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the leaders of China broke off relations gree of restraint. We support the initiative support the general line of our party, dibetween the Soviet Union and China. The which took place and the steps taken by our rected at the creation of all the necessary results of this turned out to be deplorable. It government, directed at the stabilization of preconditions for the successful building of began with [China's) isolation from abso- Soviet-Chinese relations.

communism in our country. lutely the majority of the communist par- Fully assessing the danger of the situa- V.I. Lenin's precepts about the necesties. The people of China, who were only tion, we must be prepared for the outbreak of sity of a consistent struggle for the unity of just liberated from feudalism, again found any type of provocation along the border. the international communist movement themselves in a difficult economic situa- The personnel in the district is firmly re- against the forces of imperialist reaction, tion.

solved in these days of preparation for the against all forms of opportunism are eterWe approve the policy of the CC of our 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin nally dear to us. These Leninist ideas are the party to decide all disputed issues by peace- to further improve the level of political and basis for all the documents passed by the ful means, not by armed provocations. We military knowledge, increase the military Moscow Conference of Communist and fully understand that today a very difficult preparedness of the forces, to merit with Workers' parties. situation has been developing on the Far honor the great trust of the party and the The only correct policy - is a policy Eastern borders given the unleashing of people, to defend the inviolability of the which is principled and consistent as is our anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Soviet hys- borders of our Motherland.

policy towards China. We are building our teria. And we support the policy of our party

policy on the basis of a long-term perspecto begin negotiations with China, to resolve Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. tive. all questions through peaceful means, par- Plotkin, the head of the "Energomash" con- The meeting between comr. Kosygin ticularly with a country which considers struction bureau.

and Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking itself to be socialist.


is evidence of the readiness of our party to

Comrades, today we heard the report in establish normal relations between our counComr. Shitikov - The floor goes to which we were informed about the humani- tries. If the Chinese leaders exhibit prucomr. Bokan’, the head of the political de- tarian mission fulfilled by our delegation dence and undertake to respond with steps to partment of the Krasnoznamennyi Far East- headed by comr. Kosygin. The entire Soviet stabilize relations, this would be received ern border district.

people and we, Far Easterners, in particular, with approval by the Soviet people. Comr. BOKAN'

follow with great interest and undivided at- However the position of the Chinese Comrades, the soldiers of the tention the development of Soviet-Chinese leaders cannot but evoke alarm among our Krasnoznamennyi border district reacted to relations.

people. Now, in the period of preparation the report of the meeting between comr. The report about the meeting in Peking for the 20th anniversary [ 1 October 1969] of Kosygin and Zhou Enlai concerning the between Kosygin and the Chinese leaders the founding of the PRC, Peking's propastabilization of relations on the Soviet-Chi- was very brief, but we understood the whole ganda continues to fuel an anti-Soviet camnese border with a feeling of deep under- value of this step by our government. The paign. The Peking radio programs talk about standing, satisfaction, and approval. trip to Peking, the organization of the meet

this daily. In the report it is apparent that the ing - all this expressed confidence in the All this conceals a serious danger for improvement of relations along the Soviet- correctness of our cause.

the international communist movement and Chinese border was the central question at As a member of the plant collective the world socialism system. We, members this meeting. The border events attracted many times I have heard the workers express of the military, know well that Maoism enthe attention not just of Soviet people but of their concerns about the criminal actions of gendered the military provocations and this people all over the world. Incursions by the Chinese leaders. Therefore we are glad to requires of us continuous vigilance and readiChinese citizens onto Soviet territory be- hear that our government is searching for ness to give a worthy rebuff to the provocacame a daily occurrence.

paths to stabilize relations. I totally and fully tions by the Maoists at any moment. In this year alone in the area guarded by approve of the policy of our party.

Permit me in the name of the soldiers of the forces of our district there were about

our district to assure the Central Committee 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citi- Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. of our party, that in the future the commuzens onto our territory. Ideological diver- Popov, deputy director of the political direc- nists and Komsomol members of our district sions on the Chinese border increased no- torate of the KDVO (Krasnoznamennyi Far will guard our party's well-equipped weapticeably. Eastern Military District).

ons and will always be ready to fulfill any The personnel in the district thoroughly

tasks of our party and people. understand the situation and show courage Comr. POPOV

Comr. Shitikov - Who else would like to and the ability to counter the provocations. Comrades, communists and all the sol- speak? There are no more speakers. The We feel the constant support of the people of ders of our Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern following two proposals are put forth for Khabarovskiy Kray, the party, state, and military district are completely satisfied by your consideration. youth organizations.

the wise domestic and foreign policy of our I. To approve completely and fully the In the period since the meeting in party and the Soviet government.

initiative of the CC of our party and the Beijing, no substantive changes have oc- Along with entire Soviet people the sol- Soviet government concerning the meeting curred, with the exception of a certain de- diers of the army and fleet unanimously between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai,

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designed to ease the situation on the border On 22 September 1969 a regional meet- nies, and institutions to fulfill socialist reand to consider this meeting to have been ing of the party electoral aktiv was held to sponsibilities in a manner worthy of the very useful.

acquaint them with the Information from the meeting in honor of the 100th anniversary of II. The regional party aktiv completely CC CPSU regarding the trip by the Soviet V.I. Lenin's birth." and fully approves the policy of the party party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and I.P. Kadochnikov, member of the reand government, aimed at normalizing rela- comrade A.N. Kosygin's discussion with gional committee of the CPSU, a milling tions between the Soviet Union and China. Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969.

cutter at the Khabarovsk heating equipment What other proposals are there? There The First Secretary of the regional party plant, stated: are proposals to accept such a resolution. No committee read the Information from the CC “Wecannot passively observe the course one is opposed? No. CPSU.

of events in China, where the leaders inAfter this the meeting of the aktiv was 7 people spoke at the meeting. The creasingly aggravate relations with our counconsidered closed.

participants noted with great satisfaction try and the situation on the Soviet-Chinese that our party, its Central Committee, persis- border. We, Far Easterners, eagerly approve

tently and consistently, in the spirit of the the practical steps by our party and govern9/23/69

decisions of the Moscow Conference of ment towards the normalization of SovietStenographer Taran

Communist and Workers' parties (in June Chinese relations.

1969 - translator's note), take a hard line on Our workers work calmly, confident in (Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy strengthening of the peace and security of their own strength and in the durability of the Kray, f. p-35, op. 96, d. 234, II. 1-12; peoples, consolidating the ranks of the inter- Soviet borders. I feel this every day, every translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

national communist movement, and over- hour, working among with the collective of
coming the difficulties and disagreements many thousands at the plant.”
within it. They (the members of the aktiv] The rector of the Khabarovsk pedagogi-

unanimously approved the initiative of the cal institute, N.V. Sverdlov, noted: Document II: Information Report Sent CC CPSU and the Soviet government, di- "The Information concisely and clearly

by Khabarovskiy Kray (Territory) rected at taking concrete measures to nor- states all the proposals by the Soviet Union Committee to CPSU CC, 22 September malize Soviet-Chinese relations, settle dis- to settle the disputes and conflicts in Soviet1969

puted issues through negotiations and the Chinese relations and to improve the situa

organization of the meeting in Peking. tion on the Soviet-Chinese border and exProletariat of all countries, unite! The Secretary of the Khabarovsk city pand economic ties between our countries.

committee of the CPSU V.S. Pasternak said These timely, reasonable, and fair proposCOMMUNIST PARTY OF THE in his remarks:

als, which stem from our mutual interests, SOVIET UNION

“The communists and all the workers of combine firmness and flexibility of policy,

the city were particularly attentive to the and, most importantly, are capable of fosterKHABAROVSKIY KRAY news of the meeting in Beijing between the ing the correct resolution of intergovernCOMMITTEE

president of the Council of Ministers of the mental disputes, of course, under circumUSSR, A.N. Kosygin, and the president of stances when the other side expresses a the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. similar understanding of the situation and

Khabarovsk residents always steadfastly the desire to find a way out of it.” City of Khabarovsk

follow the development of Soviet-Chinese E.A. Plotkin, member of the regional

relations, (and) angrily judge the great power, party committee of the CPSU, director of the (Sent 9/22/69) adventuristic course of the PRC leaders. construction bureau of the Khabarovsk CENTRAL COMMITTEE The armed raids by the Maoists on the So- Energomash plant, stated:

OF THE CPSU viet-Chinese border, the malicious slander “The trip to Beijing by the president of

DEPARTMENT OF against our Soviet people, our state, the the Council of Ministers, A.N. Kosygin, was ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK Communist party, deeply trouble the work- very brief, but we understood how important ers of our city.

this meeting was for the Soviet and Chinese INFORMATION

The initiative by the CC CPSU and the peoples. The search for paths to stabiliza

Soviet government to stabilize Soviet-Chi- tion, the reasonable resolution of foreign regarding the familiarization of the nese relations and organize a meeting in policy questions, which the Central Comelectoral aktiv of the Khabarovskiy Kray Beijing in such a difficult current situation mittee of the CPSU and our government put party organization with the Information

once again vividly affirms the wise policy of forth meet with approval at the plant." from the CC CPSU about the trip by the our party to resolve disputed issues by The head of the political department of Soviet party-governmental delegation to peaceful means.

the Krasnoznamennyi border district, I.K. Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin's

The city party organization aims to im- Bokan', expressed the thoughts and feelings discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 Septem- prove the ideological work among the work- of the border guards as follows: ber 1969

ers in every possible way, to mobilize the "The troops of the Krasnoznamennyi collectives of firms, construction compa- Far Eastern border district reacted to the

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report of the meeting between the president

sponses to Soviet diplomatic overtures for of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, How did the Central Committee of the normalizing relations. What the document comrade A.N. Kosygin, with the premier of CPSU view Soviet-Chinese relations in the fails to mention is that Soviet negotiating the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, aftermath of the violent 1969 border clashes efforts were backed up by threats. Five days with feelings of deep understanding and between the two communist powers? The after the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, Victor satisfaction and consider that this discus- following document, a February 1971 secret Louis, a Soviet journalist reportedly emsion was useful for both sides. One of the background report prepared for and ap- ployed by the KGB, published an article in central questions at this meeting was the proved by the CC CPSU, sheds some light on the London Evening News arguing that an question of the mitigation of the situation on Soviet diplomatic initiatives aimed at ame- attack on Chinese nuclear facilities could the Soviet-Chinese border.

liorating the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. not be excluded. Relations along the border exemplify Although the Central Committee analysis is The document also neglects to address the relations between the states. The relatively optimistic about the long-term pros- the discrepancy between the Soviet and ChiMaoists' provocative violations of the So- pects for normalizing of Soviet-Chinese re- nese understanding of the results of the viet-Chinese border and their intervention lations, in the short term Chinese territorial Kosygin-Zhou meeting. Contrary to the in Soviet territory attest to the adventuristic claims on Soviet territory and anti-Sovietism Soviet position outlined here, China claimed policy of the Chinese leadership, their aim among Chinese leaders were viewed as ma- that Kosygin had recognized the existence of to decide disputed questions through force. jor obstacles to any improvement in rela- "disputed territoriesand agreed to discuss

The border forces in the district have at tions. Written not long before the March a withdrawal of forces from the border retheir disposal all that is necessary to fulfill 1971 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Cen- gions. The Central Committee document their sacred duty before the Fatherland in an tral Committee analysis represented an at- would seem to support the Soviet case, but in exemplary way. In these days of prepara- tempt to explain to the Party leadership and the absence of reliable verbatim contempotion for the 100th anniversary of the V.I. aktiv why there was only limited progress in raneous documentation from the meeting Lenin's birth, we will demonstrate our level Soviet-Chinese relations (particularly at a itself it is difficult to evaluate the relative of decisiveness by increasing the military time when Sino-American relations were veracity of the Soviet and Chinese accounts. preparedness of the troops in order to honor- improving). The document outlines a series One recently published memoir supports the ably merit the great trust of the party, gov- of diplomatic overtures made by the Soviet Soviet position, however. A.I. Elizavetin, a ernment, and people, as well as of the mili- Union in 1969-1971 and attributes the mini- Soviet diplomat in Beijing who took notes tary forces in the Army and Navy, to guar- mal response by the Chinese leadership to during the Kosygin-Zhou meeting, reported antee the inviolability of the Far Eastern their need to perpetuate anti-Sovietism for in his own account of their encounter that border of our beloved Motherland." domestic reasons.

Kosygin suggested the two sides should reThe following resolution was approved One of the most interesting points in the spect the status quo ante on the border and by the participants in the meeting:

document pertains to the consequences of open talks on border demarcation as well as 1. Completely and fully approve the the 11 September 1969 discussions between on confidence-building measures. 3 initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and The issue of a withdrawal of forces from government about the meeting between the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the bor- the border regions was to remain a stumpresident of the Council of Ministers of the der clashes. According to the document, the bling block in bilateral negotiations through USSR A.N. Kosygin and the premier of the People's Republic of China rejected a later the 1980s. By the early 1980s, the Chinese State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, aimed Soviet proposal to sign a draft agreement on no longer spoke of disputed territories, but at ameliorating the state of relations be- maintaining the status quo on the border, they contended that the stationing of Soviet tween the USSR and China, and consider based on the oral agreement reportedly military forces in the border regions reprethat this meeting was useful.

reached by Kosygin and Zhou during their sented an obstacle to the improvement of 2. Unanimously support the actions of meeting. The document notes that the Chi- Sino-Soviet relations. A recently declassithe CC CPSU and the Soviet government, nese side insisted on signing an agreement fied transcript of a May 1983 CPSU CC directed at normalizing relations with China, on "temporary measuresas a precondi- Politburo meeting indicates that the Soviet

a and rebuffing any encroachments by the tion, both at the 1969 meeting and subse- military continued to oppose any withdrawal Chinese leadership on the interests of our quently. By temporary measuresthe Chi- of forces, on the grounds that the Soviet state, on the interests of our people. nese meant the withdrawal of forces from Union had spent considerable time and ef

what they viewed as disputed territories in fort to develop forward bases in the border Secretary of the Khabarovsk

the border regions. Such a precondition was region. Although Moscow and Beijing (A. Shitikov)

unacceptable to the Soviet Union, fearing finally normalized relations in 1989 and regional committee of the CPSU

that a withdrawal of troops would pave the have reduced their overall military presence

way for a Chinese attempt to occupy the 1.5 due to cuts in their respective armed forces, [Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy million square kilometers they claimed were the creation of a dimilitarized zone in the Kray, f.p-35, op. 96, d. 374, II. 16-21; wrested from China by Tsarist Russia. border region continues to present difficultranslation by Elizabeth Wishnick.)

The Central Committee document goes ties even today. At present the main stumon to criticize the Chinese leadership for bling-block is geostrategic: Russia is untheir lukewarm if not outright negative re- willing to withdraw beyond 100km from the

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border due to inadequate transportation and the CPSU previously informed the party Chinese commission on border river navigabasing infrastructure further north of the aktiv about the course of the Soviet-Chinese tion in parts of the Amur basin took place. border, while China's proposal to withdraw negotiations in Beijing about border issues An agreement on trade turnover between the forces to within 300km would leave its forces and the status of Soviet-Chinese relations. Soviet Union and the PRC for 1971 was closer to its more developed areas.

The CC CPSU and Soviet government signed. After a lengthy interruption the continue to take a long-term perspective in Soviet ambassador to Beijing and the Chiestablishing our policy towards China, which nese ambassador to Moscow resumed their

proceeds from the premise that not only duties. Document III: CPSU CC Report, normalizing governmental relations between Nevertheless the Chinese leadership "About the Status of Soviet-Chinese the USSR and the PRC, but also reestablish- takes only the minimum steps in response, Relations," 12 February 1971 ing neighborly relations and friendship be- and doses them out in such a way as not to

tween the Soviet and Chinese peoples, as impugn the decisions of the (April 1969) (cover note:)

well as their united efforts in the struggle IXth Congress of the CPC(Communist Party 4. - Information about the Status of

against imperialism and reaction, would re- of China), which confirmed anti-Sovietism Soviet-Chinese Relations

spond to our national and international inter- as one of the principal directions in the state

ests. Consistently following this course, the policy of China. Therefore the continuation (Comrades Suslov, Kirilenko, Central Committee and the Council of Min- of negotiations with us coincides with maliPel'she, Demichev, Ustinov, Katushev, isters of the USSR attentively follow the cious anti-Soviet propaganda and the orgaSolomentsev, Rusakov)

development of the situation in the PRC. nization of militaristic actions directed

Facts show that a far-reaching shift in rela- against the USSR. 1. Approve the information (re- tions between the PRC and the USSR can be At the negotiations in Beijing the PRC port), “About the Status of Soviet-Chinese achieved as a result of patient work and delegation as before refused to proceed with Relations" (proposed).

extended struggle, which should result in the the consideration of the main point on the Familiarize the CC CPSU mem- Chinese side's renouncing its current anti- agenda - the demarcation of the Sovietbers and candidate members, CC Buro mem- Soviet, anti-Leninist course.

Chinese border in specific areas. It (China) bers of republic, kray and oblast communist While taking the initiative in normaliz- continues to insist on the signing, as a preparties, as well as appropriate commanders ing Sino-Soviet intergovernmental relations, condition, an agreement on “temporary meaand political staff in the Armed Forces of the the CC CPSU and the Soviet government sures”, which, in sum, envisions that even USSR, with the text of the information. have no illusions about the readiness of the before the beginning of the border demarca

Instruct MID [Ministry of Foreign Chinese leadership to meet the Soviet pro- tion talks, the Soviet side would in a oneAffairs] USSR to bring the content of the posals half way and remove the obstacles to sided manner move the practically secure information to the attention of Soviet am- the restoration of neighborly cooperation border from what the Chinese leaders call bassadors abroad. between China and the USSR. However, we “disputed” areas, to areas deep within the

" 2. Take it to the Politburo for ap- proceed from the fact that our principled territory of the Soviet Union, sometimes by proval.

approach to Soviet-Chinese relations com- tens of kilometers. After achieving the recplicates the ability of the Chinese leadership ognition by the Soviet delegation to the to carry out its anti-Soviet line, and helps Beijing talks of the presence of "disputed"

many strata of the Chinese population to areas on the border, the Chinese side would Secret maintain their faith in the possibility of nor- similarly try to call into question the legal

malizing relations and restoring friendly ties basis for the demarcation of the SovietEnclosure between our countries. The CPSU's course Chinese border on a substantial part of its k. p.4, pr.No 123 facilitates the cohesion of anti-imperialist length and the Soviet Union's possession of

forces, meets with the understanding and those areas which it (China) contests.

support of progressive circles in all coun- Aiming to achieve progress at the negoINFORMATION

tries of the world, helps overcome the mis- tiations, the USSR delegation proposed a

conceptions about the reasons for the strain draft agreement on maintaining the statusAbout the Status of Soviet-Chinese in Soviet-Chinese relations in a certain part quo on the border, based on the agreement Relations

of foreign public opinion, which has been between the heads of states of the USSR and disoriented by Chinese propaganda. the PRC of the 11 of September 1969 and

As a result of initiatives by the Soviet taking into account some proposals by the The principled position of the CPSU Union and corresponding measures by the Chinese side. However, the PRC represenabout the Chinese question is defined by the Chinese leaders, the situation on the border tatives reject the Soviet proposals and, conconclusions of the [March 1966] XXIII Con- has been somewhat mitigated; for more than tinuing to refuse to discuss the question of gress of the CPSU; it has been elaborated a year no military conflicts have broken out. border demarcation, stubbornly insist on repeatedly in the decisions of the CC CPSU Negotiations about border issues continue in signing an agreement on “temporary meaand in speeches by leaders of the party and Beijing between governmental delegations. sures” in essentially the same unacceptable the government. The Central Committee of

The regular meeting of the Joint Soviet- format in which they were put forth more

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than a year ago. This is the main reason and forwarded a draft of such an agreement gaged in amateur artistic performances. Antiwhy, despite all the constructive efforts made to Beijing through the ambassador of the Soviet films are always playing in movie by our delegation, the negotiations on bor- USSR.

theaters. The Chinese population also is der issues in essence haven't made any In sending this draft agreement for con- exposed to anti-Soviet messages in radio progress.

sideration by the government of the PRC, the and television programs and through verbal To move things forward, the CC CPSU Soviet side expressed its belief that the ful- propaganda. and the Soviet government came out with an fillment of our proposal - the most rapid Feigning a threat of attack by the Soviet important initiative, and sent a letter from conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of Union, the Chinese leadership actively uses the Chairman of the USSR Council of Min- force (-) would create a more favorable anti-Sovietism to continue their propaganda isters, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Pre- atmosphere for the normalization of rela- about war and war preparations against the mier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou tions between our two states and, in particu- Soviet Union and to strengthen their control Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the lar, would facilitate the restoration of neigh- over the domestic situation in the country. principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we borly relations and friendship between the The Chinese leadership fears that construcproposed in this letter to begin negotiations USSR and the PRC.

tive steps by the USSR and progress in in Moscow, at the same time as the negotia- A positive answer from the Chinese side stabilizing relations between our countries tions in Beijing, between special govern- to the Soviet initiative could lead to a deci- would undermine the basic ideological mental delegations on a draft agreement sive shift forward in the negotiations. How- premise: to convince the Chinese people that between the USSR and the PRC on mutual ever there is still no answer whatsoever from the difficult situation facing them is, as it non-use of force, including nuclear weap- the Chinese side. There is a growing impres- were, the result of the policy of the Soviet ons, (and) the cessation of war propaganda sion that Beijing, as before, is interested in Union, and not of the anti-Leninist and of preparations for war against the other maintaining the “border territorial issue” in

maintaining the "border territorial issue" in adventeuristic policy of the Chinese leaders side.

relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad themselves. At the same time, to eliminate many faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming Chinese provocations were met with a controversial issues from the negotiations, a to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic decisive rebuff and furthermore our initiaproposal was made to formulate an inter- goals.

tive about carrying out negotiations for a governmental agreement on the demarca- Why have the Soviet steps towards the border settlement created serious obstacles tion of the eastern section of the Soviet- normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations to the organizations of new adventures. Chinese border (4300 km), consisting of encountered such significant difficulties? The The PRC leadership is making efforts to more than half of its length, where most of main reason, as was mentioned previously in emerge from the international isolation in the border incidents took place (from the our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism which China found itself as a result of the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, was and continues to be the main ingredient Red Guard diplomacy in the years of the MPR [Mongolia) meet in the east and fur- in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the “Cultural Revolution.” China activated its ther to the south along the Amur and Ussuri present Chinese leadership. This is con- diplomatic contacts in a number of counrivers).

firmed, in particular, by the materials of the tries, achieved diplomatic recognition by a The letter expressed the view that, in 11th plenum of the CC CPC (August-Sep- series of bourgeois states. Today even seven the interests of the improvement of Soviet- tember 1970), the nature of the celebration of NATO countries have diplomatic relations Chinese relations, it would be expedient to the 21st anniversary of the founding of the with Beijing. However, the Chinese leaderhold another meeting of the heads of gov- PRC [in October 1970), the continuing slan- ship is making concessions on major issues, ernment of the USSR and the PRC, this time derous campaign against the CPSU and the on which they previously held implacable on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also Soviet Union, carried out both in the outside positions. It is not surprising that the capirestated a range of other constructive pro- world and especially through domestic Chi- talist states actively use this flirtation in their posals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to nese channels. The strengthening of the anti- own interests. speculate in the international arena and in Soviet campaign is taking place in the pages The imperialist powers, the USA in domestic propaganda on the alleged of the Chinese press. In the last half a year particular, are playing a complex and sly existance of a "threat of force" from the alone the Chinese central newspapers pub- game in their approach to China. On the one USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet lished hundreds of materials containing rude hand they would like to use the anti-Sovietinsinuations.

assaults against our party and our country. ism of the Maoists in the struggle against the To deprive the Chinese government of The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai,

es in Beijing, Shanghai, USSR, but on the other hand, they would a basis for such inventions and facilitate the Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities are like to strengthen their own position in the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, covered with appeals to struggle against “So

covered with appeals to struggle against "So- PRC, in the vast Chinese market. As a side the subject of the negotiations, on January viet revisionism." In China anti-Soviet bro- interest these states all the more loudly urge 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet chures and posters are being published in the PRC “to get actively involved in the another step - it made a proposal to the huge numbers and widely distributed. For international community.” leadership of the PRC to conclude an agree- example, not long ago a series of brochures Recently the Chinese leadership has ment between the USSR and the PRC on the with clearly anti-Soviet content was recom- been rather pointedly making outwardly non-use of force in any form whatsoever, mended for children as study aids as well as friendly gestures towards some socialist including missiles and nuclear weapons, for the repertoire of clubs and circles en- states, promising them to open broad pros

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