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pects in the area of trade, economic, and and other fellow socialist countries, the Chi- The Central Committee of the CPSU atscientific-technical cooperation. The Chi- nese leadership is tactically using the PRC's tributes great importance to this work, since nese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the opposition to both “superpowers” (USSR positive shifts in Chinese politics can be effective political, economic, and other forms and USA), which allegedly “came to terms" facilitated in the near future only by strugof cooperation among socialist states, as to “divide the world amongst them.” gling relentlessly against the theory and pracwell as by their interaction, which facilitates All this attests to the fact that the leaders tice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism the strengthening of the international posi- of China have not changed their previous figures prominently, by further strengthentions of socialism, and their socialist states'] chauvinistic course in the international arena. ing the cohesion and unity of communist ability to move forward with the resolution Domestically, the Chinese leadership, ranks, and by combining the efforts of the of major issues in world politics. The Beijing having suppressed the enemies of their poli- Marxist-Leninist parties. leadership aims to use any opportunity to cies during the so-called “Cultural Revolubreak the unity and cohesion of the socialist tion”, is now trying to overcome the disor- CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE states, to weaken their existing social struc- der in economic and political life, brought
COMMUNIST ture. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases about by the actions of the very same ruling PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION its provocative statements on the Czecho- groups over the course of recent years. The slovak question.5 Beijing has acted simi- well-known stabilization of socio-political larly with respect to the recent events in and economic life is occurring through all- sa/ka Poland 6
encompassing militarization, leading to an The communist and workers parties of atmosphere of “a besieged fortress.” The (Source: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li. the fellow socialist countries, which firmly army is continuing to occupy key positions 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the country and serves as the main instru- Wishnick.] and socialist internationalism, understand ment of power. As before a cult of Mao is and respond appropriately to this tactical expanding, the regime of personal power is 1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant step of Beijing's, which is directed at split- being strengthened in the constitution of the from the International Research and Exchanges Board ting the socialist community and isolating PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed
(IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of
State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the the Soviet Union. in the country. This, of course, cannot but
Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible The Moscow conference of communist have a pernicious influence on the social life for the views expressed. and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong of the entire Chinese people.
2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to In an oral statement made directly to
analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., com
munist, forces within society, and the Maoist leadersplit them. Convinced by the futility of their Soviet officials about the desirability and
ship. efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in possibility in the near future of the normal- 3. A.I. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou individual countries into influential political ization of intergovernmental relations, the Enlai v pekinskom aeroportu,” with commentary by S. parties, and to cobble them together into an Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideo
Gonacharov and V. Usov, Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka
5 (1992), 39-63, and I (1993), 107-119. international anti-Leninist movement, the logical, and to a certain degree, the political
4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, TskhSD, F. 89, Op. 43. Chinese leadership once again is counting struggle between the USSR and China, will D. 53, L.1. 1-14, translated in Cold War International on its ability to either attract individual com- continue for a lengthy period of time. History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81. munist parties to its side, or at least to achieve As long as the Chinese leadership sticks
5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist movetheir refusal to publicly criticize the ideol- to ideological and political positions which
ment and Moscow's subsequent imposition of orthoogy and policy of the CPC leadership. To are hostile to us, the stabilization and nor- dox “normalization" there. this end, Beijing's propaganda and CPC malization of intergovernmental relations 6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities officials are concentrating their main efforts between the Soviet Union and the PRC would
to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk
in December 1970, and a subsequent government shakeon slandering and falsifying in the eyes of have to be achieved under conditions of
up. foreign communists the foreign and domes- sharp ideological and political struggle. tic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the In informing the party aktiv about the USSR, and in the socialist community. At current status of Soviet-Chinese relations, Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the the same time Chinese representatives are the Central Committee of the CPSU consid
Institute of Modern History, Academica aiming to exacerbate disputes in the commu- ers it important to emphasize that the practi- Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on nist movement. They use any means to heat cal measures, which, within the parameters a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with up nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Soviet of our long-term orientation, would lead to China: The Evolution of Moscow's China dispositions in the ranks of the communist normalized relations with the PRC and the Policy, 1969-95. and national-liberation movement.
restoration of friendly relations with the Beijing is trying to take the non-aligned Chinese people, are being supplemented by movement and the developing countries appropriate measures in case of possible under its own influence. For this purpose, provocations by the Chinese side, as well as and in order to alienate the states of the “third by the necessary consistent ideological-poworld” from their dependable support in the litical struggle against the anti-Leninist, antistruggle with imperialism - the Soviet Union socialist views of the Chinese leadership.
SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980: extensive relations with Romania, Yugosla- No. St-200/4s
foster economic and even political ties with
the "fraternal countries”—Bulgaria, Hun- Excerpt from the protocol No. 200
gary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslova- 4s CC Secretariat The two Central Committee documents kia—are portrayed here as being of utmost from 1980 printed below illustrate Soviet concern to the Central Committee. The docuforeign policy concerns at a time when the ment shows Soviet displeasure at China's Soviet Union was particularly isolated in interest in improving relations with these the international arena as a result of its states at a time when it refused to continue Regarding the instructions to USSR December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. negotiations with the USSR. I
ambassadors to socialist countries about In these documents, Soviet policymakers In the Soviet view, relations between the the China question express their fears that their principal adver- socialist community and China had to be saries, the United States and China, were coordinated with Soviet policy, and the “fra- Approve the text of the instructions to drawing closer together due to their shared ternal countries” were expected to wait for USSR ambassadors to socialist countries hostility toward the USSR. The documents and then follow the Soviet Union's lead. To (proposed). contend that the Sino-American this end, representatives from the Internarapproachement had two particularly unfor- tional Departments of these countries had
CC SECRETARY tunate consequences: the development of been meeting regularly with the CPSU InterSino-American military cooperation and national Department for over a decade 2 increased efforts by China to undermine the Despite all these efforts to coordinate China socialist community. policy, the March 1980 document evokes
Secret The October 1980 document about Soviet fears that China had been making Sino-American military cooperation was inroads into the socialist community and was
Enclosure written for two audiences. On the one hand, achieving a certain measure of success in
k.p.4s,pr.No 200 Soviet representatives were given the task using economic cooperation to tempt indiof convincing Western public opinion that vidual states to stray from the fold. As a BERLIN, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, military cooperation with China could back- result, the document outlines a series of steps PRAGUE, SOFIA, ULAN-BATOR, fire and engulf their countries in conflict. for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE On the other hand, the document showed foster skepticism about China's intentions Soviet concern that some non-aligned and and thwart efforts by Chinese representa
SOVIET AMBASSADORS socialist states were choosing to ignore the tives to make wide-ranging contacts in these dangerous tendencies in Chinese policies states.
Copy: BEIJING, PYONGYANG, and warned of the perils of a neutral attitude
PHNOM PENH, BUCHAREST, towards them. Since China had invaded 1. China claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan BELGRADE Vietnam soon after the Sino-American nor
made it inappropriate to go ahead with the regularly
scheduled political talks in 1980. malization of relations in February 1979, 2. Several documents from these meetings attest to this
SOVIET AMBASSADORS (for their Soviet policymakers feared that the im- aim. See, e.g., Tsk f.4, op. 19, d. 525, 11. 29, 107
information) proved U.S.-China relationship had 110, 21 January 1969; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 19. d. 605, 11. 3, emboldened the Chinese leaders to act on 40-42, 12 February 1971; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1077,
Recently Beijing's policy towards so11. 21, 9 April 1973; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 242, 11. 4, their hostility toward pro-Soviet socialist 13 April 1975; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 24, d.878; 11. 4, 20 April
cialist countries has become noticeably more states and that U.S. military assistance would 1979; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 24, d. 1268, 11. 5, 19 May 1980.
active. Under conditions, when imperialist provide the Chinese with the means to act on
circles in the USA have undertaken to aggratheir ambitions.
vate the international situation, the Chinese Which states were neutral on the China
leadership, drawing ever closer to imperialquestion and why? The March 1980 docu- Document I: CPSU CC Directive to ism, is increasing its efforts to undermine the ment clarifies this in an analysis of China's Soviet Ambassadors in Communist position of the socialist community. Beijing's policy of distinguishing among the socialist Countries, 4 March 1980
goals, as before, are to break the unity and states based on their degree of autonomy
cohesion of the fraternal countries, inspire from the USSR, a policy referred to here and
mutual distrust among them, incite them to in other Soviet analyses as China's “differ
Proletariat of all countries, unite! opposition to the Soviet Union, destroy the entiated” approach to the socialist commu
unity of action of socialist states in the internity. The document, a series of instructions COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET national arena including on the China quesabout the China question to Soviet ambassa- UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE tion and finally, to subordinate them to its dors to socialist states, notes China's hostil
own influence. ity to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia
TOP SECRET Within the parameters of a policy inand contrasts this with its development of
volving a differentiated approach (to social
ist states), the Chinese leadership is trying to “study tours," attempts are being made to intensifying attempts by the Chinese leaders stratify the socialist countries into various send Chinese delegations to some socialist to penetrate into various spheres of the dogroups. With such states as Romania, Yugo- countries and receive their delegations in the mestic life of the socialist countries. With slavia, and the DPRK, China is developing PRC.
the participation of the leaders and represenextensive relations, supporting the national- There are signs that the Chinese may tatives of the political and social circles of istic tendencies in their policies in every reevaluate their relations with the ruling your post countries, direct the following: possible way with the aim of creating its own parties of some socialist countries, and es- 1. Pay attention to the noticeable group on this basis, and using it to counter tablish party-to-party ties with them. Party- activization of Chinese policy towards sothe socialist community. In relations with to-party ties are already developing with cialist states. Using the example of Beijing's other socialist countries the hostile character Yugoslavia and Romania; the first Chinese recent maneuvers, continuously carry out of China's policy is strengthening even more, party delegation in recent years went to measures to clarify the danger of the Chias the unceasing attacks and pressure on the participate in the RKP (Romanian Commu- nese differentiated approach tactic and efSRV (Vietnam), Cuba, DPRL (Laos), and nist Party) congress.
forts to penetrate the socialist states. This MPR [Mongolia), attest. China uses a double- Denying in essence the general regu- danger is growing in connection with the dealing tactic including pressure and prom- larities of development of the revolutionary fact that the splitting activity of the Chinese ises in its approach to the PRB [Bulgaria), processes and socialist economic construc- representatives is being coordinated all the HPR (Hungary), GDR, PNR (Poland), and tion in various countries, the Chinese leader- more closely with imperialist circles, above ChSSR (Czechoslovakia): on the one hand ship has once again returned to the use of the all with the USA, and their intelligence serChina is continuing its gross interference in conception of the “national model" of so- vices. Expose the false character of Chinese their internal affairs, while clearly ignoring cialism, and especially rises to the defense of assertions, which allege that China is "contheir interests; on the other hand, it is giving the Yugoslav "model".
cerned" about the improvement of relations assurances about its readiness to develop Beijing's divisive activity shows its lim- with socialist states, and cares about their relations with them on a mutually advanta- ited, but nevertheless negative, influence in interests and security. In fact, Chinese policy, geous basis. Thanks to such a tactic, Beijing certain socialist states. Some of the workers particularly its constant appeals to the USA, is counting on at least forcing these countries do not always grasp the meaning of the Japan, and the countries of Western Europe into positions of “neutrality” regarding Chinese tactic and in certain cases do not to unite with China in a “broad international China's course, if not to achieve more. provide their own effective rebuff to front” and its pressure on the NATO coun
Within the Chinese leadership dema- Beijing's hegemonic policy. Moreover, the tries to increase their armaments, including gogic and deceptive practices are widely facts show that responsible leaders of certain nuclear missiles, is totally and fully directed used. It is affirmed, as if China's struggle fraternal countries, counter to the official against the socialist states, their security. against the USSR need not worry the other positions of their parties, are expressing an Calling for the economic integration and socialist countries, that the development of interest in excluding some important direc- military-political consolidation of the West, relations between them and China could tions in their ties with China from the sphere Beijing is all the more intensively seeking to even facilitate the improvement of Soviet- of multilateral coordination, that in certain undermine the positions of the Organization Chinese relations, that the expansion of ties situations they are taking steps to expand of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of between these states and China meets their ties with the PRC without considering the Mutual Economic Assistance. national interests, and, in particular, could level of relations between China and other One must also keep in mind that the bring them major advantages in the trade- states.
changes in domestic policy taking place in economic sphere.
Judging from all of this, China's tactical China, among them the rehabilitation of Liu Beijing has noticeably strengthened its use of a differentiated approach (to socialist Shaoqi at the Vth Plenum of the CCCPC and efforts to penetrate into various spheres of states), which plays on various nuances and the promotion to leading posts of experilife and activities in the countries of the changes in the domestic political and eco- enced political representatives who were socialist community. Chinese representa- nomic situation in certain socialist states, on victims of the "Cultural Revolution", do not tives are trying to become more active in any type of temporary difficulties, will not mean, as the facts show, that Beijing has developing relations with official institu- only continue, but may even be more widely renounced its hostile policy towards socialtions and government agencies, social orga- used in the near future. It can be inferred that ist countries. On the contrary, one can nizations, educational institutions, and the attempts by the Chinese to penetrate into expect that this policy will be pursued even mass media; they are establishing contacts various areas of the domestic life of the more tenaciously. with various strata of the population, par- socialist countries will be further intensi- 2. Show the dangerous character of the ticularly with the intelligentsia and youth, fied.
Chinese leadership's aim to undermine the and widely distributing invitations to vari- Under these conditions an important unity of the socialist states, its hypocritical ous events at the PRC embassies. Informa- question in the work of ambassadors is the efforts to separate the questions of bilateral tion is being collected about the domestic effective and systematic opposition of
effective and systematic opposition of relations between the socialist countries and life of their post country, the decisions of Beijing's splitting activities in socialist coun- China from Soviet-Chinese relations, to sow party and state organs, the economic situa- tries, the neutralization of its plans to shake illusions concerning its goals in this area, for tion and the military potential, the military the unity of the socialist states, to influence example by using for its own purposes the forces and weapons. Under the guise of their positions. It is necessary to obstruct the fact that Soviet-Chinese negotiations are
being held. As the leadership of the frater- tries. Under present conditions, when the sector)
Proletariat of all countries, unite! tiations showed that the Chinese side does socialist community, it is all the more impornot aim, in the near future in any case, to tant to meticulously observe the criteria elabo- COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET come to any agreements about the normal- rated at the meetings of the international UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE ization of relations between the USSR and departments of the CCs of the fraternal counthe PRC; that China knowingly proposes tries for approaching questions of bilateral
TOP SECRET unacceptable preconditions, and rejects the relations between socialist countries and the Soviet side's constructive proposals, directed PRC. These mandate that the rapproche- No. P217/57 at the elaboration of principles of relations ment between Beijing and the USA (as their between the two countries and the building actions in Indochina and Afghanistan attest)
To Comrades Brezhnev, of a political-juridical basis for them. is taking a more and more dangerous form
Kosygyn, Andropov, Gromyko, As far as the second round is con- and is directed against the interests of peace
Kirilenko, Suslov, Tikhonov, cerned, now it is generally difficult to say and the process of detente. Given the way the
Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, anything about it, insofar as the Chinese situation is progressing, keep in mind that the
Zamiatin, Smirtyukov. press announced that it would be "inappro- task of decisively repelling the strengthening priate” to hold them at present. Recent attacks on the socialist community on the
Extract from protocol No. 217 of events attest to the escalation of Beijing's part of imperialism, reaction, and Chinese
the CC CPSU Politburo session hostility towards the Soviet Union. hegemonism, is all the more important.
of October 2, 1980 3. Taking into account the hostile char- 5. Note the necessity of a vigilant apacter of China's policy towards socialist proach to the activities of Beijing and its states and the strengthening of its aggres- representatives in socialist countries, its at- Re: Carrying out additional measures to siveness, note the necessity of a careful and tempts to penetrate various spheres of the counter American-Chinese military deliberate approach to the development of domestic life of these countries, to spread its cooperation economic ties and scientific-technical co- influence in various strata of the population, operation with the PRC, particularly in those particularly among young people, some of Approve the draft indicated for Soviet areas which would facilitate the growth of whom are a part of the technical, scientific, ambassadors and Soviet representatives its military-industrial potential. Beijing's and creative intelligentsia. It is important not (enclosed). efforts to exaggerate the brilliant perspec- to weaken control over their contacts with tives of trade and economic cooperation Chinese representatives, to monitor their vis
CC SECRETARY with some socialist countries don't have any its to various organizations, including govreal basis and are only a tactical means of ernment agencies, scientific-research and influencing these countries. Beijing now educational institutions, and also to limit the considers it advantageous to orient itself attendance by citizens in the post countries of
For point 57 prot. No. 217 towards the West, and not to the develop- events at Chinese embassies. ment of trade-economic ties with the coun- It would be inadvisable to consider the
Secret tries of the socialist community. The Chi- explanatory work on this question to be an nese side is prepared to give any promises, episodic campaign. It is necessary to con- FOR ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS however, as experience shows, among them duct it consistently, taking into account the AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES the heralded experience of relations with specifics of the post country, and, as much as Romania and Yugoslavia, China does not possible, involve a wide range of leading At the present time the partnership behave sufficient foreign currency and trade party and government cadres, as well as the tween American imperialism and Beijing's resources to fulfill these promises. In 1979, creative intelligentsia. As necessary, con- hegemonism, which is spreading to the milifor example, the planned trade balance with tribute any suitable proposals for effective tary sphere, is a new negative phenomenon the FSRY [Yugoslavia] was fulfilled only to opposition to Beijing's subversive activities in world politics and dangerous for all of one fourth. China not only is an undesirable and the neutralization of undesirable tenden- humanity. Counting on using "strong and partner, but also often uses trade-economic cies in the policies of specific socialist states. stable" China in its strategic interests, Washrelations as a means of pressure on socialist
ington is expanding the parameters for coopstates (SRV, MNR, Albania), which refuse
eration with Beijing in the military-technito undertake obligations for purely political
cal sphere. In particular, the USA adminismotives.
Document II. CPSU CC Politburo tration has affirmed its readiness to deliver 4. Pay attention to the importance of Directive to Soviet Ambassadors and modern American weapons and technology continuing a consistent and broad coordina- Representatives, 2 October 1980
to China, which could be widely used for tion of actions towards China and its at
military purposes. tempts to use a differentiated approach to Subject to return within 7 days to
As American-Chinese military coopundermine the cohesion of the socialist coun- the CC CPSU (General department, 1st eration develops further, destructive elements
will grow in international relations.
ing China into a military "superpower," and and USA have agreed to follow. In accordance with the instructions you the resolution of the most serious problems, As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, received previously and taking into account such as increasing the extremely low mate- it has every opportunity to defend its interthe specifics of your post country, continue rial and cultural level of the Chinese people, ests and repel the presumptions of other your work to reveal the dangerous character has been relegated to an indefinite future. In countries, including the PRC. The calculaof the developing rapprochement between China they don't hide the fact that “modern- tions of those who try to direct Americanaggressive circles in the West, above all the ization” is the best means of preparing for Chinese relations in such as way as to use USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling war. In practice, unrestrained militarization China as a means of pressure and as a miliattention to the following aspects.
accelerates economic collapse and increased tary counterweight to the Soviet Union are 1. In developing military cooperation instability in China. Thus, those countries short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect with China, the ruling circles in the USA who actively take part in the Chinese pro- Chinese expansion to the north risk major count on the possibility of influencing China gram of "modernization," actually contrib- miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion to act in a "desirable" way, of channeling its ute to the growth of its military potential and of China's military potential increases the policies in an acceptable direction. Fre- render a disservice to the Chinese people. danger that certain countries would be inquently the foreign policy activity of the On the other hand, the policy of milita- veigled into Beijing's orbit, and in the longPRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in rizing the country will inevitably engender term, could lead to a situation in which these the international arena. The Chinese leaders unpredictable turns and zigzags and future very countries could become the victims of themselves are not adverse to playing up to evidence of foreign policy adventurism, lead- Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking resuch a discussion and, to this end, without ing to the dangerous destabilization of the alistically, it would follow to recognize that withdrawing the thesis of the "inevitability international situation and the inflammation a “strong” China would chose a different of war," have begun to use a more flexible of international tension. Any injection of direction for its expansionist plans: in all terminology. However, with the help of a aid, particularly by the USA, either directly likelihood it would swallow up neighboring sham "peaceful nature," invoked to add or indirectly contributing to China's milita- countries, grab hold of all the vitally imporgreater “respectability" to the PRC's foreign rization and to the development of the Chi- tant regions of the world, and would cerpolicy, Beijing is simply counting on gain- nese military potential, would enable China tainly not serve as an instrument in the hands ing time to accomplish the forced arming of to find the striking power necessary for the of the USA or any other country. the country. Actually, more and more, the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Un- 5. The development of military-politiChinese leadership is resorting to a policy of der conditions when Beijing not only op- cal cooperation between China and the USA, diktat and interference in the domestic af- poses all constructive proposals to strengthen
poses all constructive proposals to strengthen which elicits concern among many states, fairs of other countries, and assumes on peace and detente, but also directly pro- has led already to a noticeable worsening of itself the improper functions of “teaching vokes international conflict, this said] would the international situation and complicated lessons” and “punishing” the unruly with mean an increased danger of war breaking the search for real paths to strengthening the force of arms.
out and the growth of threats to all humanity, peace and security in various regions of the 2. As before, the PRC government including the Chinese and American peoples. world. In an effort to create favorable condideclines to make any international legal com- The fact that what is proposed for deliv- tions for the realization of its hegemonic mitments to disarmament, tries to diminish ery to China is “non-lethal" equipment and aims, the Beijing leadership counts on agthe importance of results achieved in this technology, “defensive,” and “dual-use,” gravating relations between countries, setarea, and refuses to take part in measures to etc., does not change the situation. The issue ting some states against others, and provoklimit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set is not that such distinctions are extremely ing military conflicts. Beijing does not hide about to manufacture and experiment with relative, but that cooperation with military the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conintercontinental ballistic missiles, capable modernization will free up the forces within flict between the Soviet Union and the USA, of carrying nuclear warheads, and is work- China and the means necessary for building and, from its ashes, assume world dominaing on the creation of neutron weapons. All up its principal strike force - its nuclear tion. this drives the global arms race forward and capability.
Those who insist on the necessity of directly contradicts the interests of detente. 4. The plans Beijing has been develop- “strengthening” China base their calculaThis policy of Beijing's seriously threatens ing for a long time to change the global tions on the assumption that Beijing would everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not correlation of forces and the entire structure coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR just the Soviet Union and other socialist of contemporary international relations elicit and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore states.
serious alarm. The transfer to China of any would not be dangerous for the West. But 3. There is absolutely no basis for technology or equipment whatsoever—this taking into account the continuing domestic concluding, as some do, that Beijing's al- would be a step in the direction of the erosion political struggle in China, no one can guarleged adoption of a "modernization pro- of the established military-balance in the antee that in 5-10 years China would not gram” represents a new political course to world and of a new cycle in the arms race. bring into play an anti-American card or overcome China's economic backwardness. The destruction of the balance of military anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force In fact this course was taken above all to forces would erode the basis for the arms against those countries which irresponsibly contribute to the realization of pre-existing limitation negotiations insofar as equal se- connived and assisted with the PRC's replans to speed up the process of transform- curity is the main principle which the USSR armament.