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we would employ diplomatic means to coor- Jinmen-Mazu). Although their policy of People's Daily the next day (9 September). dinate our fighting on the Fujian front. We escape was acceptable, the Americans also There was another interesting episode. now had both an action arena and a talk needed to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang's troops Khrushchev did not have any idea about our arena. There was yet another useful means- from Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americans intentions in shelling Jinmen. Afraid of the propaganda campaign. Then Chairman continued to stay and kept Jiang's troops being involved in a world war, he sent Mao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and said there, the situation would not be affected as Gromyko to Beijing to find out our plans on that at present our media should give wide a whole but they would put the noose around 6 September. During the Supreme State publicity to a condemnation of America for their necks.
Conference, Chairman Mao and Premier causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We During Chairman Mao's speech on the Zhou met with Gromyko, informing him of should request America to withdraw its armed 8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxi our decisions and explaining that we did not forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. was attending the meeting. I answered. intend to have a major war. In case a major Our propaganda should emphasize that Tai- Chairman Mao told me that his speech needed war broke out between China and America, wan and the offshore islands were Chinese to be included in that day's news, and asked China did not intend to involve the Soviet territory, that our bombardment of Jinmen- me to prepare it immediately. I discussed Union in the war. After receiving our mesMazu was aimed at punishing Jiang's army this with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us found sage, Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, askand was purely China's internal affair, and it difficult to decide which part of Mao's ing the American government to be very that no foreign country would be allowed to speech should be published, we agreed even- cautious in the Taiwan Straits and warning interfere with what happened there. Our tually to write the part about the noose first. that the Soviet Union was ready to assist propaganda organs, the People's Daily, I drafted the news and then let Hu read it. China anytime if China was invaded. NCNA, and radio stations should use a fiery When the conference adjourned, Chairman Right after the Supreme State Conferrhetorical tone in their articles and commen- Mao and other members of the Politburo's ence, Chairman Mao left Beijing on an intaries. Their wording, however, must be Standing Committee gathered in the lobby spection trip of the southern provinces. From measured, and should not go beyond a cer- of Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed over 10 to 28 September, he visited Hubei, Anhui, tain limit, Mao emphasized.
the news draft to Mao for his checking and Jiangsu, and Shanghai, and other places. On From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Mao approval. While talking to the others, he 30 September, one day after Mao returned to chaired the Supreme State Conference. He went over the draft and made some changes. Beijing, his secretary called to tell me that made two speeches on the 5th and the 8th.11 Mao told me that only publishing the noose Chairman Mao wanted to see me. I immediBesides domestic issues, his speeches fo- issue was all right. It was not appropriate at ately went to Fengzeyuan in Zhongnanhai.13 cused on international issues similar to the that moment to publish all the issues dis- When I walked into the eastern wing of the eight issues which he had explained at the cussed because it was merely an exchange of Juixiang Study, 14 Chairman Mao was readBeidaihe meeting. When Chairman Mao opinion among the top leaders. Moreover, ing a book. He asked me to sit down and said talked about pulling the noose, he said that Mao did not want to relate the noose issue that during his trip he was impressed by the our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu made directly to Jinmen-Mazu. This was different boundless energy of the people across the the Americans very nervous. Dulles seem- from writing articles or editorials for news- country, especially in their great efforts to ingly intended to put his neck into the noose papers. In our articles, Mao continued, we develop a steel and iron industry and to of Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan, should not write about our policy toward mobilize massive militias. Mao had drafted Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good for Jinmen-Mazu, which was a top military se- a news story for NCNA, which was being us to get the Americans there. Whenever we cret. Our writing, however, could clarify our typed and would be ready soon. Chairman wanted to kick them, we could do so. Thus position toward the Chinese-American am- Mao also told me that he particularly invited we had the initiative, and the Americans did bassadorial talks which would resume soon, 12 General Zhang Zhizhong 15 to join in the trip. not. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troubles expressing that whatever the outcome would Besides his interests in a rapid growth of for us mainly through the breach at Fujian. It be, we placed hopes on the talks. We were
be, we placed hopes on the talks. We were industry and agriculture, Zhang showed spewas indeed troublesome to let Jiang's army now shelling on the one hand and talking on cial concerns during the trip about the situaoccupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could an the other—military operations combined tion in the Taiwan Straits. Zhang did not enemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed? with diplomatic efforts. Our bombardment understand why we took so long to land on We, however, did not intend to launch an was a test. Mao said that we had fired 30,000 Jinmen. His advice was that even though we immediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. (Our shells that day in coordination with the mass were unable to liberate Taiwan at that time, bombardment) was merely aimed at testing rally at Tiananmen Square to make a great we must take over Jinmen and Mazu by all and scaring the Americans, but we would show of strength and impetus. Our talks possible means. Zhang suggested not letting land if circumstances allowed. Why should were a test through diplomacy in order to get slip an opportunity which might never come we not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there came to the bottom of American reaction. Two again. an opportunity? The Americans in fact were approaches were better than a single one. It Chairman Mao told me that in fact we afraid of having a war with us at the bottom was necessary to keep the negotiation chan- were not unwilling to take over Jinmen and of their hearts so that Eisenhower never nel open, Mao emphasized. After checking Mazu. Our decision (on the landing], howtalked publicly about an absolutely "mutual and polishing my manuscripts, Chairman ever, not only concerned Jiang Jieshi, but defense" of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americans Mao asked me to instruct NCNA to transmit also had to give special consideration to seemingly intended to shy away [from the news that evening and to publish it in the America's position. The Americans feared a war with us. After we announced atwelve- Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead pub- Straits. Our test by artillery fire in August mile zone of territorial waters, American lic thinking about relations with the Nation- and September was appropriate because the warships at first refused to accept it. They alists. According to Chairman Mao's in- Americans were forced to reconsider what invaded the boundary line of our territorial struction, the article was published as the they could do in the area. At the same time, waters many times, though they did not sail headline news on the front page of the we restricted our shelling to Jiang's ships, into the eight-mile territorial waters which People's Daily on that National Day (1 Oc- not American ships. Our naval and air forces they recognized. Later, after our warnings, tober 1958).
all strictly observed the order not to fire on American ships did not dare to invade our After the National Day, Chairman Mao American ships and airplanes. We acted twelve-mile territorial waters. Once some held continuous meetings of the Politburo's with caution and exercised proper restraint. American gunships escorted a Nationalist Standing Committee to discuss the situation Comrades (Liu] Shaoqi and (Deng] Xiaoping transportation flotilla shipping munitions in the Taiwan Straits. From 3 to 13 October, also said that we put up quite a pageant in our and supplies to Jinmen. When this joint the committee members met almost every- propaganda campaign to condemn America's flotilla reached Jinmen's harbor, I ordered day. The meetings of the 3rd and 4th focused occupation of our Taiwan territory and to heavy shelling. As soon as our batteries on an analysis of Dulles's speech on 30 protest American ships and aircraft invading opened fire, the American ships turned September. In his speech, Dulles blatantly our territorial waters and air space. Our around and quickly escaped. The National- proposed a "two Chinas" policy, requesting propaganda had mobilized not only the Chiist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently, that the Chinese Communists and the Tai- nese masses but also the international comAmerica was a paper tiger.
wan government “both should renounce the munity to support the Arab peoples and put America, however, was also a real ti- employment of force" in the straits. Mean- very heavy pressure on the American govger, Mao continued. At present, America while, he criticized Taiwan's deployment of ernment. They both emphasized that this concentrated a large force in the Taiwan large numbers of troops on Jinmen and Mazu was the right thing to do. Straits, including six out of its twelve air
as unnecessary, “unwise and not cautious" Chairman Mao said at the meeting that craft carriers, three heavy cruisers, forty actions. A reporter asked him if America's our task of probing (the American response) destroyers, and two air force divisions. Its Taiwan policy would change if the Chinese had been accomplished. The question now strength was so strong that one could not Communists made some compromises. was what we were going to do next. He underestimate it, but must consider it seri- Dulles said that “our policy in these respects pointed out that regarding Dulles's policy ously. Thus, our current policy (toward is flexible.... If the situation we have to meet we shared some common viewpoints with Jinmen] was shelling without landing, and changes, our policies change with it.”16 Jiang Jieshi—both opposed the two-China cutting-off without killing (meaning that Premier Zhou pointed out at the meeting policy. Certainly Jiang insisted that he should without a landing, we would continue bomb- that Dulles's speech indicated America's be the only legal government, and we the ing Jinmen to blockade its communication intention to seize this opportunity to create bandits. Both, therefore, could not renounce and transportation and to cut off its rear two Chinas, and Dulles wanted us to commit the use of force. Jiang was always preoccusupport and supplies, but not to bottle up the to a non-military unification of Taiwan. Using pied with recovering the mainland; and we enemy (on the island]).
this as a condition, America might ask Tai- could never agree to abandon Taiwan. The Chairman Mao also told me that the wan to give up its so-called "returning to the current situation, however, was that we were Chinese-American ambassadorial talks had mainland" plan and withdraw its troops from unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain resumed at Warsaw. After several rounds of Jinmen and Mazu. In one word, Dulles's period; Jiang's “returning to the mainland” talks, we could tell that the Americans were policy was designed to exchange Jinmen and also included “a very large measure of illucertain about defending Taiwan but not sure Mazu for Taiwan and Penghu. This was the sion" as even Dulles recognized. The reabout Jinmen. Some indications suggested same hand of cards we had recently discov- maining question now was how to handle that the Americans intended to exchange ered during the Chinese-American ambassa- Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang was unwilling to their abstaining from defending Jinmen- dorial talks in Warsaw. Zhou emphasized withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, and we did Mazu for our recognition of their forcible that the American delegates even spoke more not need to land on Jinmen-Mazu. Mao occupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We needed undisguisedly at the talks than had been asked us about the proposal of leaving Jinmen to work out a policy concerning this situa- suggested in Dulles's speech.
and Mazu in the hands of Jiang Jieshi. The tion. It was not adequate for us to accept Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and (Deng] advantage of this policy was that we could General Zhang Zhizhong's advice at that Xiaoping believed that both China and maintain contact with the Nationalists point. Mao asked the People's Daily and America were trying to find out the other's through this channel since these islands were NCNA to suspend the ongoing propaganda real intention. The two sides did the same very close to the mainland. Whenever neccampaign and wait for the Central thing at both Warsaw and Jinmen. By now essary, we could shell the Nationalists. Committee's further decision.
both had some ideas about the other's bottom Whenever we needed tension, we could pull Chairman Mao asked for my comments line, they said. Americans knew that we the noose tighter. Whenever we wanted a on his news draft after it was typed out. I neither intended to liberate Taiwan in the relaxation, we could give the noose more noted that the article particularly mentioned near future nor wanted to have a head-to- slack. [The policy of] leaving these islands at its end that General Zhang had joined head clash with America. Fairly speaking, hanging there neither dead nor alive could be Mao's inspection trip. I agreed with Mao's both sides adopted a similar cautious policy employed as one means to deal with the manuscript except the last paragraph about toward their confrontation in the Taiwan Americans. Every time we bombed, Jiang Jieshi would ask for American help; it would Later on, our shelling could be at some formally suggested that both sides hold nemake Americans anxious, worrying that intervals; sometimes heavy shelling, some- gotiations to search for peaceful resolutions Jiang might bring them into trouble. For us, times light; and several hundred shells fired to the Chinese civil war which had been not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little randomly in one day. However, Mao said fought for the past 30 years. It also animpact on our construction of a socialist that we should continue to give wide public- nounced that our forces on the Fujian front country. Jiang's troops on Jinmen-Mazu ity to our propaganda campaign. We in- would suspend their shelling for seven days alone could not cause too much damage. On sisted in our propaganda that the question of in order to allow the [Nationalist] troops and the contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu, Taiwan was China's internal affair, that residents on Jinmen to receive supplies. Our or if we allow the Americans to force Jiang bombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuation suspension of bombardment, however, to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would of the Chinese civil war, and that no foreign would be with the precondition of no Amerilose a reliable means by which we can deal country or international organization should can ships providing escort. with the Americans and Jiang.
be allowed to interfere in China's affairs. This statement drafted by Chairman Mao All the participants at the meeting agreed America's stationing of its land and air forces was a very important turning point in our with Chairman Mao's proposal to allow on Taiwan was an invasion of China's terri- policy toward Jinmen. That is, our focus Jiang's troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu and tory and sovereignty; concentrating a large shifted from military operations to political force the American government to continue number of naval ships in the Taiwan Straits (including diplomatic) efforts. with this burden. The latter would be always revealed American attempts to cause ten- After watching the situation for two on tenterhooks since we could kick it from sions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawn days, Chairman Mao called for another Potime to time.
from that area. We must oppose America's litburo Standing Committee meeting at his Premier Zhou expected the Americans attempts to create two Chinas and to legalize quarters in the afternoon of 8 September. All to propose three resolutions during the Chi- its forcible occupation of Taiwan. We would the committee members noticed that the nese-American talks. Their first proposition solve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or even world had made magnificent and strong remight ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiang the problem of Taiwan and Penghu, with sponses to the “Message to the Compatriots would reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazu Jiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chair- in Taiwan.” Some Western newspapers and and America would announce that Jinmen- man Mao emphasized that our media propa- magazines even saw the message as a straw Mazu was included in the American-Jiang ganda should explicitly address the above in the wind that augured dramatic change in mutual defense perimeter. The second pro- principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw
principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw the relations between both Chinese sides and posal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiang talks should also follow these principles between China and America. Meanwhile, reduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, while while using some diplomatic rhetoric. All American ships stopped their escorts and no America would declare that their mutual these points would not be publicly propa- longer invaded our territorial waters around defense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. The gated until we had issued a formal govern- Jinmen. Only Jiang's Defense Department last plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang's ment statement. At the present, the People's believed the message to be a Chinese Comwithdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a com- Daily could have a "cease-fire" for a couple munist “plot." mitment by both sides not to use force against of days to prepare and replenish munitions. Chairman Mao then asked me about each other. All three propositions were Then, Mao said, ten thousand cannons would how the People's Daily prepared its editounacceptable, Zhou emphasized, because boom after our orders.
rial. I answered that the paper had already they were essentially aimed at creating two After the meeting of the 4th, Chairman finished one article to attack Americans in Chinas and legalizing America's forcible Mao issued an order to the frontal forces on particular. Mao told me to work on the occupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, con- 5 September to suspend their bombardment Guomindang (GMD) first by writing an arsidered it favorable for us to continue the for two days. The same day Mao himself ticle which focused on a dialogue with Jiang Chinese-American talks, which could oc- drafted the “Message to the Compatriots in Jieshi, while at the same time posing some cupy the Americans and prevent America Taiwan,” which was published on the 6th in difficult questions for the Americans. This and the European countries from bringing the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. article should explain that our message was the question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN. The message began with “We are all Chi- not a crafty plot, but part of our consistent We also needed to explain clearly the situa- nese. Out of the thirty-six stratagems, the policy toward Taiwan. The message showed tion to our friends in Asia and Africa so as to best is making peace.” It pointed out that our stretching out both our arms once again, give them the truth and prevent (the crisis) both sides considered Taiwan, Penghu, Mao said. The article might try to alienate from doing us a disservice. All the partici- Jinmen, and Mazu as Chinese territories, Jiang from America, saying that Taiwan pants agreed with Premier Zhou's sugges- and all agreed on one China, not two Chinas. suffered from depending on other people for tions.
The message then suggested that Taiwan a living, and that getting a lift on an AmeriChairman Mao concluded at the meet- leaders should abolish the mutual defense can ship was unreliable. Then the article ing that our decision had been made-con- treaty signed with Americans. The Ameri- could criticize Dulles's so-called cease-fire tinuation of shelling but not landing, block- cans would abandon the Taiwanese sooner and ask the Americans to meet five requireading without bottling up and allowing or later; and one could discern certain clues ments for a cease-fire (stopping naval esJiang's forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Our about this in Dulles's speech of 30 Septem- corts, stopping the invasion of China's terrishelling would no longer be daily, with no ber. After all, the American imperialists torial waters and air space, ending military more 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time. were our common enemy. The message provocation and war threats, ending intervention in China's internal affairs, and with Standing Committee meeting on 4 October. one more time about this particular matter. drawing all American armed forces from Zhou gave the editorial his final check and Then we wrote another editorial to re-critiTaiwan and Penghu). Chairman Mao asked approval. Its main content was our critiques cize the Dulles-Jiang meeting. me to finish my writing that evening. He and refusal of an American request for a Chairman Mao also said at the Politwas going to wait to read and check the cease-fire on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The buro Standing Committee meeting that there article that night. Mao told me that I could editorial clearly stated that there was no war were many problems in the relationship beleave right now to write the article without between China and America, so where did tween America and Jiang. The Americans waiting for the end of the meeting.
the cease-fire come from? It asked America wanted to make Jiang's “Republic of China" Leaving Zhongnanhai, I rushed back to to withdraw all of its naval and air forces one of their dependencies or even a manthe People's Daily's building. After order- from Taiwan and surrounding areas around dated territory. But Jiang desperately sought ing a dish of fried noodles as my dinner from the Taiwan Straits. It was a perfect timing for to maintain his semi-independence. Thus a restaurant across the street, I began to draft this editorial, corresponding to the “Defense came conflicts between Jiang and America. the editorial hurriedly in my office. With Ministry's Order," which was issued on 13 Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo(Chiang Chairman Mao's instruction, my writing October and drafted by Chairman Mao. In Ching-kuo] still had a little bit of anti-Ameriwas very smooth and fast. A little bit after that order, the Defense Ministry announced can initiative. They would resist America if the midnight, I finished my draft. It was two a continuation of the suspension of our bom- it drove them too hard. Among such cases in or three o'clock in the early morning of the bardment for two more weeks. The suspen- the past were Jiang's condemnation of Hu 9th when the final proof of the article was sion, however, still contained the precondi- Shi (Hu Shih]17 and his dismissal of General sent to Chairman Mao for checking and tion that no American ships could be escorts. Sun Liren 18_actions taken because Jiang approval. Mao read the editorial early the We would resume shelling immediately if believed that the troublemakers against him same morning and made important changes there were any American escort vessels. were supported by the Americans. Another in its last paragraph. He re-wrote the para- Two days later, Eisenhower ordered all good example of Jiang's independence was graph as follows: “Seemingly, the problem the warships from the Sixth Fleet which had the recent smashing and looting of the Ameristill needs to have more tests and observa- been sent as reinforcements to the Pacific to can Embassy in Taipei by Taiwanese tions. We are still very far away from the return to the Mediterranean. He also sent masses. 19 Jiang permitted American armed time of solving the problem. After all, the Dulles to Taiwan to confer with Jiang Jieshi. forces stationed in Taiwan only at the regiimperialists are the imperialists, and the The Editorial Department of the People's mental level, while rejecting larger units at reactionaries are the reactionaries. Let us Daily, without really knowing what was go- the divisional level which America had wait and see how they will make their ing on, wrote an editorial entitled “Having planned to send to Taiwan. After our shellmoves!" Chairman Mao noted his approval Only Themselves to Blame,” saying that ing of Jinmen began, Jiang allowed only on the final proof: “Not very good, barely Dulles and Jiang played a "two-man show.” 3,000 more American marines to reinforce publishable." The time written down below After the editorial was published on 21 Octo- Taiwan and they were stationed in Tainan (a his signature was six o'clock of 9 October. ber, Premier Zhou called us during the same city in southern Taiwan). As Chairman Mao
I received my manuscript sent back by morning and gave a pungent criticism that had pointed out two days earlier, we and Chairman Mao on the morning of 9 Octo- we were neither consistent with the facts nor Jiang Jieshi had some common points. The ber. Meanwhile, I received a telephone call with the policy made by the Central Commit- conflict at the Dulles-Jiang meeting sugfrom Mao's secretary, Lin Ke. Lin told me tee. When Chairman Mao chaired a Polit- gested that we might be able to ally with that Chairman Mao wanted to include buro Standing Committee meeting that after- Jiang to resist America in a certain way. Our Dulles's 8 October announcement of Ameri- noon, he also criticized our editorial as book- policy of not liberating Taiwan in the near can ships stopping their escorts in the edito- ish and naive, reeling and swaggering, which future might help Jiang relax and concenrial. Mao also suggested postponing its had a one-sided understanding of the Central trate on his fight against America's control. publication for one day. After reading Mao's Committee's policy and gave an inappropri- We neither landed on Jinmen nor agreed revision and corrections, I felt that the ate emphasis to the American-Jiang solidar- with the American proposal for a "ceaseeditorial's title was not a very bold headline. ity. Chairman Mao believed that Dulles's fire." This clearly caused problems between So, according to the changes he made in the mission to Taiwan was to persuade Jiang Americans and Jiang. In the past months, last paragraph, I changed the title to “Let's Jieshi to withdraw his troops from Jinmen- our policy had been one of shelling without See How They Make Their Moves." After Mazu in exchange for our commitment not to landing and blockading without driving the editorial was published on 11 October, it liberate Taiwan so that America could gain a Jiang's troops to the wall. While continuing was thought to be Chairman Mao's writing total control of Taiwan's future. Disagree- the same policy, we should from now on because of its striking title and special style ing with Dulles, however, Jiang demanded implement it more flexibly in favor of supclose to that of the “Message to the Compa- that America commit to a “mutual defense” porting Jiang Jieshi to resist America's contriots in Taiwan.”
of Jinmen-Mazu. Jiang and Dulles had a big trol. Two days later, the People's Daily pub- argument in which nobody gave in to the All the participants at the meeting agreed lished another editorial, “Stop Talking about other. As a result, the meeting ended in with Chairman Mao's ideas. Premier Zhou Cease-fire; To Leave Is the Best,” on 13 discord and was not a "two-men show” of added that “shelling” was coordinated with October. This editorial was based upon solidarity. After the Politburo meeting, Chair- “blockading." Since we relaxed our "blockPremier Zhou's opinion at the Politburo man Mao asked Premier Zhou to talk to me ading," we might also need to relax our "shelling." Mao agreed with him by sug- sovereignty, you will eventually have no gesting that we should announce an odd- place to call your home and be thrown out 1. Notation, Mao Zedong on Chen Geng's numbered-day shelling, with no shelling on into the sea.” The message announced that Report, 18 December 195722 even-numbered days. For the odd-num- we had already ordered PLA batteries on the Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji [A Colbered-day shelling, our targets might be lim- Fujian front not to fire on the airport, har- lection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers) ited only to the harbors and airport, not the bors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on even (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), defense works and residential buildings on days. On odd days, we might not bomb 6:373 the island. From now on, our shelling would either, as long as there were no ships or be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light airplanes coming to Jinmen.
Return to Comrade Peng Dehuai: shelling might not be on a regular basis. The same day the statement was issued, [What has been suggested in the report) Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying20 and is absolutely necessary. You should superpolicy was unknown in the history of Chi- me for a conversation. Besides asking us to vise and push the air force to go all out (to nese or world warfare. However, we were make a survey of the current condition of fulfill the task), so that we are sure that the engaged in a political battle, which was people's communes in Henan Province, Mao invading enemy will be annihilated. Please supposed to be fought this way. Chairman talked about the bombardment of Jinmen consider the question regarding our air force's Mao said that we only had “hand grenades” and Mazu. He said that during this event moving into Fujian in 1958. right now, but no atomic bombs. "Hand both we and the Americans adopted a grenades" could be successful for us to use brinkmanship policy. America concentrated 2. Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai in beating Jiang's troops on Jin[men)-Ma[zu), many warships which invaded our territorial and Huang Kecheng, 27 July 195823 but not a good idea to use in fighting against waters and escorted Jiang's transportation Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, fleets, but never fired on us. We fired 10,000 [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Forwhen everybody had nuclear weapons, very or 20,000 shells a day, or even more when- mation of the People's Republic) (Beijing: likely nobody would use them.
ever there were American escort ships. Our The Central Press of Historical Documents, Comrades (Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] shells, however, fell only on Jiang's ships 1992), 7:326 Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meeting noton American ships. Some shells fell near whether we should issue a formal statement American ships, which frightened them and Comrades [Peng) Dehuai and (Huang) announcing future shelling on odd days only caused them to turn around. While confront- Kecheng: but not on even days. Chairman Mao be- ing each other in the Taiwan Straits, both [I] could not sleep [last night), but lieved it necessary. He also required me to sides continued talks in Warsaw. Ameri- thought about it again. It seems more approunderstand that the editorial mentioned early cans were on one side of the brink, and we on priate to hold our (plans) to attack Jinmen for in the meeting should not be published until the other. Even though both were at the several days. While holding our operations, our formal statement was issued.
brink of war, no one ever crossed the line. (we will] observe the situational developOn 25 October, the "Second Message to We used our brinkmanship policy to deal ment there. We will not attack whether or the Compatriots in Taiwan" drafted by Chair- with American brinkmanship. Mao contin- not the other side relieves a garrison. Until man Mao was issued in the name of Defense ued that there were many stories written in they launch a provocative attack, (we will] Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analy- Liaozhai Zhiyi (The Chinese Ghost Sto- then respond with a counterattack. The sis of Dulles's speech published by the U.S. ries)21 about people without fear of ghosts. solution of the problem in the Middle East State Department on 23 October, the mes- One of the stories was titled “Qing Feng,” takes time. Since we have time, why should sage pointed out that on the one hand Dulles which talked about a bohemian scholar we be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack finally saw a "Communist China” and was named Geng Qubing. One night, Geng was plans now, but one day we will put it into willing to make contact with it. On the other reading late in a remote village house. “A implementation. If the other side invades hand, however, this American bureaucrat ghost walks into his house with long hair and Zhang[zhou), Shan(tou), Fuzhou, and still considered the so-called “Republic of black face, and stares at the scholar. Laugh- Hangzhou, a best scenario [for us to take China" in Taiwan as a "political unit which ing, dipping his fingers into the black ink, action) would emerge. How do you think was factually existing.” The American plan and painting his face black himself, Geng about this idea? Could you have a discuswas first to separate Taiwan from the main- looked directly at the ghost with keen, spar- sion about this with other comrades? It is land, and second to mandate Taiwan's spe- kling eyes. The ghost felt embarrassed and extremely beneficial [for our decision-makcial status. The message read, “China's ran away." Chairman Mao told us that if we ing) with politics in command and going affairs must be handled by the Chinese them- were not afraid of ghosts, ghosts would be through repeated deliberations. To make a selves. For any problem unable to be solved unable to do anything to us. He said that our plan too quickly usually results in an unat once, we can give it further thought and experience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was the thoughtful consideration. I did such things discuss it later between us. ... We are not case in point.
quite often and sometimes had unavoidable advising you to break up with Americans I can say that what Chairman Mao told miscalculations. What is your opinion? Even right now. These sort of ideas are not prac- us here is his summary of our management if the other side attacks us, (we still] can wait tical. We simply hope that you should not of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1958. for a couple of days for a clear calculation, yield to the pressure from Americans. If you
and then start our counterattack. Can all of live under somebody's thumb and lose your Part II. Documents
the above points be accounted as working