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people who oppose imperialism, to peace- panic[ky] and restless day and night. It Dulles's talks with reporters do not clearly loving peoples all over the world, and to all seems to me that (doing this] is a big, or at indicate (America's new position), he exsocial classes, all social ranks, and the gov- least moderate, advantage [to us). What is pressed ambiguously that if China commits ernments (in various countries). They now your opinion about it? On the days of heavy to acease-fire, America can persuade Jiang's have to believe that America, always arro- shelling we will not fire scattered shells. On troops to withdraw from the offshore islands gant and aggressive, is no good after all. the days of light shelling we will use this [under his control). Apparently America [The U.S. government) moved six of its method. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowan intends to carry out basically a policy to help thirteen aircraft carriers [to the Taiwan at night, [we) should accurately calibrate Jiang slip away from Jinmen. Straits). Among these carriers, there are battery emplacements during daytime, which After Dulles made this suggestion, Jiang some big ones with the size reaching 65,000 will make the shelling at night more accu- Jieshi became very upset. Jiang knew the tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it forms rate. Please seek opinions from [the people content of Dulles's talks in advance. Thus, the strongest fleet in the world. It does not at] the front, to see if this method is workable he gave a speech on 29 September, and matter if you want to make it even stronger. or not.

another on 1 October, stating that the AmeriIt does not matter if you want to concentrate As far as the Warsaw talks are con- cans had done a disservice to him. Two days all of your four fleets here. I welcome you cerned, in the next three to four days, or one later, when he talked to British reporters all. After all, what you have is useless here. week, (we) should not lay all of our cards on from The Times (of London), Jiang asked Even though you move every ship you have the table, but should test (the Americans). It Britain to advise America not to be fooled here, you cannot land. Ships have to be in the seems that it is unlikely for the other side to [by the communists). This is really funny. water, and cannot come to the land. You can lay all of their cards out, and that they will Last night the Indian ambassador [to do nothing but make some threatening ges- also test us. What is your opinion, Zhou Beijing) hurriedly informed me of V. K. ture here. The more you play, the more the [Enlai], Peng (Dehuai), Zhang (Wentian),40 Krishna Menon's plan (at the United Napeople in the world will understand how and Qiao (Guanhua]41?

tions].46 Menon believes that current changes unreasonable you are.

Congratulations for the success from in the situation have already become a tenthe very start.

dency. Thus, he is planning to make a 7.Telegram,MaoZedongto Ho Chi Minh,

general speech at the UN meeting, including 10 September 1958

9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19 a suggestion that Jiang's troops withdraw Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, September 1958

from the offshore islands and a request to us 7:413 Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 353 to stop fighting against Jiang. Britain at

tempted to mediate this affair in the past, but Comrade President: Comrade [Zhou) Enlai:

we refused it. Dag Hammarskjold47 of the Your letter of 8 September37 has been Your letter dated the night of the 18th UN intended to talk to us through Norway, received. Thank you.

has been received. It is indeed very good.42 [but] we also turned it down. Even though I believe that (1) the Americans are [I am very happy after reading it since (we) America was not willing to invite India (to afraid of fighting a war. As far as the current have gained the initiative. Please take due mediate] before, it had no choice but to situation is concerned, it is highly unlikely actions immediately. Please also pass your invite Menon this time. Menon was unwillthat a big war will break out; and (2) it seems letter and my reply here at once to Comrades ing to come himself, if America did not send to me that the business in your country Wang Bingnan43 and Ye Fei. Make sure that an invitation to him, or if he was unsure should go on as usual.

they understand [the key to) our new policy about the situation. At the present, since

and new tactics is holding the initiative, Menon feels certain about the situation be8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and keeping the offensive, and remaining rea- cause America has asked for his help, he is Huang Kecheng, 13 September 195838 sonable. We must conduct our diplomatic planning to deliver this proposition. Our Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, struggle from a far-sighted perspective so assumption is as follows: after Menon makes 7:416-417 that it will develop without any difficulty. his proposition, it will be accepted by UN

members, and then by most countries in the Part One

Mao Zedong

world. Through this approach, the UN can Premier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng: 4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei put pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhile [I] have received [the documents) you

ask us to make compromises. Thereby, sent to me, including two intelligence re- 10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Conversation America can maneuver between Jiang and ports on Jinmen's situation and the order of with S.F. Antonov+t on the Taiwan Issue, us to make a bargain. our military.39 In addition to carrying out 5 October 1958 (Excerpt)45

We calculate that America has three (the operations) in accordance with the lines Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 262- cards to play: set up by the order, it is also necessary to fire 267

First, to defend Jin[men)-Ma[zu). some scattered shells day and night around

America's proposition on 18 September rethe clock, especially at night, shelling espe- The entire situation has already changed quested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we recially the area within the three-mile radius of at this point. Dulles's press conference jected it immediately. We have been ever Liaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to published on 30 September reveals some since condemning America's occupation of 300 shells a day) will make the enemy changes in America's position. Although Taiwan. America now attempts to expand its occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we must this kind of joint statement. If the statement stays at Jinmen and Mazu, and America oppose it firmly. America dares not engage mentioned a cease-fire, it would benefit continues to intervene. It will educate the in a war merely for the sake of Jinmen, America; we had to oppose it. If the state- people of the world, especially the Chinese because the American people and its allied ment criticized both America and China, it people. We will not let America go, when it countries oppose it. Moreover, if America would be unable to tell right from wrong, we wants to get away from Jinmen and Mazu. wants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared to had to disagree as well. A just statement We demand that America withdraw its armed fight against it. In addition, the Soviet should include the following major points: to forces form Taiwan. Under this circumUnion supports us.

After our rejection, recognize firmly that Taiwan is China's ter- stance, if we need tension, we can shell America took back its first card, that is, ritory, and that no foreign countries are al- Jinmen and Mazu; if we want relaxation, we defending Jinmen and Mazu.

lowed to intervene; America should with- can stop shelling. As Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi Its second card is about “two Chinas.” draw from the Taiwan Straits; no creation of said to you, (we can) have small-, or meAmerica's proposition on 30 September had “ "two Chinas"; China and America should dium-, or large-scale shelling of Jinmen. We a central point of lining up China with the continue their talks. Obviously, some coun- can have shelling while negotiating, and we Soviet Union on the one side, and Jiang tries that follow America will not agree to can stop shelling anytime we like. This is Jieshi with the United States on the other these points. Thus, if the Asian and African advantageous for us. So we are not going to side. It puts forth a “two Chinas” scheme countries cannot issue a just statement, it is recover these offshore islands in the near and pushes us to accept the status quo. We better for them not to issue any joint state- future. We will take back them together with firmly oppose it now, and will continue to ment.

the Penghus and Taiwan later. oppose it.

Moreover, this morning Comrade Chen Thus, we decided to issue a "Message to The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits. Yi49 met diplomatic envoys from eight con- the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the name of America intends to persuade Jiang's troops cerned Asian and African countries that have our defense minister. [It indicates that) we to withdraw from the offshore islands as an diplomatic relations with China. Regarding will suspend our shelling for seven days exchange to freeze the situation in the Tai- these countries' discussion about issuing a from 1:00 p.m. on 6 October so as to allow wan Straits, requesting our renouncing the joint statement, he clarified the above posi- Jiang's troops to transport their logistic supuse of force on Taiwan, or our accepting tion of the Chinese government and made plies easily. Our suspension of bombardAmerica's occupation of Taiwan as legiti- further explanations.

ment, however, has a precondition that no mate and two Chinas" as "an existing fact." I talked to you on 30 September (about American ships provide escort. Moreover, America may not play its third card at once. our policy toward Taiwan). Originally, our [it] suggests a direct negotiation with Jiang As soon as Dulles's meeting with press plan had two steps: the first was to recover Jieshi searching for peaceful solutions to the caused Jiang Jieshi's big complaints, Dulles the offshore islands; the second to liberate conflicts between both sides. Since our wrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort. Taiwan. Later, after we began shelling shelling is actually a punitive operation At the same time, Eisenhower informed the Jinmen, our bombardment played a role to against Jiang's troops, we can slow it down Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign mobilize the people of the world, especially as long as Jiang is willing to cooperate with Relations Committee that America could the Chinese people. Thereafter, many coun- us). If he is not, we will continue to punish not yield to force. He, however, also said tries launched and joined a new anti-Ameri- him. Therefore, we will always be in a that if Communist China ceased fire, can movement on a much larger scale than positive position. (America) could reconsider (the situation that after the Lebanon event. The situation Our purpose in publishing this “Mesthere). It shows that America is still waver- already becomes clear. America knows that sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan" is to ing, though it wants to get away from Jinmen- we do not want to fight a war against it. deepen the conflicts between America and Mazu.

When it escorted Jiang Jieshi's ships, we did Jiang. Jiang's current garrison on Jinmen, According to the above calculations, I not fire [on them). We have no intention to about 80,000 men under the command of told the Indian ambassador yesterday that liberate Taiwan immediately. We know that Chen Cheng, 50 is the main strength of Jiang's we did not want Menon to deliver his propo- America does not want to fight a war against forces. Jiang Jieshi wants to defend Jinmen sition to the UN. We cannot trade a settle- us over Jinmen either. It strictly restrained its to the last and drag America down to the ment of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition of air and naval forces from entering our terri- water. Chen Cheng, however, wants to save America's occupation of Taiwan as legiti- torial waters between three and twelve miles these troops. If we bottle up the troops on mate and acceptance of the existence of so- from our coast. Currently America works on Jinmen, it is easier for America to encourage called “two Chinas."

how to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw Chen to persuade Jiang to withdraw his Meanwhile, some Asian and African from Jinmen-Mazu to prevent its forces from troops from the offshore islands. If we let countries are suggesting that the Eight-na- being pinned down in this region.

these troops stay on Jinmen, Jiang and Chen tion Committee 48 can draft a statement about As I said to you on 30 September, we can use them to drive a hard bargain with the Taiwan situation. I also told the Indian realized that it was better to keep Jiang Jieshi America. In our message to the compatriots ambassador yesterday that we believed that on Jinmen-Mazu. After the Central [in Taiwan), we warn them that America the Asian and African countries could hardly Committee's discussions, we still believe will abandon them sooner or later. There is issue such a joint tement since there ex- that it is the best to keep Jiang Jieshi on no need to fight for America's interests isted two different positions among them- Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It between the two Chinese sides. Although selves. I said to him it was better not to have is extremely beneficial [to us] that Jiang we can possibly fight for thirty more years, it is better (for both sides] to talk for solu- P.S.: After you have handled this letter, 14. Notation, Mao Zedong on Zhou Enlai's tions. please convey it to the Premier, 52

Report, "On the Shelling of Jinmen," 20 To be sure, (on the one hand,] Jiang

October 195857 Jieshi will likely hold a press conference [as 12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, soon as we publish our message), accusing and Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958

7:466 us of attempting to cast a bone between him Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, and America, saying that he will never sit 7:437

Part I down with the Chinese Communists for ne

The report is approved. gotiations, and so forth. In his mind, how- Peng (Dehuai) and Huang (Kecheng]: ever, Jiang can figure out himself that there Please pass on to Han [Xianchu) and Ye Part II is a lot behind this, and that he can make a [Fei):

It is more appropriate to start shelling one further bargain with America. This is his old Yesterday I said not to issue any public hour after, or half hour after, the reading (of trick. On the other hand, Americans will statement, and to wait and see for two days. the order) is finished. 58 also criticize the Chinese Communist at- Later [I] thought about this again, and contempt to drive a wedge between them and sidered it more appropriate to issue a state- 15. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Jiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect in ment first. This is the reason for [me to Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 31 October their minds that we suddenly let up pressure write) the “Message to the Compatriots in 1958 on Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death, Taiwan.”53 This statement is about to be Source: Mao Zedong Wengao, 7:479 because there might be a tacit agreement issued, please instruct the Fujian Front radio between us and Jiang. The louder Jiang station to broadcast it repeatedly.

Comrades (Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and yells, the more suspicious the Americans

[Huang) Kecheng: will become.

Mao Zedong

(We) should extend the areas where no Therefore, we cause a new dilemma for 2:00 A.M., 6 October

shelling is allowed on even-numbered days. America, and it does not know how to cope Send this to (Huang) Kecheng for handling That means shelling will be prohibited on with it. America is facing a very difficult immediately. 54

even days on all fronts. Allow Jiang's troops situation right now. It originally planned to

to come outdoors and get some sunshine so persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw [from 13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, that they can continue to stay there. Only fire Jinmen). If it again suggests withdrawal, 11 October 1958

a few shells on odd days. Instruct the Fujian Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandons Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, (front) by internal channels to carry it out. him. If America stops persuading Jiang to 7:449-450

Do not issue public statement at this point. If withdraw, we will achieve our goal.

there is a need later, (we) will consider Comrade (Zhou] Enlai:

making an announcement then. Please dis11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng No hurry to reply to the letters from the cuss and decide on this matter. and Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958 Soviets.55 Need to discuss them first.

I am leaving for a southern trip this Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Cao Juren 56 has arrived. Ignore him for afternoon. 7:437

a few days, do not talk to him too soon. (I)

will think about whether I need to meet him Mao Zedong Comrades (Peng] Dehuai and [Huang) or not.

2:00 A.M., 31 October Kecheng:

Tell (Huang) Kecheng to double-check Our batteries should not fire a single accurate numbers of how many enemy air- 16. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, shell on 6 and 7 October, even if there are planes we shot down, and how many Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 2 November American airplanes and ships escorts. If the planes were shot down in more than fifty 1958 enemy bombs us, our forces should still not days of air engagements since the Shantou Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, return fire. (We should) cease our activities, air battle on 19 August. Prepare the statistics 7:490 lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then, for the Soviets' information. They believed we will know what to do. Although the air the enemy's false information and do not Comrades (Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and force must carry on our defense, the air- know the true story. [The Soviets) should (Huang) Kecheng: planes should not fly off the coast. One more sell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let us Suggest having a heavy all day shelling thing: do not issue any public statement control the employment of them. The Sovi- tomorrow (the 3rd, an odd day). Fire at least during these two days because we need to ets may send a few people to teach us how to 10,000 shells and bomb all the military tarwait and see clearly how the situation will use them. I intend to adopt this policy. [We gets (on Jinmen) in order to affect America's develop. Please carry out the above order can) discuss and decide whether it is appro- election, promoting the Democrats' victory immediately. Or (you can) pass this letter priate tonight or tomorrow night.

and the Republicans' defeat. Meanwhile, (as an order to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu.51

give Jiang's troops an excuse for refusing to Mao Zedong

withdraw (from Jinmen). Please consider Mao Zedong

10:00 A.M., 11 October

and decide if this is proper. 8:00 A.M., 5 October



Mao Zedong
5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou

17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2 November 1958

Part One59
Attention, Military and Civilian Compatri-
ots on the Jinmen Islands:

Tomorrow, 3 November, is an oddnumbered day. You must make sure not to come outside. Do be careful!

Part Two

Deliver to Premier Zhou.

The Xiamen Front must broadcast (the message) this afternoon (2 November) for three times.

18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on “Huan
Xiang on the Division within the Western
World,"60 25 November 1958
Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,

Part I

Huan Xiang's viewpoint is right. The situation in the Western world is indeed disintegrating. Even though currently it is in the middle of a gradual disunification and not yet breaking into pieces, the West is moving toward its inevitable final disintegration. It will probably take a long time, not overnight nor a single day, for this process. The so-called united West is purely empty talk. There may be a kind of unity that Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants [the West) to "unite" under the control of America, and asks all his partners and puppets to get close to America in front of its atomic bombs, paying their tributes and kowtowing and bowing as America's subjects. This is America's so-called unity. The current situation must move toward the so-called unity's opposite—disunity. Comrades, please take a look at today's world and ask which side has the real control.

tee, served as director of Xinhua (New China) News 14. The Juixiang Study was the location of Mao's office
Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People's in Zhongnanhai.
Daily) in 1958.

15. General Zhang Zhizhong, who had been Jiang
2. Beidaihe is a beach area located at the border of Hebei Jieshi's subordinate, shifted to the Communist side in
and Liaoning provinces, where Chinese leaders regu- 1949 and was then vice chairman of China's national
larly take vacations and hold meetings during summer. defense commission.
3. Hu Qiaomu, a CCP theorist, was Mao Zedong's 16. For the transcript of Dulles's answers, see The New
political secretary and a member of the CCP Central York Times, 1 October 1958, 8.

17. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a prominent Chinese scholar 4. This refers to the Communist takeover in China in and Chinese ambassador to the United States during the 1949.

Second World War, had a pro-American reputation. He 5. In late 1957, the Beijing leadership began to plan to then served as president of the Central Academy deploy air force units in the Fujian area, so that the [Academia Sinica) in Taipei. Guomindang air force would no longer be able to 18. Sun Liren, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, control the air (for more information on this matter, see commanded the Taiwan garrison in 1949, when the document 1). On 18 July 1958, the CCP Central Military Guomindang government moved from mainland China Commission held an urgent meeting attended by heads to Taiwan. In 1955, Jiang dismissed Sun and placed him of the PLA's different arms and branches. Peng Dehuai, under house arrest. the defense minister, conveyed to the meeting Mao 19. This is also known as the “May 24th Incident.” On Zedong's instructions: Under the circumstances that 20 March 1957, an American army sergeant, Robert R. America and Britain continued to dispatch troops to the Reynolds, shot a Chinese, Liu Zhiran, in Taipei's AmeriMiddle East, the Guomindang planned a diversion by can military residence area. On 23 May 1957, an Americausing a tense situation in the Taiwan Straits. In order can court-martial found Reynolds not guilty. The next to provide effective support to the anti-imperialist day, a riot involving tens of thousands protesters erupted struggle by the people in the Middle East, it was neces- in Taipei, with the American Embassy and other Amerisary for China to take action. First, air force units should can agencies as the target. Guomindang authorities be deployed in Fujian. Second, Jinmen islands should be announced martial law in Taipei on the same evening to shelled. The air force units must enter the air bases in control the situation. Fujian and eastern Guangdong by July 27. The next day, 20. Tian Jiaying (1922-1966) was Mao Zedong's secthe Air Force Headquarters issued the operation order. retary from October 1948 to May 1966, when he comAfter extensive preparations, on July 27, 48 MiG-17 mitted suicide. planes finally took position in the two air bases located 21. This is a collection of bizarre stories by Pu Songling respectively at Liancheng, Fujian province, and Shantou, written during Qing times. Guangdong province. (See Wang Dinglie et al., Dongdai 22. Mao Zedong wrote his remarks on the 9 December zhongguo kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force) 1957 report of Chen Geng, the PLA's deputy chief of (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 334- staff, to Peng Dehuai. Chen Geng's report stated: “This 336.)

year, planes from Taiwan have frequently invaded (the 6. Liu Shaoqi, vice chairman of the CCP Central Com- air space) of important coastal cities and the inner land mittee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the of the mainland, dropping large numbers of reactionary People's National Congress, was China's second most leaflets and ‘condolence gifts,' creating a very bad important leader; Zhou Enlai was vice chairman of the impression on the masses. Because some leading memCCP Central Committee and China's premier; Deng bers of our army failed to take anti-aircraft operations Xiaoping was the CCP's general secretary

seriously and their superiors failed to supervise them 7. Wang Shangrong headed the operations department closely, (we have been) unable to shoot down any of the of the PLA General Staff; Ye Fei was political commis- invading planes (dispatched by]Jiang (Jieshi). In order sar of the Fuzhou Military District.

to improve quickly this situation, we have arranged for 8. Cangao ziliao (Restricted Reference Material], an the air force and all military regions to take every internal publication circulated among high ranking positive and effective step necessary to attack the Jiang Chinese Communist officials, published Chinese trans- planes that are invading the mainland, trying our best to lations of news reports and commentaries from foreign shoot them down.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, news agencies, newspapers, and journals in a timely 6:372.) Chinese air force units finally took position in fashion.

Fujian on 27 July 1958. See note 5. 9. On 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai stated at the Bandung 23. Mao Zedong composed this letter on the eve of the Conference that China was willing to hold talks with the deadline previously established by the CCP leadership United States to discuss all questions between the two to shell Jinmen. On 15 July 1958, the Eisenhower countries. On 13 July 1955, through Britain, the U.S. administration dispatched 5,000 American marines to government proposed holding bilateral meetings at land in Lebanon. On July 17, the Beijing leadership Geneva, Switzerland. The Chinese-American ambassa- made the decision to bombard Jinmen, and China's dorial talks began on 1 August 1955 at Geneva and defense minister, Peng Dehuai, conveyed the decision lasted until December 1957. In September 1958, during to the General Staff. On the evening of July 18, Mao the Taiwan crisis, the Chinese-American ambassadorial Zedong spoke at a decision-making meeting attended talks resumed in Warsaw, Poland.

by vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission 10. On 4 September 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai formally and leading officers of the air force and navy, emphasizannounced a twelve-mile zone off the Chinese coast as ing that the Arab people's anti-imperialist struggle China's territorial waters.

needed more than moral support and China would take 11. For the minutes of these two talks, see documents 5 real action. He stated that since Jinmen and Mazu were and 6.

China's territory and the shelling of Nationalist troops 12. See note 9.

there was China's internal affair, it would be difficult 13. Zhongnanhai is the compound where top Chinese for the enemy to use this as an excuse [to attack leaders live and work, and Fengzeyuan was Mao mainland China) while at the same time it would play Zedong's residence in the 1950s.

the role in checking American actions in the Middle

Mao Zedong
Part II
Comrade (Deng) Xiaoping:

Please print and distribute this report.

Mao Zedong
10:00 A.M., 25 November

1. Wu Lengxi, a member of the CCP Central Commit

East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to als who had been criticized and purged during the
three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired “Anti-Rightist" campaign in 1957.
a Central Military Commission meeting, which sched- 33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a high
uled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. ranking Nationalist officer. During China's War of
During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as
artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to “pre- chief of the general staff and headed the Military-
pare for an operational order at any moment.” At this Political Department of the Military Commission of the
juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter.

Nationalist Government.
24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the 34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India's premier
artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the from 1947 to 1964.
bombardment and focus on making further prepara- 35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the Taiwan
tions for the shelling.

Defense Command. 25. After three weeks of "waiting and seeing,” Mao 36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This eight “democratic parties” existed, all claiming to folletter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of low the CCP's leadership. the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to 37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of telegraphed to Mao Zedong: “Considering the tense Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu) situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen for a war to break out between China and the United and Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at that States? (B) What preparations should we make here in time if the shelling should be followed by landing Vietnam?" (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, operations in accordance with the actual situation. On 7:413-414.) August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the 38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particu- began escorting Guomindang transport vessels deliverlarly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the ing supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted enemy's headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also becomes the background of this letter and the CMC's made it clear that the initial shelling would last for three order cited in the next note. days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next 39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's action could be taken in accordance with the responses order, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” issued at 11:15 of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al., a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: “(1) If the Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo (The American ships continue their escort today and anchor Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.) shell Jiang's transport ships entering the Liaoluowan 26. The italics are Mao's.

harbor to unload and the people working there. The 27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese ships not entering the harbor, be they America's or military planners believed that they had succeeded in Jiang's, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities needed to sink or to expel Jiang's transport ships, while repeatedly requested American assistance to support at the same time damaging the enemy positions on their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and antiMao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to aircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to the air raids by Jiang's planes. The air force and antiobserve the responses of the other side.

aircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If 28. This refers to the CCPCentral Military Commission's enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may “Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better and the Offshore Islands under Jiang's Occupation." handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be The instruction emphasized that “because the struggle sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang's principles, you may make your own decisions on speoccupation is a complicated international struggle, which cific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and situation changes, (you) must report immediately so propaganda should follow the principles of concentra- that (we) can report it to the Central Committee to make tion and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on new decisions.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, his own.” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 6:380.) 7:376-377)

40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP 29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Polit- Politburo, was China's first vice foreign minister. buro, headed the CCP's Central Propaganda Depart- 41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign ment.

minister; he later served as China's foreign minister in 30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), estab- the mid-1970s. lished in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, 42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American and Turkey. The United States was related to the ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in organization as an “observer.” The Manila Treaty Or- this letter, concluding that China had gained the initiaganization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, tive at the meeting. New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and 43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the AmeriTreaty Organization (SEATO).

cans in Warsaw. 31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt's 44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d'affaires to president from 1956 to 1970.

China. 32. The “Rightists” referred to by Mao were intellectu- 45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the

alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to
3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing,
holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and
other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however,
did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to
bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the
Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei
Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing's leaders told the
Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct
confrontation between China and the United States, let
alone one between the Soviet Union and the United
States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively
well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis.
46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the
Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962.
47 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplo-
mat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to
48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group
established by Asian and African countries at the UN to
draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations
included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Japan, and the Philippines.
49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Polit-
buro, was China's vice premier and foreign minister.
50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice presi-
dent and prime minister in Taiwan.
51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the
PLA's Fuzhou Military District.
52. The italics are Mao's.
53. The “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" was
broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in
all major newspapers in mainland China the same day.
The message announced that the PLA would stop
shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist
troops to receive supplies.
54. The italics are Mao's.
55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita
Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to
Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing's intentions on
handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the
reliability of Beijing's statistics on the results of air
battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide
China with ground-to-air missiles.
56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had exten-
sive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he
visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from
Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him,
mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had
cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for
the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring
about Taiwan's “peaceful liberation.” After returning
to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou
Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again
visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages
between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao
mentioned Cao's name on the eve of the second “Mes-
sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan," announcing that
the PLA would stopping shelling Jinmen for another
two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12.
57. At 12:30p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the
following report to Mao Zedong: “The broadcasts to
warn America against using its escort vessels in the
waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The
broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and
English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft
of the Defense Ministry's order has been completed. It
is also enclosed here for your consideration. Please
return it to me right after you have read and approved it.
Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades
Deng (Xiaoping), Chen (Yi), and Huang (Kecheng) for

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