionary force
not to conduct the struggle in rural regions. Zedong, even in Yanan the slogans of the in China. In 1926 Stalin had given the
In the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CPC which were posted on the walls of the Chinese Communists an instruction about
CC CPC there was permitted such, for ex- houses were replaced, on Van Minh's order,
with slogans “about a stable union with the continued to believe more in the power of people asked us whether a treaty of the Guomintang," etc.
the Guomintang than of the Communist USSR with the new China will be signed, As a result of the serious ideological Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with why until now legally there continues to struggle and the great explanatory work fol- Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) support- exist a treaty with the supporters of the lowing the 7th Congress of the Communist ers, on a united front with the Guomintang Guomintang, etc. The issue of the treaty was Party, especially in the last four years, the and the creation in China of a “democratic an extremely important matter for us, which majority of Communists who made left or republic." In particular, in 1945 the CCCPC
republic.” In particular, in 1945 the CCCPC determined the possibilities for the further right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van received a secret telegram, for some reason development of the PRC. At the first conMinh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from versation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I with acknowledgement of his mistakes, how- Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along ever he then once again returned to his old Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations government lines, but Stalin declined to anpositions. All of the former activity of Van with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against swer. During the second conversation I Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried this journey, since a provocation from Jiang returned once again to that issue, showing out under the direct leadership of the Jieshi's side was expected. However, said Stalin a telegram from the CC CPC with the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious Mao Zedong, I was required to go since same type of proposal about a treaty. I loss to the Chinese revolution.
Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow Characterizing the Comintern's activ- armed struggle against the forces of Jiang
armed struggle against the forces of Jiang to sign the treaty, since he is the Minister of ity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were Foreign Affairs. Stalin used this suggestion Lenin was alive he had played the most on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that as a pretext for refusal and said that “it is prominent role in bringing together the forces peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he inconvenient to act in this way, since the of the Communist movement, in the creation doubted the forces of the Chinese revolu- bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chiand consolidation of the Communist parties tion. This lack of belief remained in Stalin nese government is located in Moscow.” in various countries, in the fight with the even during the first stages of the formation Subsequently, Stalin refrained from any opportunists from the Second International. of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of meetings with me. From my side there was But that had been a short period in the the revolution. It is possible that Stalin's an attempt to phone him in his apartment, but activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused they responded to me that Stalin is not home, the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since
by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since and recommended that I meet with (A.I.] Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain Mikoyan. All this offended me, Mao Zedong as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh disappointment, many conversations took said, and I decided to undertake nothing more than the CC CPC. In the last period of place to the effect that the Chinese Commu- further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then the Comintern's work, especially when nist Party was going along the Yugoslav an unpleasant conversation took place with Dimitrov worked there, certain movements path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito.” [I.V.) Kovalev and (N.T.) Fedorenko, who were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on I told Mao Zedong that there were no such proposed that I go on an excursion around us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van moods and conversations in our Party. the country. I sharply rejected this proposal Minh. However, in this period as well, not The bourgeois press around the world, and responded that I prefer to sleep through just a few mistakes were made by the continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right it at the dacha.” Comintern, for example, the dissolution of socialists, had taken up the version of Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, the Polish Communist Party and others. In “China's third way," and extolled it. At that
“China's third way,” and extolled it. At that they handed me a draft of my interview for this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, publication which had been signed by Stalin. discern three periods in the activity of the did not believe us, while the bourgoisie and In this document it was reported that negoComintern, of which the second, longest laborites sustained the illusion of the tiations are being held in Moscow on conperiod, brought the biggest loss to the Chi- “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang cluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This alnese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, Jieshi alone “defended” Mao Zedong, shriek- ready was a significant step forward. It is precisely in this period the Comintern dealt ing that the capitalist powers should not in possible that in Stalin's change of position, most of all with the East. We can say any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the "he will not turn from his path,” etc. This Indians and the English, who had recogdefeat of the Chinese revolution at that time behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, nized the PRC in January 1950. Negotiawas, right along with other reasons, also the since he knows us too well, he more than tions began right after this, in which result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of once had to stand in confrontation to us and Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, to fight with us.
Kaganovich and Beria took part. During the noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when The distrust of Stalin to the CPC, Mao negotiations, at Stalin's initiative there was we found out about the dissolution of the Zedong continued further, was apparent also undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union Comintern.
during the time of Mao Zedong's visit to the to assume sole ownership of the Chinese In the last period, continued Mao Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway. SubseZedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a quently, however, a decision was made about the situation in China and the possibilities Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, coop- the joint exploitation of the Chinese for the development of the revolution. He eration and mutual assistance. The Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway, besides