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however, the General Office of the Central bly had passed a resolution requesting Ameri- though Mao believed that the imperialists Committee called, urging me to go to can and British troops to withdraw from were more afraid of us, he told me that our Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American media and propaganda should state that first August on a scheduled flight arranged by the occupation of Taiwan became even more we were not afraid of war, and second we Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was opposed war. Another point he made was with Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe's that American armed forces should with- that international tension had a favorable central district. This seaside resort area was draw from Taiwan, and Jiang's army should aspect for the people of the world. Our used only for the leading members of the withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they propaganda, however, should declare that Central Committee during summers. All of did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far we must prevent the imperialists from makthe villas in the resort area were built before away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen ing any international tension, and work on the liberation4 for high officials, noble lords, and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bom- relaxing such tension. These were only and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman bardment would certainly shock the interna- some examples, he continued. There were Mao's large, one-story house was newly tional community, not only the Americans, so many bad things happening in our world. constructed.

but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab If we were too distracted with worries by At noon on 23 August, the third day world would be delighted, and African and everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People's Lib- Asian peoples would take our side.

psychologically under pressure. We should eration Army's artillery forces in Fujian Then Chairman Mao turned to me and learn how to use a dichotomous method to employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces said that the reason for rushing me to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though

[] and heavily bombed Jinmen (Quemoy), attend the meeting was to let me know about

attend the meeting was to let me know about international tension was certainly a bad Mazu (Matsu), and other surrounding off- this sudden event. He directed me to instruct thing, we should see the good side of it. The shore islands occupied by the Nationalist the New China News Agency (NCNA) to tension had made many people awaken and army.

collect international responses to the bom- decide to fight the imperialists to the end. In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the bardment. Important responses should be Employing such an analytical method could

I Politburo's Standing Committee meeting immediately reported to Beidaihe by tele- help us achieve a liberation in our mind and chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting! phone. Mao asked me not to publish our I

get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks. learned the reason (for the bombardment). own reports and articles on the bombard- Chairman Mao said that the bombardIn mid-July, American troops invaded Leba- ment at present. We needed to wait and see ment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our non and British troops invaded Jordan in for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao turn to create international tension for a order to put down the Iraqi people's armed also asked me to instruct editorial depart- purpose. We intended to teach the Amerirebellion. Thereafter, the Central Commit- ments of the NCNA, the People's Daily, and cans a lesson. America had bullied us for tee decided to conduct certain military op- national radio stations that they mu

national radio stations that they must obey many years, so now that we had a chance, erations in the Taiwan Straits to support the these orders and instructions in all their why not give it a hard time? For the present Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle as well as to reports. Our military troops must follow the we should first wait and see what internacrack down on the Nationalist army's fre- orders, as well as our media and propaganda tional responses, especially American requent and reckless harassment along the units, Mao emphasized.

sponses, there were to our shelling, and then Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Chairman Mao continued his talk. Sev- we could decide on our next move. AmeriJiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek] announced eral days earlier, at the beginning of the cans started a fire in the Middle East, and we on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu (Pescadores), summit meeting, he addressed eight interna- started another in the Far East. We would Jinmen, and Mazu were all “to be on emer- tional issues. He had been thinking of these see what they would do with it.

In our gency alert.” It showed that Jiang's army issues for many years. His thinking had propaganda, however, we still need to con

. was going to make some moves soon. We gradually formulated some points and opin- demn the Americans for causing tension in therefore deployed our air force in Fujian ions, and his mind thereby became clear. the Taiwan Straits. We did not put them in Province at the end of July. Our fighters Those viewpoints, however, could not be all the wrong. The United States has several had been fighting the Nationalist air force brought forth without considering time,

brought forth without considering time, thousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plus and had already taken over control of the air place, and circumstance in our public propa- two air force bases there. Their largest fleet, space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, ganda, Mao said to me. We had to use a the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Taiour artillery reinforcement units arrived at different tone in our media work. What he wan Straits. They also have a large naval the front one after another. And mass rallies used as the first example was that at the base in Manila. The chief of staff of the and parades were organized all over the meeting a couple days earlier he predicted American navy had stated not long ago country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples that world war would not break out. But our (around 6 August) that the American armed and to protest against the American and military should still be prepared for a total

a forces were ready anytime for a landing British imperialists' invasions of the Middle war. And our media should still talk about campaign in the Taiwan Straits just as they East.

the danger of world war and call for oppos- did in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof (of Chairman Mao talked first at the meet- ing the imperialists' aggressive and war- America's ambition), Mao said. ing of August 23. He said that the day's provoking policies to maintain world peace. Two days later, during the afternoon of bombardment was perfectly scheduled. The next example in his explanations was 25 August, Chairman Mao held another PoThree days earlier, the UN General Assem- which side feared the other a bit more. Al- litburo Standing Committee meeting in the ing.?

lounge hall of the swimming area at bardment of Jinmen (to the America's land- America's responses. During these days, I Beidaihe's beach. Mao chaired the meeting ing in Lebanon). Our major propaganda asked NCNA to report to me every morning in his bathrobe right after swimming in the target was America's aggressions all over by telephone about headline news from forocean. Among the participants were Liu the world, condemning its invasion of the eign news agencies. I reported the important Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Middle East and its occupation of our terri- news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Peng Dehuai.6 Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, tory, Taiwan, Mao said. The People's Daily The Central Committee's working conHu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meet- could begin our propaganda campaign by ference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August.

criticizing an anti-China memorandum re- Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to Chairman Mao started the meeting by cently published by the U.S. State Depart- chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 saying that while we had had a good time at ment, enumerating the crimes of America's September, one day before the conference, this summer resort, the Americans had ex- invasion of China in the past and refuting the Mao called for another Politburo Standing tremely hectic and nervous days. Accord- memorandum'scalumny and slander against Committee meeting, which mainly discussed ing to their responses during the past days, us. We could also organize articles and the international situation after the bomMao said that Americans were worried not commentaries on the resolution passed by bardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed only by our possible landing at Jinmen and the UN General Assembly, requesting Ameri- the American responses. Both (Dwight] Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate can and British troops to withdraw from Eisenhower and (John Foster] Dulles made Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request public speeches. They ordered half of their with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We the withdrawal of American armed forces warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. did not say if we were or were not going to from their military bases in many countries Meanwhile, the American government also land. We were acting as circumstances across the world, including Taiwan. Our suggested resuming Chinese-American amdictated. We had to be doubly cautious, media should now conduct an outer-ring bassadorial talks at Warsaw.9 Seemingly, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was propaganda campaign. After we learned the the American leaders believed that we were not a small matter because it had a bearing responses and moves of America, of Jiang going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to on much more important international is- Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to sues. The problem was not the 95,000 issue announcements and publish commen- have made up their mind whether or not to Nationalist troops stationed there—this was taries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu.

taries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower easy to handle. The problem was how to Mao said that at the present our media should and Dulles slurred over this matter without assess the attitude of the American govern- build up strength and store up energy-draw giving a straight answer. The participants at ment. Washington had signed a mutual the bow but not discharge the arrow. the meeting agreed that the Americans feared defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, Peng Dehuai suggested that the media a war with us. They might not dare to fight however, did not clearly indicate whether should write some reports and articles about us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombardthe U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen the heroic fighting of our commanders and ment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accomand Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The plished our goal. We made the Americans Americans wanted to carry these two bur- participants at the meeting agreed that our very nervous and mobilized the people of the dens on their backs. The main purpose of reporters on the front could prepare articles, world to join our struggle. our bombardment was not to reconnoiter and we would decide later when they could At the Politburo's Standing Committee Jiang's defenses on these islands, but to publish their reports.

meeting, however, the participants decided probe the attitude of the Americans in Wash- That evening I informed the editors of that our next plan was not an immediate ington, testing their determination. The the People's Daily in Beijing, through a landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose Chinese people had never been afraid of secured telephone line, of the Politburo's [around America's neck] tighter and provoking someone far superior in power instructions on how to organize our propa- tighter-putting

tighter-putting more pressure on and strength, and they certainly had the ganda campaign. But I did not say anything

ganda campaign. But I did not say anything America—and then looking for an opportucourage to challenge [the Americans) on about the Politburo's decisions, intentions, nity to act. All participants agreed with such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, Premier Zhou's suggestion of announcing a and Mazu, which had always been China's which were a top military secret at that time. twelve-mile zone as our territorial waters so territories.

For the next two days, the Politburo's as to prevent America's warships from reachMao said that we needed to grasp an Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe ing Jinmen and Mazu. 10 Chairman Mao opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen focused its discussions upon how to double considered it righteous for us to defend our was an opportunity we seized when Ameri- steel and iron production and upon issues of territory if American ships entered our terrican armed forces landed in Lebanon (on 15 establishing the people's commune. Chair- torial water. Our batteries, however, might July 1958). Our action therefore not only man Mao, however, still paid close attention not fire on them immediately. Our troops allowed us to test the Americans, but also to to the responses from all directions to our could send a warning signal first, and then support the Arab people. On the horns of a bombardment of Jinmen, especially to act accordingly. dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to America's response. Mao's secretary called Chairman Mao also said that we were cope with both the East and the West at the me several times checking on follow-up in- preparing another approach as well. Through same time. For our propaganda, however, formation after the NCNA's Cangao ziliao the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, we should not directly connect the bom- (Restricted Reference Material]8 printed which would be resumed soon in Warsaw, we would employ diplomatic means to coor- Jinmen-Mazu). Although their policy of People's Daily the next day (9 September). dinate our fighting on the Fujian front. We escape was acceptable, the Americans also There was another interesting episode. now had both an action arena and a talk needed to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang's troops Khrushchev did not have any idea about our arena. There was yet another useful means- from Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americans intentions in shelling Jinmen. Afraid of the propaganda campaign. Then Chairman continued to stay and kept Jiang's troops being involved in a world war, he sent Mao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and said there, the situation would not be affected as Gromyko to Beijing to find out our plans on that at present our media should give wide a whole but they would put the noose around 6 September. During the Supreme State publicity to a condemnation of America for their necks.

Conference, Chairman Mao and Premier causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We During Chairman Mao's speech on the Zhou met with Gromyko, informing him of should request America to withdraw its armed 8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxi our decisions and explaining that we did not forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. was attending the meeting. I answered. intend to have a major war. In case a major Our propaganda should emphasize that Tai- Chairman Mao told me that his speech needed war broke out between China and America, wan and the offshore islands were Chinese to be included in that day's news, and asked China did not intend to involve the Soviet territory, that our bombardment of Jinmen

me to prepare it immediately. I discussed Union in the war. After receiving our mesMazu was aimed at punishing Jiang's army this with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us found sage, Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, askand was purely China's internal affair, and it difficult to decide which part of Mao's ing the American government to be very that no foreign country would be allowed to speech should be published, we agreed even- cautious in the Taiwan Straits and warning interfere with what happened there. Our tually to write the part about the noose first. that the Soviet Union was ready to assist propaganda organs, the People's Daily, I drafted the news and then let Hu read it. ,

China anytime if China was invaded. NCNA, and radio stations should use a fiery When the conference adjourned, Chairman Right after the Supreme State Conferrhetorical tone in their articles and commen- Mao and other members of the Politburo's ence, Chairman Mao left Beijing on an intaries. Their wording, however, must be Standing Committee gathered in the lobby spection trip of the southern provinces. From measured, and should not go beyond a cer- of Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed over 10 to 28 September, he visited Hubei, Anhui, tain limit, Mao emphasized.

the news draft to Mao for his checking and Jiangsu, and Shanghai, and other places. On From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Mao approval. While talking to the others, he 30 September, one day after Mao returned to chaired the Supreme State Conference. He went over the draft and made some changes. Beijing, his secretary called to tell me that made two speeches on the 5th and the 8th.11 Mao told me that only publishing the noose Chairman Mao wanted to see me. I immediBesides domestic issues, his speeches fo- issue was all right. It was not appropriate at ately went to Fengzeyuan in Zhongnanhai.13 cused on international issues similar to the that moment to publish all the issues dis- When I walked into the eastern wing of the eight issues which he had explained at the cussed because it was merely an exchange of Juixiang Study, 14 Chairman Mao was readBeidaihe meeting. When Chairman Mao opinion among the top leaders. Moreover, ing a book. He asked me to sit down and said talked about pulling the noose, he said that Mao did not want to relate the noose issue that during his trip he was impressed by the our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu made directly to Jinmen-Mazu. This was different boundless energy of the people across the the Americans very nervous. Dulles seem- from writing articles or editorials for news- country, especially in their great efforts to ingly intended to put his neck into the noose papers. In our articles, Mao continued, we develop a steel and iron industry and to of Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan, should not write about our policy toward mobilize massive militias. Mao had drafted Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good for Jinmen-Mazu, which was a top military se- a news story for NCNA, which was being us to get the Americans there. Whenever we cret. Our writing, however, could clarify our typed and would be ready soon. Chairman wanted to kick them, we could do so. Thus position toward the Chinese-American am- Mao also told me that he particularly invited we had the initiative, and the Americans did bassadorial talks which would resume soon, 12 General Zhang Zhizhong15 to join in the trip. not. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troubles expressing that whatever the outcome would Besides his interests in a rapid growth of for us mainly through the breach at Fujian. It be, we placed hopes on the talks. We were industry and agriculture, Zhang showed spewas indeed troublesome to let Jiang's army now shelling on the one hand and talking on cial concerns during the trip about the situaoccupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could an the other-military operations combined tion in the Taiwan Straits. Zhang did not enemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed? with diplomatic efforts. Our bombardment understand why we took so long to land on We, however, did not intend to launch an was a test. Mao said that we had fired 30,000 Jinmen. His advice was that even though we immediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. (Our shells that day in coordination with the mass were unable to liberate Taiwan at that time, bombardment) was merely aimed at testing rally at Tiananmen Square to make a great ]

we must take over Jinmen and Mazu by all and scaring the Americans, but we would show of strength and impetus. Our talks possible means. Zhang suggested not letting land if circumstances allowed. Why should were a test through diplomacy in order to get slip an opportunity which might never come we not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there came to the bottom of American reaction. Two again. an opportunity? The Americans in fact were approaches were better than a single one. It

a

Chairman Mao told me that in fact we afraid of having a war with us at the bottom was necessary to keep the negotiation chan- were not unwilling to take over Jinmen and of their hearts so that Eisenhower never nel open, Mao emphasized. After checking Mazu. Our decision (on the landing), howtalked publicly about an absolutely "mutual and polishing my manuscripts, Chairman ever, not only concerned Jiang Jieshi, but defense” of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americans Mao asked me to instruct NCNA to transmit also had to give special consideration to seemingly intended to shy away (from the news that evening and to publish it in the America's position. The Americans feared a war with us. After we announced atwelve- Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead pub- Straits. Our test by artillery fire in August mile zone of territorial waters, American lic thinking about relations with the Nation- and September was appropriate because the warships at first refused to accept it. They alists. According to Chairman Mao's in- Americans were forced to reconsider what invaded the boundary line of our territorial struction, the article was published as the

struction, the article was published as the they could do in the area. At the same time, waters many times, though they did not sail headline news on the front page of the we restricted our shelling to Jiang's ships, into the eight-mile territorial waters which People's Daily on that National Day (1 Oc- not American ships. Our naval and air forces they recognized. Later, after our warnings, tober 1958).

all strictly observed the order not to fire on American ships did not dare to invade our After the National Day, Chairman Mao American ships and airplanes. We acted twelve-mile territorial waters. Once some held continuous meetings of the Politburo's with caution and exercised proper restraint. American gunships escorted a Nationalist Standing Committee to discuss the situation Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping transportation flotilla shipping munitions in the Taiwan Straits. From 3 to 13 October, also said that we put up quite a pageant in our and supplies to Jinmen. When this joint the committee members met almost every- propaganda campaign to condemn America's flotilla reached Jinmen's harbor, I ordered day. The meetings of the 3rd and 4th focused occupation of our Taiwan territory and to heavy shelling. As soon as our batteries on an analysis of Dulles's speech on 30 protest American ships and aircraft invading opened fire, the American ships turned September. In his speech, Dulles blatantly our territorial waters and air space. Our around and quickly escaped. The National- proposed a “two Chinas” policy, requesting propaganda had mobilized not only the Chiist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently, that the Chinese Communists and the Tai- nese masses but also the international comAmerica was a paper tiger.

wan government “both should renounce the munity to support the Arab peoples and put America, however, was also a real ti- employment of force” in the straits. Mean- very heavy pressure on the American govger, Mao continued. At present, America while, he criticized Taiwan's deployment of ernment. They both emphasized that this concentrated a large force in the Taiwan large numbers of troops on Jinmen and Mazu was the right thing to do. Straits, including six out of its twelve air- as unnecessary, “unwise and not cautious” Chairman Mao said at the meeting that craft carriers, three heavy cruisers, forty actions. A reporter asked him if America's our task of probing (the American response) destroyers, and two air force divisions. Its Taiwan policy would change if the Chinese had been accomplished. The question now strength was so strong that one could not Communists made some compromises. was what we were going to do next. He underestimate it, but must consider it seri- Dulles said that “our policy in these respects pointed out that regarding Dulles's policy ously. Thus, our current policy (toward is flexible.... If the situation we have to meet we shared some common viewpoints with Jinmen] was shelling without landing, and changes, our policies change with it."16 Jiang Jieshi—both opposed the two-China cutting-off without killing (meaning that Premier Zhou pointed out at the meeting policy. Certainly Jiang insisted that he should without a landing, we would continue bomb- that Dulles's speech indicated America's be the only legal government, and we the ing Jinmen to blockade its communication intention to seize this opportunity to create

bandits. Both, therefore, could not renounce and transportation and to cut off its rear two Chinas, and Dulles wanted us to commit the use of force. Jiang was always preoccusupport and supplies, but not to bottle up the to a non-military unification of Taiwan. Using pied with recovering the mainland; and we enemy (on the island)).

this as a condition, America might ask Tai- could never agree to abandon Taiwan. The Chairman Mao also told me that the wan to give up its so-called "returning to the current situation, however, was that we were Chinese-American ambassadorial talks had mainland" plan and withdraw its troops from unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain resumed at Warsaw. After several rounds of Jinmen and Mazu. In one word, Dulles's period; Jiang's “returning to the mainland” talks, we could tell that the Americans were policy was designed to exchange Jinmen and also included “a very large measure of illucertain about defending Taiwan but not sure Mazu for Taiwan and Penghu. This was the sion” as even Dulles recognized. The reabout Jinmen. Some indications suggested same hand of cards we had recently discov- maining question now was how to handle that the Americans intended to exchange ered during the Chinese-American ambassa- Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang was unwilling to their abstaining from defending Jinmen- dorial talks in Warsaw. Zhou emphasized withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, and we did Mazu for our recognition of their forcible that the American delegates even spoke more not need to land on Jinmen-Mazu. Mao occupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We needed undisguisedly at the talks than had been asked us about the proposal of leaving Jinmen to work out a policy concerning this situa- suggested in Dulles's speech.

and Mazu in the hands of Jiang Jieshi. The tion. It was not adequate for us to accept Comrades (Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] advantage of this policy was that we could General Zhang Zhizhong's advice at that Xiaoping believed that both China and maintain contact with the Nationalists point. Mao asked the People's Daily and America were trying to find out the other's through this channel since these islands were NCNA to suspend the ongoing propaganda real intention. The two sides did the same very close to the mainland. Whenever neccampaign and wait for the Central thing at both Warsaw and Jinmen. By now essary, we could shell the Nationalists. Committee's further decision.

both had some ideas about the other's bottom Whenever we needed tension, we could pull Chairman Mao asked for my comments line, they said. Americans knew that we the noose tighter. Whenever we wanted a on his news draft after it was typed out. I neither intended to liberate Taiwan in the relaxation, we could give the noose more noted that the article particularly mentioned near future nor wanted to have a head-to- slack. [The policy of) leaving these islands at its end that General Zhang had joined head clash with America. Fairly speaking, hanging there neither dead nor alive could be Mao's inspection trip. I agreed with Mao's both sides adopted a similar cautious policy employed as one means to deal with the manuscript except the last paragraph about toward their confrontation in the Taiwan Americans. Every time we bombed, Jiang Jieshi would ask for American help; it would Later on, our shelling could be at some formally suggested that both sides hold nemake Americans anxious, worrying that intervals; sometimes heavy shelling, some- gotiations to search for peaceful resolutions Jiang might bring them into trouble. For us, times light; and several hundred shells fired to the Chinese civil war which had been not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little randomly in one day. However, Mao said fought for the past 30 years. It also animpact on our construction of a socialist that we should continue to give wide public- nounced that our forces on the Fujian front country. Jiang's troops on Jinmen-Mazu ity to our propaganda campaign. We in- would suspend their shelling for seven days alone could not cause too much damage. On sisted in our propaganda that the question of in order to allow the (Nationalist] troops and the contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu, Taiwan was China's internal affair, that residents on Jinmen to receive supplies. Our or if we allow the Americans to force Jiang bombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuation suspension of bombardment, however, to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would of the Chinese civil war, and that no foreign would be with the precondition of no Amerilose a reliable means by which we can deal country or international organization should can ships providing escort. with the Americans and Jiang.

be allowed to interfere in China's affairs. This statement drafted by Chairman Mao All the participants at the meeting agreed America's stationing of its land and air forces was a very important turning point in our with Chairman Mao's proposal to allow on Taiwan was an invasion of China's terri- policy toward Jinmen. That is, our focus Jiang's troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu and tory and sovereignty; concentrating a large shifted from military operations to political

; force the American government to continue number of naval ships in the Taiwan Straits (including diplomatic) efforts. with this burden. The latter would be always revealed American attempts to cause ten- After watching the situation for two on tenterhooks since we could kick it from sions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawn days, Chairman Mao called for another Potime to time.

from that area. We must oppose America's litburo Standing Committee meeting at his Premier Zhou expected the Americans attempts to create two Chinas and to legalize quarters in the afternoon of 8 September. All

8 to propose three resolutions during the Chi- its forcible occupation of Taiwan. We would the committee members noticed that the nese-American talks. Their first proposition solve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or even

, world had made magnificent and strong remight ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiang the problem of Taiwan and Penghu, with sponses to the “Message to the Compatriots would reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazu Jiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chair- in Taiwan.” Some Western newspapers and and America would announce that Jinmen- man Mao emphasized that our media propa- magazines even saw the message as a straw Mazu was included in the American-Jiang ganda should explicitly address the above in the wind that augured dramatic change in mutual defense perimeter. The second pro- principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw the relations between both Chinese sides and posal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiang talks should also follow these principles between China and America. Meanwhile, reduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, while while using some diplomatic rhetoric. All American ships stopped their escorts and no America would declare that their mutual these points would not be publicly propa- longer invaded our territorial waters around defense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. The gated until we had issued a formal govern- Jinmen. Only Jiang's Defense Department last plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang's ment statement. At the present, the People's believed the message to be a Chinese Comwithdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a com- Daily could have a “cease-fire” for a couple munist “plot.” mitment by both sides not to use force against of days to prepare and replenish munitions. Chairman Mao then asked me about each other. All three propositions were Then, Mao said, ten thousand cannons would how the People's Daily prepared its editounacceptable, Zhou emphasized, because boom after our orders.

rial. I answered that the paper had already they were essentially aimed at creating two After the meeting of the 4th, Chairman finished one article to attack Americans in Chinas and legalizing America's forcible Mao issued an order to the frontal forces on particular. Mao told me to work on the occupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, con- 5 September to suspend their bombardment Guomindang (GMD) first by writing an arsidered it favorable for us to continue the for two days. The same day Mao himself ticle which focused on a dialogue with Jiang Chinese-American talks, which could oc- drafted the “Message to the Compatriots in Jieshi, while at the same time posing some cupy the Americans and prevent America Taiwan,” which was published on the 6th in difficult questions for the Americans. This and the European countries from bringing the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. article should explain that our message was the question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN. The message began with "We are all Chi- not a crafty plot, but part of our consistent We also needed to explain clearly the situa- nese. Out of the thirty-six stratagems, the policy toward Taiwan. The message showed tion to our friends in Asia and Africa so as to best is making peace.” It pointed out that our stretching out both our arms once again, give them the truth and prevent (the crisis] both sides considered Taiwan, Penghu, Mao said. The article might try to alienate from doing us a disservice. All the partici- Jinmen, and Mazu as Chinese territories, Jiang from America, saying that Taiwan pants agreed with Premier Zhou's sugges- and all agreed on one China, not two Chinas. suffered from depending on other people for tions.

The message then suggested that Taiwan a living, and that getting a lift on an AmeriChairman Mao concluded at the meet- leaders should abolish the mutual defense can ship was unreliable. Then the article ing that our decision had been made—con- treaty signed with Americans. The Ameri- could criticize Dulles's so-called cease-fire tinuation of shelling but not landing, block- cans would abandon the Taiwanese sooner and ask the Americans to meet five requireading without bottling up and allowing or later; and one could discern certain clues ments for a cease-fire (stopping naval esJiang's forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Our about this in Dulles's speech of 30 Septem- corts, stopping the invasion of China's terrishelling would no longer be daily, with no ber. After all, the American imperialists torial waters and air space, ending military more 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time. were our common enemy. The message provocation and war threats, ending inter

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