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Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influence." See “Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," L. 93. 25. For a useful list of collections of Mao's secret speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward, Harvard Contemporary China Series No.6(Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989), 78-81. 26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more nuanced appraisal of Stalin's policy. Among many items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection of documents being compiled under the auspices of the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents from Recent History (RTsKhIDNI): Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bolsheviki), Komintern, i Narodno-revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae. The first volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been published in several recent issues of the journal Problemy Dalnego vostoka. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in JanuaryFebruary 1949, which is presented along with supporting documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan's report, were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g.,” Novaya i noveisha istoriya (Moscow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, LI. 95-118. 27. “Address on March 10,” 98. For Mao's extended comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, see "Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," Ll. 88-92. 28. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part C ("O Vengrii"), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev's version of events is borne out by a close reading of the Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chinese media spoke positively about the events in Hungary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers suddenly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chinese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht uber die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev's account. (Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev's version is not inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 September 1963 (cited in note 9 supra), despite the way that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev's
account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts Khrushchev's account. The September 1963 statement goes on to claim that Chinese leaders "insisted on the adoption of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev's claim that Mao strongly supported the invasion after the Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any chronology, it creates the impression that Mao's backing for an invasion preceded the Soviet decision, but the statement would hold up equally well if, as appears likely, Mao's support for an invasion followed rather than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev's account. 29. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsKot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49NVI (STRICTLY SECRET), 31 October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41. 30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in particular Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking 's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the supposed contrast between Soviet and Chinese approaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking rhetorical flourishes for actual policy. 32. See Mark Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers and Military Aid to the Third World," in S. Neil MacFarlane and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (London: Routledge, 1989), 66-110, esp. 68-70. 33. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi propagandy i kulturnykh svyazei KNR szarubezhnymi stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SECRET) of a speech by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the PRC's Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, 24 April 1959, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, L. 26. 34. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 6 (“Otnosheniya s kapitalisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami"), Part H ("Otnosheniya s arabskimi stranami”), pp. 5758. 35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-duna,” Pravda (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassador in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev during the 1958 trip. 36. In Peking und Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern crisis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis began). Mehnert's comments have no bearing on the initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here has shown, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely differed in their views about how to respond. 37. See Allen S. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations,” The China Quarterly 62 (June 1975), 263-270. The various post-hoc rationalizations that Mao offered (so that he could avoid admitting what a failure the whole venture had been) should not be
allowed to obscure the real purpose of the operation, as revealed in Mao's secret speeches in September 1958. 38. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 7273. The present author confirmed this point in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to Beijing. 39. Ibid., 73. 40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 293-294, 691-693. 41. Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54-55. 42. See, e.g., Mao's speech on 9 November 1958 at the First Zhengzhou Conference, translated in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, esp. 460-461. 43. For a cogent assessment of Sino-Soviet dynamics during the crisis, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in Morton H. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 265-303. Halperin's and Tsou's conclusions differ markedly from standard Western interpretations of the crisis, which posited it as a case of Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet timidity. For a typical example of this view (which, unlike Halperin's and Tsou's analysis, does not fare well in light of new evidence), see John R. Thomas, “The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," Orbis 6:1 (Spring 1962), 38-64. John Lewis Gaddis has noted that U.S. officials at the time "interpreted (the bombardment of Quemoy] as a joint Sino-Soviet probe intended to test Western resolve." See “Dividing Adversaries: The United States and International Communism, 1945-1958," in The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 186-187. Gaddis seems to believe that this perception was not quite accurate, but in fact the evidence amply bears out the views of President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. 44. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 233. Mao's reference to “a few rounds of artillery” is disingenuous to say the least, since the Chinese leader himself acknowledged in a secret speech in April 1959 (ibid., 290) that some 19,000 shells had been fired at Quemoy on 23 August 1958 alone. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the number of shells fired on the first day was closer to 41,000, but whichever figure may be correct, it is clear that far more than “a few rounds of artillery" were fired. 45. As Allen Whiting points out (“Quemoy 1958,"266267), there is little evidence that Mao intended at this point to attack Taiwan. Instead, he was hoping merely to destabilize the Guomintang government. 46. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 255. See also Whiting, “Quemoy 1958,” 266-267. 47. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, p. 132-133. 48. Full citations for Khrushchev's two major statements, as mentioned here and in the next sentence, are provided below in my annotations to Zimyanin's report. 49. On this point, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 16. 50. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 7374. 51. This also was a theme in official Chinese polemics beginning in 1963. Reliable documentation from 1958 undercuts these post-hoc Chinese accusations.
52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting,
also three official Chinese statements released in 1963: 69. For the effect on Khrushchev's trip, see his
can troops be allowed to penetrate deep into China so 62. On 21 January 1960 the Chinese National People's that they could be wiped out by a Soviet nuclear strike Congress adopted a resolution stipulating that China (p. 133). Gromyko’s retrospective assertions about this would not be bound by any arms control agreement particular matter have been controversial from the time unless it had participated in the negotiations and had they appeared in 1988. A leading Western expert on given its express consent.
political-military affairs in China, John Wilson Lewis, 63. For background and widely differing perspectives has discounted Gromyko's report (see Lewis and Xue, on these matters, see Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China's Strategic Seapower, 16 and 258), but has China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, adduced no specific evidence to contradict it. What is 1990), 9-74; Wilhelm von Pochhammer, Die known about China's cautious policy during the Quemoy Auseinandersetzung um Tibets Grenzen (Frankfurt am crisis (see above) does raise doubts about Gromyko's Main: A. Metzner, 1962); Alastair Lamb, The China- claim, but it seems likely that Mao said something India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries reasonably close, and that Gromyko may have some(London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Alastair what misinterpreted it. After all, on 5 September 1958 Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh (Columbia: Mao told a closed gathering of the PRC's Supreme University of South Carolina Press, 1975); W. F. Van State Conference that China should be ready, if necesEekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute sary, for a “war in which hydrogen bombs” would be with China, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, used: “If we must fight, we will fight. If half the people 1967); Neville Maxwell, India's China War(New York: die, there is still nothing to fear.” (See Mao Zedong Pantheon, 1970), esp. 47-134; Allen S. Whiting, The sixiang wansui, 1969, p. 237.) Assuming that Mao said Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina roughly the same thing to Gromyko, it is plausible that (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 1-41; the Chinese leader also made comments similar to what R. K. Jain, ed., China-South Asian Relations, 1947- Gromyko alleged. This is the view of Oleg Troyanovskii, 1980, 2 vols. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adPress, 1981), Vol. 1: India, pp. 97-151; Chang, China's viser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes, esp. 61-78; leader during his trip to China in 1958, a few weeks Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. before Gromyko's visit. In an interview in Cambridge, Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Ri- Massachusetts on 6 October 1995, Troyanovskii said, valry in Ladakh (New York: Praeger, 1963); G. V. “I recall hearing something about this at the time, after Ambekar and V.D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's the crisis began. It fits in with what Mao said during the Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) Moscow conference in November 1957, which shocked (New York: Paragon, 1964), 111-186, esp. 111-151; us all." and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Misperceptions in For- 72. For background, see A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, eign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959- Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya 1962 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. 64. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi 1. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K. U. Chernenko i M. propagandy v kul'turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi S. Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SE- otnosheniya, 1994), 71-72; and O. Grinevskii, “Na CRET), 24 April 1959, by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of Smolenskoi Ploshchadi v 1950-kh godakh,” the PRC's Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' (Moscow) 11 (November TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, Ll. 18, 27.
1994), 120-126, esp. 124. 65. “Zayavlenie TASS,” Pravda (Moscow), 10 Septem- 73. “Pribytie N. S. Khrushcheva v kitaiskuyu stolitsu: ber 1959, 3.
Vstrecha na aerodrome Shoudu,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 66. MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 258-260. October 1959, 1. 67. Cited in O. B. Borisov (pseud.) and B. T. Koloskov, 74. A very useful account of Khrushchev's interactions Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii with Gromyko during the trip is in Khrushchev's ocherk (Moscow: Mysl', 1972), 155.
Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part E (“O poezdke v SShA”), 68. A more serious incident occurred in late October, pp. 7-25. Khrushchev notes that he “greatly respected two-and-a-half weeks after Khrushchev's visit to China. Gromyko as foreign minister both during this time and Nine Indian policemen were killed or wounded and ten afterwards” (p. 8). were taken prisoner after they clashed with Chinese 75. A cover note on Zimyanin's report alludes to a onetroops near Kongka Pass in Ladakh (northeastern Kash- page update, but the text has not yet been located. No mir, along the Tibetan border). The Soviet authorities doubt, the update cited the announcement on 17 Sepagain maintained a policy of strict neutrality in their tember 1959 that the Chinese defense minister, Marshal coverage of this incident, further antagonizing the Chi- Peng Dehuai, was being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao.
Numerous other top military officials also were re
moved at this time: the chief of the Chinese General sovetskikh gostei: Ot"ezd iz Pekina partiino-
other documents cited here by Zimyanin, see
debt was not fully repaid until 1965. During the “anti- title used foreight earlier compilations of secret speeches rightist" crackdown after the Hundred Flowers cam- by Mao). All three speeches were translated into paign, Lung was punished for his remarks, but he English, introduced, and annotated by Michael managed to regain his spot on the National Defense Schoenhals in “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 Council in December 1958. See MacFarquhar, The ‘Moscow Conference',” The Journal of Communist Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellec- Studies 2:2 (June 1986), 109-126. Mao's comments tuals, 50. See also Mineo Nakajima, “Foreign Rela- about the Anti-Party Group were as follows: “I endorse tions: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in the CPSU Central Committee's resolution of the MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., The People's Repub- Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. lic, Part 1, 270, 277.
The facts show that unity could not be achieved and that 94. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov dal'neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva clique took the opportunity to attack when Comrade mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU even though they launched a surprise attack, our ComPresidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vypiska rade Khrushchev is no fool; he is a smart man who iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 immediately mobilized his forces and launched a victooktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/ rious counterattack. That struggle was one between I (STRICTLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30. Zimyanin's description the four or five years since Stalin's death the situation of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities in the Soviet Union has improved considerably in the immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip shows that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for is more correct and that opposition to this line is example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly incorrect. Comrade Molotov is an old comrade with a praised the October 30 statement as evidence of long fighting history, but this time he made a mistake. Moscow's “determination to eliminate certain abnor- The struggle between the two lines within the CPSU mal features of its relations with other socialist states.” was of an antagonistic variety because the two sides 95. "Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 could not accommodate each other and each side exJanuary 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, cluded the other. When this is the case, there need not eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 330-335. be any trouble if everything is handled well, but there is Zimyanin's characterization of this declaration (see the danger of trouble if things are not handled well." next sentence) is accurate.
99. “Vstrecha Predsedatelya Mao Tsze-dunas kitaiskimi 96. The reference here is to a two-part conference in studentami i praktikantami v Moskve," Pravda (MosMoscow on 14-19 November 1957 marking the 40th cow), 22 November 1957, 3. anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of 100. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i all 13 ruling Communist parties were invited to the first Mao Tsze-duna,” 3 August 1958, in Kurdyukov, session on 14-16 November, but at the outset Yugosla- Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie via declined to take any further part. As Zimyanin otnosheniya, 403-406. accurately observes below, China joined the other par- 101. The “questions of military cooperation” discussed ticipants in issuing a statement that reaffirmed the at this meeting were essentially fivefold. First, China CPSU's preeminent role in the world Communist move- sought new weapons and broader military backing from ment. See “Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei Moscow for a possible operation against Taiwan (see kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii above). Second, Khrushchev sought, once again, to sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostoyavshegosya v Moskve persuade China to permit a long-wave military commu14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 nications center to be established on Chinese territory November 1957, 1-2. Yugoslav officials refused to by 1962 for Soviet submarines operating in the Pacific. endorse the 12-party statement, but they agreed to This idea was first broached to the Chinese by Soviet participate in the second phase of the conference, which defense minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii in April was held immediately afterwards, on 16-19 November. 1958, and over the next few months the two sides A total of 64 Communist parties from around the world haggled over the funding and operation rights. At the took part in that session, which culminated in the adop- summit, Khrushchev and Mao concurred that China tion of a so-called Peace Manifesto.
would build and operate the station with Soviet funding 97. “Rech’ rukovoditelya delegatsii Kitaiskoi Narodnoi and technical assistance, and a formal agreement to that Respubliki Mao Tsze-duna na yubileinoi sessii effect was signed. (The withdrawal of Soviet personnel Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), 7 No- from China in mid-1960 left the communications center vember 1957,2. See also Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, only half-completed, but the Chinese eventually comVol. 5, Part G, pp. 42-46.
pleted it on their own.) Third, Chinese prime minister 98. This is a paraphrase of what Mao said in a speech at Zhou Enlai requested Soviet aid in the development of the 64-party conference on 18 November 1957, the only nuclear-powered submarines, a proposal that time he is known to have offered direct support for Khrushchev quickly brushed aside, as he had in the Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group. Excerpts past. Fourth, Khrushchev renewed an earlier proposal from the speech were later published in Renmin Ribao, for a joint submarine flotilla, which effectively would but all references to Khrushchev and the “Molotov have been a reciprocal basing arrangement for Soviet clique" were omitted. As a result, until the mid-1980s submarines at Chinese ports and Chinese submarines at Western scholars assumed that Mao had never spoken Soviet Arctic ports. Mao summarily rejected this idea, out against the Anti-Party Group. Fortunately, in 1985 just as he did when it was first raised via the Soviet the full text of Mao's 18 November 1957 speech was ambassador in China, Pavel Yudin, ten days before published, along with the texts of two other other unpub- Khrushchev's visit. Fifth, the question of nuclear lished speeches he gave during the November 1957 weapons cooperation came up. In accordance with the conference, in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang NDTA, the Soviet Union at the time was training wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,” the same Chinese nuclear weapons scientists and was providing
assistance. (In other words, they wanted to receive
Mark Kramer, a scholar at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, contributes frequently to the Bulletin.
information needed to build nuclear weapons. But Strategic Seapower, 15-17 and Whiting, “The Sino-
republished in XXII S"ezd 102. Khrushchev declared that “an attack against the Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (MosChinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi and neighbor of our country, would be an attack against literatury, 1962). the USSR itself. True to its duty, our country will do 105. Zimyanin's characterization of the Chinese reeverything necessary, in conjunction with People's sponse to Khrushchev's report (especially the section China, to defend the security of both states.” This on "The New Stage in Communist Construction and statement was repeated, in more or less identical phras- Certain Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory") is acing, in numerous high-level Soviet statements. See, curate. Beijing's tepid initial response appeared in the e.g., "Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR main daily Renmin Ribao on 5 February 1959, and a N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkhaueru much more extended commentary was published in the po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 7 Septem- theoretical journal Hongqi on 16 February. ber 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, 106. Zimyanin is referring here to the momentous eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 411. According Second Session of the CPC's 8th Congress, which to Khrushchev's memoirs, as soon as this statement was adopted a “General Line” of drastically accelerated issued, Mao expressed doubt that the Soviet Union had economic development and ideological fervor. The any intention of fulfilling it; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, hallmarks of the new line, as it evolved over the next Part F (“Mao Tsze-dun”), pp. 4-5. This assertion is few months, were: (1) the Great Leap Forward, a crash problematic, but there is not yet (and perhaps cannot be) program of industrialization relying primarily on China's any direct evidence to contravene it.
own resources; (2) the establishment of huge “people's 103. The clearest statement to this effect came in a letter communes" (the “basic social units of a Communist Khrushchev sent to President Eisenhower during the society"), which were intended to replace collective Quemoy crisis, warning that “those who are concocting farms and to combine agriculture with industry (includplans for an atomic attack against the PRC should not ing “backyard" steel furnaces) all around the country; forget that it is not only the USA, but the other side as (3) the elimination of virtually all remaining forms of well that possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and private property; (4) the further leveling of social classes the means of delivering them, and that if such an attack and systematic deprecation of expertise; (5) the abanis carried out against the PRC, the aggressor will be donment of earlier birth control efforts; and (6) the dealt a swift and automatic rebuffinkind.” See “Poslanie conversion of the army into a full-fledged people's Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. militia (via the communes) and the establishment of an Khrushcheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkhaueru o “Everyone a Soldier” campaign requiring Chinese milipolozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 19 September 1958, in tary officers to spend at least one month a year performKurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko- ing the duties of a common soldier. Chinese leaders' kitaiskie otnosheniya, 417. At the time, the Chinese hopes of achieving immediate, rapid growth via the authorities warmly praised Khrushchev's statement, Great Leap Forward were evident from the goals they describing it as “a lofty expression of our fraternal set for steel output (to cite a typical case). In 1957 steel relations." See “Sotsialisticheskii lager v sovremennoi production in China had been 5.9 million tons, whereas mezhdunarodnoi obstanovke," Pravda (Moscow), 10 the target for 1958 was nearly twice that, at 10.7 million November 1958, 3. Mao himself said he was “deeply tons, and the targets for subsequent years were even touched by the Soviet Union's] boundless devotion to more ambitious. Not surprisingly, these goals proved the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international- unattainable, and the whole effort turned out to be a ism” and wanted to “convey heartfelt gratitude” to debilitating failure. The communes (which became Khrushchev for his support during the Taiwan Straits smaller but more numerous after 1958) produced equally crisis. Several years later, however, Chinese leaders disastrous results, causing widespread food shortages shifted their view (in accordance with the polemics of and starvation in the early 1960s. The Chinese armed the time) and expressed contempt for Khrushchev's forces also suffered immense damage from both the pledge, arguing that “Soviet leaders declared their demoralization of the officer corps and the disarray support for China only when they were certain there within the military-industrial complex. Of the many was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out Western analyses of Chinese politics and society during and there was no longer any need for the Soviet Union this period, see in particular MacFarquhar, The Great to support China with its nuclear weapons.” See “State- Leap Forward ment by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A 107. This was indeed the thrust of China's campaign Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 21 against “blind faith in foreigners” (quoted by Zimyanin August,” 1 September 1963, in Peking Review 6:36 (6 in the previous sentence), as formulated in the spring September 1963), 9. New evidence suggests that these and summer of 1958. Although Chinese officials and accusations were unfounded, and that Khrushchev's military commanders at this point were still hoping for pledge was far more meaningful than the Chinese an increase in Soviet military-technical aid, they wanted authorities later claimed; see Lewis and Xue, China's to limit the political and doctrinal effects of Soviet