網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

cluding some branches of heavy industry; capital investments into the construction of public buildings will also be cut.

In the course of the conversation he briefly mentioned the bottlenecks of the PRC's industry, pointing, for instance, at the mining and coal industry, and the transport as well, talked about the interconnection of these industries, their influence on the development of many other branches (steel production etc.).

Returning to the problem of agriculture, he emphasized that the lack of appropriate attention to this most important field of the PRC's economy, as well as to the development of the light industry, would make it impossible to satisfy the requirements of the population for foodstuffs, clothing and consumer goods. Our own experience, Mao Zedong went on, persuaded us that "organizing the production of living plants and animals is much more difficult than the production of lifeless items - metals, ore, coal etc." He stated jokingly that "the dead will not run away from us and can wait."

In the course of the conversation Mao Zedong repeatedly stressed that after the revolution in the PRC the material requirements of the Chinese population have been steadily growing. So the CPC must seriously contemplate these problems, and the way to overcome the arising difficulties. Of course, it is not the difficulties only that matter. Even when we have successes, new problems and tasks are appearing all the same. He stated in this connection, that even in 300-400 years new problems will be still arising, demanding to be solved, "no development will be possible without them."

I shared with Mao Zedong some of the impressions from my trip around the Soviet Union together with the Chinese delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi, stressing the significance of the trip for the strengthening of friendship and solidarity between the USSR and the PRC.

Mao Zedong actively supported this part of the conversation. He said that in China they are very happy with this visit, "it is very good that it took place." Both our peoples, he said with emphasis, demanded such an action to be taken. "By making this decision, the Central Committees of both parties satisfied the demands of both peoples."

I told him as if jokingly, that many republics of the USSR, Ukraine for instance,

were however "displeased" that the Chinese delegation was not able to visit them. He said, laughing, that this protest should be addressed to the members of the delegation, for instance to Yang Shankun, who is present here at the conversation, as the Politburo had no objections against prolonging the visit. I noted in the same tone that the Chinese friends had disarmed the "displeased" Soviet comrades, saying that it was not their last visit to the Soviet Union. So, Mao Zedong said, one can maintain that they owe you.

When he broadened the topic of the usefulness of these meetings and visits I told him that during the trip of the Chinese delegation Soviet citizens had repeatedly asked to give him (Mao Zedong) their best wishes and expressed their hope that he will also come to the Soviet Union when he finds it convenient, visit different cities, enterprises, convenient, visit different cities, enterprises, collective farms, especially that he had had no chance to get better acquainted with the country during his previous visits. He reacted warmly and stated that he “must certainly find the time for such a visit."

Then Mao Zedong told that in China he is criticized by the functionaries from the periphery, who are displeased that he has not been able yet to visit a number of cities and regions - Xinjiang, Yanan, Guizhou, Tibet, Taiyuan, Baotou, Xian, Lanzhou etc. These workers, he said, used to call me "the Chairman for half of the Republic," and when I resigned from this post in favor of Liu Shaoqi, they started to call me "the Chairman of the CPC for half of the country."

In the final part of the conversation Mao Zedong returned to the notion of his alleged retirement from active state and party work, saying half jokingly that now "he will wait for the moment when he will become an ordinary member of the Politburo." I have not consulted anybody in the party on this matter, he mentioned, even him, Mao Zedong said, pointing at Yang Shankun, you are the first whom I am telling about my "conspiracy."

I expressed assurance that the members of the CPC will apparently not agree to such a proposal from Mao Zedong. Then, he said jokingly, I will have to wait until everybody realizes its necessity; "in several years they will have mercy for me."

The conversation lasted more than an hour in an exceptionally cordial, friendly atmosphere. When it was over Mao Zedong

came to see us to our car. Bidding us a warm farewell, he once again asked to give his warm greetings to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and the members of the CPSU CC Presidium and most sincere thanks for their congratulations and warm wishes.

Candidate member of the CPC CC Secretariat Yang Shankun, the functionaries of the CPC CC apparatus Yan Min Fu and Zhu Jueren, Counsellor Minister of the USSR Embassy in the PRC Sudarikov N.G. and the counsellor of the embassy Rakhmanin O.B. were present at the conversation.

The Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

[signature]

S. CHERVONENKO

[Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 55, papka 454, delo 9, listy 98-105; translation for CWIHP by Maxim Korobochkin.]

1. Memorandum of conversation, Yudin-Mao Zedong, 2 May 1956, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, delo 9, listy 124-130.

THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959

by Mark Kramer

In early September 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed the head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a detailed background report on China for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of September and early October to take part in ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory in China. The Soviet leader's trip, as Gromyko was well aware, was also intended to alleviate a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing-a rift that had not yet flared up in public. Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to travel to China because he had numerous other commitments at around the same time; but after discussing the matter with his colleagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided that face-to-face negotiations with Mao Zedong and other top Chinese officials would be the only way to "clear the atmosphere" and restore a "sense of friendship between our peoples."

Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30page survey of "The Political, Economic, and International Standing of the PRC" (Report No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the same day that Khrushchev began a highly publicized visit to the United States. The Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 September, just a day before he was due to leave for China. On his way back from the United States, he was given a copy of Zimyanin's report. That copy is now housed in the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD).2 The final section of Zimyanin's report, which focuses on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the most interesting portion of the document, is translated here in full except for a few extraneous passages at the beginning and end.3

Zimyanin's appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations is intriguing not only because of its substance, but also because of the light it sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. Both points will be briefly taken up in this introduction, which is divided into two main

parts. The first part will discuss the content of the Foreign Ministry's report, highlighting items of particular interest as well as several important lacunae. The second part will consider how Zimyanin's assessment contributed to, and was affected by, changes under way in Soviet policy-making toward China. Those changes, as explained below, temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Ministry and therefore gave increased prominence to Zimyanin's report.

Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations

In both substance and tone, Zimyanin's analysis of Soviet relations with China reflected the burgeoning unease among Soviet officials. Although his view of the relationship was still distinctly favorable overall, he was quick to point out many areas of incipient conflict between the two countries. His report suggested that a full-fledged rift could be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent differences were bound to cause growing acrimony and recriminations unless appropriate steps were taken. In citing a litany of disagreements about key ideological and practical questions, the report drew a causal link between internal political conditions in China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, a theme emphasized by many Western analysts as well.4 Although Zimyanin concluded the document on an upbeat noteclaiming that "relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing lished on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year"— his analysis left little doubt that existing tensions between Moscow and Beijing could eventually take a sharp turn for the worse.

Four specific points about the document are worth highlighting.

First, the report acknowledged that friction between the two Communist states had been present, to some degree, since the very start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin did not imply that China had been merely a "reluctant and suspicious ally" of Moscow in the early 1950s, he emphasized that the Soviet Union under Stalin had "violated the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic" and had "kept the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR."5 No doubt, these criticisms were motivated in part by the then-prevailing line of deStalinization, but Zimyanin provided concrete examples of "negative" actions on

Moscow's part between 1950 and 1953 that had "impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust."6

His views on this matter, interestingly enough, were very similar to conclusions reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and Beijing to project an image of monolithic unity (an image, incidentally, that was not far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time could sense that negotiations leading to the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will between the two countries. According to a secret background report, Mao was "highly dissatisfied with [Moscow's] attempted exactions on China," and Zhou Enlai said he "would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] demands as presented." Although Soviet and Chinese officials did their best to conceal any further hints of bilateral discord over the next few years, word continued to filter into Washington about "strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia"-the same strain and difficulties that Zimyanin noted.8

By tracing the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict back to the Stalin period, Zimyanin's report was quite different from the public statements made later on by officials in both Moscow and Beijing, who averred that the split had begun when the two sides disagreed about Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956.9 Until recently, the large majority of Western (and Russian) scholars had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in which to pinpoint the origins of the dispute. 10 It is now clear, both from Zimyanin's report and from other new evidence (see below), that tensions actually had begun emerging much earlier.

This is not to say that the whole SinoSoviet rift, especially the bitter confrontation of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, but the reality is usually more complex. Far from being a "reluctant and suspicious ally" of the Soviet Union during the first half of the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet experience and to forge close, comprehensive ties with Moscow in the name of socialist internationalism. Even so, the latest memoirs and archival revelations, including Zimyanin's report, leave little doubt that the seeds of a conflict between Moscow and

Beijing were present, at least in some fashion, as early as 1950-53.

Second, while giving due emphasis to problems that arose during the Stalin era, Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th Soviet Party Congress and by the "Hundred Flowers" campaign in China. Zimyanin claimed that the Chinese leadership had "fully supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences” after the 20th Party Congress, but he conceded that Beijing's assessment of Stalin was considerably "different from our own" and that the Congress had prompted "the Chinese friends. . . to express critical comments about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations." Even more damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He cited a wide range of "hostile statements" and "denunciations of the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship" that had surfaced in China. "The airing of these types of statements," he wrote, "can in no way be justified." The report expressed particular concern about a number of territorial demands that had been raised against the Soviet Union.11

Third, as one might expect, Zimyanin devoted considerable attention to the SinoSoviet ideological quarrels that began to surface during the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the form of disagreements about the establishment of "people's communes," the role of material versus ideological incentives, the nature of the transition to socialism and Communism, and other aspects of Marxism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter disputes erupted over territorial demands and questions of global strategy (not to mention a clash of personalities between Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had not yet come to dominate the relationship in September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideological differences that were particularly salient at the time. His report provides further evidence that ideological aspects of the conflict must be taken seriously on their own merits, rather than being seen as a mere smokescreen for geopolitical or other con

omissions in Zimyanin's assessment, which
are worth briefly explicating here because
they provide a better context for understand-
ing the document:

• Stalin's relationship with Mao. Al-
though Zimyanin discussed problems in
though Zimyanin discussed problems in
Sino-Soviet relations that arose during the
Stalin era, he did not explicitly refer to the
way Stalin behaved when Mao visited the
Soviet Union for nearly two-and-a-half
months beginning in December 1949. This
omission is unfortunate because even a few
brief comments might have helped clarify
what has been a matter of great confusion.
First-hand accounts of the Stalin-Mao rela-
tionship by former Soviet and Chinese offi-
cials offer sharply conflicting interpreta-
tions. One of the most jaundiced descrip-
tions of the way Stalin treated Mao can be
found in Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs:

Stalin would sometimes not lay eyes
on [the Chinese leader] for days at a
time

and since Stalin neither saw
Mao nor ordered anyone else to
entertain him, no one dared to go
see him. We began hearing rumors
that Mao was very unhappy be-
cause he was being kept under lock
and key and everyone was ignoring
him. Mao let it be known that if the
situation continued, he would leave.
... In this way, Stalin sowed the
seeds of hostility and anti-Soviet,
anti-Russian sentiment in China. 12

A similar appraisal of Stalin's demeanor
was offered by Andrei Gromyko, who
claimed in his memoirs that when Stalin
hosted a special dinner for Mao in February
1950, the atmosphere was "oppressive" and
the two leaders "seemed personally to have
nothing in common that would enable them
to establish the necessary rapport."13 Be-
cause Khrushchev's and Gromyko's obser-
vations fit so well with everything that is
known about Stalin's general behavior, their
accounts have been widely accepted in the
West.

More recently, though, a very different picture of the Stalin-Mao relationship has emerged from testimony by Nikolai Fedorenko, a former diplomat at the Soviet embassy in China who served as an interpreter for Stalin, and by Shi Zhe, a former official in the Chinese foreign ministry who Finally, there are a few conspicuous interpreted for Mao. Both men were present

cerns.

during all the high-level Sino-Soviet meetings in 1949-1950.14 Although Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that several points of contention had surfaced between Stalin and Mao, they both emphasized that the relationship overall was amicable. Fedorenko specifically took issue with Khrushchev's account:

Later on it was claimed that Stalin had not received Mao Zedong for nearly a month, and in general had not displayed appropriate courtesy toward the Chinese leader. These reports created a false impression of the host and his guest. In actual fact, everything happened quite differently. Judging from what I saw first-hand, the behavior of the two leaders and the overall atmosphere were totally different from subsequent depictions. ... From the very first meeting, Stalin invariably displayed the utmost courtesy toward his Chinese counterpart. Throughout the talks with Mao Zedong, Stalin was equable, restrained, and attentive to his guest. His thoughts never wandered and were always completely focused on the conversation.

Likewise, Shi Zhe noted that "Stalin was visibly moved [when he met the Chinese leader] and continuously dispensed compliments to Chairman Mao." Shi dismissed rumors in the West that "Stalin had put Chairman Mao under house arrest" during a particularly tense stage in the negotiations leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alli

ance.

Even with the benefit of new evidence, it is difficult to sort out the discrepancies between these accounts. So far, transcripts of only the first two private meetings between Mao and Stalin-on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950-are available. 15 Both transcripts shed a good deal of light on the Stalin-Mao relationship (not least by confirming how long the interval was between meetings), but they do not, and indeed cannot, convey a full sense of Stalin's behavior toward Mao. Gestures, facial expressions, and even some unflattering comments are apt to be omitted from these stenographic reports either deliberately or inadvertently, just as there are crucial gaps in numerous

other East-bloc documents. 16 The two transcripts also do not reveal anything about unpleasant incidents that may have occurred outside the formal talks. Although retrospective accounts by aides to Stalin and Mao who took part in the meetings can be helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs must be used with extreme caution, especially when they are published long after the events they describe. Khrushchev's recollections were compiled more than 15 years after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko's, Fedorenko's, and Shi's accounts were written nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the memoir-writers relied on notes and documents from the period they were discussing and depicted events as faithfully as they could, the passage of so many years is bound to cause certain failings of memory. 17

Two important factors might lead one to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko's version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than to Khrushchev's. First, Fedorenko and Shi participated in all the private talks between Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and Gromyko were present at only the public meetings. 18 Second, it is conceivable that Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin's behavior in an unduly negative light. (Khrushchev may have done this sub-consciously, or he may have been seeking to lay the "blame" on Stalin for the subsequent rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Stalin. One could therefore make a prima facie case on behalf of Fedorenko's ac

count.

On the other hand, most of the latest evidence tends to support Khrushchev's and Gromyko's versions, rather than Fedorenko's. One of the most trusted aides to Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, who remained a staunch defender of the Soviet dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that when the Chinese delegation came to Moscow in December 1949, Mao had to wait many days or even weeks after his initial perfunctory meeting with Stalin until the Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him again. 19 This corresponds precisely to what Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. Khrushchev's account is further strengthened by the recollections of General Ivan

Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military officer who served as Stalin's personal envoy to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev recounted the tribulations and rudeness that Mao had experienced during his visit:

Mao was met [on 16 December] by Bulganin and Molotov, who brusquely turned down his invitation to join him for a meal, saying that it would be contrary to protocol. For the same reason, they declined Mao's invitation to ride with him to his assigned dacha.... Mao was clearly upset by the cool reception. That same day, Stalin received Mao Zedong, but they held no confidential talks of the sort that Mao had wanted. After that, Mao spent numerous boring days at the dacha. Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan stopped by to see him, but had only very brief official conversations. I was in touch with Mao and saw him every day, and I was aware that he was upset and apprehensive.20

Kovalev also noted that in late December, Mao asked him to convey a formal request to Stalin for another private meeting, indicating that "the resolution of all matters, including the question of [Mao's] spare time and medical treatment, [would] be left entirely to your [i.e., Stalin's] discretion."21 According to Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and "as before, Mao remained practically in isolation." Even when Mao "retaliated by refusing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador to China," it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev emphasized that it was “not until Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow at the end of January 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more successfully." All this amply corroborates what Khrushchev wrote.

Khrushchev's depiction of the StalinMao relationship is also borne out by newly declassified testimony from another key source, namely Mao himself. In a private meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about the "ugly atmosphere" he had confronted in Moscow in 1950 and about the "profound distrust and suspicion" that Stalin had shown toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Mao also recalled the "insulting" treatment he had suffered after his prelimi

nary discussions with Stalin:

From then on, Stalin sought to avoid me. I tried, for my part, to phone Stalin's apartment, but was told that he was not home and that I should meet with Mikoyan instead. I was offended by all this, and so I decided that I would not do anything more and would simply spend my time resting at the dacha. Then I had an unpleasant conversation with Kovalev and Fedorenko, who suggested that I go for a trip around the country. I flatly rejected this proposal and said that I might as well just "go on sleeping at my dacha."22

Mao revealed these "problems and difficulties" to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech at the CCP's Chengdu conference in March 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight years earlier:

In 1950, Stalin and I argued with each other in Moscow for two months about our mutual defense treaty, about the Chungchang railroad, about joint economic ventures, and about our boundary lines. Our attitudes were such that when he offered a proposal which was unacceptable to me, I would resist it; but when he insisted on it, I would give in. I did so for the sake of socialism.23

Mao noted with particular distaste that he had allowed Stalin to get away with treating Manchuria and Xinjiang as mere "colonies" of the Soviet Union-a point mentioned by Zimyanin as well.24 At Chengdu and in numerous other speeches before closed CCP gatherings, Mao repeatedly condemned Stalin's "serious mistakes" and "shortcomings," a practice that suggests long pent-up feelings of animosity toward the late Soviet dictator, 25

Furthermore, even some of the comments in Fedorenko's and Shi's own articles imply—if only inadvertently—that the relationship between Stalin and Mao was not really so cordial after all. Both Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that a residue of tension still plagued Sino-Soviet relations in

the early 1950s because of Stalin's refusal during the Chinese civil war to provide greater support for the Communist rebels.26 This tension inevitably caused personal strains between the two leaders, as Mao himself observed during his March 1956 meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in one of his secret speeches two years later at the Chengdu conference:

The victory of the Chinese revolution was against Stalin's wishes.... When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake. We made no protest.27

Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into a “sullen" mood during the 1949-50 meetings whenever Mao was being deliberately "evasive." This was particularly evident, according to Shi, when negotiations on the treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to "gauge Chairman Mao's intentions." Shi added that the testy exchanges between the two leaders prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcastically that Stalin was wont to "blame the Chinese for all the mistakes" in bilateral relations. Similarly, Fedorenko alluded to Stalin's extreme suspiciousness during the talks, as reflected in the Soviet dictator's incessant complaints about “conspiracies," "plots," and "illegal murmurs." This behavior, too, suggests that Stalin may not have been quite as hospitable as Fedorenko initially implied.

Despite the wealth of new evidence, there are still many unresolved questions about the nature of Stalin's relationship with Mao. Further scrutiny of the emerging documentation and first-hand accounts will be essential to set the record straight. Khrushchev's and Gromyko's recollections seem to be corroborated by the latest disclosures, but Fedorenko's and Shi's accounts must be taken seriously, at least for now. Zimyanin's analysis, with its strong criticism of Soviet policy during the early 1950s, is more compatible with Khrushchev's version than with Fedorenko's, but the report provides no conclusive evidence one way or the other.

The crises in Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956. During the standoff between the Soviet Union and Poland in October 1956, Chinese officials generally supported the defiant Polish leader,

Wladyslaw Gomulka, and urged the Soviet

Union to forgo military intervention in Poland. Ultimately, Khrushchev did accept a peaceful settlement with Gomulka. Senior Chinese officials also initially counseled against an invasion of Hungary when they traveled to Moscow on October 30 for emer

By that point, By that point,

gency consultations. Khrushchev and his colleagues were no longer confident that "the Hungarian working class" could “regain control of the situation and suppress the uprising on its own," but they agreed for the time being to desist from further intervention in Hungary.28 Less than 24 hours later, however, the Soviet authorities reversed their decision and voted in favor of a large-scale invasion.29 When Mao Zedong was informed of this last-minute change, he immediately and strongly endorsed the Soviet decision, not least because Imre Nagy had announced on November 1 (the day after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade) that Hungary was pulling out of the Warsaw Pact and establishing itself as a neutral state.

China subsequently became the most vocal supporter of the invasion and even publicly welcomed the execution of Imre Nagy in June 1958, but the whole episode, as Chinese officials later confirmed, had a jarring effect in Beijing. Zimyanin prominently cited the Soviet declaration of 30 October 1956 in his report, but he made no mention of the turmoil that had given rise to the declaration or of the actions that followed.

•Sino-Soviet policies in the Third World. In the late 1950s, Chinese leaders began vigorously championing—and, where possible, actively promoting "wars of national liberation" and "anti-imperialist struggles" in the developing world.30 This strategy mirrored the growing radicalization of China's domestic politics at the time. It also flowed naturally from Mao's view, first enunciated in November 1957, that “the East Wind is now stronger than the West Wind." Recent Soviet breakthroughs with long-range nuclear missiles, according to Mao, would deter Western countries from responding to Communist-backed guerrilla movements. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautiousat least rhetorically-than their Chinese. counterparts, not least because they were aware that the East-West military balance had not improved as much as most Chinese officials assumed. Soviet leaders periodiofficials assumed. Soviet leaders periodi

cally warned that local Third World conflicts could escalate to a highly destructive global war if the superpowers directly intervened on opposing sides.

In terms of actual policy, however, the difference between Soviet and Chinese approaches was relatively small.31 If only for logistical reasons, it was the Soviet Union, not China, that had been the primary arms supplier to Communist insurgents in numerous Third World countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaya, South Vietnam, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Cuba).32 Moreover, Chinese leaders, for all their seeming belligerence, were often hesitant about translating rhetoric into concrete policy. In private discussions with Soviet officials, senior Chinese representatives argued that "reasonable caution" was needed even when "conditions were ripe for the spread of progressive ideas in certain [Third World] countries."33

Despite the underlying similarities between Chinese and Soviet policies, the two Communist states were bound to disagree at times. This was evident in July 1958 when a leftist coup against Iraq's pro-Western government sparked a brief but intense crisis in the Middle East, leading to U.S. and British troop landings in Lebanon and Jordan. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials urged the Soviet Union to take a firm stand against "American imperialist aggression" in the Middle East, a task that China itself could not perform because of its lack of power-projection capabilities. Contrary to Beijing's wishes, however, Soviet leaders quickly decided there was little to be gained by risking a direct East-West confrontation.34 Rather than sending "volunteers" to the Middle East or extending an overt military guarantee to the new Iraqi regime (as urged by Beijing), the Soviet Union relied mainly on diplomacy and called for a special UN-sponsored meeting to resolve the situation. Although the peak of the crisis had subsided (and Sino-Soviet differences on this score had seemingly waned) by the time Khrushchev arrived in China at the end of July 1958, the ongoing tensions in the Middle East were a prominent topic of discussion during his visit.35 The resulting exchanges may have been partly responsible for the bolder stance that the Soviet Union took during the Quemoy Islands crisis a few weeks later (see below).

Judging from numerous documents prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far

« 上一頁繼續 »