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the CPSU previously informed the party aktiv about the course of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations in Beijing about border issues and the status of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The CC CPSU and Soviet government continue to take a long-term perspective in establishing our policy towards China, which proceeds from the premise that not only normalizing governmental relations between the USSR and the PRC, but also reestablishing neighborly relations and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples, as well as their united efforts in the struggle against imperialism and reaction, would respond to our national and international interests. Consistently following this course, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR attentively follow the development of the situation in the PRC. Facts show that a far-reaching shift in relations between the PRC and the USSR can be achieved as a result of patient work and extended struggle, which should result in the Chinese side's renouncing its current antiSoviet, anti-Leninist course.

While taking the initiative in normalizing Sino-Soviet intergovernmental relations, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government have no illusions about the readiness of the Chinese leadership to meet the Soviet proposals half way and remove the obstacles to the restoration of neighborly cooperation between China and the USSR. However, we proceed from the fact that our principled approach to Soviet-Chinese relations complicates the ability of the Chinese leadership to carry out its anti-Soviet line, and helps many strata of the Chinese population to maintain their faith in the possibility of normalizing relations and restoring friendly ties between our countries. The CPSU's course facilitates the cohesion of anti-imperialist forces, meets with the understanding and support of progressive circles in all countries of the world, helps overcome the misconceptions about the reasons for the strain in Soviet-Chinese relations in a certain part of foreign public opinion, which has been disoriented by Chinese propaganda.

As a result of initiatives by the Soviet Union and corresponding measures by the Chinese leaders, the situation on the border has been somewhat mitigated; for more than a year no military conflicts have broken out. Negotiations about border issues continue in Beijing between governmental delegations. The regular meeting of the Joint Soviet

Chinese commission on border river navigation in parts of the Amur basin took place. An agreement on trade turnover between the Soviet Union and the PRC for 1971 was signed. After a lengthy interruption the Soviet ambassador to Beijing and the Chinese ambassador to Moscow resumed their duties.

Nevertheless the Chinese leadership takes only the minimum steps in response, and doses them out in such a way as not to impugn the decisions of the [April 1969] IXth Congress of the CPC [Communist Party of China], which confirmed anti-Sovietism as one of the principal directions in the state policy of China. Therefore the continuation of negotiations with us coincides with malicious anti-Soviet propaganda and the organization of militaristic actions directed against the USSR.

At the negotiations in Beijing the PRC delegation as before refused to proceed with the consideration of the main point on the agenda - the demarcation of the SovietChinese border in specific areas. It [China] continues to insist on the signing, as a precondition, an agreement on "temporary measures", which, in sum, envisions that even before the beginning of the border demarcation talks, the Soviet side would in a onesided manner move the practically secure border from what the Chinese leaders call "disputed" areas, to areas deep within the territory of the Soviet Union, sometimes by tens of kilometers. After achieving the recognition by the Soviet delegation to the Beijing talks of the presence of "disputed" areas on the border, the Chinese side would similarly try to call into question the legal basis for the demarcation of the SovietChinese border on a substantial part of its length and the Soviet Union's possession of those areas which it [China] contests.

Aiming to achieve progress at the negotiations, the USSR delegation proposed a draft agreement on maintaining the statusquo on the border, based on the agreement between the heads of states of the USSR and the PRC of the 11 of September 1969 and taking into account some proposals by the Chinese side. However, the PRC representatives reject the Soviet proposals and, continuing to refuse to discuss the question of border demarcation, stubbornly insist on signing an agreement on "temporary measures" in essentially the same unacceptable format in which they were put forth more

than a year ago. This is the main reason why, despite all the constructive efforts made by our delegation, the negotiations on border issues in essence haven't made any progress.

To move things forward, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government came out with an important initiative, and sent a letter from the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we proposed in this letter to begin negotiations in Moscow, at the same time as the negotiations in Beijing, between special governmental delegations on a draft agreement between the USSR and the PRC on mutual non-use of force, including nuclear weapons, [and] the cessation of war propaganda and of preparations for war against the other side.

At the same time, to eliminate many controversial issues from the negotiations, a proposal was made to formulate an intergovernmental agreement on the demarcation of the eastern section of the SovietChinese border (4300 km), consisting of more than half of its length, where most of the border incidents took place (from the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, MPR [Mongolia] meet in the east and further to the south along the Amur and Ussuri rivers).

The letter expressed the view that, in the interests of the improvement of SovietChinese relations, it would be expedient to hold another meeting of the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, this time on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also restated a range of other constructive proposals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to speculate in the international arena and in domestic propaganda on the alleged existance of a "threat of force" from the USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet insinuations.

To deprive the Chinese government of a basis for such inventions and facilitate the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, the subject of the negotiations, on January 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet another step it made a proposal to the leadership of the PRC to conclude an agreement between the USSR and the PRC on the non-use of force in any form whatsoever, including missiles and nuclear weapons,

and forwarded a draft of such an agreement to Beijing through the ambassador of the USSR.

In sending this draft agreement for consideration by the government of the PRC, the Soviet side expressed its belief that the fulfillment of our proposal the most rapid conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of force [-] would create a more favorable atmosphere for the normalization of relations between our two states and, in particular, would facilitate the restoration of neighborly relations and friendship between the USSR and the PRC.

A positive answer from the Chinese side to the Soviet initiative could lead to a decisive shift forward in the negotiations. However there is still no answer whatsoever from the Chinese side. There is a growing impression that Beijing, as before, is interested in maintaining the "border territorial issue" in relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic goals.

Why have the Soviet steps towards the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. encountered such significant difficulties? The main reason, as was mentioned previously in our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism was and continues to be the main ingredient in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the present Chinese leadership. This is confirmed, in particular, by the materials of the 11th plenum of the CC CPC (August-September 1970), the nature of the celebration of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC [in October 1970], the continuing slanderous campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, carried out both in the outside world and especially through domestic Chinese channels. The strengthening of the antiSoviet campaign is taking place in the pages of the Chinese press. In the last half a year of the Chinese press. In the last half a year alone the Chinese central newspapers published hundreds of materials containing rude assaults against our party and our country. The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai, The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities are covered with appeals to struggle against "Soviet revisionism." In China anti-Soviet brochures and posters are being published in huge numbers and widely distributed. For example, not long ago a series of brochures with clearly anti-Soviet content was recommended for children as study aids as well as for the repertoire of clubs and circles en

gaged in amateur artistic performances. AntiSoviet films are always playing in movie theaters. The Chinese population also is exposed to anti-Soviet messages in radio and television programs and through verbal propaganda.

Feigning a threat of attack by the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership actively uses anti-Sovietism to continue their propaganda about war and war preparations against the Soviet Union and to strengthen their control over the domestic situation in the country. The Chinese leadership fears that constructive steps by the USSR and progress in stabilizing relations between our countries would undermine the basic ideological premise: to convince the Chinese people that the difficult situation facing them is, as it were, the result of the policy of the Soviet Union, and not of the anti-Leninist adventeuristic policy of the Chinese leaders themselves.

Chinese provocations were met with a decisive rebuff and furthermore our initiative about carrying out negotiations for a border settlement created serious obstacles to the organizations of new adventures.

The PRC leadership is making efforts to emerge from the international isolation in which China found itself as a result of the Red Guard diplomacy in the years of the "Cultural Revolution." China activated its diplomatic contacts in a number of countries, achieved diplomatic recognition by a series of bourgeois states. Today even seven NATO countries have diplomatic relations with Beijing. However, the Chinese leadership is making concessions on major issues, on which they previously held implacable positions. It is not surprising that the capitalist states actively use this flirtation in their own interests.

The imperialist powers, the USA in particular, are playing a complex and sly game in their approach to China. On the one hand they would like to use the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists in the struggle against the USSR, but on the other hand, they would like to strengthen their own position in the PRC, in the vast Chinese market. As a side interest these states all the more loudly urge the PRC "to get actively involved in the international community."

Recently the Chinese leadership has been rather pointedly making outwardly friendly gestures towards some socialist states, promising them to open broad pros

pects in the area of trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation. The Chinese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the effective political, economic, and other forms of cooperation among socialist states, as well as by their interaction, which facilitates the strengthening of the international positions of socialism, and their [socialist states'] ability to move forward with the resolution of major issues in world politics. The Beijing leadership aims to use any opportunity to break the unity and cohesion of the socialist states, to weaken their existing social structure. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases its provocative statements on the Czechoslovak question.5 Beijing has acted similarly with respect to the recent events in Poland.6

The communist and workers parties of the fellow socialist countries, which firmly stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, understand and respond appropriately to this tactical step of Beijing's, which is directed at splitting the socialist community and isolating the Soviet Union.

The Moscow conference of communist and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to split them. Convinced by the futility of their efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in individual countries into influential political parties, and to cobble them together into an international anti-Leninist movement, the Chinese leadership once again is counting on its ability to either attract individual communist parties to its side, or at least to achieve their refusal to publicly criticize the ideology and policy of the CPC leadership. To this end, Beijing's propaganda and CPC officials are concentrating their main efforts on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of foreign communists the foreign and domestic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the USSR, and in the socialist community. At the same time Chinese representatives are aiming to exacerbate disputes in the communist movement. They use any means to heat up nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Soviet dispositions in the ranks of the communist and national-liberation movement.

Beijing is trying to take the non-aligned movement and the developing countries under its own influence. For this purpose, and in order to alienate the states of the "third world" from their dependable support in the struggle with imperialism - the Soviet Union

and other fellow socialist countries, the Chinese leadership is tactically using the PRC's opposition to both "superpowers" (USSR and USA), which allegedly "came to terms" to "divide the world amongst them."

All this attests to the fact that the leaders of China have not changed their previous chauvinistic course in the international arena.

Domestically, the Chinese leadership, having suppressed the enemies of their policies during the so-called "Cultural Revolution", is now trying to overcome the disorder in economic and political life, brought about by the actions of the very same ruling groups over the course of recent years. The well-known stabilization of socio-political and economic life is occurring through allencompassing militarization, leading to an atmosphere of "a besieged fortress." The army is continuing to occupy key positions in the country and serves as the main instrument of power. As before a cult of Mao is expanding, the regime of personal power is being strengthened in the constitution of the PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed in the country. This, of course, cannot but have a pernicious influence on the social life of the entire Chinese people.

In an oral statement made directly to Soviet officials about the desirability and possibility in the near future of the normalization of intergovernmental relations, the Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideological, and to a certain degree, the political struggle between the USSR and China, will continue for a lengthy period of time.

As long as the Chinese leadership sticks to ideological and political positions which are hostile to us, the stabilization and normalization of intergovernmental relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC would have to be achieved under conditions of sharp ideological and political struggle.

In informing the party aktiv about the current status of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Central Committee of the CPSU considers it important to emphasize that the practical measures, which, within the parameters of our long-term orientation, would lead to normalized relations with the PRC and the restoration of friendly relations with the Chinese people, are being supplemented by appropriate measures in case of possible provocations by the Chinese side, as well as by the necessary consistent ideological-political struggle against the anti-Leninist, antisocialist views of the Chinese leadership.

The Central Committee of the CPSU attributes great importance to this work, since positive shifts in Chinese politics can be facilitated in the near future only by struggling relentlessly against the theory and practice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism figures prominently, by further strengthening the cohesion and unity of communist ranks, and by combining the efforts of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST

PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

45-mz sa/ka

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li. 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed.

2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., communist, forces within society, and the Maoist leadership.

3. A.I. Elizavetin, "Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou Enlai v pekinskom aeroportu," with commentary by S. Gonacharov and V. Usov, Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka 5 (1992), 39-63, and 1 (1993), 107-119.

4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, TskhSD, F. 89, Op. 43. D. 53, L.1. 1-14, translated in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81.

5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist movement and Moscow's subsequent imposition of orthodox "normalization" there.

6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk in December 1970, and a subsequent government shakeup.

Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Academica Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with China: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy, 1969-95.

SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980: TWO RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS

by Elizabeth Wishnick

The two Central Committee documents from 1980 printed below illustrate Soviet foreign policy concerns at a time when the Soviet Union was particularly isolated in the international arena as a result of its December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In these documents, Soviet policymakers express their fears that their principal adversaries, the United States and China, were drawing closer together due to their shared hostility toward the USSR. The documents contend that the Sino-American rapproachement had two particularly unfortunate consequences: the development of Sino-American military cooperation and increased efforts by China to undermine the socialist community.

The October 1980 document about Sino-American military cooperation was written for two audiences. On the one hand, Soviet representatives were given the task of convincing Western public opinion that military cooperation with China could backfire and engulf their countries in conflict. On the other hand, the document showed Soviet concern that some non-aligned and socialist states were choosing to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policies and warned of the perils of a neutral attitude towards them. Since China had invaded Vietnam soon after the Sino-American normalization of relations in February 1979, Soviet policymakers feared that the improved U.S.-China relationship had emboldened the Chinese leaders to act on their hostility toward pro-Soviet socialist states and that U.S. military assistance would provide the Chinese with the means to act on their ambitions.

Which states were neutral on the China question and why? The March 1980 document clarifies this in an analysis of China's policy of distinguishing among the socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR, a policy referred to here and in other Soviet analyses as China's "differentiated" approach to the socialist community. The document, a series of instructions. about the China question to Soviet ambassadors to socialist states, notes China's hostility to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia and contrasts this with its development of

extensive relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea. China's efforts to foster economic and even political ties with the "fraternal countries"-Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia-are portrayed here as being of utmost concern to the Central Committee. The document shows Soviet displeasure at China's interest in improving relations with these states at a time when it refused to continue negotiations with the USSR.1

In the Soviet view, relations between the socialist community and China had to be coordinated with Soviet policy, and the "fraternal countries" were expected to wait for and then follow the Soviet Union's lead. To this end, representatives from the International Departments of these countries had been meeting regularly with the CPSU International Department for over a decade.2 Despite all these efforts to coordinate China policy, the March 1980 document evokes Soviet fears that China had been making inroads into the socialist community and was achieving a certain measure of success in using economic cooperation to tempt individual states to stray from the fold. As a result, the document outlines a series of steps result, the document outlines a series of steps for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would foster skepticism about China's intentions and thwart efforts by Chinese representatives to make wide-ranging contacts in these states.

1. China claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it inappropriate to go ahead with the regularly scheduled political talks in 1980.

2. Several documents from these meetings attest to this aim. See, e.g., TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 19, d. 525, 11. 29, 107110, 21 January 1969; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 19. d. 605, 11. 3, 40-42, 12 February 1971; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1077, II. 21, 9 April 1973; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 242, II. 4, 13 April 1975; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 24, d.878; 11. 4, 20 April 1979; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 24, d. 1268, 11. 5, 19 May 1980.

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Recently Beijing's policy towards socialist countries has become noticeably more active. Under conditions, when imperialist circles in the USA have undertaken to aggravate the international situation, the Chinese leadership, drawing ever closer to imperialism, is increasing its efforts to undermine the position of the socialist community. Beijing's goals, as before, are to break the unity and cohesion of the fraternal countries, inspire mutual distrust among them, incite them to Proletariat of all countries, unite! opposition to the Soviet Union, destroy the

Document I: CPSU CC Directive to Soviet Ambassadors in Communist Countries, 4 March 1980

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

unity of action of socialist states in the international arena including on the China question and finally, to subordinate them to its own influence.

Within the parameters of a policy involving a differentiated approach [to social

ist states], the Chinese leadership is trying to stratify the socialist countries into various groups. With such states as Romania, Yugoslavia, and the DPRK, China is developing extensive relations, supporting the nationalistic tendencies in their policies in every possible way with the aim of creating its own group on this basis, and using it to counter the socialist community. In relations with other socialist countries the hostile character of China's policy is strengthening even more, as the unceasing attacks and pressure on the SRV [Vietnam], Cuba, DPRL [Laos], and MPR [Mongolia], attest. China uses a doubledealing tactic including pressure and promises in its approach to the PRB [Bulgaria], HPR [Hungary], GDR, PNR [Poland], and ChSSR [Czechoslovakia]: on the one hand China is continuing its gross interference in their internal affairs, while clearly ignoring their interests; on the other hand, it is giving assurances about its readiness to develop relations with them on a mutually advantageous basis. Thanks to such a tactic, Beijing is counting on at least forcing these countries into positions of "neutrality" regarding China's course, if not to achieve more.

Within the Chinese leadership demagogic and deceptive practices are widely used. It is affirmed, as if China's struggle against the USSR need not worry the other socialist countries, that the development of relations between them and China could even facilitate the improvement of SovietChinese relations, that the expansion of ties between these states and China meets their national interests, and, in particular, could bring them major advantages in the tradeeconomic sphere.

Beijing has noticeably strengthened its efforts to penetrate into various spheres of life and activities in the countries of the socialist community. Chinese representatives are trying to become more active in developing relations with official institutions and government agencies, social organizations, educational institutions, and the mass media; they are establishing contacts with various strata of the population, particularly with the intelligentsia and youth, and widely distributing invitations to various events at the PRC embassies. Information is being collected about the domestic life of their post country, the decisions of party and state organs, the economic situation and the military potential, the military forces and weapons. Under the guise of

"study tours," attempts are being made to send Chinese delegations to some socialist countries and receive their delegations in the PRC.

There are signs that the Chinese may reevaluate their relations with the ruling parties of some socialist countries, and establish party-to-party ties with them. Partyto-party ties are already developing with Yugoslavia and Romania; the first Chinese party delegation in recent years went to participate in the RKP [Romanian Communist Party] congress.

Denying in essence the general regularities of development of the revolutionary processes and socialist economic construction in various countries, the Chinese leadership has once again returned to the use of the conception of the "national model" of socialism, and especially rises to the defense of the Yugoslav "model".

Beijing's divisive activity shows its limited, but nevertheless negative, influence in certain socialist states. Some of the workers do not always grasp the meaning of the Chinese tactic and in certain cases do not provide their own effective rebuff to Beijing's hegemonic policy. Moreover, the facts show that responsible leaders of certain fraternal countries, counter to the official positions of their parties, are expressing an interest in excluding some important directions in their ties with China from the sphere of multilateral coordination, that in certain situations they are taking steps to expand ties with the PRC without considering the level of relations between China and other states.

Judging from all of this, China's tactical use of a differentiated approach [to socialist states], which plays on various nuances and changes in the domestic political and economic situation in certain socialist states, on any type of temporary difficulties, will not only continue, but may even be more widely used in the near future. It can be inferred that attempts by the Chinese to penetrate into various areas of the domestic life of the socialist countries will be further intensified.

Under these conditions an important question in the work of ambassadors is the effective and systematic opposition of Beijing's splitting activities in socialist countries, the neutralization of its plans to shake the unity of the socialist states, to influence their positions. It is necessary to obstruct the

intensifying attempts by the Chinese leaders to penetrate into various spheres of the domestic life of the socialist countries. With the participation of the leaders and representatives of the political and social circles of your post countries, direct the following:

1. Pay attention to the noticeable activization of Chinese policy towards socialist states. Using the example of Beijing's recent maneuvers, continuously carry out measures to clarify the danger of the Chinese differentiated approach tactic and efforts to penetrate the socialist states. This danger is growing in connection with the fact that the splitting activity of the Chinese representatives is being coordinated all the more closely with imperialist circles, above all with the USA, and their intelligence services. Expose the false character of Chinese assertions, which allege that China is “concerned" about the improvement of relations with socialist states, and cares about their interests and security. In fact, Chinese policy, particularly its constant appeals to the USA, Japan, and the countries of Western Europe to unite with China in a “broad international front" and its pressure on the NATO countries to increase their armaments, including nuclear missiles, is totally and fully directed against the socialist states, their security. Calling for the economic integration and military-political consolidation of the West, Beijing is all the more intensively seeking to undermine the positions of the Organization of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

One must also keep in mind that the changes in domestic policy taking place in China, among them the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi at the Vth Plenum of the CC CPC and the promotion to leading posts of experienced political representatives who were victims of the "Cultural Revolution", do not mean, as the facts show, that Beijing has renounced its hostile policy towards socialist countries. On the contrary, one can expect that this policy will be pursued even more tenaciously.

2. Show the dangerous character of the Chinese leadership's aim to undermine the unity of the socialist states, its hypocritical efforts to separate the questions of bilateral relations between the socialist countries and China from Soviet-Chinese relations, to sow illusions concerning its goals in this area, for example by using for its own purposes the fact that Soviet-Chinese negotiations are

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