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which the PRC gave the USSR the naval complete a trip around the whole country. In to the union of the working class and the base in Port Arthur, and four joint stock relation to this I told Mao Zedong about a peasantry. Mao Zedong observed that this companies were opened in China. At Stalin's conversation which I had with Stalin, in the group of mistakes, in particular, the incorinitiative, said Mao Zedong, Manchuria and presence of several members of the Polit- rect policy in relation to the peasantry, was Xinjiang were practically turned into spheres buro, upon my return from the trip to China. discussed during Comrade Khrushchev's of influence of the USSR. Stalin insisted on Stalin at that time asked me whether the conversation with [PRC military leader]Zhu the fact that in these regions only Chinese ruling Chinese comrades are Marxists. Hav- De in Moscow; people and Soviet citizens be permitted to ing heard my affirming response, Stalin said, 4. Mistakes in the nationality question live. Representatives of other foreign states, “That's good! We can be calm. They've connected to the unlawful resettlement of including Czechs, Polish people, and En- grown up themselves, without our help." certain nationalities and others. However, glishmen who were living permanently in Mao Zedong noted that in the very pos- overall, said Mao Zedong, nationality policy those regions should be evicted from there. ing of this question Stalin's distrust of the was implemented correctly; The only ones whom Stalin skipped over Chinese Communists was also made appar- 5. Rejection of the principle of collecthrough his silence were Koreans, of whom ent.

tive leadership, conceit and surrounding himthere are counted one and a half million in Important things which, evidently, to self with toadies; Manchuria. These types of pretensions from some extent strengthened Stalin's belief in 6. Dictatorial methods and leadership Stalin's side, said Mao Zedong, were in- the CPC, were your (Yudin's) report about style; comprehensible to us. All this also was the journey to China and the Korean War- 7. Serious mistakes in foreign policy fodder for the bourgeois press and represen- performance of the Chinese people's volun- (Yugoslavia, etc.). tatives of capitalist states. In fact, continued teers.

Mao Zedong further stressed a thought Mao Zedong, in the course of the negotia- In such a way, said Mao Zedong, if we to the effect that overall in the Communist tions around this treaty, there was the most look historically at the development of the movement great victories were won. The genuine trading going on. It was an unat- Chinese revolution and at Stalin's attitude to single fact of the growth of the Socialist tractive way to pose the issue, in which it, then it is is possible to see that serious camp from 200 million people to 900 milStalin's distrust and suspicion of the CPC mistakes were made, which were especially lion people speaks for itself. However, in was brightly expressed.

widespread during the time of the the course of successful forward advance in We are glad to note, said Mao Zedong, Comintern's work. After 1945, during the some certain countries, in some certain parthat the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin period of the struggle with Jiang Jieshi, be- ties these or other mistakes arose. Mistakes Railway and Port Arthur have been returned cause of the overestimation of the forces of similar to these and others, he said, can arise to China, and the joint stock companies the Guomintang and the underestimation of in the future too. I observed that it would be have ceased to exist. In this part of the the forces of the Chinese revolution, Stalin better not to repeat mistakes like Stalin's. To conversation Mao Zedong stressed that undertook attempts at pacification, at re- this, Mao Zedong answered that, evidently, Khrushchev did not attend these negotia- straining the development of the revolution- there will be these types of mistakes again. tions, and that Bulganin's participation in ary events. And even after the victory of the The


of these mistakes are enthem was minimal. Stalin's distrust of the revolution Stalin continued to express mis- tirely explicable from the point of view of CPC was apparent in a number of other trust of the Chinese Communists. Despite all dialectical materialism, since it is well known issues, including Kovalev's notorious docu- that, said Mao Zedong, we have stood firmly that society develops through a struggle of ment about anti-Soviet moods in the leader- behind the revolutionary positions, for if we contradictions, the fight of the old with the ship of the CPC. Stalin, in passing this had permitted vascillations and indecisive- new, the new-born with the obsolete. In our document to the CC CPC, wanted, evi- ness, then, no doubt, long ago we would not consciousness, said Mao Zedong, there are dently, to stress his mistrust and suspicions. have been among the living.

still too many vestiges of the past. It lags Over the course of the time I spent in Then Mao Zedong moved on to a gen- behind the constantly developing material Moscow, said Mao Zedong, I felt that dis- eral evaluation of Stalin's role. He noted that world, behind everyday life. trust of us even more strongly and there I Stalin, without a doubt, is a great Marxist, a In our countries, continued Mao Zedong, asked that a Marxist-representative of the good and honest revolutionary. However, in much has come from the former, capitalist CC CPSU be sent to China in order to his great work in the course of a long period society. Take, for example, the issue of the become acquainted with the true situation in of time he made a number of great and application of corporal punishments to the China and to get to know the works of the serious mistakes, the primary ones of which accused. For China too, this is not a new Chinese theoreticians, and simultaneously were listed in Khrushchev's speech. These issue. Even in 1930 in the Red Army during to examine the works of Mao Zedong, since fundamental mistakes, said Mao Zedong, interrogations beatings were broadly applied. these works in the Chinese edition were not could be summed up in seven points: I, said Mao Zedong, at that time personally reviewed by the author in advance, while 1. Unlawful repressions;

was a witness to how they beat up the acthe Soviet comrades, counter to the wish of 2. Mistakes made in the course of the cused. Already at that time a corresponding the author, insisted on their publication. war, moreover, in particular in the begin- decision was made regarding a ban on cor

Mao Zedong reminded me that upon ning, rather than in the concluding period of poral punishment. However, this decision my (Yudin's) arrival in China he had persis

was violated, and in Yanan, it is true, we tently and specially recommended to me to 3. Mistakes which dealt a serious blow tried not to allow unlawful executions. With



the war;

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the creation of the PRC we undertook a this topic and getting greatly carried away further struggle with this ugly manifesta- briefly touched on a few philosophical ques- AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE tion. It is entirely evident, continued Mao tions (about the struggle of materialism with PRC P. YUDIN Zedong, that according to the logic of things idealism, etc.). In particular he stressed that during a beating the one who is being beaten it is incorrect to imagine to oneself Commu- (Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian begins to give false testimony, while the one nist society as a society which is free from Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, who is conducting the interrogation accepts any sort of contradictions, from ideological papka 410, delo 9, listy 87-98; also Center

9 that testimony as truth. This and other ves- struggle, from any sort of vestiges of the for Storage of Contemporary Documentatiges which have come to us from the bour- past. In a Communist society too, said Mao tion (TsKhSD), fond 5, opis 30, delo 163, geois past, will still for a long time be pre- Zedong, there will be good and bad people. listy 88-99; see also Problemi Dalnego served in the consciousness of people. A Further he said that the ideological work of Vostok 5 (1994), 101-110. Translation for striving for pomposity, for ostentatiousness, China still to a significant extent suffers CWIHP by Mark Doctoroff, National Secufor broad anniversary celebrations, this is from a spirit of puffery (nachetnichestva rity Archive]

] also a vestige of the psychology of bour- and cliches. The Chinese press, in particugeois man, since such customs and such lar, still cannot answer to the demands which psychology objectively could not arise are presented to it. On the pages of the among the poorest peasantry and the work- newspapers the struggle of opinions is lack

Document II: ing class. The presence of these and other ing, there are no serious theoretical discus- Mao's Conversation with Chervonenko, circumstances, said Mao Zedong, creates sions. Because of insufficient time Mao

26 December 1960 the conditions for the arising of those or Zedong expressed a wish to meet with me other mistakes with which the Communist again to talk a little specifically about issues From the diary of

TOP SECRET parties will have to deal. of philosophy.

S. V. CHERVONENKO Copy No.3 I observed that the main reason for At the end of the discussion Iinquired of Stalin's mistakes was the cult of personality, Mao Zedong whether he had become acbordering on deification.

quainted with the Pravda editorial about the "6" January 1961 Mao Zedong, having agreed with me, harm of the cult of personality, a translation Outgoing No. 2 noted that Stalin's mistakes accumulated of which was placed in [Renmin Ribao) on gradually, from small ones growing to huge 30 March. He responded that he still had not RECORD OF CONVERSATION ones. To crown all this, he did not acknowl- managed to read through that article, but

with comrade Mao Zedong edge his own mistakes, although it is well they had told him that it is a very good known that it is characteristic of a person to article. Now, said Mao Zedong, we are

26 December 1960 make mistakes. Mao Zedong told how, preparing for publication in Renmin Ribao a reviewing Lenin's manuscripts, he had be- lead article which is dedicated to this issue, According to the instructions of the come convinced of the fact that even Lenin which should appear in the newspapers in Center I visited Mao Zedong today. crossed out and re-wrote some phrases or the coming week. Beginning on 16 March, In the name of the CPSU CC and comother in his own works. In conclusion to his he noted jokingly, all the newspapers in the rade N.S. Khrushchev personally, I concharacterization of Stalin, Mao Zedong once world raised a ruckus about this issue- gratulated Mao Zedong with his 67th birthagain stressed that Stalin had made mistakes China alone for the time being is silent. day and wished him good health, long life not in everything, but on some certain is- Then I briefly told Mao Zedong about and fruitful work. sues.

the arrival in the PRC of 16 prominent So- Mao Zedong was very impressed by this Overall, he stressed that the materials viet scholars and about the beginning of the warm attention from the CPSU CC and from the Congress made a strong impression work of a theoretical conference dedicated comrade N.S. Khrushchev. He was deeply on him. The spirit of criticism and self- to the 20th Congress, which is opening today moved, and, without concealing his emocriticism and the atmosphere which was in the Club of Soviet specialists. Soviet and tions, he most warmly expressed his thanks created after the Congress will help us, he Chinese scholars will deliver speeches at the for the friendly congratulations and wishes. said, to express our thoughts more freely on conference.

Mao Zedong stated that it is a great honor for a range of issues. It is good that the CPSU Mao Zedong listened to these thoughts him to receive these high congratulations on has posed all these issues. For us, said Mao with great interest.

his birthday. He asked to give his warmest Zedong, it would be difficult to take the The conversation continued for three thanks to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and initiative on this matter.

hours. Mao Zedong was in a good mood, wished him, personally, as well as all the Mao Zedong declared that he proposes and joked often.

members of the CPSU CC Presidium, good to continue in the future the exchange of The Deputy Head of the Adminstration health and big fruitful successes in their opinions on these issues during Comrade of Affairs of the CPC Yang Shankun, the work. Mikoyan's visit, and also at a convenient Chief of the CCCPC Translation Bureau Shi Then, on Mao Zedong's initiative, we time with Comrades Khrushchev and Zhe and Counselor of the USSR Embassy in had a conversation. He told me that the Bulganin.

the PRC Skvortsov, T.F. attended the con- Chinese leaders have to work a lot now. “As Then Mao Zedong got distracted from versation.

for myself - he mentioned - I am now working much less than before. Though - Mao (before they are adopted) of the most impor- instructions on this question to the provZedong went on - I mostly work 8 hours a tant party and state conferences and meet- inces. day (sometimes more), the productivity is ings.

Then he told me that the CPC CC Plenot the same as it used to be. His compre- Mao Zedong agreed with my statement, num will take place in January 1961 (the last hension of the material studied is less effec- that in spite of a certain redistribution of Plenum was in April 1960), where the CPC tive, and the necessity arose [for him) to authority between the CPC CC leaders he CC delegation at the Moscow Conference read documents printed in large charac- (Mao Zedong) still has great responsibilities will present its report. It is planned to adopt ters.” He mentioned in this connection that in the leadership of the party and the country.

a short Plenum resolution on this question, “this must be a general rule that people of He said that he still often has to work at night.

He said that he still often has to work at night. expressing support of the Moscow advanced age are in an unequal position to “The principal workload is connected with Conference's decisions. Apart from the the young as regards the efficiency of their the reading of numerous documents and ma- results of the Conference the January Plework.”

terials.” Twice a day, for instance, he said, num of the CPC CC will also discuss the Mao Zedong then emphasized that his “they bring me two big volumes of routine economic plan of the PRC for 1961. resignation from the post of the Chairman of information on international affairs, which After that Mao Zedong told me that the PRC had lessened the load of state of course it is necessary to look through to there are certain difficulties in the PRC which activities on him. Speaking about this he keep updated, not to lose contact with life.” make it impossible to elaborate a perspecmentioned that at the time when he had In the course of the conversation I men- tive plan, “and we also lack the experience submitted this proposal he had been sup- tioned that the rapidly developing interna- for this.” At first, he went on, the CPC CC ported only by the Politburo members, while tional affairs demand constant attention and wanted to work out a plan for the three many members of the CPC CC had ob- timely analysis. I stressed the outstanding remaining years of the second five year plan. jected. “There was even more disagreement significance of the Moscow Conference However, 1960 is already over. So it was among the rank and file communists." By where the recent international developments decided to make separate plans for the two now, he said, everybody was supporting this were submitted to deep Marxist-Leninist remaining years of the five year plan. He decision. analysis.

said that the current plan of economic develAs he continued talking about his work Mao Zedong agreed with this statement opment for the first quarter of 1961 exists and the activities of the leadership of the and quickly responded to the topic, saying: and is practically put into implementation. CPC CC, Mao Zedong said that for several “The Moscow Conference was a success, it For my part I told him about the favoryears, practically from 1953-54 he was not was thoroughly prepared, and the editing able conditions for planning achieved in the chairing the Politbureau meetings any more.

commission, which included the representa- Soviet Union, of the adoption of the ecoHe said that from 1956 Liu Shaoqi is in tives of 26 parties, worked fruitfully." For- nomic plan and budget for 1961 by the charge of all the routine activities of the eign representatives, he went on, are often Supreme Council of the USSR.

, Politbureau, while he is taking part in some puzzled and ask why was the conference so Expressing a critical opinion of the lag of the meetings from time to time. Mao long. Mao Zedong said that they apparently with the adoption of economic plans in the Zedong mentioned that he personally is do not have a full understanding of the real PRC, Mao Zedong said that the plan for usually working and consulting mostly with situation when it took more than 10 days for 1960, for instance, was adopted only in the members of the Permanent Committee each of the representatives of 81 parties to April 1960, and on some occasions plans of the CPC CC Politbureau. Sometimes deliver his speech. Then there were repeated were adopted by the sessions of CAPR [Chispecially invited persons also take part in speeches, not to mention the work on the nese Assembly of People's Representatives] the meetings of the Permanent Committee. documents themselves. He stated: “It is very only in June-July. He explained it by the

Then Mao Zedong told that on some good that there were arguments and discus- lack of sufficient experience in the PRC. occasions he takes part in the enlargened sions at the conference. This is not bad.” I told Mao Zedong of the forthcoming Politbureau meetings. Leading party ex- Then, agreeing with my statement on Plenum of the CPSU CC, of the serious ecutives from the periphery are usually in- the deep theoretical character of the docu- attention paid by the party and government vited to these meetings, for instance the ments of the Moscow Conference, Mao to the problems of agricultural development secretaries and deputy secretaries of the Zedong added that these documents caused a in the Soviet Union, including some special CPC CC bureaus from certain regions, the great confusion in the Western imperialist features of the forthcoming Plenum, where secretaries of the CPC Provincial Commit- circles, among our common enemies. the most important questions of further intees. Mao Zedong said that now he practi- During the conversation I gave a brief crease of agricultural production will be cally never speaks at the CPC CC Plenums, review of the work to popularize the results discussed and resolved. and even at the CPC Congress he just deliv- of the Moscow Conference in the Soviet Mao Zedong said that the CPC CC is ers a short introductory speech. His resigna- Union, to study the Conference's documents now also “specializing” on agriculture. Intion from the post of the Chairman of the within the political education network. creasing the attention to this question, he Republic gave him also an opportunity to In his turn Mao Zedong told me that the continued, “we are even thinking about narrefrain from participating in the work of the study of the Moscow Conference documents rowing the industrial front to some extent." Supreme State Conference. However, he is also being organized by the CPC. As for Explaining this idea he said that it is about a mentioned in this connection, I systemati- the summarizing of the Conference's results, certain lowering of the scale of capital incally study the documents and materials the CPC CC has not yet sent any precise vestments into the industrial production, in


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cluding some branches of heavy industry; were however “displeased” that the Chinese came to see us to our car. Bidding us a warm capital investments into the construction of delegation was not able to visit them. He farewell, he once again asked to give his public buildings will also be cut.

said, laughing, that this protest should be warm greetings to comrade N.S. Khrushchev In the course of the conversation he addressed to the members of the delegation, and the members of the CPSUCC Presidium briefly mentioned the bottlenecks of the for instance to Yang Shankun, who is present and most sincere thanks for their congratulaPRC's industry, pointing, for instance, at the here at the conversation, as the Politburo had tions and warm wishes. mining and coal industry, and the transport no objections against prolonging the visit. I Candidate member of the CPC CC Secas well, talked about the interconnection of noted in the same tone that the Chinese retariat Yang Shankun, the functionaries of these industries, their influence on the de- friends had disarmed the "displeased" So- the CPC CC apparatus Yan Min Fu and Zhu velopment of many other branches (steel viet comrades, saying that it was not their Jueren, Counsellor Minister of the USSR production etc.).

last visit to the Soviet Union. So, Mao Embassy in the PRC Sudarikov N.G. and the Returning to the problem of agriculture, Zedong said, one can maintain that they owe counsellor of the embassy Rakhmanin O.B. he emphasized that the lack of appropriate you.

were present at the conversation. attention to this most important field of the When he broadened the topic of the PRC's economy, as well as to the develop- usefulness of these meetings and visits I told The Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC ment of the light industry, would make it him that during the trip of the Chinese delimpossible to satisfy the requirements of the egation Soviet citizens had repeatedly asked

[signature] population for foodstuffs, clothing and con- to give him (Mao Zedong) their best wishes

S. CHERVONENKO sumer goods. Our own experience, Mao and expressed their hope that he will also Zedong went on, persuaded us that "orga- come to the Soviet Union when he finds it (Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 55, papka nizing the production of living plants and convenient, visit different cities, enterprises,

convenient, visit different cities, enterprises, 454, delo 9, listy 98-105; translation for animals is much more difficult than the collective farms, especially that he had had CWIHP by Maxim Korobochkin.] production of lifeless items - metals, ore, no chance to get better acquainted with the coal etc.” He stated jokingly that “the dead country during his previous visits. He rewill not run away from us and can wait.” acted warmly and stated that he “must cer

1. Memorandum of conversation, Yudin-Mao Zedong,

2 May 1956, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian In the course of the conversation Mao tainly find the time for such a visit.”

Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, Zedong repeatedly stressed that after the Then Mao Zedong told that in China he delo 9, listy 124-130. revolution in the PRC the material require- is criticized by the functionaries from the ments of the Chinese population have been periphery, who are displeased that he has not steadily growing. So the CPC must seri- been able yet to visit a number of cities and ously contemplate these problems, and the regions - Xinjiang, Yanan, Guizhou, Tibet, way to overcome the arising difficulties. Of Taiyuan, Baotou, Xian, Lanzhou etc. These course, it is not the difficulties only that workers, he said, used to call me “the Chairmatter. Even when we have successes, new man for half of the Republic,” and when I problems and tasks are appearing all the resigned from this post in favor of Liu Shaoqi, same. He stated in this connection, that even they started to call me “the Chairman of the in 300-400 years new problems will be still CPC for half of the country." arising, demanding to be solved, "no devel- In the final part of the conversation Mao opment will be possible without them.” Zedong returned to the notion of his alleged

I shared with Mao Zedong some of the retirement from active state and party work, impressions from my trip around the Soviet saying half jokingly that now "he will wait Union together with the Chinese delegation for the moment when he will become an headed by Liu Shaoqi, stressing the signifi- ordinary member of the Politburo." I have cance of the trip for the strengthening of not consulted anybody in the party on this friendship and solidarity between the USSR matter, he mentioned, even him, Mao Zedong and the PRC.

said, pointing at Yang Shankun, you are the Mao Zedong actively supported this first whom I am telling about my "conpart of the conversation. He said that in spiracy." China they are very happy with this visit, “it Iexpressed assurance that the members is very good that it took place.” Both our of the CPC will apparently not agree to such peoples, he said with emphasis, demanded a proposal from Mao Zedong. Then, he said such an action to be taken. “By making this jokingly, I will have to wait until everybody decision, the Central Committees of both realizes its necessity; “in several years they parties satisfied the demands of both will have mercy for me.” peoples.”

The conversation lasted more than an I told him as if jokingly, that many hour in an exceptionally cordial, friendly republics of the USSR, Ukraine for instance, atmosphere. When it was over Mao Zedong

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THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S parts. The first part will discuss the content Moscow's part between 1950 and 1953 that

APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET of the Foreign Ministry's report, highlight- had “impeded the successful development
RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ing items of particular interest as well as of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of
SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959 several important lacunae. The second part full equality, mutuality, and trust.”6
will consider how Zimyanin's assessment

His views on this matter, interestingly by Mark Kramer

contributed to, and was affected by, changes enough, were very similar to conclusions

under way in Soviet policy-making toward reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the In early September 1959, Soviet For- China. Those changes, as explained below, early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and eign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Beijing to project an image of monolithic the head of the Foreign Ministry's Far East- Ministry and therefore gave increased promi- unity (an image, incidentally, that was not ern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to pre- nence to Zimyanin's report.

far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time pare a detailed background report on China

could sense that negotiations leading to the for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of

1950 had generated a modicum of ill will September and early October to take part in In both substance and tone, Zimyanin's between the two countries. According to a ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary analysis of Soviet relations with China re- secret background report, Mao was "highly of the Communist victory in China. The flected the burgeoning unease among Soviet dissatisfied with (Moscow's attempted exSoviet leader's trip, as Gromyko was well officials. Although his view of the relation- actions on China," and Zhou Enlai said he aware, was also intended to alleviate a grow- ship was still distinctly favorable overall, he "would rather resign than accede to [Soviet) ing rift between Moscow and Beijing-a was quick to point out many areas of incipi- demands as presented."? Although Soviet rift that had not yet flared up in public. ent conflict between the two countries. His and Chinese officials did their best to conInitially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to report suggested that a full-fledged rift could ceal any further hints of bilateral discord travel to China because he had numerous be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent over the next few years, word continued to other commitments at around the same time; differences were bound to cause growing filter into Washington about “strain and difbut after discussing the matter with his col- acrimony and recriminations unless appro- ficulties between Communist China and Rusleagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided priate steps were taken. In citing a litany of sia”—the same strain and difficulties that that face-to-face negotiations with Mao disagreements about key ideological and Zimyanin noted. 8 Zedong and other top Chinese officials practical questions, the report drew a causal By tracing the origins of the Sino-Sowould be the only way to “clear the atmo- link between internal political conditions in viet conflict back to the Stalin period, sphere” and restore a “sense of friendship China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy,

China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, Zimyanin's report was quite different from between our peoples.”l

a theme emphasized by many Western ana- the public statements made later on by offiZimyanin completed a top-secret, 30- lysts as well. Although Zimyanin con- cials in both Moscow and Beijing, who page survey of "The Political, Economic, cluded the document on an upbeat note- averred that the split had begun when the and International Standing of the PRC”(Re- claiming that “relations of fraternal amity two sides disagreed about Khrushchev's seport No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the and fruitful cooperation have been estab- cret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress same day that Khrushchev began a highly lished on a lasting basis and are growing in February 1956.9 Until recently, the large

a publicized visit to the United States. The wider and stronger with every passing year" majority of Western (and Russian) scholars Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 his analysis left little doubt that existing had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in September, just a day before he was due to tensions between Moscow and Beijing could which to pinpoint the origins of the disleave for China. On his way back from the eventually take a sharp turn for the worse. pute.10 It is now clear, both from Zimyanin's United States, he was given a copy of Four specific points about the document report and from other new evidence (see Zimyanin's report. That copy is now housed are worth highlighting.

below), that tensions actually had begun in the former CPSU Central Committee First, the report acknowledged that fric- emerging much earlier. archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as tion between the two Communist states had This is not to say that the whole Sinothe Center for Storage of Contemporary been present, to some degree, since the very Soviet rift, especially the bitter confrontaDocumentation, or TsKhSD).2 The final start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin tion of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. section of Zimyanin's report, which focuses did not imply that China had been merely a Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the “reluctant and suspicious ally" of Moscow in but the reality is usually more complex. Far most interesting portion of the document, is the early 1950s, he emphasized that the So- from being a "reluctant and suspicious ally" translated here in full except for a few extra- viet Union under Stalin had “violated the of the Soviet Union during the first half of neous passages at the beginning and end.3 sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet Zimyanin's appraisal of Sino-Soviet People's Republic" and had “kept the PRC in

People's Republic" and had kept the PRC in experience and to forge close, comprehenrelations is intriguing not only because of its a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR."5 sive ties with Moscow in the name of socialsubstance, but also because of the light it No doubt, these criticisms were motivated in ist internationalism. Even so, the latest sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. part by the then-prevailing line of de- memoirs and archival revelations, including Both points will be briefly taken up in this Stalinization, but Zimyanin provided con- Zimyanin's report, leave little doubt that the introduction, which is divided into two main crete examples of “negative" actions on seeds of a conflict between Moscow and

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