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The experience of history attests to the Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present
COLD WAR IN ASIA fact that the extent of China's expansion a direct threat to other regions.
continued from page 191 will be proportional to the military might of Under these conditions, the Soviet Union
RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC: the Chinese army. Even today China's can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not
PAST AND PRESENT neighbors, above all the countries of South- only do we carefully monitor the direction of east Asia which the Chinese leaders con- American-Chinese cooperation in the mili
(Khabarovsk, 26-29 August 1995) sider to be their traditional sphere of influ- tary sphere, but also we must take the neces
26 August 1995: Multiethnic Demographics ence, experience an immediate threat. It
sary steps to strengthen the security of our would be easy to imagine how China will borders. We cannot tolerate change in the behave in relation to its neighbors once the military-strategic balance in favor of forces
Morning: Russians Abroad in the Far East USA and its neighbors assist China to ac- hostile to the cause of peace. quire more modern weapons. Above all, (Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw,
Maria Krotova (Herzen Institute, PetersChina is trying to institute its control over Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, burg): “Russo-Chinese Daily Relations in pre
1917 Harbin" Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul. Malacca and the straits of Singapore.
The post countries should inform MID
Lena Aurilena (Institute of History,
Vladivostok): “Youth Politics in Russian Emigre Under these conditions, attempts to ig- [Ministry of Foreign Affairs) that Soviet nore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese ambassadors were sent instructions about
Organizations in Manchukuo, 1930s-40s” policy and to remain neutral will only en- carrying out work to counter the negative
Nadezhda Solov'eva (Khabarovsk Provincourage Beijing to undertake new adven
cial Archive): “Khabarovsk's Archival Holdings counsequences for the causes of socialism,
on Russo-Chinese Relations" tures and to extend its expansion. Collec- peace, and detente, of the establishment of an
David Wolff (Princeton U.): "Interlocking tive efforts by Asian states could, on the American-Chinese military alliance. Familcontrary, impede China's path to increased iarize the recipient with the content of the
Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914” military might, which is directed above all aforementioned instructions.
Shuxiao LI (Heilongjiang Trade Corporaagainst countries of this region.
Carry out your work in coordination
tion): "The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin's (For New Delhi only. The connivance with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the
Rise as an Economic Center" and outright support of the USA for military Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the
Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the preparations in China can only contradict People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the
Far East, Vladivostok): “Russia's Far Eastern India's interests. Although the Chinese Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), the Ger
Neighbors" leadership is holding talks about normaliz- man Democratic Republic (GDR), the Lao
Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): ing relations with India, there is an entire tian People's Democratic Republic (LPDR),
“The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigra
tion, 1920s-30s” array of means of pressure against it in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), China's arsenal of strategies. In American- the Polish People's Republic (PPR), and the Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Czechoslovak People's Republic (CPR).)
Afternoon : “Foreigners” in the Russian Far East Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India It is necessary to attentively follow all
(RFE): Settlement and Resettlement and as a base of support for the aggressive foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans actions of the USA and China in Southeast for the expansion of American-Chinese mili
Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute, Asia is expanding more and more. In coop- tary cooperation, to regularly and effectively Khabarovsk): “German Intelligence in the RFE eration with the USA, Beijing is flooding inform the Center about them, and to take the
during WWI: Suspicions and Realities" India's neighbors with arms and, by creat- measures required to neutralize the tenden
Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, ing an atmosphere of war psychosis, is at- cies that are undesirable for our interests.
Vladivostok): “Intervention and Civil War: New tempting to maintain in power unpopular
Documents and Approaches” regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. (Source: TsKhSD, F. 89. Per. 34, Dok. 10;
Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Beijing is speeding up its military prepara- translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.)
Sapporo, Japan): "The Japanese in Vladivostok,
1906-1922" tions along the Chinese-Indian border, constructing missile bases and strategic roads in
Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, Tibet, and activating its support for separat
Vladivostok): “Forced Migrations in the Far East Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the ist movements in northeast India, where it is
from the 1920s till mid-1950s” Institute of Modern History, Academica practically waging an "undeclared war”
Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on against this country.)
Economies): “Koreans in the Russian Far East: a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with There is no doubt that as China strength- China: The Evolution of Moscow's China
Collectivization and Deportation" ens its military-industrial potential, it will Policy, 1969-95.
Viktoriia Romanova (Ped. Institute, advance further along the path to the real
Khabarovsk): “The Jewish Diaspora in the makization of Chinese leadership's openly de
ing of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast" clared territorial pretensions against neigh
Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Jaboring countries in Southeast, South, and
pan): "Reevaluating the 'Birobidzhan Project': West Asia. This will not only lead to a
The Regional Context" serious destabilization of the situation in
27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Borderland: Options and Tensions
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL
Morning: Regional Political-Economy
Vladivostok): “Foreign Investment in the Rus-
Lidija Varaksina (Khabarovsk Provincial
Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): “For-
Takeshi HAMASHITA (Tokyo U.): “Japanese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia"
CWIHP Working Papers are available free upon request. Requests can be sent to Jim Hershberg, Director, CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Castle, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; faxed to (202) 3574439; or e-mailed to email@example.com
28 August 1995: The Crossborder Learning
Pavel Minakir and Nadezhda Mikheeva (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “The Economy of the Russian Far East : Between Centralization and Regionalization”
Vladimir Syrkin (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Economic Regionalism: Conditions, Factors and Tendencies"
Katherine Burns (Massachusetts Inst. of Technology): “The Russian Far Eastern Initiative: Autonomous Decision-Making and Cooperation in Northeast Asia.”
Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San Diego): “Politics and the Reform of the Primorsk Fuel and Energy Complex"
#1. Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War"
Morning: International Economic Considerations
#2. P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw”
#3. James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Toward Germany during the Beria Interregnum"
Afternoon: The RFE as “Outpost"
#4. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small' Committee of Information, 1952-52"
Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar):
Weixian MA (Institute of E. Europe and
Natal’ia Bezliudnaia (Far Eastern State U.):
Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin):
Andrei Admidin and E. Devaeva (Institute
Douglas Barry (U. of Alaska - Anchorage):
#5. Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961"
Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): “The Cossack Revival in the Far East: From Borderguards to Émigrés to Interest Group"
Vladimir Sokolov (Primor'e Provincial Museum): “Russian Nationalism and the Cossacks of the Far East"
Jun NIU (Institute of American Studies, CASS): “Soviet Policy towards Northeast China, 1945-49"
Ping BU (Institute of Modern History, Heilongjiang Province Academy of Social Sciences): "Sino-Soviet Disposal of Japanese Chemical Weapons after 1945"
Evgenija Gudkova (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Military Conversion in the Russian Far East"
James Hershberg (Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, DC): “Northeast Asia and the Cold War”
Tamara Troyakova (Institute of History, Vladivostok): “The Maritime Province on the Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok”
#6. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”
#7. Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two Reports"
Afternoon: Perceptions, Images & Area-Studies
#8. Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea
New Evidence from Russian Archives”
#9. Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, Integration: Chinese Migration and the Russian
"New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Far East in Two Periods, 1907-14 and 1988- Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports" 1995"
Zhengyun NAN (Beijing Normal U.): “The #10. Norman M. Naimark, "To Know EveryRoots of Russian Studies in China : Harbin, thing and To Report Everything Worth Know1950s-60s"
ing': Building the East German Police State,
#11. Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, Seminar, 1920s-1950s"
the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits Evgenii Plaksen (Institute of History,
#12. Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, and the
#13. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three
After World War II: New Documents on Soviet
Thinking about Post War Relations with the United
Late Afternoon: International Economic Considerations (1)
Natal'ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): "The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia and China"
Mikhail Koval'chuk (Institute of Transport, Khabarovsk): “Foreign Trade and Transport in the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s”
Anatolii Mandrik (Institute of History,
MAO ZEDONG'S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958:
CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS
Translated and Annotated
Translators' Note: On 23 August 1958, as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic CulChinese Communist forces in the Fujian scholars have been forced to resort to “edu- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, area along the People's Republic of China's cated guesses” to answer these questions. 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery The materials in the following pages, Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled translated from Chinese, provide new in- Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: ChineseJinmen Island. In the following two months, sights for understanding Beijing's handling British-American Relations, 1949-1958 several hundred thousand artillery shells of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by it. At one point, a Chinese Communist Lengxi, then the director of the New China Thomas Christensen to be published by invasion of the Nationalist-controlled off- News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin Princeton University Press.) shore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) ribao (People's Daily). Wu was personally Rendering Chinese- or English-lanand Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In involved in the decision-making process in guage materials into the other language is response to the rapidly escalating Commu- Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and difficult because the two languages have no nist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the attended several Politburo Standing Com- common linguistic roots. Thus, the materiEisenhower Administration, in accordance mittee meetings discussing the events. His als provided below are sometimes free rather with its obligations under the 1954 Ameri- memoir provides both a chronology and an than literal translations from Chinese to can-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. insider's narrative of how Beijing's leaders, English. Great care has been taken to avoid naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. Mao Zedong in particular, handled the cri- altering the substantive meaning intended naval vessels to help the Nationalists pro- sis. The second part comprises 18 docu- by the author of the documents. Material tect Jinmen's supply lines. Even the leaders ments, including two internal speeches de- appearing in the text in brackets has been of the Soviet Union, then Beijing's close livered by Mao explaining the Party's exter- supplied to clarify meaning or to provide ally, feared the possible consequences of nal policies in general and its Taiwan policy missing words or information not in the Beijing's actions, and sent Foreign Minis- in particular. The two parts together provide original text. Additional problems with inter Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to in- a foundation to build a scholarly under- dividual documents are discussed in the quire about China's reasons for shelling standing of some of the key calculations notes. The notes also include explanatory Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the underlying the Beijing leadership's man- information to place key individual and Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly events in context or to provide further inforon October 6, when Beijing issued a "Mes- interesting is the revelation that Mao de- mation on the material being discussed. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the cided to shell Jinmen to distract American name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it attention from, and counter American moves Part I. Memoir, "Inside Story of the was speculated by many at that time, and in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his Decision Making during the Shelling of later confirmed that this message was extensive explanation of how China should Jinmen” drafted by Mao Zedong). The message use a “noose strategy” to fight the “U.S. By Wu Lengxil called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan imperialists." Equally important is his em- [Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Litproblem, arguing that all Chinese should phasis on the connection between the tense erature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]] unite to confront the "American plot” to situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass divide China permanently. From this day mobilization in China leading to the Great In August 1958, the members of the on, the Communist forces dramatically re- Leap Forward. It should also be noted that Standing Committee of the Chinese Comlaxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the despite the aggressive appearance of munist Party (CCP) Central Committee PoTaiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war Beijing's Taiwan policy, Mao paid special litburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular top between China and the United States. attention to avoiding a direct military con- leaders' working conference. The meeting
In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of frontation with American forces present in originally planned to focus on the nation's the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. industrial problems, and later the issue of the Cold War history, it is particularly impor. Although these materials are not directly people's commune was added to the discustant to understand Beijing's motives. Why from Chinese archives, they create a new sion. did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the basis for scholars to deepen their under- The Politburo convened its summit shelling relate to China's overall domestic standing of the 1958 events. (Ed. note: For meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in and international policies? Why did the recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis newly available Chinese sources, see Shu the meeting several days later. On the 20th, however, the General Office of the Central bly had passed a resolution requesting Ameri- though Mao believed that the imperialists Committee called, urging me to go to can and British troops to withdraw from were more afraid of us, he told me that our Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American media and propaganda should state that first August on a scheduled flight arranged by the occupation of Taiwan became even more we were not afraid of war, and second we Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was opposed war. Another point he made was with Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe's that American armed forces should with- that international tension had a favorable central district. This seaside resort area was draw from Taiwan, and Jiang's army should aspect for the people of the world. Our used only for the leading members of the withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they propaganda, however, should declare that Central Committee during summers. All of did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far we must prevent the imperialists from makthe villas in the resort area were built before away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen ing any international tension, and work on the liberation for high officials, noble lords, and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bom- relaxing such tension. These were only and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman bardment would certainly shock the interna- some examples, he continued. There were Mao's large, one-story house was newly tional community, not only the Americans, so many bad things happening in our world. constructed.
but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab If we were too distracted with worries by At noon on 23 August, the third day world would be delighted, and African and
world would be delighted, and African and everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People's Lib- Asian peoples would take our side. psychologically under pressure. We should eration Army's artillery forces in Fujian Then Chairman Mao turned to me and learn how to use a dichotomous method to employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces said that the reason for rushing me to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though and heavily bombed Jinmen (Quemoy), attend the meeting was to let me know about international tension was certainly a bad Mazu (Matsu), and other surrounding off- this sudden event. He directed me to instruct thing, we should see the good side of it. The shore islands occupied by the Nationalist the New China News Agency (NCNA) to tension had made many people awaken and army.
collect international responses to the bom- decide to fight the imperialists to the end. In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the bardment. Important responses should be Employing such an analytical method could Politburo's Standing Committee meeting immediately reported to Beidaihe by tele- help us achieve a liberation in our mind and chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I phone. Mao asked me not to publish our get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks. learned the reason for the bombardment). own reports and articles on the bombard- Chairman Mao said that the bombardIn mid-July, American troops invaded Leba- ment at present. We needed to wait and see ment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our non and British troops invaded Jordan in for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao turn to create international tension for a order to put down the Iraqi people's armed also asked me to instruct editorial depart- purpose. We intended to teach the Amerirebellion. Thereafter, the Central Commit- ments of the NCNA, the People's Daily, and cans a lesson. America had bullied us for tee decided to conduct certain military op- national radio stations that they must obey many years, so now that we had a chance, erations in the Taiwan Straits to support the these orders and instructions in all their why not give it a hard time? For the present Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle as well as to reports. Our military troops must follow the we should first wait and see what internacrack down on the Nationalist army's fre- orders, as well as our media and propaganda tional responses, especially American requent and reckless harassment along the units, Mao emphasized.
sponses, there were to our shelling, and then Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Chairman Mao continued his talk. Sev- we could decide on our next move. AmeriJiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek] announced eral days earlier, at the beginning of the cans started a fire in the Middle East, and we on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores), summit meeting, he addressed eight interna- started another in the Far East. We would Jinmen, and Mazu were all “to be on emer- tional issues. He had been thinking of these see what they would do with it. In our gency alert.” It showed that Jiang's army issues for many years. His thinking had propaganda, however, we still need to conwas going to make some moves soon. We gradually formulated some points and opin
gradually formulated some points and opin- demn the Americans for causing tension in therefore deployed our air force in Fujian ions, and his mind thereby became clear. the Taiwan Straits. We did not put them in Province at the end of July. Our fighters Those viewpoints, however, could not be all the wrong. The United States has several had been fighting the Nationalist air force brought forth without considering time,
brought forth without considering time, thousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plus and had already taken over control of the airplace, and circumstance in our public propa- two air force bases there. Their largest fleet, space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, ganda, Mao said to me. We had to use a the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Taiour artillery reinforcement units arrived at different tone in our media work. What he wan Straits. They also have a large naval the front one after another. And mass rallies used as the first example was that at the base in Manila. The chief of staff of the and parades were organized all over the meeting a couple days earlier he predicted American navy had stated not long ago country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples that world war would not break out. But our (around 6 August) that the American armed and to protest against the American and military should still be prepared for a total forces were ready anytime for a landing British imperialists' invasions of the Middle war. And our media should still talk about campaign in the Taiwan Straits just as they East.
the danger of world war and call for oppos- did in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof (of Chairman Mao talked first at the meet- ing the imperialists' aggressive and war- America's ambition), Mao said. ing of August 23. He said that the day's provoking policies to maintain world peace. Two days later, during the afternoon of bombardment was perfectly scheduled. The next example in his explanations was 25 August, Chairman Mao held another PoThree days earlier, the UN General Assem- which side feared the other a bit more. Al- litburo Standing Committee meeting in the
lounge hall of the swimming area at bardment of Jinmen (to the America's land- America's responses. During these days, I Beidaihe's beach. Mao chaired the meeting ing in Lebanon). Our major propaganda asked NCNA to report to me every morning in his bathrobe right after swimming in the target was America's aggressions all over by telephone about headline news from forocean. Among the participants were Liu the world, condemning its invasion of the eign news agencies. I reported the important Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Middle East and its occupation of our terri- news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Peng Dehuai.6 Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, tory, Taiwan, Mao said. The People's Daily The Central Committee's working conHu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meet- could begin our propaganda campaign by ference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August. ing. 7
criticizing an anti-China memorandum re- Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to Chairman Mao started the meeting bycently published by the U.S. State Depart
cently published by the U.S. State Depart- chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 saying that while we had had a good time at ment, enumerating the crimes of America's September, one day before the conference, this summer resort, the Americans had ex- invasion of China in the past and refuting the Mao called for another Politburo Standing tremely hectic and nervous days. Accord- memorandum's calumny and slander against Committee meeting, which mainly discussed ing to their responses during the past days, We could also organize articles and the international situation after the bomMao said that Americans were worried not commentaries on the resolution passed by bardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed only by our possible landing at Jinmen and the UN General Assembly, requesting Ameri- the American responses. Both [Dwight) Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate can and British troops to withdraw from Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles made Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request public speeches. They ordered half of their with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We the withdrawal of American armed forces warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. did not say if we were or were not going to from their military bases in many countries Meanwhile, the American government also land. We were acting as circumstances across the world, including Taiwan. Our suggested resuming Chinese-American amdictated. We had to be doubly cautious, media should now conduct an outer-ring bassadorial talks at Warsaw.9 Seemingly, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was propaganda campaign. After we learned the the American leaders believed that we were not a small matter because it had a bearing responses and moves of America, of Jiang going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to on much more important international is- Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to sues. The problem was not the 95,000 issue announcements and publish commen- have made up their mind whether or not to Nationalist troops stationed there—this was taries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower easy to handle. The problem was how to Mao said that at the present our media should and Dulles slurred over this matter without assess the attitude of the American govern- build up strength and store up energy-draw giving a straight answer. The participants at ment. Washington had signed a mutual the bow but not discharge the arrow. the meeting agreed that the Americans feared defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, Peng Dehuai suggested that the media a war with us. They might not dare to fight however, did not clearly indicate whether should write some reports and articles about us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombardthe U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen the heroic fighting of our commanders and ment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accomand Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The plished our goal. We made the Americans Americans wanted to carry these two bur- participants at the meeting agreed that our very nervous and mobilized the people of the dens on their backs. The main
of reporters on the front could prepare articles, world to join our struggle. our bombardment was not to reconnoiter and we would decide later when they could At the Politburo's Standing Committee Jiang's defenses on these islands, but to publish their reports.
meeting, however, the participants decided probe the attitude of the Americans in Wash- That evening I informed the editors of that our next plan was not an immediate ington, testing their determination. The the People's Daily in Beijing, through a landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose Chinese people had never been afraid of secured telephone line, of the Politburo's (around America's neck) tighter and provoking someone far superior in power instructions on how to organize our propa- tighter-putting more pressure on and strength, and they certainly had the ganda campaign. But I did not say anything America—and then looking for an opportucourage to challenge (the Americans) on about the Politburo's decisions, intentions, nity to act. All participants agreed with such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, Premier Zhou's suggestion of announcing a and Mazu, which had always been China's which were a top military secret at that time. twelve-mile zone as our territorial waters so territories.
For the next two days, the Politburo's as to prevent America's warships from reachMao said that we needed to grasp an Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe ing Jinmen and Mazu. 10 Chairman Mao opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen focused its discussions upon how to double considered it righteous for us to defend our was an opportunity we seized when Ameri- steel and iron production and upon issues of territory if American ships entered our terrican armed forces landed in Lebanon (on 15 establishing the people's commune. Chair- torial water. Our batteries, however, might July 1958). Our action therefore not only man Mao, however, still paid close attention not fire on them immediately. Our troops allowed us to test the Americans, but also to to the responses from all directions to our could send a warning signal first, and then support the Arab people. On the horns of a bombardment of Jinmen, especially to act accordingly. dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to America's response. Mao's secretary called Chairman Mao also said that we were cope with both the East and the West at the me several times checking on follow-up in- preparing another approach as well. Through same time. For our propaganda, however, formation after the NCNA's Cangao ziliao the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, we should not directly connect the bom- (Restricted Reference Material] printed which would be resumed soon in Warsaw,