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nists took power in Beijing, but the relation provided for subsidized credits to India of to China was quite different. The MFA ship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as some $385 million over five years.

ended up with a dominant role in the prepaa result of differences over Tibet and the These events were still under way—and rations for the trip, thanks in part to a delibdisputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the tensions along the Sino-Indian border were erate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater Himalayas.63 In the spring of 1959 China still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his say for the Foreign Ministry in policy tocrushed a popular revolt in Tibet and de- report, so it was probably too early for him to ward China.72 When Gromyko first asked ployed many thousands of extra troops on gauge the significance of Moscow's deci- Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with sion to remain neutral.68 Even so, it is odd China, the foreign minister knew that he great apprehension in neighboring India. that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian would soon be accompanying Khrushchev Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up on a two-week visit to the United States, a border dispute heated up, leading to a seri- having such a deleterious effect on task that would enable him to bolster the ous incident in late August 1959, when Khrushchev's visit.69

Foreign Ministry's standing (as well as his Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a

own influence) on other issues, especially contested border post at Longju. Although

Zimyanin's Report and

Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in each side blamed the other for the incident,

Soviet Policy-Making

between Khrushchev's two visits in late the clash apparently was motivated in part

September was so limited, briefings for the by the Chinese authorities' desire to take a The submission of Zimyanin's report to China trip had to occur almost entirely on the firm stand against India before Khrushchev Khrushchev was one of several indicators of plane. Gromyko was aware that the other arrived in Beijing.

a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy- senior members of the Soviet “party-govAs recriminations between India and making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the ernment delegation,"led by Mikhail Suslov, China escalated, Chinese officials secretly 1950s the Soviet Union's dealings with the were scheduled to depart for China on Sepurged "the Soviet Union and other fraternal PRC, as with other Communist states, had tember 26-27, while Khrushchev and socialist countries to exploit all possible been handled mainly along party-to-party Gromyko were still in the United States. opportunities” to “conduct propaganda mea- lines. A special CPSU Central Committee Hence, the foreign minister knew he would sures against India” and “expose the subver- department, known after February 1957 as be the only top official accompanying sive role of imperialist and reactionary Ti- the Department for Ties with Communist Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the betan forces” armed and supported by In- and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, 29th and 30th.73 (Gromyko, of course, also dia. 64 These pleas were of no avail. Instead was responsible for keeping track of devel- intended to make good use of his privileged of rallying to China's defense, the Soviet opments in East-bloc countries and for man- access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and Union scrupulously avoided taking sides aging relations with those countries on a day- flight back from, the United States.74) during the skirmishes, and released a state- to-day basis. 70 (Matters requiring high-level Under those circumstances, the Foreign ment on 9 September 1959 expressing hope decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium Ministry's report on China, prepared by that China and India would soon resolve the or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Zimyanin, became the main briefing matematter “in the spirit of their traditional friend Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded rial for Khrushchev, along with a short upship."65 Chinese officials were shown the from Soviet policy-making toward China. date (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent TASS statement before it went out, and they On some issues, such as the effort to gain a personnel changes in the Chinese military did their best to persuade Moscow not to seat for Communist China in the United High Command. 75 What is more, Zimyanin release it; but far from helping matters, Nations, the MFA was the only important (who was a member of the MFA Collegium Beijing's latest remonstrations merely in- actor involved. Also, the foreign minister as well as head of the ministry's Far Eastern duced Soviet leaders to issue the statement himself at times played a key role, notably in department) and a number of other senior

, a day earlier than planned, without any the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing amendments.66 Mao and his colleagues authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold to provide on-site advice and support, somewere so dismayed by the Soviet Union's secret negotiations with Mao about “issues thing that had not happened during refusal to back its chief Communist ally in of war and peace, the international situation, Khrushchev's earlier visits to China.76 Ala dispute with a non-Communist state that and the policy of American imperialism.”71 though the head of the CPSU CC department they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and on September 13 claiming that “the TASS Ministry's input was limited. Apart from a few other CC department heads also travstatement has revealed to the whole world standard diplomatic support, the MFA had eled to China as advisers, the Foreign the divergence of views between China and contributed relatively little during Ministry's role during the visit was far more the Soviet Union regarding the incident on Khrushchev's two previous visits to China salient than in the past. (This was reflected the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as in Gromyko's own role as well; among other has literally brought joy and jubilation to the well as his visits to most other Communist things, he was the only Soviet official be

, Indian bourgeoisie and to American and states. The bulk of the preparations had been sides Suslov who took part in all of British imperialism.”67 The irritation and handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Khrushchev's talks with Mao and Zhou sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two Central Committee departments and by Enlai.77) Hence, Zimyanin's report proved days later when Soviet and Indian leaders Khrushchev's own staff.

highly influential. signed a much-publicized agreement that In that respect, the September 1959 trip As things worked out, however, the

MFA's expanded role had little effect one nior ideological officials from the CPSU, months after he took over the Far Eastern way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail department and a month after Khrushchev's The trip in September-October 1959 left Suslov, ended up handling most of the So- ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the crucial differences unresolved, and the two viet Union's polemical exchanges and other Foreign Ministry's role in policy-making sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to dealings with China. Throughout the late toward China remained well short of what it take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after 1950s (and even well into 1960) Suslov had had been in September 1959. Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet been the chief proponent within the Soviet The MFA's diminished impact on SinoUnion quietly began pulling some of its key leadership of a conciliatory posture toward Soviet relations was largely unchanged until military technicians out of China.78 Ten- China; but as attitudes on both sides steadily mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department sions increased rapidly over the next several hardened and the split became irreparable, was bifurcated, and the ministry's senior months, culminating in the publication of a Suslov embraced the anti-Chinese line with expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April a vengeance, in part to compensate for his

a vengeance, in part to compensate for his in charge of the new "First Far Eastern" 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anni- earlier, more accommodating stance. Oleg department.84 That department, under versary of Lenin's birthday.79 The state- Rakhmanin, a senior official and expert on Kapitsa's highly visible direction for well ment, entitled “Long Live Leninism!" re- China in the CPSU CC Department for Ties over a decade (until he was promoted to be moved any doubts that Soviet officials and with Communist and Workers' Parties of adeputy foreign minister in December 1982), diplomats still had about the magnitude of Socialist Countries, also gained an increas- was responsible for China, Korea, and the rift between the two countries. 80 Soon ing role in policy toward the PRC.83 Mongolia, while the "Second Far Eastern"

, thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East Rakhmanin's expertise and aggressive anti- department handled Indonesia, Japan, and European governments became aware of the Maoist stance gave Soviet leaders precisely the Philippines.85 Even after separate deconflict when Chinese officials voiced strong what they needed as the split widened, and partments were established, however, the criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in the result was an even more confrontational continued hostility between China and the Beijing of the World Federation of Trade policy toward Beijing.

Soviet Union left the MFA's First Far EastUnions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a Foreign Ministry employees were not ern department with a relatively modest role few weeks later at the Third Congress of the necessarily any more favorably disposed in policy-making, in part because the departRomanian Communist Party in Bucharest, toward China than senior party officials were, ment overlapped so much with the sections where Khrushchev sought to rebut the com- but the demand for input from the MFA on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the ments expressed at the WFTU meeting and tended to decline as bilateral tensions grew. CPSU CC Department for Ties with Comto retaliate for China's decision to provide Although Soviet diplomats in China still had munist and Workers' Parties of Socialist other delegates with copies of a confidential important liaison and information-gathering Countries. Not until the 1980s, when relaletter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP roles, the expertise of the MFA's Far Eastern tions between Moscow and Beijing finally leadership. The top Chinese official in department was largely eclipsed during the

department was largely eclipsed during the began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.81 1960s. Zimyanin left the department as regain extensive influence over policy to

Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet early as February 1960, having been ap- ward China. That trend was under way as Union withdrew all its remaining military pointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Sub- early as 1982, but it gathered much greater technicians and advisers from China in July sequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin momentum after 1986, as Eduard and August 1960, and simultaneously began served briefly as a deputy foreign minister Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as recalling its thousands of non-military per- and then gained prominence within the CPSU Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail sonnel, causing disarray in many of China's in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, largest economic and technical projects and of Pravda (from 1965 to 1976), as a full the MFA had acquired a dominant role in scientific research programs. 82 Although Central Committee member (from 1966 on), policy-making toward China. Soviet and Chinese officials managed to and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC The status of the Foreign Ministry on gloss over the dispute at a “world confer- Secretary, beginning in 1976.

this issue was never quite as prominent durence” of 81 Communist parties in Moscow Like Zimyanin, the new head of the ing Andrei Gromyko's long tenure as forin November 1960, the polemics and re- Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, eign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA's criminations soon resumed, with ever greater I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on stridency. Subsequently, as news of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appoint- the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin's conflict spread throughout the world, ment, but aside from that one distinction, report thus symbolized a high point for the Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional Tugarinov was an obscure official whose ministry vis-a-vis China in the preattempts to reconcile their differences; but tenure at the department lasted only until Gorbachev era. the split, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes August 1963. His successor, N. G. The translation of Zimyanin's report of restoring a semblance of unity in the Sudarikov, was not yet even a member of the follows below: international Communist movement were MFA Collegium when he became head of dashed.

the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of The downward spiral of Sino-Soviet the department’s waning influence. relations after Khrushchev's visit in 1959 (Sudarikov was not appointed to the tended to rigidify Soviet policy-making. Se- Collegium until November 1964, some 15


Soviet-Chinese Relations

tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to ing the rightist elements, did not offer any a more frequent and more amicable exchange open condemnation of statements expressed

of candid views. The Chinese friends began by them about so-called “territorial claims The victory of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the Chi

to speak more openly about their plans and on the USSR.”

difficulties and, at the same time, to express nese People's Republic marked the start of

The Soviet government's declaration of critical comments (from a friendly position) 30 October 1956 (endorsing the principle of a qualitatively new stage in relations be

about Soviet organizations, the work of So- equality in relations between the Soviet tween the peoples of the Soviet Union and

viet specialists, and other issues in Soviet- Union and other communist countries—ed.] China, based on a commonality of interests

Chinese relations. The CPC CC (Commu- was received with great satisfaction in and a unity of goals in constructing a social

nist Party of China Central Committee) fully China. 94 In January 1957 a government ist and Communist society in both coun

supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the tries.

the cult of personality and its consequences. Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a

It is worth noting, however, that the CPCCC, joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.95 The When discussing the overall success of

while not speaking about this directly, took a Declaration emphasized the complete unity the development of Soviet-Chinese rela

position different from ours when evaluating of the USSR and PRC as an important factor tions during the first three years after the

the activity of J. V. Stalin. 90 A bit later the in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it formation of the PRC, we must not overlook

Chinese comrades reexamined their evalua- exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched several negative features of these relations

tion of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in claims about a struggle between the CPSU connected with the violation of the sover

Mao Zedong's pronouncements when he was and CPC for the right to leadership of world eign rights and interests of the Chinese

visiting Moscow.91 For example, he said: “. Communism.” In accordance with the DecPeople's Republic, as reflected in bilateral

.. Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now laration, the Soviet Union devised and impleagreements signed between the Soviet Union

have the same view as the CPSU.” In a mented concrete measures aimed at the furand PRC, including, for example, agree

number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a ther development of Soviet-Chinese friendments to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950),

critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. ship and cooperation on the basis of equalStalin.

ity, mutual interest, and complete trust. to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock com

Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a In 1957 a series of consultations took panies, and to set the rate of exchange for the

campaign was launched in China to combat place between the CPSU CC and the CPC ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.86 dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to

CC on common, concrete matters pertaining "let a hundred flowers bloom."92 In connec- to the international situation and the ComBeginning in 1953, the Soviet side took

tion with this the Chinese press began, with munist movement. The Chinese friends measures to eliminate everything that, by increasing frequency, to express criticism of actively participated in the preparations and keeping the PRC in a subordinate position specific conditions and of works by Soviet conduct of the Moscow conference of offivis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the suc

authors in the fields of philosophy, natural cials from Communist and workers' parties cessful development of Soviet-Chinese re

history, literature, and art. This inevitably in November 1957.96 While the Chinese lations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.87 Over time, the above

gave strong impetus to hostile statements by delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong

rightist forces who denounced the Soviet spoke approvingly about the positive expementioned agreements were annulled or re

Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rience of such consultations and the constant vised if they did not accord with the spirit of

rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing readiness of the Chinese comrades to underfraternal friendship. The trip to China by a

to uphold principles of equality and mutualSoviet party and state delegation headed by ity, and they alleged that Soviet assistance

take a joint review of these and other matC[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October

was self-interested and of inferior quality. The steps to reorganize the manage1954 played an important role in the estab

They also asserted that the Soviet Union had lishment of closer and more trusting rela

ment of the national economy in the USSR not provided compensation for equipment were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The tions. As a result of this visit, joint declara

taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the tions were signed on Soviet-Chinese rela

the Soviet Union was extracting money from June (1957) and other plenary sessions of tions and the international situation and on

China in return for weapons supplied to the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press relations with Japan.88 In addition, a com

Korea, which were already paid for with the did not feature an official commentary or munique and additional agreements were

blood of Chinese volunteers. 93 In addition, reactions to the decisions of these sessions. signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the

After details about the activity of the AntiSoviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock they lodged a number of territorial demands

against the USSR. The airing of these types Party faction had been explained to the CPC companies responsible for scientific-tech

of statements during the struggle against CC, the friends began to speak more resonical cooperation, the construction of a

rightists can in no way be justified, even if lutely about these matters. “If Molotov's Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the

one takes account of the tactical aims of our line had prevailed within the CPSU,” Mao construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator rail

friends, who were seeking to unmask the declared in Moscow, “that would have been road, and so forth.89 The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against dangerous not only for the USSR, but for

them for all their statements. It is also worth other socialist countries as well.":98 exceptionally great importance for the fur

noting that the Chinese friends, despite crush- Taking account of the divisive activity ther improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela

ters. 97

USSR. 105

of revisionists and the surge of imperialist The letter from Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, began to display a more proper understandpropaganda, which tried to use several ideo- and a variety of reports from the CPSU ing of matters considered by the 21st Conlogical campaigns in China in 1957-and, in CC—about the provision of assistance to the gress, such as the question of the signifiparticular, the campaign to "let a hundred PRC to continue strengthening its defense cance of creating a material-technical base flowers bloom" as well as the publication of capability, about a reduction in the number and increasing the productivity of labor for a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of of Soviet specialists in the PRC and the the construction of socialism, the question Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among elimination of the network of Soviet “ad- of the role of the principle of material incenthe People"—to provoke a schism in rela


viser-consultants," about the CPSU CC's tives and labor distribution under socialism, tions between the Soviet Union and PRC, views of the Yugoslav Communist League's and other questions. the leadership of the CPC CC and the gov- draft program, and about other matters- The CPSU's position in offering a prinernment of the PRC emphasized the close had important political benefits.

cipled explanation of a number of Marxistunity of the socialist camp and the leading The results of the CPSU's 21st Con- Leninist precepts and laws of the building of role of the CPSU among Communist and gress provided a great boost to the practical socialism and Communism, which were igworkers' parties. Mao Zedong stated this activity of the CPC in overseeing socialist nored in China during the implementation of very definitively in his speech to Chinese construction in the country. 104 It is worth the "Great Leap Forward" and the establishstudents attending Moscow State University noting that after the publication of the theses ment of communes (see the report and speech (November 1957), and he spoke about it at of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev at the by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Conlength with officials from Yugoslavia and CPSU's 21st Congress and during the pro- gress and the speeches that followed), helped also during meetings that PRC government ceedings of the Congress, the Chinese friends, the Chinese comrades to evaluate the situadelegations had with delegations from Po- while giving a generally positive evaluation tion correctly and to begin rectifying the land and other countries of the socialist of the achievements of socialist construction mistakes and shortcomings that had arisen. camp. 99 In 1959 the CPC CC, having reex- in the USSR, made almost no mention of the The statement by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev amined the proposal of the CPSU CC to theoretical portions of the report by Cde. about the permanent foundations of Sovietclarify its formula about the leading role of N.S. Khrushchev and said that those por- Chinese friendship swept the rug out from the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again tions related only to the practice of socialist under imperialist and Yugoslav revisionist affirmed that this formula must be preserved and Communist construction in the propaganda, which was intended to sow in the future.

mistrust between our countries and provoke The durability of Soviet-Chinese rela- In a similar vein, the provisions adopted a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. tions and the role of Soviet-Chinese friend- at the Second Session of the CPC's 8th ship gained new strength as the international Congress (May 1958) regarding a struggle An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations situation deteriorated in the Middle East and against "blind faith" and regarding the need

over the past decade confirms that relations also in connection with the provocations by to foster sentiments of national pride among of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the the people, as well as some preliminary have been established on a lasting basis and summer of 1958. The most important politi- success in implementing the “Great Leap are growing wider and stronger with every cal event that year in Soviet-Chinese rela- Forward,” caused a number of cadre work- passing year. These relations are a decisive tions, which had an enormously positive ers in the PRC to take on airs. 106 They factor in the further growth of the might and influence on the development of the whole began excessively emphasizing China's cohesion of the world socialist camp and in international situation, was the July-August uniqueness and displaying a guarded atti- the consolidation of world peace and the meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. tude toward Soviet experience and the rec- security of nations. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. 100 During ommendations of Soviet specialists. 107 an exchange of views they considered a Some began declaring that the Soviet Union

1. N. S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 6 vols. (Moscow: number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chi- had stayed too long at the socialist stage of typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. 5 (“Vzaimootnosheniya s

sotsialisticheskimi stranami”), Part nese relations and, in particular, questions of development, while China was moving val

G military cooperation.101 The speech by iantly ahead toward Communism. The Chi

(“Vzaimootnosheniya s Kitaem"), pp. 77-78.

2. “Vnutripoliticheskoe, ekonomicheskoe i Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his state- nese press quite actively featured criticism

mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie KNR," Fond (F.) 5, Opis' ment that an attack on the PRC would be of the socialist principles implemented in (Op.) 30, Delo (D.) 307, Listy (LI.) 49-79, TsKhSD. regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union the USSR for the distribution of material

3. The section, entitled “Sovetsko-kitaiskie

otnosheniya," is on Ll. 71-79. itself, was fervently greeted with expres- goods in accordance with one's labor, for the

4. For two quite different versions of this theme, see sions of gratitude and approval in China. 102 compensation of labor on a job-by-job basis, Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956The government of the PRC displayed great and so forth. Some authors essentially ar- 1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); satisfaction at our assurance about our readi

and Steven M. Goldstein, “Nationalism and Internagued that communes were incompatible with

tionalism: Sino-Soviet Relations," in Thomas W. ness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation

kolkhozes 108

Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Forfor a nuclear strike against China. 103 In Later on, after studying materials from eign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon turn, the Chinese government declared that the Congress and after numerous mistakes Press, 1994), 224-265, esp. 224-248. Zagoria argues the PRC will come to the assistance of the arose during the establishment of the peas

that China's policy vis-a-vis other countries (including

the Soviet Union) was largely determined by the shiftUSSR in any part of the globe if an attack is ant communes and during the implementa

ing fortunes of “left” and “right" factions within the carried out against it.

tion of the “Great Leap Forward,” the CPC Chinese leadership. Goldstein attributes the collapse of


Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in
[Mao's own] domestic political priorities,” which el-
evated “national" over "internationalist” concerns.
Although Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics
altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone
and the agenda of Chinese politics” himself, and that
China's relations with the Soviet Union were therefore
“decisively altered” when “Mao's thought about
China's domestic condition underwent a sea change in
the years 1956-9" (emphasis added). For an opposing
view, see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-
1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Unlike
Zagoria and Goldstein (and many others), Gittings
avers that changes in the external climate led to shifts
in Chinese domestic politics, rather than the other way
around. For a similar, though more qualified, assess-
ment, see Michael B. Yahuda, China's Role in World
Affairs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), esp. 11-
42 and 102-129. Curiously, very few Western scholars
have attempted to connect shifts in Soviet domestic
politics with changes in Soviet policy toward China (or
vice versa). Alexander Dallin outlined a general frame-
work in “The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign
Policy,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context
of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press, 1981), 335-408, but he made no specific appli-
cation to Soviet ties with China. Carl A. Linden offered
a few comments about the effect of Soviet leadership
politics on Khrushchev's stance vis-a-vis China in
Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966),
and Victor Baras discussed the impact of China on
Soviet leadership politics (1953-1956) in a brief re-
search note, “China and the Rise of Khrushchev,"
Studies in Comparative Communism 8:1-2 (Spring-
Summer 1975), 183-191; but most of Baras's and
Linden's observations are speculative and (particu-
larly in Linden's case) not wholly convincing. Even the
illuminating book by James G. Richter, Khrushchev's
Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic
Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1994), which focuses on the connection
between Soviet domestic politics and foreign relations,
barely mentions Soviet policy toward China. It may
well be that domestic-external linkages in Sino-Soviet
relations, to the extent they existed for either China or
the USSR, were weaker in the Soviet case, but that
remains a fitting topic for study.
5. The phrase “reluctant and suspicious ally” comes
from two recent essays by Steven M. Goldstein which
debunk the notion that China was “forced” into an
alliance with the Soviet Union in 1949-50 because of
hostility on the part of the United States. See Goldstein's
“Nationalism and Internationalism,” 231 ff. and “The
Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937 to 1962: Ideology and
Unity," forthcoming in Harry Harding, ed., Patterns of
Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of China.
6. For further comments by Khrushchev on Stalin's
treatment of the PRC, see Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part
G, pp. 5-13. See also Andrei Gromyko's remarks on
the same subject in A. A. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, 2 vols.
(Moscow: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988),
Vol. 2, pp. 127-130.
7. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson
to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 11 February 1950, in U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 6/China (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 309.
8. Memorandum of Eisenhower-Churchill-Bidault
meeting, 7 December 1953 (Secret), in U.S. Depart-
ment of State, FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 5/China, pp. 1808-


Predsedatelem Tsentral'nogo Narodnogo Pravitel'stva 9. See, e.g., “The Origin and Development of the Differ- Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Mao Tsze-dunom 16 ences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Our- dekabrya 1949 g.,” Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi selves: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Federatsii (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, 11. 9-17; and Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of “Zapis' besedy I. V. Stalina s Predsedatelem People's Daily and Red Flag,6 September 1963, in Tsentral'nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva Kitaiskoi Peking Review 6:37 (13 September 1963), 6-23. Narodnoi Respubliki Mao-Tsze-Dunom, 22 yanvarya 10. Among countless studies citing 1956 as the start of 1950 g.," APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, 11. 29-38. the conflict are Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict; Wil- 16. Among many examples of gaps in official tranliam E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, MA: scripts are the exchanges deleted from the Polish record The MIT Press, 1964); Francois Fejto, Chine-URSS, de of the five-power meeting in Warsaw in July 1968 l'alliance au conflit, 1950-1972 (Paris: Editions due (“Protokol ze spotkania przywodcow partii i rzadow Seuil, 1973); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: krajow socjalistycznych: Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Unity and Conflict, rev. and enlarged ed. (Cambridge, Wegier, i ZSRR," in Archiwum Akt Nowych, Arch. KC MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), esp. 271-308 and PZPR, Paczka 193, Tom 24, Dokument 4) and the 357-432; Jean Baby, La grande controverse sino- Czechoslovak account of the Soviet-Czechoslovak sovietique, 1956-66 (Paris: Grasset, 1966); G. F.Hudson, meeting in Cierna nad Tisou in July-August 1968 "Introduction,” in G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, (“Zaznam jednani predsednictva UV KSC a UV KSSS and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dis- v Cierna n. T., 29.7.-1.8.1968," in Archiv Ustredniho pute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 1-8; and Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska, Prague, Thomas G. Hart, Sino-Soviet Relations: Re-Examining F. 07/15, Archivna jednotka 274.). In the former case, the Prospects for Normalization (Aldershot: Gower, discussions held during a formal recess in the talks (as 1987). For a variant of this point, see Goldstein, “Na- recorded verbatim in the diaries of a key participant, tionalism and Internationalism," 224-242, which claims Pyotr Shelest) were not included in the final transcript. that Mao's rethinking of Chinese domestic priorities, This omission was important because the discussions rather than Khrushchev's secret speech, was the water- pertained to military options vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. shed event in 1956. Among those who cite 1958 as the In the latter case, Shelest's anti-Semitic slurs about a beginning of the dispute are Yahuda, China's Role in Czechoslovak official, Frantisek Kriegel, were omitted World Affairs, esp. 102-129; Allen S. Whiting. "The from the transcript. Fortunately, these derogatory comSino-Soviet Split,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John ments were recorded by several participants, including K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, (fittingly enough) Shelest himself in his diaries. Vol. 14: The People's Republic, Part I: The Emergence 17. On the need for caution in using memoirs, see Mark of Revolutionary China 1949-1965 (New York: Cam- Kramer, “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: bridge University Press, 1987), 478-538; and Roderick Should We Swallow Oral History?" International SeMacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, curity 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-218; and Mark Kramer, Vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960 (New “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” York: Columbia University Press, 1983), esp. 36-40 Cold War International History Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), and 255-292.

1, 14-37. 11. For documentation and analysis of these territorial 18. The transcripts reveal that, in addition to Stalin, the issues, see Dennis J. Doolin, comp., Territorial Claims Soviet participants in the talks included Vyacheslav in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Andrei Vyshinskii, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1965); George plus Anastas Mikoyan and Nikolai Bulganin at some of Ginsburg and Carl F. Pinkeles, The Sino-Soviet Territo- the meetings. rial Dispute, 1949-64 (New York: Praeger, 1978); W. 19. F. Chuev, ed., Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz A. Douglas Jackson, Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone dnevnika F. Chueva (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 114. of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict?, rev. ed. 20. “Istoriya i sovremennost’: Dialog Stalina s Mao (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1968); Tai Sung An, The Tszedunom,Problemy Dal'nego vostoka (Moscow) Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute (Philadelphia: 1/2 (1992), 109. This comes from the second part of Westminster Press, 1973), 13-73; and Luke T. Chang, fascinating interview with Kovalev by the historian China's Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes (New Sergei N. Goncharov. For the first part of the interview, York: Oceana Publications, 1982), 9-38 and 107-197. as well as backgroundon Kovalev’scareer, see Problemy For an intriguing argument that territorial issues were Dal'ne go vostoka 6 (1991), 77-91. not at the heart of the Sino-Soviet rift, see Klaus Mehnert, 21. “Istoriya i sovremennost'," 110. China nach dem Sturm: Bericht und Kommentar 22. “Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971), esp. 228- 1956 g.," Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. 234. Although Mehnert's case is generally persuasive, Yudin, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in Zimyanin's report as well as other new evidence (see TsKHSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 93-94. Fedorenko's below) suggests that China's territorial claims were a article referred to the meeting that he and Kovalev had more serious irritant (at least from the Soviet perspec- with Mao, but Fedorenko gave no intimation that Mao tive) than Mehnert implied.

had found anything "unpleasant” about it. 12. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 6- 23. Mao's three speeches at the Chengdu conference 7.

were first published in 1969 in a CCP collection, Mao 13. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 128-129. Zedong sixiang wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong 14. Shi Zhe, “*Soprovozhdaya Predsedatelya Mao'," Thought”), pp. 159-172, the text of which was later and N. Fedorenko, “Stalin i Mao: besedy v Moskve,” spirited to the West. The speech cited here is the one Problemy Dal'nego vostoka 2 (1989), 139-148 and 149- delivered on 10 March 1958. An English translation of 164, respectively. A slightly abridged version of the speech first appeared as “Address on March 10," in Fedorenko's article appeared as “Nochnye besedy: Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95Stranitsy istorii,Pravda (Moscow), 23 October 1988, 98. 4.

24. Mao also discussed this point at length in his March 15. “Zapis' besedy tovarishcha Stalina I. V. s 1956 meeting with Yudin, remarking that Dongbei and


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