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Mao Zedong 5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou

17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2 November 1958

Part One 59 Attention, Military and Civilian Compatriots on the Jinmen Islands:

Tomorrow, 3 November, is an oddnumbered day. You must make sure not to come outside. Do be careful!

Part Two

Deliver to Premier Zhou.

The Xiamen Front must broadcast (the message) this afternoon (2 November) for three times.

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18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on "Huan Xiang on the Division within the Western World,"60 25 November 1958 Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:581-582

Part I

Huan Xiang's viewpoint is right. The situation in the Western world is indeed disintegrating. Even though currently it is in the middle of a gradual disunification and not yet breaking into pieces, the West is moving toward its inevitable final disintegration. It will probably take a long time, not overnight nor a single day, for this process. The so-called united West is purely empty talk. There may be a kind of unity

a that Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants [the West) to “unite” under the control of America, and asks all his partners and puppets to get close to America in front of its atomic bombs, paying their tributes and kowtowing and bowing as America's subjects. This is America's so-called unity. The current situation must move toward the so-called unity's opposite-disunity. Comrades, please take a look at today's world and ask which side has the real control.

tee, served as director of Xinhua (New China) News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People's Daily) in 1958. 2. Beidaihe is a beach area located at the border of Hebei and Liaoning provinces, where Chinese leaders regularly take vacations and hold meetings during summer. 3. Hu Qiaomu, a CCP theorist, was Mao Zedong's political secretary and a member of the CCP Central Committee. 4. This refers to the Communist takeover in China in 1949. 5. In late 1957, the Beijing leadership began to plan to deploy air force units in the Fujian area, so that the Guomindang air force would no longer be able to control the air (for more information on this matter, see document 1). On 18 July 1958, the CCP Central Military Commission held an urgent meeting attended by heads of the PLA's different arms and branches. Peng Dehuai, the defense minister, conveyed to the meeting Mao Zedong's instructions: Under the circumstances that America and Britain continued to dispatch troops to the Middle East, the Guomindang planned a diversion by causing a tense situation in the Taiwan Straits. In order to provide effective support to the anti-imperialist struggle by the people in the Middle East, it was necessary for China to take action. First, air force units should be deployed in Fujian. Second, Jinmen islands should be shelled. The air force units must enter the air bases in Fujian and eastern Guangdong by July 27. The next day, the Air Force Headquarters issued the operation order. After extensive preparations, on July 27, 48 MiG-17 planes finally took position in the two air bases located respectively at Liancheng, Fujian province, and Shantou, Guangdong province. (See Wang Dinglie et al., Dongdai zhongguo kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 334336.) 6. Liu Shaoqi, vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress, was China's second most important leader; Zhou Enlai was vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China's premier; Deng Xiaoping was the CCP's general secretary 7. Wang Shangrong headed the operations department of the PLA General Staff; Ye Fei was political commissar of the Fuzhou Military District. 8. Cangao ziliao (Restricted Reference Material), an internal publication circulated among high ranking Chinese Communist officials, published Chinese translations of news reports and commentaries from foreign news agencies, newspapers, and journals in a timely fashion. 9. On 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai stated at the Bandung Conference that China was willing to hold talks with the United States to discuss all questions between the two countries. On 13 July 1955, through Britain, the U.S. government proposed holding bilateral meetings at Geneva, Switzerland. The Chinese-American ambassadorial talks began on 1 August 1955 at Geneva and lasted until December 1957. In September 1958, during the Taiwan crisis, the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks resumed in Warsaw, Poland. 10. On 4 September 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai formally announced a twelve-mile zone off the Chinese coast as China's territorial waters. 11. For the minutes of these two talks, see documents 5 and 6. 12. See note 9. 13. Zhongnanhai is the compound where top Chinese leaders live and work, and Fengzeyuan was Mao Zedong's residence in the 1950s.

14. The Juixiang Study was the location of Mao's office in Zhongnanhai. 15. General Zhang Zhizhong, who had been Jiang Jieshi's subordinate, shifted to the Communist side in 1949 and was then vice chairman of China's national defense commission. 16. For the transcript of Dulles's answers, see The New York Times, 1 October 1958, 8. 17. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a prominent Chinese scholar and Chinese ambassador to the United States during the Second World War, had a pro-American reputation. He then served as president of the Central Academy (Academia Sinica) in Taipei. 18. Sun Liren, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, commanded the Taiwan garrison in 1949, when the Guomindang government moved from mainland China to Taiwan. In 1955, Jiang dismissed Sun and placed him under house arrest. 19. This is also known as the “May 24th Incident." On 20 March 1957, an American army sergeant, Robert R. Reynolds, shot a Chinese, Liu Zhiran, in Taipei's American military residence area. On 23 May 1957, an American court-martial found Reynolds not guilty. The next day, a riot involving tens of thousands protesters erupted in Taipei, with the American Embassy and other American agencies as the target. Guomindang authorities announced martial law in Taipei on the same evening to control the situation. 20. Tian Jiaying (1922-1966) was Mao Zedong's secretary from October 1948 to May 1966, when he committed suicide. 21. This is a collection of bizarre stories by Pu Songling written during Qing times. 22. Mao Zedong wrote his remarks on the 9 December 1957 report of Chen Geng, the PLA's deputy chief of staff, to Peng Dehuai. Chen Geng's report stated: “This year, planes from Taiwan have frequently invaded (the air space) of important coastal cities and the inner land of the mainland, dropping large numbers of reactionary leaflets and `condolence gifts,' creating a very bad impression on the masses. Because some leading members of our army failed to take anti-aircraft operations seriously and their superiors failed to supervise them closely, [we have been] unable to shoot down any of the invading planes (dispatched by] Jiang (Jieshi). In order to improve quickly this situation, we have arranged for the air force and all military regions to take every positive and effective step necessary to attack the Jiang planes that are invading the mainland, trying our best to shoot them down." (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:372.) Chinese air force units finally took position in Fujian on 27 July 1958. See note 5. 23. Mao Zedong composed this letter on the eve of the deadline previously established by the CCP leadership to shell Jinmen. On 15 July 1958, the Eisenhower administration dispatched 5,000 American marines to land in Lebanon. On July 17, the Beijing leadership made the decision to bombard Jinmen, and China's defense minister, Peng Dehuai, conveyed the decision to the General Staff. On the evening of July 18, Mao Zedong spoke at a decision-making meeting attended by vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission and leading officers of the air force and navy, emphasizing that the Arab people's anti-imperialist struggle needed more than moral support and China would take real action. He stated that since Jinmen and Mazu were China's territory and the shelling of Nationalist troops there was China's internal affair, it would be difficult for the enemy to use this as an excuse [to attack mainland China) while at the same time it would play the role in checking American actions in the Middle

Mao Zedong
Part II
Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping:

Please print and distribute this report.

Mao Zedong 10:00 A.M., 25 November

1. Wu Lengxi, a member of the CCP Central Commit

East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which scheduled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to “prepare for an operational order at any moment.” At this juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter. 24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the bombardment and focus on making further preparations for the shelling. 25. After three weeks of "waiting and seeing,” Mao Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This letter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu) to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at that time if the shelling should be followed by landing operations in accordance with the actual situation. On August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particularly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the enemy's headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also made it clear that the initial shelling would last for three days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next action could be taken in accordance with the responses of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo (The Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.) 26. The italics are Mao's. 27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese military planners believed that they had succeeded in cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities repeatedly requested American assistance to support their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to observe the responses of the other side. 28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's “Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan and the Offshore Islands under Jiang's Occupation." The instruction emphasized that “because the struggle against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang's occupation is a complicated international struggle, which has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and propaganda should follow the principles of concentration and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on his own." (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:376-377) 29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, headed the CCP's Central Propaganda Depart

als who had been criticized and purged during the “Anti-Rightist" campaign in 1957. 33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a high ranking Nationalist officer. During China's War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as chief of the general staff and headed the MilitaryPolitical Department of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government. 34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India's premier from 1947 to 1964. 35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the Taiwan Defense Command. 36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, eight “democratic parties” existed, all claiming to follow the CCP's leadership. 37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), telegraphed to Mao Zedong: “Considering the tense situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible for a war to break out between China and the United States? (B) What preparations should we make here in Vietnam?" (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:413-414.) 38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships began escorting Guomindang transport vessels delivering supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This becomes the background of this letter and the CMC's order cited in the next note. 39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's order, “On the Shelling of Jinmen," issued at 11:15 a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: “(1) If the American ships continue their escort today and anchor three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should shell Jiang's transport ships entering the Liaoluowan harbor to unload and the people working there. The ships not entering the harbor, be they America's or Jiang's, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level needed to sink or to expel Jiang's transport ships, while at the same time damaging the enemy positions on ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and antiaircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with the air raids by Jiang's planes. The air force and antiaircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above principles, you may make your own decisions on specific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the situation changes, (you) must report immediately so that (we) can report it to the Central Committee to make new decisions.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:380.) 40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, was China's first vice foreign minister. 41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign minister; he later served as China's foreign minister in the mid-1970s. 42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in this letter, concluding that China had gained the initiative at the meeting. 43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Americans in Warsaw. 44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d'affaires to China. 45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the

alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to 3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing, holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however, did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing's leaders told the Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct confrontation between China and the United States, let alone one between the Soviet Union and the United States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis. 46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962. 47 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplomat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to 1961. 48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group established by Asian and African countries at the UN to draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, and the Philippines. 49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Politburo, was China's vice premier and foreign minister. 50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice president and prime minister in Taiwan. 51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the PLA's Fuzhou Military District. 52. The italics are Mao's. 53. The “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" was broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in all major newspapers in mainland China the same day. The message announced that the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist troops to receive supplies. 54. The italics are Mao's. 55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing's intentions on handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the reliability of Beijing's statistics on the results of air battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide China with ground-to-air missiles. 56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had extensive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him, mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring about Taiwan's “peaceful liberation.” After returning to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao mentioned Cao's name on the eve of the second “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” announcing that the PLA would stopping shelling Jinmen for another two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12. 57. At 12:30 p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the following report to Mao Zedong: “The broadcasts to warn America against using its escort vessels in the waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft of the Defense Ministry's order has been completed. It is also enclosed here for your consideration. Please return it to me right after you have read and approved it. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades Deng (Xiaoping], Chen (Yi), and Huang (Kecheng) for

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ment.

30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), established in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The United States was related to the organization as an “observer.” The Manila Treaty Organization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). 31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt's president from 1956 to 1970. 32. The “Rightists” referred to by Mao were intellectu

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their reading and checking. Everything is ready on the KHRUSHCHEV'S NUCLEAR PROMISE year later, in the autumn of 1959. Xiamen front. Our order (for the shelling) has already

continued from page 219 been issued (to the front) separately by telephone and in writing which was signed by (Huang) Kecheng. The

Chinese leadership developing their own order limits shelling to fortifications, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Jinmen islands. No shellschool of brinkmanship that threatened to

From the CC CPSU's letter to the ing of civilian villages, garrison camps, and command draw the USSR into a conflict with the United

Central Committee of the CPC About headquarters is allowed, particularly no shelling of any States. Yet, there is no reason to believe that

the USSR's Readiness to Provide American ships. Our air and naval forces will make no

Khrushchev, the real authority behind the movement at this time. The Defense Ministry's order

Assistance to the PRC in the Event of will be broadcast at 3:00 (p.m.) in Chinese and foreign Soviet letter, was dismayed by the Chinese

an Attack on It From the Side of the languages at the same time. As soon as the reading of position (though he may well have been

USA or Japan, 27 September 1958 the order is finished, (our batteries) will open fire.” miffed that Mao failed to tip him off during (Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466

his summit in Beijing only a few weeks 467.)

... Comrade Gromyko informed us about before the PRC opened the crisis by shelling 58. The italics are Mao's.

his conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai 59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast. the offshore islands on August 23).

which took place in Peking on 7 September. 60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d'affaires in Khrushchev, it appears, actually supported Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the considBritain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the

nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achievChinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the

eration of the situation in the Taiwan region report "Huang Xiang on the Division within the Westing China's reunification, provided that the

the Politburo of the Central Committee of ern World." The main points of the report were as policy was fully coordinated with the Krem

the Communist Party of China proceeded follows: The two-year long British-French negotiation lin. 5 He therefore took the Chinese position, from the fact that should the USA start a war to establish a free trade zone in Western Europe had

reported to him in an urgent cable from recently failed, and a trade war between imperialist

against the People's Republic of China and countries had started. The British plans to divide West Gromyko, as an indication that the Chinese

in this event uses tactical nuclear weapons, Germany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland, leaders had begun to put their national inter

then the Soviet Union will make a stern and sabotage the European Common Market had failed. ests above the common interests of the “enIn an economic sense, this was not a big failure for

warning to the USA but will not take part in tire Socialist camp.” This effective unilatBritain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was the

the war. Only in the event that the United eral Chinese revision of the Treaty signified States uses large yield nuclear weapons, and first serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplomacy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced two an implicit challenge to the unity of the

in this way risks widening the war, will the important choices: it could take retaliatory measures communist bloc under Kremlin leadership Soviet Union make a retaliatory strike with and thus destroy the political and economic coopera

and was therefore anathemato Soviet leaders tions between European countries, or it could return to

nuclear weapons. negotiations, searching for the basis of a temporary on both political and ideological grounds.

We carefully considered this issue and compromise. It seemed that only one choice was fea- Hence the letter decries the peril of disunity

decided to express to you our opinion... We sible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort to

in the strongest terms possible: "...a crime find ways to compromise with France and Germany,

cannot allow the illusion to be created among before the world working class a retreat and to seek the support of the United States. This failure

our enemies that if an attack will be launched on the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain's from the holy of holies of the Communists

against the PRC by the USA or Japan—and position as the second power" in the capitalist world from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.”

these are the most likely adversaries, or by had been weakened further, and that the postwar Brit- Khrushchev evidently dictated his letter ish hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughly

any other state, that the Soviet Union will to Eisenhower immediately after he received shaken. The balance of power in continental Western

stand on the sidelines as a passive observer. Europe now tilted toward France and West Germany, the warning from Gromyko. It took him 20

Should the adversary even presume this, and against Britain. As far as the triangular relations more days to address the Chinese leadership

a very dangerous situation would be created. between Britain, France, and Germany were concerned, through party channels. It is still unclear it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to take

It would be a great calamity for the entire what happened inside the Kremlin in the advantage of French-West German contradictions in

Socialist camp, for the Communist working order to divide the two countries, making them check interim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about the

class movement, if, when atomic bombs each other. This balance of power policy would cer- same time to respond to the CC CPSU's

have begun to fall on the Chinese People's tainly last a long time. The balance of power among letter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he imperialist countries in West Europe was changing,

Republic and China has begun to pay with thanked him "heartily" for his stand and and the contradictions between the imperialists over

the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet West European problems had never been so sharp. wrote that the Chinese leadership had been

Union, possessing terrible weapons which (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:582- “deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to

could not only stop but could also devastate 5823.) the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in

our common enemy, would allow itself not ternationalism."6

to come to your assistance. This would be a

In sum, this episode testifies to the amLi Xiaobing is Assistant Professor of History,

crime before the world working class, it biguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese relaUniversity of Central Oklahoma; Chen Jian is

would be a retreat from the holy of holies of tionship: for the majority of the leadership on the Communists—from the teaching of Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, and author of China's both sides, it continued the grim comedy of

Marxism-Leninism. Road to the Korean War: The Making of the misunderstandings; only Khrushchev began

Thank you for your nobility, that you Sino-Soviet Confrontation (New York: Colum- to suspect what was occurring in faraway

are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the bia University Press, 1994); David L. Wilson is Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian Soviet Union. However, we believe, and are Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois internationalism the Sino-Soviet rift was

convinced, that you also agree that the main University at Carbondale. deepening and would erupt in earnest only a

thing now consists of the fact that everyone

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has seen—both our friends and, especially, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129our enemies—that we are firm and united in

142; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul

ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 our understanding of the tasks, which flow

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959 (Kent, brother Communist parties is unshakeable,

OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and

documents translated, annotated, and introduced by that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to

Xiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed in the aggressor in the event of an attack on any this issue of the Cold War International History Project Socialist state. This is necessary so that no

Bulletin. hopes will arise in our enemies that they will

2. Khrushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston:

Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 469-470; Khrushchev be able to separate us, so that no cracks will

Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, ed. Jerrold L. Schecter be created which the enemy could be able to with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, use to break the connection between the and Co., 1990), 147-150; “Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Socialist countries.

Khrushcheva," Voprosi istorii (Questions of History]2

(1993), 90-91; Andrei A. Gromyko, Memoirs (New ... It is necessary that neither our friends

York: Knopf, 1989), 251-252; see also Philip Taubman, nor our enemies have any doubts that an "Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used on attack on the Chinese People's Republic is a G.I.'s," New York Times, 22 February 1988, 1, 6-7. war with the entire Socialist camp. For

3. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul

ture, 255; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the ourselves we can say that an attack on China

Eagle, 198. is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also

4. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assisconvinced that in the event of an attack on tance Between the People's Republic of China and the the Soviet Union the Chinese People's Re

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 14 February 1950,

reprinted in English translation as an appendix to Sergei public would fulfill its brotherly revolution

N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncerary duty. If we in this way will build our tain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260. depending on the unity of our goals, on the

5. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from

Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Unimight of our states, on our joint efforts, the

versity Press, forthcoming, March 1996), 226-227. uniting of which is favored by the geo

6. “We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to graphical disposition of our countries, then the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalthis will be an invincible shield against our

ism. In the name of all my comrades-members of the

Communist Party of China, I express to you my heartenemies....

felt gratitude.” Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR(1949

1983) (USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents (Source: Information and Documentation and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry Administration, First Far Eastern Depart

of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no.

148), 231-33. ment, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (19491983) (USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) National Security Archive, contributes fre(Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; quently to the Bulletin. His book, Inside the internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from The letter appears in a formerly classified Stalin to Khrushchev, co-authored with Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary col- Constantine Pleshakov, will be published in lection on the history of Sino-Soviet rela- March 1996 by Harvard University Press. tions, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.; Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.)

1. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972

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MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES'S the expense of individuals. Despite these taking effect in the Soviet Union, given

. "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION" drawbacks, Bo's memoirs contain many valu- Khrushchev's fascination with peaceful coSTRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM able new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Es- existence with the capitalist West. Mao BO YIBO'S MEMOIRS

pecially notable are Bo's references to Mao's wanted to prevent that from happening in

statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo China. Here lie the roots of China's subseIntroduction, translation, and played a major role in Chinese economic

quent exchange of polemics with the Soviet annotation by Qiang Zhai decision-making during the period, his mem- Union and Mao's decision to restructure the

oirs are especially strong on this topic. He Chinese state and society in order to prevent

sheds new light on such domestic events as a revisionist “change of color” of China, Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chi

the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, culminating in the launching of the Cultural nese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925.

the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the Anti- Revolution in 1966. Mao’s frantic response During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a

Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposi- to Dulles's speeches constitutes a clear case leading member of the CCP-led resistance

tion to Rush Advance, the Great Leap For- of how international events contributed to force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was

ward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, eco- China's domestic developments. It also elected a member of the CCP Central Com

nomic rectification in 1961-1962, and the demonstrates the effects of Dulles's stratmittee at the Party's Seventh Congress.

Socialist Education Campaign. Although egy of driving a wedge between China and During the Chinese Civil War in 1946

international relations in general does not the Soviet Union. 1949, he was First Secretary of the CCP

receive much attention, the volumes do inNorth China Bureau and Vice Chairman of

clude illuminating chapters on some key the CCP-led North China People's Govern

foreign policy decisions.2 ment. After the establishment of the People's

The translation below is taken from To Prevent “Peaceful Evolution" and Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949,

Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138- Train Successors to the Revolutionary he became Finance Minister. As a revolu1146). This section is very revealing about

Cause tionary veteran who survived the Cultural

Mao's perception of and reaction to John
Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of
Foster Dulles's policy toward China in 1958-

by Bo Yibo the most powerful figures in China today.

1959. The CCP leader took seriously stateBetween 1991 and 1993, Bo published two volumes of his memoirs, Ruogan encouraging a peaceful change of the Comments by the U.S. Secretary of State about According to the general law of social

ist revolution, only through the leadership of zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (Recol

munist system. In November 1959, accord- a proletarian political party directed by Marxlections of Certain Major Decisions and

ing to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao's secretary, prepared ism, reliance on the working class and other Events) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang

for Mao translations of three speeches by laboring masses, and waging of an armed dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first

Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful struggle in this or that form can a revolution volume covers the period 1949-1956 and

evolution within the Communist world. Af- obtain state power. International hostile the second volume 1957-1966. In the pref

ter reading the documents, Mao commented forces to the newly born people's governace and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes

on them before having them circulated among ment would always attempt to strangle it in that in preparing his memoirs he has con

a small group of Party leaders for discussion. the cradle through armed aggression, intersulted documents in the CCP Central Ar

Thus Bo's memoirs not only provide fresh vention, and economic blockade. After the chives and received the cooperation of Party

texts of what Mao said, but also an important victory of the October Revolution, the Sohistory researchers. Bo's reminiscences

window into what he read. As a result, the viet Union experienced an armed intervenrepresent the most important memoirs of a

interactive nature of Mao's activities with tion by fourteen countries. In the wake of high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966

his top colleagues and his secretary-is open World War II, imperialism launched a properiod.

to examination. A sense of the policy-mak- tracted “Cold War" and economic containAs a still active senior leader, Bo is not a disinterested writer. His arguments and

ing process, as well as Mao's opinions, ment of socialist countries. Immediately

emerges from Bo's memoirs. conclusions are completely in line with the

after the triumph of the revolution in China

The years 1958-1959 were a crucial and the Democratic People's Republic of 1981 Resolution on Party History." Memoirs in China usually have a didactic pur

period in Mao's psychological evolution. Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea, a

He began to show increasing concern with blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and implepose that encourages the creation of edify- the problem of succession and worried about mented an all-out embargo against China. ing stereotypes. Bo's memoirs conform to

his impending death. He feared that the All of this shows that it will take a sharp a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the

political system that he had spent his life struggle with external hostile forces through PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo's political system that he had spent his life

creating would betray his beliefs and values an armed conflict or other forms of contest memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little

and slip out of his control. His apprehension before a newly born socialist country can description of the character and personali

about the future development of China was consolidate its power. ties of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo's

History suggests that although the armed volumes follow another memoirs-writing closely related to his analysis of the degen

eration of the Soviet system. Mao believed aggression, intervention, and economic tradition in the PRC, which tends to empha

that Dulles's idea of inducing peaceful evo- blockade launched by Western imperialists size the role of groups and societal forces at

lution within the socialist world was already against socialist countries can create enor

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