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Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influence." See “Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," L. 93. 25. For a useful list of collections of Mao's secret speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward, Harvard Contemporary China Series No.6(Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989), 78-81. 26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more nuanced appraisal of Stalin's policy. Among many items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection of documents being compiled under the auspices of the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents from Recent History (RTsKhIDNI): Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bolsheviki), Komintern, i Narodno-revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae. The first volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been published in several recent issues of the journal Problemy Dalnego vostoka. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in JanuaryFebruary 1949, which is presented along with supporting documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan's report, were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g.,” Novaya i noveisha istoriya (Moscow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, LI. 95-118. 27. “Address on March 10,” 98. For Mao's extended comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, see "Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," Ll. 88-92. 28. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part C ("O Vengrii"), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev's version of events is borne out by a close reading of the Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chinese media spoke positively about the events in Hungary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers suddenly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chinese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht uber die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev's account. (Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev's version is not inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 September 1963 (cited in note 9 supra), despite the way that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev's

account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts Khrushchev's account. The September 1963 statement goes on to claim that Chinese leaders "insisted on the adoption of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev's claim that Mao strongly supported the invasion after the Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any chronology, it creates the impression that Mao's backing for an invasion preceded the Soviet decision, but the statement would hold up equally well if, as appears likely, Mao's support for an invasion followed rather than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev's account. 29. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsKot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49NVI (STRICTLY SECRET), 31 October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41. 30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in particular Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking 's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the supposed contrast between Soviet and Chinese approaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking rhetorical flourishes for actual policy. 32. See Mark Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers and Military Aid to the Third World," in S. Neil MacFarlane and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (London: Routledge, 1989), 66-110, esp. 68-70. 33. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi propagandy i kulturnykh svyazei KNR szarubezhnymi stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SECRET) of a speech by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the PRC's Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, 24 April 1959, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, L. 26. 34. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 6 (“Otnosheniya s kapitalisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami"), Part H ("Otnosheniya s arabskimi stranami”), pp. 5758. 35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-duna,” Pravda (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassador in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev during the 1958 trip. 36. In Peking und Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern crisis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis began). Mehnert's comments have no bearing on the initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here has shown, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely differed in their views about how to respond. 37. See Allen S. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations,The China Quarterly 62 (June 1975), 263-270. The various post-hoc rationalizations that Mao offered (so that he could avoid admitting what a failure the whole venture had been) should not be

allowed to obscure the real purpose of the operation, as revealed in Mao's secret speeches in September 1958. 38. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 7273. The present author confirmed this point in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to Beijing. 39. Ibid., 73. 40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 293-294, 691-693. 41. Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54-55. 42. See, e.g., Mao's speech on 9 November 1958 at the First Zhengzhou Conference, translated in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, esp. 460-461. 43. For a cogent assessment of Sino-Soviet dynamics during the crisis, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in Morton H. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 265-303. Halperin's and Tsou's conclusions differ markedly from standard Western interpretations of the crisis, which posited it as a case of Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet timidity. For a typical example of this view (which, unlike Halperin's and Tsou's analysis, does not fare well in light of new evidence), see John R. Thomas, “The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," Orbis 6:1 (Spring 1962), 38-64. John Lewis Gaddis has noted that U.S. officials at the time "interpreted (the bombardment of Quemoy] as a joint Sino-Soviet probe intended to test Western resolve." See “Dividing Adversaries: The United States and International Communism, 1945-1958," in The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 186-187. Gaddis seems to believe that this perception was not quite accurate, but in fact the evidence amply bears out the views of President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. 44. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 233. Mao's reference to “a few rounds of artillery” is disingenuous to say the least, since the Chinese leader himself acknowledged in a secret speech in April 1959 (ibid., 290) that some 19,000 shells had been fired at Quemoy on 23 August 1958 alone. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the number of shells fired on the first day was closer to 41,000, but whichever figure may be correct, it is clear that far more than “a few rounds of artillery" were fired. 45. As Allen Whiting points out (“Quemoy 1958,"266267), there is little evidence that Mao intended at this point to attack Taiwan. Instead, he was hoping merely to destabilize the Guomintang government. 46. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 255. See also Whiting, “Quemoy 1958,” 266-267. 47. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, p. 132-133. 48. Full citations for Khrushchev's two major statements, as mentioned here and in the next sentence, are provided below in my annotations to Zimyanin's report. 49. On this point, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 16. 50. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 7374. 51. This also was a theme in official Chinese polemics beginning in 1963. Reliable documentation from 1958 undercuts these post-hoc Chinese accusations.

52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting,
“The Sino-Soviet Split,” 499-500.
53. Ibid. and “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v
Pekine 2 oktyabrya 1959 g.," Osobaya papka
(STRICTLY SECRET), APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331,
Ll. 12-15.
54. For a brief but reliable overview of Sino-Soviet
nuclear weapons cooperation, see the highly acclaimed
book by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China
Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1988), 39-46, 60-65, 71-72, and 221-222. Additional
valuable details, especially about cooperation in deliv-
ery vehicle technology, are provided by Lewis and Xue
in their subsequent study, China's Strategic Seapower,
2-4, 10-18, 47-49, and 130-134. See also Robert S.
Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W.Fieldhouse,
Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5: British, French,
and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO:Westview
Press, 1994), 324-356. For a sample of earlier ac-
counts, see Harold P. Ford, “The Eruption of Sino-
Soviet Politico-Military Problems, 1957-60,” in
Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Rela-
tions (New York: Praeger, 1966), 100-113; Thomas
W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 216-
224; Alice Langley Hsieh, “The Sino-Soviet Nuclear
Dialogue: 1963,Journal of Conflict Resolution 8:2
(June 1964), 99-115 (Hsieh uses the Sino-Soviet ex-
changes of 1963 to look back at the earlier period of
nuclear cooperation as well as the subsequent dis-
putes); Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strat-
egy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1962), 70-109; Morton H. Halperin, “Sino-So-
viet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960,” in Halperin, ed.,
Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 117-143; and
Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York:
Praeger, 1965), 78-82.
55. The information here was first revealed by the
former head of the Soviet “missile group" in China,
Major-General Aleksandr Savel'ev, in Aleksandr
Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,”
Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1995, 6.
56. Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, 131-
132. For more on the R-11FM, see Mikhail Turetsky,
The Introduction of Missile Systems Into the Soviet
Navy (1945-1962), Monograph Series on Soviet Union
No. 8 (Falls Church, VA: Delphic Associates, Febru-
ary 1983), 65-72.
57. This is discussed by Khrushchev in Vospominaniya,
Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 98-99.
58. Ibid., p. 98. Details of the NDTA and the June 1959
letter were first publicly revealed in a Chinese broad-
caston 15 August 1963, which claimed that Khrushchev
had reneged on the agreement so that he would have “a
gift to take to Eisenhower when visiting the USA in
September.” A very similar formulation was used in
the official Chinese statement cited in note 9 supra.
59. “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya
1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SE-
CRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F.45, Op. 1, D. 331,
Ll. 12-15. For an assessment of the Chinese leadership's
perspective on this matter, see Lewis and Xue, China's
Strategic Seapower, 17-18, 133.
60. Khrushchev deals with this point at length in his
memoirs; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 71-
76. See also Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, vol. 2, pp. 133-
61. On this point, see Lewis and Xue, China Builds the
Bomb, 64-65 and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Nuclear
Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations," in Halperin, ed.,
Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 146-147. See

also three official Chinese statements released in 1963: 69. For the effect on Khrushchev's trip, see his
“Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 78-82. For the
Complete, Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition official Chinese perspective, see The Truth About How
and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons," Peking Review the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with
6:31 (2 August 1963), 7-8; “Statement by the Spokes- India Against China (Beijing: Foreign Languages
man of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Press, 1963).
Soviet Government's Statement of 3 August,” Peking 70. CPSU CC General Department, “Otdel TSK KPSS
Review 6:33 (16 August 1963), 7-15, esp. 8-10; and po svyazyam s inostrannymi kompartiyami, mart 1953-
“Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Govern- fevral' 1957 g.," 1958 (Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op.
ment: A Comment on the Soviet Government's State- 28, “Predislovie," L. 2.
ment of 21 August,” Peking Review 6:36 (6 September 71. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 132-135. Ac-
1963), 7-16. These formed the basis of a booklet cording to Gromyko, the talks focused almost exclu-
published in late 1963 by the Foreign Languages Press sively on recent developments in the Taiwan Straits,
in Beijing, People of the World, Unite for the Complete, and were largely unproductive. He said he was “as-
Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and De- tounded" when Mao nonchalantly proposed that Ameri-
struction of Nuclear Weapons!

can troops be allowed to penetrate deep into China so 62. On 21 January 1960 the Chinese National People's that they could be wiped out by a Soviet nuclear strike Congress adopted a resolution stipulating that China (p. 133). Gromyko’s retrospective assertions about this would not be bound by any arms control agreement particular matter have been controversial from the time unless it had participated in the negotiations and had they appeared in 1988. A leading Western expert on given its express consent.

political-military affairs in China, John Wilson Lewis, 63. For background and widely differing perspectives has discounted Gromyko's report (see Lewis and Xue, on these matters, see Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China's Strategic Seapower, 16 and 258), but has China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, adduced no specific evidence to contradict it. What is 1990), 9-74; Wilhelm von Pochhammer, Die known about China's cautious policy during the Quemoy Auseinandersetzung um Tibets Grenzen (Frankfurt am crisis (see above) does raise doubts about Gromyko's Main: A. Metzner, 1962); Alastair Lamb, The China- claim, but it seems likely that Mao said something India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries reasonably close, and that Gromyko may have some(London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Alastair what misinterpreted it. After all, on 5 September 1958 Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh (Columbia: Mao told a closed gathering of the PRC's Supreme University of South Carolina Press, 1975); W. F. Van State Conference that China should be ready, if necesEekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute sary, for a “war in which hydrogen bombs” would be with China, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, used: “If we must fight, we will fight. If half the people 1967); Neville Maxwell, India's China War(New York: die, there is still nothing to fear.” (See Mao Zedong Pantheon, 1970), esp. 47-134; Allen S. Whiting, The sixiang wansui, 1969, p. 237.) Assuming that Mao said Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina roughly the same thing to Gromyko, it is plausible that (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 1-41; the Chinese leader also made comments similar to what R. K. Jain, ed., China-South Asian Relations, 1947- Gromyko alleged. This is the view of Oleg Troyanovskii, 1980, 2 vols. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adPress, 1981), Vol. 1: India, pp. 97-151; Chang, China's viser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes, esp. 61-78; leader during his trip to China in 1958, a few weeks Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. before Gromyko's visit. In an interview in Cambridge, Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Ri- Massachusetts on 6 October 1995, Troyanovskii said, valry in Ladakh (New York: Praeger, 1963); G. V. “I recall hearing something about this at the time, after Ambekar and V.D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's the crisis began. It fits in with what Mao said during the Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) Moscow conference in November 1957, which shocked (New York: Paragon, 1964), 111-186, esp. 111-151; us all." and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Misperceptions in For- 72. For background, see A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, eign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959- Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya 1962 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. 64. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi 1. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K. U. Chernenko i M. propagandy v kul'turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi S. Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SE- otnosheniya, 1994), 71-72; and O. Grinevskii, “Na CRET), 24 April 1959, by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of Smolenskoi Ploshchadi v 1950-kh godakh,” the PRC's Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' (Moscow) 11 (November TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, Ll. 18, 27.

1994), 120-126, esp. 124. 65. “Zayavlenie TASS,” Pravda (Moscow), 10 Septem- 73. “Pribytie N. S. Khrushcheva v kitaiskuyu stolitsu: ber 1959, 3.

Vstrecha na aerodrome Shoudu,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 66. MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 258-260. October 1959, 1. 67. Cited in O. B. Borisov (pseud.) and B. T. Koloskov, 74. A very useful account of Khrushchev's interactions Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii with Gromyko during the trip is in Khrushchev's ocherk (Moscow: Mysl', 1972), 155.

Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part E (“O poezdke v SShA”), 68. A more serious incident occurred in late October, pp. 7-25. Khrushchev notes that he “greatly respected two-and-a-half weeks after Khrushchev's visit to China. Gromyko as foreign minister both during this time and Nine Indian policemen were killed or wounded and ten afterwards” (p. 8). were taken prisoner after they clashed with Chinese 75. A cover note on Zimyanin's report alludes to a onetroops near Kongka Pass in Ladakh (northeastern Kash- page update, but the text has not yet been located. No mir, along the Tibetan border). The Soviet authorities doubt, the update cited the announcement on 17 Sepagain maintained a policy of strict neutrality in their tember 1959 that the Chinese defense minister, Marshal coverage of this incident, further antagonizing the Chi- Peng Dehuai, was being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao.

Numerous other top military officials also were re


moved at this time: the chief of the Chinese General sovetskikh gostei: Ot"ezd iz Pekina partiino-
Staff, General Huang Kecheng (who was replaced by pravitelstvennoi delegatsii SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow),
the public security minister, General Luo Ruiching); 5 October 1959, 1. The MFA Collegium was a group
two other deputy defense ministers, General Xiao Ke of 12-15 of the most senior officials in the ministry,
and General Li Da; and a half dozen lower-ranking including the minister, all the first deputy and deputy
generals. These officers and two deputy foreign minis- ministers, and about a half dozen others, among them
ters were all removed because of their purported links Zimyanin.
with Peng Dehuai, who was accused in mid-1959 of 77. See “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya
"rightist opportunism” and forming an “anti-Party 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SE-
clique.” These charges, approved by the CCP Central CRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331,
Committee at its plenum in Lushan in the first half of L. 1; and “Beseda N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-
August, stemmed from a secret “letter of opinion” that duna," Pravda (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1.
Peng sent to Mao in mid-July, which strongly criticized 78. This is documented in Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red
the “confusion,” “shortcomings,” “extravagance," and Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, trans. by
"waste” of Mao's economic policies. The letter was (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), 572-573. Nie
disclosed to other senior officials at an expanded ses- Rongzhen was the long-time head of China's strategic
sion of the CCP Politburo in Lushan in the latter half of weapons program; his memoirs were first published in
July. Mao regarded the document as a grave threat to Chinese (Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu) in 1984.
his authority, and he responded with a furious counter- 79. “Long Live Leninism!” was first published in
attack, forcing members of the Politburo to side either Hongqi 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in
with him or with Peng. Although several top officials translation in Peking Review 3:17 (April 1960), 14-22.
undoubtedly shared Peng's misgivings about recent This statement and many others from 1959 and 1960 are
policies, they were unwilling to take a stand against available in well-annotated translation in Hudson,
Mao. By the time the enlarged Politburo session in Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet
Lushan adjourned at the end of July and the Central Dispute and as appendices in John Gittings, ed., Survey
Committee plenum convened a few days later, Peng's of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967 (New York:
fate was sealed. For solid analyses of the Peng Dehuai Oxford University Press, 1968), 287-394. The Gittings
affair, see Jurgen Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and book also includes key statements from 1963-1967
the Image (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), organized thematically to shed light on events from the
esp. 77-106; MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 1950s and early 1960s.
187-237;J. D. Simmonds, “P'eng Teh-huai: A Chrono- 80. See, e.g., Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev
logical Re-Examination,The China Quarterly 37 (Janu- obuchali," 6.
ary-March 1969), 120-138; and Frederick C. Teiwes, 81. For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which
Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and De- includes details omitted from the official transcript, see
cline of Party Norms 1950-1965 (White Plains, NY: M. Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v.
E. Sharpe, 1979), ch. 9. Another invaluable source on Peking (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 97-110.
the affair is the “memoir" by Peng Dehuai himself, 82. For a useful account of this process by a participant,
which was compiled posthumously on the basis of see Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China
autobiographical notes Peng wrote in response to inter- (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives,
rogators during the Cultural Revolution. An English 1964), esp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, “Kak nashi
version is now available: Memoirs of a Chinese Mar- raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali," 6.
shal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai 83. For a good indication of Rakhmanin's views at the
(1898-1974), trans. by Zheng Longpu (Beijing: For- time, see his pseudonymously written book, O. B.
eign Languages Press, 1984). The book includes a Borisov, Iz istorii sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii v 50-
whole chapter on the Lushan plenum (pp. 485-509) and kh godakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981). Although the
an appendix with the full text of the letter that Peng sent book was written much later, his views were remark-
to Mao in July 1959. For additional documentation, see ably constant over the years. Rakhmanin wrote numer-
The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968 (Kowloon: ous other books about China (also under the pseudonym
Union Research Institute, 1968). Contrary to much of O. B. Borisov), which are also worth consulting. See
speculation in the West, there is no reason to believe in particular O. B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov, Sovetsko-
that Peng's challenge to Mao revolved around military kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk (Mos-
issues per se or had anything to do with the Soviet cow: Mysl, 1972).
Union. Peng undoubtedly was troubled by the growing 84. For background on Kapitsa and his dealings with
frictions with Moscow because he knew how depen- Rakhmanin, see Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Social-
dent China still was on the USSR for military technol- ism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton, NJ:
ogy, but he never raised this issue in his confrontation Princeton University Press, 1985), 51-53.
with Mao. Nor is there any evidence to substantiate 85. All other Southeast Asian countries came within the
claims about a “Soviet connection" made in David A. purview of the MFA's Southeast Asian Department,
Charles (pseud.), “The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng which remained a unified entity.
Teh-Huai,The China Quarterly 8 (October-Decem- 86. The provisions excluding foreigners from Manchu-
ber 1961), 63-76. Charles's article alleges that Peng's ria and Xinjiang were not made public in February 1950
letter to Mao was prepared with Moscow's knowledge, and indeed had not been publicly disclosed at the time
and that “Khrushchev's refusal to apologize for this Zimyanin was drafting his report. The existence of
intervention in Chinese domestic affairs perhaps pre- these agreements first came to light in 1969 when a
cipitated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute." secret speech delivered by Mao in March 1958 was
These assertions are no more than dubious speculation. published in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang
76. On the role of senior MFA officials during the trip, wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought"), 159-172.
see, inter alia, “Uzhin u Mao Tsze-duna" and An English translation of the speech was published in
“Prebyvanie v Pekine sovetskoi partiino- Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95-
pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii,” both in Pravda (Mos- 98. Mao emphasized that these provisions relegated
cow), 3 October 1959, 1; and “Kitai teplo provozhaet Manchuria and Xinjiang to the status of “colonies." For

other documents cited here by Zimyanin, see
“Soglashenie mezhdu Soyuzom Sovetskikh
Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi
Respublikoi o Kitaiskoi Chanchun’skoi zheleznoi
doroge, Port-Arture i Dalnem,” 14 February 1950;
“Soobshchenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR
i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii dvukh
Sovetsko-kitaiskikh aktsionernikh obshchestv," 29
March 1950; and “Soobshchenie o podpisanii
soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi
Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii Sovetsko-kitaiskogo
aktsionernogo obshchestva grazhdanskoi aviatsii," 2
April 1950, all in I. F. Kurdyukov, V. N. Nikiforov, and
A.S. Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya,
1917-1957: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo
Vostochnoi literatury, 1959), 221-222, 227-228 and
228-229, respectively. For further commentary on
these agreements, see Chang, China's Boundary Trea-
ties and Frontier Disputes, 9-38, and for a detailed
contemporary assessment of the inequitable nature of
the joint stock companies, see the top-secret memoran-
dum “O nedostatkakh deyatel'nosti Sovetsko-kitaiskikh
obshchestv Sovkitmetall i Sovkitneft' v Sintszyane,"
from N.V. Vazhnov, secretary of the CPSU branch at
the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, 25 February 1954, in
TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 9, D. 1933, LI. 18-38.
87. For Khrushchev's version of these efforts, see
Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 25-31.
88. “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel’stva Soyuza
Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitelstva
Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki,” 12 October 1954, and
“Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitelstva Soyuza
Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respubliki pravitel'stva
Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki ob otnosheniyakh s
Yaponiei,” 12 October 1954, both in Kurdyukov,
Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie
otnosheniya, 299-301 and 301-302, respectively
89. “Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o peredache
Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike sovetskoi doli uchastiya
v smeshannykh obshchestvakh," 12 October 1954,
"Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o stroitel'stve
zheleznoi dorogi Lan'chzhou-Urumchi-Alma Alta,"
12 October 1954, “Sovmestnoe kommyunike
pravitelstv Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh
Respublik, Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki i Mongol'skoi
Narodnoi Respubliki o stroitel'stve zheleznoi dorogi ot
Tsenina do Ulan-Batora i organizatsii pryamogo
soobshcheniya v 1955g.,”12 October 1955, ibid., 303-
304, 305, and 305-306, respectively.
90. Zimyanin's chronology here is slightly amiss. In
private discussions with Soviet officials as early as
March 1956 (a few weeks after Khrushchev's secret
speech), Mao began condemning the “great and serious
mistakes committed by Stalin," including his "errone-
ous and ill-considered" actions vis-a-vis China. See
“Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956
g.,” Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Yudin,
Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in TsKhSD,
F.5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 88-99. Only after the upheavals
in Eastern Europe in October-November 1956 did Chi-
nese leaders express strong reservations about the de-
Stalinization campaign. Zimyanin is right, however,
that Mao had been uneasy about Khrushchev's secret
speech from the very start. For reasons discussed
above, it is unlikely that Mao's aversion to the reassess-
ment of Stalin stemmed from any great feeling of
personal warmth toward the late Soviet dictator. The
more probable reasons for Mao's hostility toward the
de-Stalinization campaign were threefold: (1) his irri-
tation that Khrushchev had not consulted with him
before delivering the secret speech; (2) his concern that
attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own
status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3)
his belief that the chief features of Stalinism, especially
the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were
still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on,
after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support
for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate
against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement
from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that
he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of
Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central
Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Depart-
ments of People's Daily and Red Flag,” 13 September
1963, in Peking Review 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8-
91. The reference here is to Mao's trip in November
1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip
outside China) since early 1950. On the point dis-
cussed in the next sentence, see Khrushchev,
Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105.
92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated
the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a
Hundred Schools of Thought Contend"; and in the
spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee
published a directive inviting public criticism, many
Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportu-
nity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques
of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had
anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the
authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the
new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds."
Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter-
revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000
eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other
punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this
episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Hundred
Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New
York: Praeger, 1960), which includes extensive docu-
mentation as well a lengthy narrative and critical com-
mentaries. For a perceptive analysis of the fundamen-
tal differences between the Hundred Flowers cam-
paign in China and the post-Stalin “Thaw” in the Soviet
Union, see S. H. Chen, “Artificial Flowers During a
Natural ‘Thaw'," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet
and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differ-
ences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967),
220-254. Useful insights into Mao's own goals for the
Hundred Flowers campaign can be gained from 14
secret speeches he delivered between mid-February
and late April 1957, collected in MacFarquhar, Cheek,
and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao,
93. These particular complaints were expressed by a
high-ranking Chinese military officer, General Lung
Yun, the vice chairman of the PRC National Defense
Council, in the newspaper Xinhua on 18 June 1957, at
the very end of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He
declared that it was "totally unfair that the People's
Republic of China had to bear all the expenses of the
Korean War,” noting (accurately) that China had been
forced to pay for all the military equipment it received
from the Soviet Union. Lung contrasted Moscow's
position with the “more suitable” policy of the United
States during World War I and World War II, when
Allied debts were written off. He also emphasized that
China's debt to the Soviet Union should be reduced in
any case as compensation for the large amount of
industry that the Soviet Union extracted from Manchu-
ria in 1945-46. Lung's appeals went unheeded, and the
Chinese government continued to pay off the bills it
had accumulated, equivalent to nearly $2 billion. The

debt was not fully repaid until 1965. During the “anti- title used foreight earlier compilations of secret speeches rightist" crackdown after the Hundred Flowers cam- by Mao). All three speeches were translated into paign, Lung was punished for his remarks, but he English, introduced, and annotated by Michael managed to regain his spot on the National Defense Schoenhals in “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 Council in December 1958. See MacFarquhar, The ‘Moscow Conference',The Journal of Communist Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellec- Studies 2:2 (June 1986), 109-126. Mao's comments tuals, 50. See also Mineo Nakajima, “Foreign Rela- about the Anti-Party Group were as follows: “I endorse tions: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in the CPSU Central Committee's resolution of the MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., The People's Repub- Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. lic, Part 1, 270, 277.

The facts show that unity could not be achieved and that 94. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov dal'neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva clique took the opportunity to attack when Comrade mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU even though they launched a surprise attack, our ComPresidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vypiska rade Khrushchev is no fool; he is a smart man who iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 immediately mobilized his forces and launched a victooktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/ rious counterattack. That struggle was one between I (STRICTLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30. Zimyanin's description the four or five years since Stalin's death the situation of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities in the Soviet Union has improved considerably in the immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip shows that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for is more correct and that opposition to this line is example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly incorrect. Comrade Molotov is an old comrade with a praised the October 30 statement as evidence of long fighting history, but this time he made a mistake. Moscow's “determination to eliminate certain abnor- The struggle between the two lines within the CPSU mal features of its relations with other socialist states.” was of an antagonistic variety because the two sides 95. "Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 could not accommodate each other and each side exJanuary 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, cluded the other. When this is the case, there need not eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 330-335. be any trouble if everything is handled well, but there is Zimyanin's characterization of this declaration (see the danger of trouble if things are not handled well." next sentence) is accurate.

99. “Vstrecha Predsedatelya Mao Tsze-dunas kitaiskimi 96. The reference here is to a two-part conference in studentami i praktikantami v Moskve," Pravda (MosMoscow on 14-19 November 1957 marking the 40th cow), 22 November 1957, 3. anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of 100. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i all 13 ruling Communist parties were invited to the first Mao Tsze-duna,” 3 August 1958, in Kurdyukov, session on 14-16 November, but at the outset Yugosla- Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie via declined to take any further part. As Zimyanin otnosheniya, 403-406. accurately observes below, China joined the other par- 101. The “questions of military cooperation” discussed ticipants in issuing a statement that reaffirmed the at this meeting were essentially fivefold. First, China CPSU's preeminent role in the world Communist move- sought new weapons and broader military backing from ment. See “Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei Moscow for a possible operation against Taiwan (see kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii above). Second, Khrushchev sought, once again, to sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostoyavshegosya v Moskve persuade China to permit a long-wave military commu14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 nications center to be established on Chinese territory November 1957, 1-2. Yugoslav officials refused to by 1962 for Soviet submarines operating in the Pacific. endorse the 12-party statement, but they agreed to This idea was first broached to the Chinese by Soviet participate in the second phase of the conference, which defense minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii in April was held immediately afterwards, on 16-19 November. 1958, and over the next few months the two sides A total of 64 Communist parties from around the world haggled over the funding and operation rights. At the took part in that session, which culminated in the adop- summit, Khrushchev and Mao concurred that China tion of a so-called Peace Manifesto.

would build and operate the station with Soviet funding 97. “Rech’ rukovoditelya delegatsii Kitaiskoi Narodnoi and technical assistance, and a formal agreement to that Respubliki Mao Tsze-duna na yubileinoi sessii effect was signed. (The withdrawal of Soviet personnel Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), 7 No- from China in mid-1960 left the communications center vember 1957,2. See also Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, only half-completed, but the Chinese eventually comVol. 5, Part G, pp. 42-46.

pleted it on their own.) Third, Chinese prime minister 98. This is a paraphrase of what Mao said in a speech at Zhou Enlai requested Soviet aid in the development of the 64-party conference on 18 November 1957, the only nuclear-powered submarines, a proposal that time he is known to have offered direct support for Khrushchev quickly brushed aside, as he had in the Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group. Excerpts past. Fourth, Khrushchev renewed an earlier proposal from the speech were later published in Renmin Ribao, for a joint submarine flotilla, which effectively would but all references to Khrushchev and the “Molotov have been a reciprocal basing arrangement for Soviet clique" were omitted. As a result, until the mid-1980s submarines at Chinese ports and Chinese submarines at Western scholars assumed that Mao had never spoken Soviet Arctic ports. Mao summarily rejected this idea, out against the Anti-Party Group. Fortunately, in 1985 just as he did when it was first raised via the Soviet the full text of Mao's 18 November 1957 speech was ambassador in China, Pavel Yudin, ten days before published, along with the texts of two other other unpub- Khrushchev's visit. Fifth, the question of nuclear lished speeches he gave during the November 1957 weapons cooperation came up. In accordance with the conference, in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang NDTA, the Soviet Union at the time was training wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,” the same Chinese nuclear weapons scientists and was providing

assistance. (In other words, they wanted to receive
Soviet weaponry and sensitive technology, but to use
these in accordance with China's own doctrine, strat-
egy, and political goals.) At Mao's behest, Chinese
officials began speaking against the “mechanical imita-
tion of foreign tec gy” and “excessive reliance on
assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal
countries," and warned that “there is no possibility for
us to make wholesale use of the existing experiences of
other countries.” They emphasized that China “must
carry out advanced research itself" instead of “simply
hoping for outside aid.” For more on this point, see
Ford, “The Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military
Problems, 1957-60,” esp. 102-104; Lewis and Xue,
China's Strategic Seapower, 3-4, and MacFarquhar,
The Great Leap Forward, 36-40, passim. For a good
example of Mao's own thoughts on the topic, see his
secret “Address on March 10" at the Chengdu Confer-
ence, published in Issues & Studies 10:2 (November
1973), 95-98.
108. For Soviet officials' views of these ideological
disputes, see the voluminous files in TsKhSD, F.5, Op.
30, Dd. 247, 301, 398, and 399.



Mark Kramer, a scholar at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, contributes frequently to the Bulletin.

information needed to build nuclear weapons. But Strategic Seapower, 15-17 and Whiting, “The Sino-
unbeknownst to Chinese officials, Soviet leaders had Soviet Split,” 499-500. For an earlier study reaching
decided in early 1958 not to transfer a prototype nuclear the same conclusion, see Halperin and Tsou, “The 1958
bomb to China, despite having made a pledge to that Quemoy Crisis,” 265-303.
effect in the October 1957 agreement. Mao raised this 104. "Vneocherednoi XXI S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi
matter during the talks with Khrushchev, but got a non- partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O kontrol'nykh tsifrakh
committal response. Information here is derived from: razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistvo SSSR na 1959-1965
(1) an interview with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former gody- Doklad tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva," Pravda
Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to (Moscow), 28 January 1959,2-10; and “Vneocherednoi
Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader dur- XXI S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo
ing this trip to China, in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Soyuza: Zaklyuchitel’noe slovo tovarishcha N. S.
6 October 1995; (2) Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Khrushcheva,” Pravda (Moscow), 6 February 1959, 1-
Seapower, 14-15; and (3) Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 3. These speeches and other materials from the Con-
Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 76-78.


republished in XXII S"ezd 102. Khrushchev declared that “an attack against the Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (MosChinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi and neighbor of our country, would be an attack against literatury, 1962). the USSR itself. True to its duty, our country will do 105. Zimyanin's characterization of the Chinese reeverything necessary, in conjunction with People's sponse to Khrushchev's report (especially the section China, to defend the security of both states.” This on "The New Stage in Communist Construction and statement was repeated, in more or less identical phras- Certain Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory") is acing, in numerous high-level Soviet statements. See, curate. Beijing's tepid initial response appeared in the e.g., "Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR main daily Renmin Ribao on 5 February 1959, and a N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkhaueru much more extended commentary was published in the po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 7 Septem- theoretical journal Hongqi on 16 February. ber 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, 106. Zimyanin is referring here to the momentous eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 411. According Second Session of the CPC's 8th Congress, which to Khrushchev's memoirs, as soon as this statement was adopted a “General Line” of drastically accelerated issued, Mao expressed doubt that the Soviet Union had economic development and ideological fervor. The any intention of fulfilling it; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, hallmarks of the new line, as it evolved over the next Part F (“Mao Tsze-dun”), pp. 4-5. This assertion is few months, were: (1) the Great Leap Forward, a crash problematic, but there is not yet (and perhaps cannot be) program of industrialization relying primarily on China's any direct evidence to contravene it.

own resources; (2) the establishment of huge “people's 103. The clearest statement to this effect came in a letter communes" (the “basic social units of a Communist Khrushchev sent to President Eisenhower during the society"), which were intended to replace collective Quemoy crisis, warning that “those who are concocting farms and to combine agriculture with industry (includplans for an atomic attack against the PRC should not ing “backyard" steel furnaces) all around the country; forget that it is not only the USA, but the other side as (3) the elimination of virtually all remaining forms of well that possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and private property; (4) the further leveling of social classes the means of delivering them, and that if such an attack and systematic deprecation of expertise; (5) the abanis carried out against the PRC, the aggressor will be donment of earlier birth control efforts; and (6) the dealt a swift and automatic rebuffinkind.” See “Poslanie conversion of the army into a full-fledged people's Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. militia (via the communes) and the establishment of an Khrushcheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkhaueru o “Everyone a Soldier” campaign requiring Chinese milipolozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 19 September 1958, in tary officers to spend at least one month a year performKurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko- ing the duties of a common soldier. Chinese leaders' kitaiskie otnosheniya, 417. At the time, the Chinese hopes of achieving immediate, rapid growth via the authorities warmly praised Khrushchev's statement, Great Leap Forward were evident from the goals they describing it as “a lofty expression of our fraternal set for steel output (to cite a typical case). In 1957 steel relations." See “Sotsialisticheskii lager v sovremennoi production in China had been 5.9 million tons, whereas mezhdunarodnoi obstanovke," Pravda (Moscow), 10 the target for 1958 was nearly twice that, at 10.7 million November 1958, 3. Mao himself said he was “deeply tons, and the targets for subsequent years were even touched by the Soviet Union's] boundless devotion to more ambitious. Not surprisingly, these goals proved the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international- unattainable, and the whole effort turned out to be a ism” and wanted to “convey heartfelt gratitude” to debilitating failure. The communes (which became Khrushchev for his support during the Taiwan Straits smaller but more numerous after 1958) produced equally crisis. Several years later, however, Chinese leaders disastrous results, causing widespread food shortages shifted their view (in accordance with the polemics of and starvation in the early 1960s. The Chinese armed the time) and expressed contempt for Khrushchev's forces also suffered immense damage from both the pledge, arguing that “Soviet leaders declared their demoralization of the officer corps and the disarray support for China only when they were certain there within the military-industrial complex. Of the many was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out Western analyses of Chinese politics and society during and there was no longer any need for the Soviet Union this period, see in particular MacFarquhar, The Great to support China with its nuclear weapons.” See “State- Leap Forward ment by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A 107. This was indeed the thrust of China's campaign Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 21 against “blind faith in foreigners” (quoted by Zimyanin August,” 1 September 1963, in Peking Review 6:36 (6 in the previous sentence), as formulated in the spring September 1963), 9. New evidence suggests that these and summer of 1958. Although Chinese officials and accusations were unfounded, and that Khrushchev's military commanders at this point were still hoping for pledge was far more meaningful than the Chinese an increase in Soviet military-technical aid, they wanted authorities later claimed; see Lewis and Xue, China's to limit the political and doctrinal effects of Soviet

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