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during the meeting.

to their advantage. Therefore, China will nals of the United Nations and its special Please consider our above-stated propo- from now on refuse to participate in any organizations. sitions. The Chinese side wishes to know the international organizations or conferences 3. With regard to those international Soviet Government's response.

involving such a situation. China will also
a

conferences already having certain relations consider withdrawing from those interna- with the United Nations or its special orga10. Memo, (PRC) Ministry of Foreign tional organizations, such as the Interna- nizations which China considers participatAffairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 4 tional Law Association, at an appropriate ing, our policy is as follows: September 1958 moment.

a. China will support any resolutions of Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, For those overseas Chinese individuals the conferences which only generally mendelo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, who participate in the international organi- tion the United Nations Charter. China will Moscow

zations or conferences which have already not comply with any resolutions of the con

invited Chinese delegates, (we) will decide ferences which have a good deal to do with (1) As China's influence in the interna- by looking at these (overseas Chinese indi- the United Nations or its special organizational community rises day by day, the US viduals') attitude toward politics. If they do

viduals') attitude toward politics. If they do tions. However, if these resolutions are imperialists' policy of disregarding the Chi- not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but favorable to world peace and friendly coopnese people and not recognizing but shutting represent their (residential] countries, [we] eration (among all the nations), China will out the Chinese (Government from interna- will not treat them as complicating the "two- not oppose. tional life is getting increasingly difficult China” issue. However, (we) must not relax b. China will not attend any sessions (of and losing support of the peoples (all over our vigilance because they might disguise the conferences) which are designated to the world). In order to extricate itself from their appearance but in effect carry out con- discuss the United Nations or its special such a difficult position as well as to assure a

spiratorial activities (related to the creation organizations. continuous control of Taiwan, the US Gov- of two Chinas").

c. China will refuse to attend any sesernment] has stepped up the realization of its 3. With regard to the situation in which sions where United Nations representatives "two-China" conspiracy.

an international organization which has al- speak in the name of conference advisers or ( (2) The following is the Chinese ready had the Jiang representatives, or its as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese Government's counter-measure against the branch organization, invites us to attend [delegates) listen to United Nations repre(US) "two-China” plot:

conferences even if Jiang Clique's delegates sentatives' report or presentation. However, 1. With regard to the situation in which are not invited. Such a situation definitely Chinese delegates will be allowed to particiChina's delegation and Jiang (Jieshi] constitutes a "two-China” reality. More

pate in sessions where United Nations repreClique's "delegation" join the same interna- over, it will leave others with a wrong im- sentatives participate in or give speeches as tional organization or attend the same inter- pression that China is anxious to participate ordinary participants. If UN representatives national conference. Facing this situation, in the activities of those international orga- deliver speeches or remarks to insult or the Chinese side will resolutely demand to nizations. Therefore, China will not be part slander China, Chinese delegates will have have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If of these organizations or conferences. to refute them right on the spot and then (our request is) rejected, China will not co- (3) Controlled by the United States, the leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are operate with such an organization or confer- United Nations and its Special Organiza- included in the UN delegation, Chinese delence and, thus, will have to withdraw with tions have generally retained Jiang's repre- egates must point out that this ignored China's no hesitation. In the past year China has sentatives and kept rejecting the restoration interests and then, protest and refuse to paralready done this many times, including of China's legitimate positions in these ticipate. withdrawing from the Nineteenth World international organizations). The following d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to Convention of the Red Cross. (China) has are our counter-measures.

express any opinion on whether China will recently decided not to recognize the Inter- 1. China will not dispatch any represen- establish, in some fashion, a consultative national Olympic Committee. From now tatives (either of the Chinese Government or relationship with the United Nations or its on, China will resolutely refuse to partici- of other organizations) to participate in any special organizations. If any international pate in any international organizations or conferences organized by the United Na- conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese conferences which invite or tolerate the par- tions and its Special Organizations. No delegates cannot but abstain from the votticipation of the Jiang Clique's representa- individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a ing. tives.

representative or a staff member of other (4) China asserts that [its) participation 2. With regard to the situation in which international organizations, is permitted to in international conferences and organizaChina's delegation or individual and Jiang contact or conduct negotiations with the tions is only one way to establish contacts Clique's individuals participate in the same United Nations and its special organiza- and relations in the international commuinternational organization or international tions.

nity, which may bring about some results in conference. Such a situation, although in 2. China will not provide the United terms of enhancing China's visibility and formality constituting no "two-China," will Nations or its special organizations with any obtaining some information on how certain in effect impress upon the international] materials or statistics, nor will China en[

specific (international) projects progress. community that “two Chinas” co-exist, and dorse that sour] brother countries publish However, no or minimum participation in is very likely to be used by (our) adversaries any materials concerning China in the jour- the international conferences or organizations will not keep China from developing 10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia's first ambassador to vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese

the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time

on 30 June 1955. people from getting acquainted or making

11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was friends with other nations; no or minimum born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes participation in some international confer- still lacked a common name. He became their great ences or organizations does not mean that

organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Ch gis

established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by China adopts a negative or protective atti

conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The
tude toward (international]cultural exchange Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressive-
activities. [In regard to these activities), ness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was
China take
may

certainly present in Chinggis.
in other fashions. On
part

12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in the other hand, China's non-participation

China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese may put so much pressure on these confer

population. ences or organizations that they will have 13. The "War to Resist America and Assist Korea" difficulties in organizing activities thus mak

describes China's participation in the Korean War from

October 1950 to July 1953. ing them discontented with the United States.

14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou As a result, more and more criticism and

Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 condemnation of the "two-China” policy December 1953. These principles-(1) mutual respect may be aroused. In short, China remains for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non

aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international willing to cooperate with those international

affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful conferences and organizations which are in coexistence—were later repeatedly claimed by the ChiChina's interests (and) have no intention to nese government as the foundation of the PRC's foreign impair China's sovereignty.

policy.

15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with [We are certain] that, as long as we

Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugoslahave the Soviet-led socialist countries' sup- vian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 port, our just cause of smashing America's October 1949, four days after the PRC's establishment.

16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher "two-China" conspiracy will achieve a com

and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet plete success.

Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet am-
bassador to China from 1953 to 1959.

17. "On Ten Relationships” was one of Mao's major 1. The content of this conversation suggests that it

works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship be

tween industry and agriculture and heavy industry and occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the CCP's Eighth National Congress was in session.

light industry, between coastal industry and industry in

the interior, between economic construction and na2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist

tional defense, between the state, the unit of production, and Workers' Parties (Cominform), which was estab

and individual producers, between the center and the lished in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet

regions, between the Han nationality and the minority Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France,

nationalities, between party and non-party, between Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau

revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right announced that it was ending its activities in April

and wrong, and between China and other countries. For 1956.

an English translation of one version of the article, see 3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen

Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union and a

(New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83. leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the

18. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that

leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At Wang Ming committed "ultra-leftist" mistakes in the

the Party's Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and early 1930s and "ultra-rightist” mistakes in the late 1930s.

Zhou were elected the Party's vice chairmen, and Deng

the Party's general secretary. 4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas. 5. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of the CCP Central

19. This was part of Mao Zedong's speech to a confer

ence attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee

secretaries. of the People's National Congress. He was China's

20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, second most important leader. 6. The Chinese Communist party's eighth national

the year of completing the third five-year plan would be

1968. congress was held in Beijing on 15-27 September

21. The elimination of the “four pests” (rats, bedbugs, 1956.

flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a na7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian commu

tional hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and nist, was the Comintern's secretary general from 1935

late 1950s. to 1943.

22. “Democratic figures" is a term used by Mao and the 8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935,

Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or during which the “international section," of which

communist sympathizers in China. Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the

23. This refers to Zhou Enlai's visit to the Soviet Union, central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central

Poland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou

Enlai's report on the visit, see the next document. Committee and vice chairman of the PRC.

24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation

to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January
1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from
January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five
formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai
Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan.
After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this
report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership,
summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese
and Soviet parties.
25. Liu Xiao was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet
Union from February 1955 to October 1962.
26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland.
This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit
the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved
Zhou's Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to
Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a
formal state visit in India): “The Polish ambassador
visited us, mentioning that their congress election is
scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon.
There exists the danger that the United Workers' Party
might lose the majority support. He hoped that China
would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit
Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Com-
rade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why
it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the
trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already
invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time
allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip.
Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one
between the United Workers' Party and other parties
(with bourgeoisie character) over attracting votes from
the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon.
But if the United Workers' Party loses control, it would
be disadvantageous to the socialist camp). Therefore,
we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to
Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is
a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the
trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it
is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should
visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will
allow you to have four to five days to have the Sino-
Soviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can
travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also
issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help.”
(Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de zhuoyeu fengxian, 299-
300).
27. Wladyslaw Gomulka was the leader of the Polish
Communist regime.
28. This refers to the “Declaration on Developing and
Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation
between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Coun-
tries" issued by the Soviet government on the evening
of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian
crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its
relations with other communist countries and promised
that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges
with them in the future.
29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP
Politburo and published in the name of the editorial
board of Renmin ribao (People's Daily) on 29 Decem-
ber 1956.
30. Peng Dehuai, China's minister of defense, submit-
ted this report in the context of the emerging dispute
between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of estab-
lishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On
18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union's
defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai:

In order to command the Soviet Union's sub-
marines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high
command urgently hopes that between 1958
and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will

W

jointly construct a high-power long-wave radio transmission center and a long-wave radio receiving station specially designed for long distance communication. In terms of the fund that is needed for the construction of the two stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller

portion (30%). The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a matter related to China's sovereignty and integrity. Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and to have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 112-113.) 31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai's report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document. 32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China's vice premier; Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and China's vice premier in charge of financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a member of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi was a member of the CCP Politburo, China's vice premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting in February 1958). 33. Words in italics were added by Mao. 34. Following Mao Zedong's instructions, Peng Dehuai sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June 1958: “The Chinese government agrees to the construction of high-power long-wave radio stations, and welcomes the technological assistance from the Soviet Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union after the completion of their construction. Therefore, it is necessary for the governments of the two countries to sign an agreement on the project.” On 11 July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement to construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did not understand the nature of Beijing's concern over having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft insisted that the stations should be constructed and jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese responded with several suggestions for revision: China would take the responsibility for constructing the station and its ownership belongs to China; China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to help construct the station; after the station's completion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union. 35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance for China's naval buildup, especially the designs for new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev’s name, Yudin told Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type submarines. Because China had a long coastline and good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: “First, we should make clear the guiding principle. (Do you mean that) we should create (the flotilla) with your

assistance? Or (do you mean) that we should jointly 52. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and
create [the flotilla), otherwise you will not offer any China's vice premier, chairman of State Planning Com-
assistance?" Mao emphasized that he was not interested mission.
in creating a Sino-Soviet “military cooperative.”
(Source: Han Nianlong et al. Dangdai zhongguo waijiao,
113-114.) The next day, Mao discussed the proposal
with Yudin at length.

Zhang Shu Guang is associate professor at 36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who the University of Maryland at College Park were present during this discussion.

and author, most recently, of Mao's Military 37. In March 1950 and July 1951, the Chinese and

Romanticism: China and the Korean War, Soviet government signed four agreements, establishing a civil aviation company, an oil company, a non

1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press ferrous and rare metal company, and a shipbuilding of Kansas, 1995); Chen Jian is associate company jointly owned by the two countries.

professor of history at Southern Illinois 38. Xibaipo was tiny village Hebei Province where

University at Carbondale and author of the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin,

China's Road to the Korean War: The Mak-
Mikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo from 31 January to 7 ing of the Sino-American Confrontation
February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao (New York: Columbia University Press,
Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account

1994).
of Mikoyan's visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian),
"With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese
Interpreter,Chinese Historians 5:1 (Spring 1992), 45-
56. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei
Ledovsky, “Mikoyan's Secret Mission to China in
January and February 1949," Far Eastern Affairs (Mos-
cow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to
note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit
are in accord.
39. Mao Zedong attended the Moscow conference of
leaders of communist and workers' parties from social-
ist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the
40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution.
40. The “Moscow Manifesto” was adopted by the
Moscow conference of leaders of communist and work-
ers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957.
41. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for
China's first five-year plan, focusing on energy devel-
opment, heavy industry and defense industry.
42. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin's telegrams to the
CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which
Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the
Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause
“the danger of national elimination."
43. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to
dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao's
works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before
becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China
from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October
1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao
Zedong's works.
44. I. V. Kovalev, Stalin's representative to China from
1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the
Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950; N. T.
Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s
served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy
in Beijing
45. See note 30.
46. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District.
47. Mao commanded these military operations during
the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934.
48. Documents in this group are found in Russian
Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chi-

nese.

49. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People's Liberation Army's General Logistics Department. 50. Li Xiannian was a member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier and finance minister. 51. Bo Yibo was then alternate member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier, chairman of National Economic Commission.

a

MAO’S CONVERSATIONS the orientation to the Guomintang, having ample, a deviation, that in the Soviet regions

, continued from page 157

viewed it as a united front of the revolution- of China which were blockaded by the

ary forces of China. Stalin said that it is Guomintang even the petty trading bourDocument I:

necessary to depend on the Guomintang, to geoisie was liquidated and all kinds of interMao's Conversation with Yudin,

follow after that party, i.e. he spoke directly nal trade was stopped. As a result of this 31 March 1956

about the subordination of the Communist policy the Chinese Red Army, which in

Party of China to the Guomintang. This was 1929 was comprised of 300,000 fighters, From the Journal of

Top Secret

a great mistake which had held back the was reduced by 1934-35 to 25,000, and the P.F. Yudin

Copy No. 1

independent work of the Communist Party of territory which made up the Soviet regions "5" April 1956

China on the mobilization of the masses and of China was reduced by 99%. CPC organiNo. 289

on attracting them to the side of the Commu- zations in the cities were routed by the nist Party

Guomintang and the number of Commu

Through the Comintern, Mao Zedong nists was reduced from 300,000 to 26,000 RECORD OF CONVERSATION

continued, Stalin, having become after the people. The Soviet regions were totally with Comrade Mao Zedong

death of V.I. Lenin the de facto leader of the isolated from the remaining part of the coun

Comintern, gave to the CC CPC a great try and remained without any products, even 31 March 1956

number of incorrect directives. These mis- without salt. All this caused serious discon

taken and incorrect directives resulted from tent among the population of the Soviet Today I visited Mao Zedong and gave

the fact that Stalin did not take into account regions. him Comrade Khrushchev's letter about the

the opinion of the CPC. At that time Van As a result of the ultra-leftist policy of assistance which the Soviet Union will pro

Minh, being a Comintern worker, met fre- Van Minh, the more or less large regions vide: 1) in the construction of 51 enterprises quently with Stalin and tendentiously had

which remained under CPC leadership were and 3 scientific research institutes for mili

informed him about the situation in the CPC. mostly in North China (the provinces of tary industry, 2) in the construction of a Stalin, evidently, considered Van Minh the Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia), to which Van

, railroad line from Urumqi to the Soviet

single exponent of the opinion of the CC Minh's power did not extend. Van Minh, Chinese border. Mao Zedong asked me to CPC.

backed by the Comintern, essentially mansend his deep gratitude to the CC CPSU and

Van Minh and Li Lisan, who repre- aged it so that the 8th and 4th armies rethe Soviet government.

sented the CPC in the Comintern, tried to moved themselves from subordination to Further I said that I had wanted to visit

concentrate the whole leadership of the CPC the CC CPC. him (Mao Zedong) in the very first days in their own hands. They tried to present all

Van Minh and his successors saw the following my return to Beijing and to tell

the Communists who criticized the mistakes Guomintang as the “young power,” which about the work of the 20th Congress of the

of Van Minh and Li Lisan as opportunists. absorbs all the best and will be able to gain CPSU and, in particular, about Comrade

Mao Zedong said, they called me a right a victory over Japan. They spoke against the Khrushchev's speech at the closed session

opportunist and a narrow empiricist. As an independent and autonomous policy of the regarding the cult of personality. Mao

example of how the Comintern acted incor- Communist Party in the united front, and Zedong responded that because of his ill

rectly in relation to the Communist Party of against the strengthening of the armed forces ness he had found it necessary to put off the

China, Mao Zedong introduced the follow- of the CPC and revolutionary bases, against meeting with me. Mao Zedong said that the ing.

the unification of all strata of the population members of the CPC delegation who had

Under the pretext that the Third Plenum around the policy of the CPC. Van Minh's attended the 20th Congress had told him

of the CC CPC, while considering the coup- supporters tried to replace the genuinely something about the work of the Congress plotting errors of Li Lisan, had not carried the revolutionary program of the CPC, which and had brought one copy of Comrade

successive criticism of these mistakes to its consisted of 10 points, with their own sixKhrushchev's speech regarding the cult of

conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the point program, the author of which was Van personality. That speech has already been

mistakes of the Third Plenum of the CCCPC, Minh, although this was, in the essence of translated into Chinese and he had managed

the Comintern after 3-4 months had sent to the matter, a capitulationist program. In to become acquainted with it.

China two of its own workers - [Pavel] Mif conducting this whole program Van Minh,

[ During a conversation about I.V.

and Van Minh - charged with the task of backed by the Comintern and in Stalin's Stalin's mistakes Mao Zedong noted that

conducting the Fouth Plenum of the CPC. name, spoke as the main authority. Stalin's line on the China question, though Nonetheless the decisions of the Fourth Ple- Van Minh's supporters, taking advanit had basically been correct, in certain peri

num of the CC CPC made under the pressure tage of the fact that they had captured a ods he, Stalin, had made serious mistakes.

of Mif and Van Minh, were in fact more majority in the Southern bureau of the CC In his speeches in 1926 Stalin had exagger

ultra-leftist that Li Lisan's line. In them it CPC in Wuhan, gave incorrect directives to ated the revolutionary capabilities of the

was stated that it is necessary to move into the army and to the local authorities. So, for Guomintang, had spoken about the the large cities, to take control of them, and example, once, to our surprise, said Mao

, Guomintang as the main revolutionary force

not to conduct the struggle in rural regions. Zedong, even in Yanan the slogans of the in China. In 1926 Stalin had given the

In the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CPC which were posted on the walls of the Chinese Communists an instruction about

CC CPC there was permitted such, for ex- houses were replaced, on Van Minh's order,

with slogans “about a stable union with the continued to believe more in the power of people asked us whether a treaty of the Guomintang,” etc.

the Guomintang than of the Communist USSR with the new China will be signed, As a result of the serious ideological Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with why until now legally there continues to struggle and the great explanatory work fol- Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's] support- exist a treaty with the supporters of the lowing the 7th Congress of the Communist ers, on a united front with the Guomintang Guomintang, etc. The issue of the treaty was Party, especially in the last four years, the and the creation in China of a “democratic an extremely important matter for us, which majority of Communists who made left or republic." In particular, in 1945 the CCCPC determined the possibilities for the further right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van received a secret telegram, for some reason development of the PRC. At the first conMinh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from versation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I with acknowledgement of his mistakes, how- Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along ever he then once again returned to his old Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations government lines, but Stalin declined to anpositions. All of the former activity of Van with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against swer. During the second conversation I Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried this journey, since a provocation from Jiang returned once again to that issue, showing

a out under the direct leadership of the Jieshi's side was expected. However, said Stalin a telegram from the CC CPC with the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious Mao Zedong, I was required to go since same type of proposal about a treaty. I loss to the Chinese revolution.

Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow Characterizing the Comintern's activ- armed struggle against the forces of Jiang to sign the treaty, since he is the Minister of ity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were Foreign Affairs. Stalin used this suggestion Lenin was alive he had played the most on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that as a pretext for refusal and said that "it is prominent role in bringing together the forces peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he inconvenient to act in this way, since the of the Communist movement, in the creation doubted the forces of the Chinese revolu- bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chiand consolidation of the Communist parties tion. This lack of belief remained in Stalin nese government is located in Moscow." in various countries, in the fight with the even during the first stages of the formation Subsequently, Stalin refrained from any opportunists from the Second International. of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of meetings with me. From my side there was But that had been a short period in the the revolution. It is possible that Stalin's an attempt to phone him in his apartment, but activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused they responded to me that Stalin is not home, the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since and recommended that I meet with (A.I.) Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain Mikoyan. All this offended me, Mao Zedong as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh disappointment, many conversations took said, and I decided to undertake nothing more than the CC CPC. In the last period of place to the effect that the Chinese Commu- further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then the Comintern's work, especially when nist Party was going along the Yugoslav an unpleasant conversation took place with Dimitrov worked there, certain movements path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito." [I.V.) Kovalev and [N.T.) Fedorenko, who were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on I told Mao Zedong that there were no such proposed that I go on an excursion around us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van moods and conversations in our Party. the country. I sharply rejected this proposal Minh. However, in this period as well, not The bourgeois press around the world, and responded that I prefer to sleep through just a few mistakes were made by the continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right it at the dacha.” Comintern, for example, the dissolution of socialists, had taken up the version of Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, the Polish Communist Party and others. In "China's third way," and extolled it. At that

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they handed me a draft of my interview for this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, publication which had been signed by Stalin. discern three periods in the activity of the did not believe us, while the bourgoisie and In this document it was reported that negoComintern, of which the second, longest laborites sustained the illusion of the tiations are being held in Moscow on conperiod, brought the biggest loss to the Chi- “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang

“Yugoslav path of China," and only Jiang cluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This alnese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, Jieshi alone "defended" Mao Zedong, shriek- ready was a significant step forward. It is precisely in this period the Comintern dealt ing that the capitalist powers should not in possible that in Stalin's change of position, most of all with the East. We can say any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the "he will not turn from his path,” etc. This Indians and the English, who had recogdefeat of the Chinese revolution at that time behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, nized the PRC in January 1950. Negotiawas, right along with other reasons, also the since he knows us too well, he more than tions began right after this, in which result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of once had to stand in confrontation to us and Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, to fight with us.

Kaganovich and Beria took part. During the noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when The distrust of Stalin to the CPC, Mao negotiations, at Stalin's initiative there was we found out about the dissolution of the Zedong continued further, was apparent also undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union Comintern.

during the time of Mao Zedong's visit to the to assume sole ownership of the Chinese In the last period, continued Mao Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway. SubseZedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a quently, however, a decision was made about the situation in China and the possibilities Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, coop- the joint exploitation of the Chinese for the development of the revolution. He eration and mutual assistance. The Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway, besides

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