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Eastern department in 1958 and early 1959, there is no doubt Zimyanin was aware that Chinese leaders had been disappointed by Soviet policy during the first ten days of the 1958 Middle Eastern crisis, when it still appeared that U.S. and British forces might try to restore a pro-Western government in Iraq. The initial phase of the crisis marked one of the first times that Soviet and Chinese policies in the Third World had diverged, albeit only temporarily.36 It is odd, therefore, that Zimyanin's briefing report for Khrushchev barely mentioned the crisis and gave no intimation that Beijing and Moscow had been at odds about the best way to handle it.

• Lessons derived from the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. Shortly before Khrushchev's trip to Beijing in July-August 1958, the Chinese Communist Party's Military Affairs Committee (which had been meeting in an extraordinary two-month session since 27 May 1958) approved Mao's plans for a major operation in late August to recapture China's small offshore islands. The aim of the operation was to weaken or even undermine the Guomintang (Chinese Nationalist) government in Taiwan by exposing its inability to defend against an attack from the mainland.37 Khrushchev was not explicitly informed of the proposed undertaking during his visit to Beijing, but he was told in general terms that a military operation was being planned to "bring Taiwan back under China's jurisdiction."38 The Soviet leader welcomed the news and offered both political and military backing for China's efforts. In the first few weeks of August the Soviet Union transferred longrange artillery, amphibious equipment, airto-air missiles, and combat aircraft to China in the expectation that those weapons would facilitate a "decisive move against the Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] regime."39 Soviet military advisers also were sent to China to help supervise—and, if necessary, take part in the upcoming operation.

Although Chinese and Soviet leaders assumed (or at least hoped) that the action would not provoke a direct military response from the United States, this assumption proved erroneous from the very start. After the Chinese army launched a heavy artillery bombardment of the Quemoy Islands on August 23 and Chinese patrol boats were sent to blockade Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts,

the United States responded by deploying a huge naval contingent to the Taiwan Straits. Simultaneously, top U.S. officials, including President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, publicly reaffirmed their commitment to protect Taiwan against Chinese incursions and to counter any naval threats in the Taiwan Straits.40 The strongest warning to this effect came on September 4, three days before heavily armed U.S. ships three days before heavily armed U.S. ships began escorting Taiwanese vessels on resupply missions to Quemoy. U.S. naval aircraft also were called into action to support the Taiwanese air force as it established control of the region's airspace. In a rapid series of air battles, Taiwanese pilots flying U.S.made fighters routed their Chinese opponents, casting serious doubt on the quality of China's air crews and Soviet-made MiGs.41 These humiliating defeats forced Mao and several of his top military commanders onto the defensive during subsequent intra-party debates.42

The unexpectedly forceful U.S. response posed a dilemma for Chinese and Soviet leaders.43 On September 5, Mao privately acknowledged to the PRC's Supreme State acknowledged to the PRC's Supreme State Conference that he "simply had not anticipated how roiled and turbulent the world would become" if China "fired a few rounds of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu."44 Confronted by the threat of U.S. military retaliation, Mao abandoned any hopes he may have had at the time of seizing the offshore islands or, perhaps, attacking Taiwan.45 Although Chinese artillery units continued in September and early October to shell U.S.-escorted convoys as they landed with resupplies in Quemoy, these actions were coupled with efforts to defuse the crisis by diplomatic means. Most notably, on September 6, Zhou Enlai proposed a resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and on October 6 the Chinese government announced a provisional cease-fire, effectively bringing the crisis to an end. The continued bombardment of Quemoy had posed some risk that wider hostilities would break out, but Chinese leaders were careful throughout the crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Mao's retreat came as a disappointment to some of his colleagues because of his earlier claims that the United States was merely a "paper tiger." At a meeting of senior Chinese officials in late November (several weeks after the crisis had been defused), Mao even found it necessary to re

buke the "many people both inside and outside the Party who do not understand the paper tiger problem."46

Soviet leaders, for their part, were convinced until late September that the PRC's effort to get rid of Jiang Jieshi was still on track. When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko flew secretly to Beijing shortly after the crisis began, he found that Mao was still expressing hope of "responding with force against force."47 After hearing back from Gromyko, Khrushchev followed up on his earlier pledge to support the Chinese operation. On September 7, while U.S. ships were embarking on their first escort missions, the Soviet leader issued a public warning that any attack against mainland China would be deemed an attack against the Soviet Union as well.48 This warning was followed two weeks later by a declaration that any use of nuclear weapons against China would be grounds for a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. Many Western analysts have claimed that these two Soviet statements were largely cosmetic, and that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric only when he believed there was no longer any danger of war. New evidence does not bear out this long-standing view. A week after Khrushchev issued his initial warning, he met secretly with the Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, and gave every indication that he still expected and hoped that China would proceed with its "decisive" military action against Taiwan.49 Although Khrushchev clearly wanted to avoid a war with the United States, the failure of U.S. aircraft carriers to attack mainland China after Chinese artillery units resumed their bombardment of Quemoy gave the Soviet leader reason to believe (or at least hope) that U.S. forces would not follow through on their commitment to defend Taiwan. Later on, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had felt betrayed when he finally realized in late September/early October that Mao had decided to bail out of the operation.50

To that extent, the Quemoy crisis ended up sparking discord between Soviet and Chinese officials, but for a much different reason from what has usually been suggested. Most Western analysts have argued that Chinese leaders were dismayed when the Soviet Union allegedly provided only lukewarm military backing for the probe against Taiwan.51 New evidence suggests that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union did

everything it had promised to do in support of the Chinese operation, and that it was China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to follow through.52 This outcome explains why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned once, was determined not to let it happen again. From then on he emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These different views became a sore point in SinoSoviet relations, as was evident during Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in the autumn of 1959.53 Zimyanin's brief discussion of Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does not mention the frustration that Soviet leaders felt and the lasting impact this had on Khrushchev's approach to the Taiwan issue.

• Soviet assistance to China's nuclear weapons program. When Chinese leaders formally decided in January 1955 to pursue an independent nuclear weapons program, they did so in the expectation that they would receive elaborate advice and backing from Moscow. Between January 1955 and December 1956 the Soviet Union and China concluded four preliminary agreements on bilateral cooperation in uranium mining, nuclear research, and uranium enrichment, and these were followed in October 1957 by the signing of a New Defense Technology Agreement (NDTA), which provided for broad Soviet assistance to China in the development of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.54 Soon thereafter, Soviet nuclear weapons scientists and engineers were dispatched to China, sensitive information was transferred, equipment was sold for uranium processing and enrichment, and preparations were made to ship a prototype nuclear bomb to the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute for training and instruction purposes. In addition, a group of highranking Soviet military specialists were sent to help the Chinese establish new regiments for nuclear-capable SS-1 (8A11) and SS-2 (8Zh38) tactical missiles.55 The Soviet officers not only gave detailed advice on the technology and operational uses of the missiles, but also helped find suitable locations for SS-1/SS-2 test ranges and deployment fields. Similar cooperative arrangements were established for naval delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union provided China with technical data, designs, components, and production equipment for liquid-fueled R-11FM

submarine-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBMs), the naval version of the SS-1B.56 Although the R-11FM had a maximum range of just 162 kilometers and could be fired only from the surface, it was the most advanced Soviet SLBM at the time.

Despite the initial success of these efforts, Soviet leaders decided by early 1958 that it would be inadvisable, in light of Beijing's territorial claims against the Soviet Union, to fulfill the pledge undertaken in the NDTA to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to the PRC.57 Chinese officials were not informed of this decision until nearly a year and a half later, and in the meantime mutual recriminations occurred behind the scenes when the promised shipment repeatedly failed to materialize. Khrushchev tried to alleviate the burgeoning tension when he traveled to Beijing at the end of July 1958, but his trip proved of little avail in this respect and tensions continued to increase. Finally, in a secret letter dated 20 June 1959, Soviet leaders formally notified their Chinese counterparts that no prototype bombs or detailed technical blueprints would be provided. The letter infuriated the Chinese, but Khrushchev and his colleagues were willing to pay that price at a time when, in their view, Sino-Soviet "relations were steadily deteriorating" and the NDTA was "already coming unraveled."58 Curiously, the letter did not yet cause officials in Beijing to give up all hope of obtaining further assistance from Moscow on nuclear arms. At the summit in October 1959, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai formally requested Soviet aid in the development and production of nuclear-powered strategic submarines and longer-range, solid-fueled SLBMs. Khrushchev immediately turned down both proposals, thus dashing any lingering expectations that Mao and Zhou still had of pectations that Mao and Zhou still had of pursuing new forms of nuclear-weapons cooperation or of at least reviving the NDTA.59

The Soviet Foreign Ministry had not been involved in the implementation of the NDTA, but senior ministry officials most likely were aware that nuclear assistance was being provided to China. (After all, the Foreign Ministry had been the initial contact point for Chinese leaders in mid-1957 when they sought to open negotiations for the agreement.) Hence, it is surprising that Zimyanin did not bring up this matter at all, apart from two oblique references to "questions of defense cooperation."

Differences about Soviet efforts to seek improved ties with the United States. Starting in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union pursued a line of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. Chinese leaders, by contrast, wanted to step up the confrontation between the Communist world and the capitalist world and to avoid any hint of compromise. Chinese leaders even claimed that they were willing, in extremis, to risk a global nuclear war in the "struggle against imperialism." To be sure, the connection between rhetoric and concrete policy was often tenuous; in 1958, China quickly backed down when confronted by a massive U.S. naval force in the Taiwan Straits. Nevertheless, even after that humiliating retreat, officials in Beijing continued to insist that "if the imperialists launch an all-out war," it inevitably would result in "victory" for the Communist states and "inspire hundreds of millions of people to turn to socialism." Mao's seeming indifference to the potential consequences of nuclear war chastened Soviet leaders, who were concerned that the Soviet Union might be drawn into a large-scale conflict against its will.60 Soviet officials like Zimyanin were fully cognizant of these divergent outlooks (and the high-level concern they had provoked in Moscow), so it is odd that he made no more than an oblique reference to the matter.

Nor did Zimyanin mention the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing about the value of East-West arms control. Chinese officials were deeply suspicious of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the late 1950s aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Chinese leaders feared that their country, too, would come under pressure to sign a test ban treaty (even though they had taken no part in the negotiations), and that this would effectively end China's hopes of becoming a nuclear power.61 The inception of a U.S.-Soviet test moratorium in the spring of 1958, coupled with the Soviet letter of 20 June 1959 (which explicitly cited the test ban negotiations as a reason not to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to China), intensified Beijing's concerns that arms control talks were antithetical to China's nuclear ambitions.62 Zimyanin was well aware of these differences, but chose not to bring them up.

•China's deepening confrontation with India. Sino-Indian relations had been harmonious for several years after the Commu

nists took power in Beijing, but the relationship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as a result of differences over Tibet and the disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the Himalayas.63 In the spring of 1959 China crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and deployed many thousands of extra troops on Tibetan soil-actions that were viewed with great apprehension in neighboring India. Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian border dispute heated up, leading to a serious incident in late August 1959, when Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a contested border post at Longju. Although each side blamed the other for the incident, the clash apparently was motivated in part by the Chinese authorities' desire to take a firm stand against India before Khrushchev arrived in Beijing.

As recriminations between India and China escalated, Chinese officials secretly urged "the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries to exploit all possible opportunities" to "conduct propaganda measures against India" and "expose the subversive role of imperialist and reactionary Tibetan forces" armed and supported by India.64 These pleas were of no avail. Instead of rallying to China's defense, the Soviet Union scrupulously avoided taking sides during the skirmishes, and released a statement on 9 September 1959 expressing hope that China and India would soon resolve the matter "in the spirit of their traditional friendship."65 Chinese officials were shown the TASS statement before it went out, and they did their best to persuade Moscow not to release it; but far from helping matters, Beijing's latest remonstrations merely induced Soviet leaders to issue the statement a day earlier than planned, without any amendments.66 Mao and his colleagues were so dismayed by the Soviet Union's refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a dispute with a non-Communist state that they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow on September 13 claiming that "the TASS statement has revealed to the whole world the divergence of views between China and the Soviet Union regarding the incident on the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that has literally brought joy and jubilation to the Indian bourgeoisie and to American and British imperialism."67 The irritation and sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two days later when Soviet and Indian leaders signed a much-publicized agreement that

provided for subsidized credits to India of some $385 million over five years.

These events were still under way—and tensions along the Sino-Indian border were still acute when Zimyanin was drafting his report, so it was probably too early for him to gauge the significance of Moscow's decision to remain neutral.68 Even so, it is odd that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up having such a deleterious effect on Khrushchev's visit.69

Zimyanin's Report and Soviet Policy-Making

The submission of Zimyanin's report to Khrushchev was one of several indicators of a small but intriguing change in Soviet policymaking vis-a-vis China. Throughout the 1950s the Soviet Union's dealings with the PRC, as with other Communist states, had been handled mainly along party-to-party lines. A special CPSU Central Committee department, known after February 1957 as the Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, was responsible for keeping track of developments in East-bloc countries and for managing relations with those countries on a dayto-day basis.70 (Matters requiring high-level decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded from Soviet policy-making toward China. On some issues, such as the effort to gain a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, the MFA was the only important actor involved. Also, the foreign minister himself at times played a key role, notably in the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold secret negotiations with Mao about "issues of war and peace, the international situation, and the policy of American imperialism.”71 Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign Ministry's input was limited. Apart from standard diplomatic support, the MFA had contributed relatively little during Khrushchev's two previous visits to China (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as well as his visits to most other Communist states. The bulk of the preparations had been handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Central Committee departments and by Khrushchev's own staff.

In that respect, the September 1959 trip

to China was quite different. The MFA ended up with a dominant role in the preparations for the trip, thanks in part to a deliberate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater say for the Foreign Ministry in policy toward China.72 When Gromyko first asked Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on China, the foreign minister knew that he would soon be accompanying Khrushchev on a two-week visit to the United States, a task that would enable him to bolster the Foreign Ministry's standing (as well as his own influence) on other issues, especially Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in between Khrushchev's two visits in late September was so limited, briefings for the China trip had to occur almost entirely on the plane. Gromyko was aware that the other senior members of the Soviet "party-government delegation," led by Mikhail Suslov, were scheduled to depart for China on September 26-27, while Khrushchev and Gromyko were still in the United States. Hence, the foreign minister knew he would be the only top official accompanying Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the 29th and 30th.73 (Gromyko, of course, also intended to make good use of his privileged access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and flight back from, the United States.74)

Under those circumstances, the Foreign Ministry's report on China, prepared by Zimyanin, became the main briefing material for Khrushchev, along with a short update (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent personnel changes in the Chinese military High Command.75 What is more, Zimyanin (who was a member of the MFA Collegium as well as head of the ministry's Far Eastern department) and a number of other senior MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing to provide on-site advice and support, something that had not happened during Khrushchev's earlier visits to China.76 Although the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and a few other CC department heads also traveled to China as advisers, the Foreign Ministry's role during the visit was far more salient than in the past. (This was reflected in Gromyko's own role as well; among other things, he was the only Soviet official besides Suslov who took part in all of Khrushchev's talks with Mao and Zhou Enlai.77) Hence, Zimyanin's report proved highly influential.

As things worked out, however, the

MFA's expanded role had little effect one way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. The trip in September-October 1959 left crucial differences unresolved, and the two sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet Union quietly began pulling some of its key military technicians out of China.78 Tensions increased rapidly over the next several months, culminating in the publication of a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday.79 The statement, entitled "Long Live Leninism!" removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.80 Soon thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, where Khrushchev sought to rebut the comments expressed at the WFTU meeting and to retaliate for China's decision to provide other delegates with copies of a confidential letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP leadership. The top Chinese official in Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.81

Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet Union withdrew all its remaining military technicians and advisers from China in July and August 1960, and simultaneously began recalling its thousands of non-military personnel, causing disarray in many of China's largest economic and technical projects and scientific research programs.82 Although Soviet and Chinese officials managed to gloss over the dispute at a "world conference" of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960, the polemics and recriminations soon resumed, with ever greater stridency. Subsequently, as news of the conflict spread throughout the world, Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional attempts to reconcile their differences; but the split, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes of restoring a semblance of unity in the international Communist movement were dashed.

The downward spiral of Sino-Soviet relations after Khrushchev's visit in 1959 tended to rigidify Soviet policy-making. Se

nior ideological officials from the CPSU, especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail Suslov, ended up handling most of the Soviet Union's polemical exchanges and other dealings with China. Throughout the late 1950s (and even well into 1960) Suslov had been the chief proponent within the Soviet leadership of a conciliatory posture toward China; but as attitudes on both sides steadily hardened and the split became irreparable, Suslov embraced the anti-Chinese line with a vengeance, in part to compensate for his earlier, more accommodating stance. Oleg Rakhmanin, a senior official and expert on China in the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, also gained an increasing role in policy toward the PRC.83 Rakhmanin's expertise and aggressive antiMaoist stance gave Soviet leaders precisely what they needed as the split widened, and the result was an even more confrontational policy toward Beijing.

Foreign Ministry employees were not necessarily any more favorably disposed toward China than senior party officials were, but the demand for input from the MFA tended to decline as bilateral tensions grew. Although Soviet diplomats in China still had important liaison and information-gathering roles, the expertise of the MFA's Far Eastern department was largely eclipsed during the 1960s. Zimyanin left the department as early as February 1960, having been appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Subsequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin served briefly as a deputy foreign minister and then gained prominence within the CPSU in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief of Pravda (from 1965 to 1976), as a full Central Committee member (from 1966 on), and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC Secretary, beginning in 1976.

Like Zimyanin, the new head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appointment, but aside from that one distinction, Tugarinov was an obscure official whose tenure at the department lasted only until August 1963. His successor, N. G. Sudarikov, was not yet even a member of the MFA Collegium when he became head of the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of the department's waning influence. (Sudarikov was not appointed to the Collegium until November 1964, some 15

months after he took over the Far Eastern department and a month after Khrushchev's ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the Foreign Ministry's role in policy-making toward China remained well short of what it had been in September 1959.

The MFA's diminished impact on SinoSoviet relations was largely unchanged until mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department was bifurcated, and the ministry's senior expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed in charge of the new "First Far Eastern" department.84 That department, under Kapitsa's highly visible direction for well over a decade (until he was promoted to be a deputy foreign minister in December 1982), was responsible for China, Korea, and Mongolia, while the "Second Far Eastern" department handled Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines.85 Even after separate departments were established, however, the continued hostility between China and the Soviet Union left the MFA's First Far Eastern department with a relatively modest role in policy-making, in part because the department overlapped so much with the sections. on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. Not until the 1980s, when relations between Moscow and Beijing finally began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry regain extensive influence over policy toward China. That trend was under way as early as 1982, but it gathered much greater momentum after 1986, as Eduard Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, the MFA had acquired a dominant role in policy-making toward China.

The status of the Foreign Ministry on this issue was never quite as prominent during Andrei Gromyko's long tenure as foreign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA's influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin's report thus symbolized a high point for the ministry vis-a-vis China in the preGorbachev era.

The translation of Zimyanin's report follows below:

Soviet-Chinese Relations

The victory of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries.

When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the

formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock companies, and to set the rate of exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.86

Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.87 Over time, the abovementioned agreements were annulled or re

vised if they did not accord with the spirit of

fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on

relations with Japan.88 In addition, a communique and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the

Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth.89

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela

tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in SovietChinese relations. The CPC CC [Communist Party of China Central Committee] fully supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences. It is worth noting, however, that the CPCCC, while not speaking about this directly, took a

position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin.90 A bit later the Chinese comrades reexamined their evaluation of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in Mao Zedong's pronouncements when he was visiting Moscow.91 For example, he said: “. .. Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now have the same view as the CPSU." In a number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. Stalin.

Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a

campaign was launched in China to combat dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to "let a hundred flowers bloom."92 In connection with this the Chinese press began, with

increasing frequency, to express criticism of specific conditions and of works by Soviet authors in the fields of philosophy, natural history, literature, and art. This inevitably gave strong impetus to hostile statements by rightist forces who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The

rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality. They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers.93 In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR. The airing of these types of statements during the struggle against rightists can in no way be justified, even if one takes account of the tactical aims of our friends, who were seeking to unmask the

ing the rightist elements, did not offer any open condemnation of statements expressed by them about so-called "territorial claims on the USSR."

The

The Soviet government's declaration of 30 October 1956 [endorsing the principle of equality in relations between the Soviet Union and other communist countries-ed.] was received with great satisfaction in China.94 In January 1957 a government delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.95 Declaration emphasized the complete unity of the USSR and PRC as an important factor in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched claims about a "struggle between the CPSU and CPC for the right to leadership of world Communism." In accordance with the Declaration, the Soviet Union devised and implemented concrete measures aimed at the further development of Soviet-Chinese friendship and cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual interest, and complete trust.

In 1957 a series of consultations took

place between the CPSU CC and the CPC CC on common, concrete matters pertaining to the international situation and the Communist movement. The Chinese friends

actively participated in the preparations and conduct of the Moscow conference of officials from Communist and workers' parties in November 1957.96 While the Chinese delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong spoke approvingly about the positive experience of such consultations and the constant

readiness of the Chinese comrades to under

take a joint review of these and other mat97 ters.

The steps to reorganize the management of the national economy in the USSR were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the June [1957] and other plenary sessions of the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press did not feature an official commentary or reactions to the decisions of these sessions. After details about the activity of the AntiParty faction had been explained to the CPC CC, the friends began to speak more resolutely about these matters. "If Molotov's line had prevailed within the CPSU," Mao declared in Moscow, “that would have been

rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against dangerous not only for the USSR, but for other socialist countries as well."98 Taking account of the divisive activity

them for all their statements. It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crush

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