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the United States must withdraw from Tai- national democratic revolution led by the (Beijing: Central Documentary Press and wan, and after that all other problems can be bourgeoisie. Our two parties are Commu- World Knowledge Press, 1994), 570-573.] easily resolved. The United States does not nist. In terms of mobilizing the masses and accept this point. China and the United carrying out people's war, our two parties are States have been negotiating for ten years different from Algeria.

Document 7: Mao's Conversation with and we are still repeating the same old I talked about people's war in my article. Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968. words. We will not give up that point. The Some of the statements refer to specific probUnited States once wanted to exchange press lems of ten to twenty years ago. Now you Because there has been no battle to fight delegations with us. They argued that when have encountered some new conditions. recently, you want to negotiate with the we began with minor issues, we could better Many of your methods are different from our United States. It is all right to negotiate, but settle major problems later. We contended methods in the past. We should have differ- it is difficult to get the United States to that only by starting from major issues could ences. We also learn about war gradually. At withdraw through negotiations. The United minor problems be easily resolved. the beginning we lost battles. We have not States also wants to negotiate with you beYou withdrew your armed forces from done as smoothly as you have.

cause it is in a dilemma. It has to deal with the South in accordance with the Geneva I have not noticed what issues you have problems of three regions: the first is the Accords. As a result, the enemy began to negotiated with the United States. I only pay Americas—the United States, the second is kill people in the South, and you revived attention to how you fight the Americans and Europe, and the third is Asia. In the last few armed struggle. At first you adopted politi- how you drive the Americans out. You can years the United States has stationed its cal struggle as a priority supplemented by have negotiations at certain time[s], but you major forces in Asia and has created an armed struggle. We supported you. In the should not lower your tones. You should imbalance. In this regard American capitalsecond stage when you were carrying out raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared ists who have investments in Europe are political and armed struggles simulta- that the enemy may deceive you.

dissatisfied. Also throughout its history the neously, we again supported you. In the We will support you until your final United States has always let other countries third stage when you are pursuing armed victory. The confidence in victory comes fight first before it jumps in at halfway. It is struggle as a priority supplemented by po- from the fighting you have done and from the only after World War Two that the United litical struggle, we still support you. In my struggle you have made. For instance, one States has begun to take the lead in fighting, view, the enemy is gradually escalating the experience we have is that the Americans can first in the Korean War and then in the war; so are you. In the next two and three be fought. We obtained this experience only Vietnam War. In Vietnam the United States years you may encounter difficulties. But it

after fighting the Americans. The Ameri- is taking the lead, but it is followed by only is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need cans can be fought and can be defeated. We a small number of other countries. Whether to take this possibility into consideration. should demolish the myth that the Ameri- the war is a special war or a limited war, the So long as you have made all kinds of cans cannot be fought and cannot be de- United States is totally devoted to it. Now it preparations, even if the most difficult situ- feated. Both of our two parties have many cannot afford to pay attention to other counation emerges, you will not find it too far experiences. Both of us have fought the tries. Its troops in Europe, for example, are from your initial considerations. Isn't this a Japanese. You have also fought the French. complaining, saying that there is a shortage good argument? Therefore there are two At the moment you are fighting the Ameri- of manpower and that experienced soldiers essential points: the first is to strive for the

and commanders have been removed and most favorable situation, and the second to The Americans have trained and edu- better equipment has been relocated. The prepare for the worst.

cated the Vietnamese people. They have United States has also redeployed its troops The Algerian experience can serve as a educated us and the people of the whole from Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia. reference for you. Possibly in the fourth or world. In my opinion it is not good without Did not the United States claim that it has a fifth year of their war, some Algerian lead- the Americans. Such an educator is indis- population of two hundred million? But it ers became worried. At that time, their pensable. In order to defeat the Americans, cannot endure the war. It has dispatched Prime Minister Arbas came to talk with us. we must learn from the Americans. Marx's only several hundred thousand troops. There They said that Algeria had a very small works do not teach us how to fight the Ameri- is a limit to its troops. population of ten million. A million had cans. Nor do Lenin's books write about how After fighting for over a dozen years already died. While the enemy had an army to fight the Americans. We primarily learn you should not think about only your own of 800,000, their own regular forces pos- from the Americans.

difficulties. You should look at the enemy's sessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops. The Chinese people and the people of difficulties. It has been twenty-three years To add the guerrillas, their total forces were the whole world support you.

The more since Japan's surrender in 1945, but your less than 100,000. I told them at the time that friends you have, the better you are. country still exists. Three imperialist counthe enemy was bound to defeat and that their

tries have committed aggression against you: population would increase. Later, after ne- [Source: The People's Republic of China Japan, France, and the United States. But gotiations France began to withdraw its Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Commu- your country has not only survived but also troops. Now it has completed the with- nist Party Central Documentary Research developed. drawal, only leaving behind a few small Office, comp., Mao Zedong Waijiao wenxuan Of course imperialism wants to fight. naval bases. The Algerian revolution is a (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong One purpose for its war is to put out fire. A

cans.

fire has started in your country, and imperi- States would attack North Vietnam. Later the problem, he will have difficulties in alism wants to put out that fire. The second the United States bombed North Vietnam, winning another term of presidency. purpose is to make money through produc- proving my words wrong. Now the United One more point. It is the puppet regime ing munitions. To put out fire they must States has stopped bombing. My words are in South Vietnam who is afraid of the Naproduce fire-extinguishing machines, which correct again. Maybe the United States will tional Liberation Front of South Vietnam. will bring about profits. Every year the resume bombing, proving my words wrong Some people in the United States have United States expends over 30 billion dol- a second time. But eventually my words will pointed out that the really effective governlars in your country.

prove correct: the United States has to stop ment popular among the South Vietnamese It has been an American custom not to bombing. Therefore I believe that it is all people is not the Saigon government but the fight a long war. The wars they have fought right for you to make several contingency

right for you to make several contingency Liberation Front. This is not a statement average about four to five years. The fire in plans.

attributed to someone in the U.S. Congress. your country cannot be put out. On the In sum, in the past years the American It is reported by journalists, but the name of contrary, it has spreaded. Capitalists in the army has not invaded North Vietnam. The the speaker was not identified. The stateUnited States are divided into factions. When United States has neither blockaded ment was attributed to a so-called U.S. govthis faction makes more profit and that fac- Haiphong nor bombed the Hanoi city itself. ernment individual. The statement raises a tion make less profit, an imbalance in booty- The United States has reserved a method. At question: Who represents the government sharing will occur and trouble will begin one point it claimed that it would practice a with real prestige in South Vietnam? Nguyen domestically. These contradictions should “hot pursuit.” But when your aircraft flew Van Thieu or Nguyen Huu Tho? Therefore be exploited. Those monopolized capital- over our country, the United States did not although the United States publicly praises ists who have made less money are unwill- carry out a “hot pursuit." Therefore, the Nguyen Van Thieu, saying that he will not ing to continue the war. This contradiction United States has bluffed. It has never go to Paris to attend the negotiations, it in can be detected in election speeches made by mentioned the fact that your aircraft have fact realizes that problems can not be solved the two factions. Especially the American used our airfields. Take another example, if the National Liberation Front of South journalist Walter Lippmann has published China had so many people working in your

China had so many people working in your Vietnam does not participate in the negotiaan article recently, warning not to fall into country. The United States knew that, but

tions. another trap. He says that the United States had never mentioned it, as if such a thing did has already fallen into a trap in Vietnam and not exist. As to the remaining people sent by (Source: Ibid., 580-583.] that the current problem is how to find ways China to your country who are no longer to climb out of that trap. He is afraid that the needed, we can withdraw them. Have you 1. Using recent Chinese sources, Chen Jian's “China's United States may fall into other traps. There- discussed this issue? If the United States

Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,The China

Quarterly 142 (June 1995), 357-387, provides an inforfore your cause is promising. comes again, we will send people to you as

mative and insightful analysis of China's decision to In 1966, I had a conversation with Chair- well. Please discuss this issue to see which assist Hanoi during the Vietnam War, but he does not man Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou. At that Chinese units you want to keep and which address the historiographical controversy of whether time, the United States had already resumed units you do not want to keep. Keep the units

there was a “strategic debate” in Beijing in 1965. Fresh

materials released in China in 1994 and 1995 shed new attack on North Vietnam, but had not re- that are useful to you. We will withdraw the

light on this issue. newed bombing. I said that the United States units that are of no use to you. We will send 2. See Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model: might end the war that year because it was an them to you if they are needed in the future. Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, American election year. No matter which This is like the way your airplanes have used

1950-1954,The Journal of Military History 57 (Octo

ber 1993), 698-715; idem., "China and the Geneva president came to power, he would encoun- Chinese airfields: use them if you need and

Conference of 1954,The China Quarterly 129 (March ter the problem of whether the United States not use them if you do not need. This is the 1992), 103-122; Chen Jian, "China and the First should continue the war or withdraw now. I way to do things.

Indochina War, 1950-1954,The China Quarterly 133 believed that the difficulties that the United I am in favor of your policy of fighting

(March 1993), 85-110.

3. Guo Ming, ed., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian States faced would increase if it continued while negotiating. We have some comrades

[The Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations over the the war. Countries in all of Europe did not who are afraid that you may by taken in by Last Forty Years) (Nanning: Guangxi People's Press, participate in the war. This situation was the Americans. I think you will not. Isn't

1991), 65. The contributors in this volume are from the different from that of the Korean War. Japan this negotiation the same as fighting? We

Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, a major research

center on Sino-Vietnamese relations in China. probably would not enter the war. It might can learn experience and know patterns

4. Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., Zhonghua renmin lend some helpeconomically because it could through fighting. Sometimes one cannot gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949-1956 [A Diplomatic Hismake money by producing ammunition. I avoid being taken in. Just as you have said, tory of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1956) think the Americans overestimated their the Americans do not keep their words.

(Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 94; Hoang

Van Hoan, Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geming strength in the past. Now the United States Johnson once said publicly that even agree

huiyilu (A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's is repeating its past practice by overstretch- ments sometimes could not be honored. But

Revolutionary Reminiscences) (Beijing: Liberation ing its forces. It is not just us who make this things must have their laws. Take your Army Press, 1987), 267. argument. Nixon has also said so. The negotiations as an example, are you going to

5. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese United States has stretched its forces not negotiate for a hundred years? Our Premier Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi

guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi (Historionly in the Americas and Europe but also in has said that if Nixon continues the negotia- cal Facts about the Role of the Chinese Military AdviAsia. At first I did not believe that the United tions for another two years and fails to solve sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and Resist

France) (Beijing: Liberation army Press, 1990), 126- comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-
127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selected 1975, 313-314. Remarks by Mao and Zhou are taken
Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and Wei Guoqing as mem- from Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67.
bers of the Chinese delegation for the forthcoming 17. Cong Jin, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue (Years of Twist-
discussions during Giap's second visit. See Mao to Liu ing Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press,
Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16 1989), 500-502. The author is a party history researcher
October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Re- at the Chinese National Defense University. See also
search Office,comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao Zhu Zhongli, Liming yu wanxia: Wang Jiaxiang wenxue
[Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the zhuanji (Dawn and Dusk: A Literary Biography of
PRC) (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419. Wang Jiaxiang] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986),
Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had served 394-396. The author is the wife of Wang Jiaxiang.
as China's chief military advisor to the Vietminh in 18. Ma Qibin, Chen Wenbin, et al. Zhongguo
1950, was not mentioned during Giap's first visit; gongchandang zhizheng sishinian, 1949-1989[The Forty
evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chinese Years of the Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-
team to talk with Giap during his second trip.

1989) (Beijing: CCP Party History Material Press, 1989),
6. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. 213; Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 502;Zhu, Liming yu
7. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese wanxia, 396-399.
Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi 19. Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, chief comp.,
guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi, 142-143. Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese
8. During the Vietnamese land reform, an excessive Diplomacy) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press,
persecution of so-called landlords and rich peasants 1990), 159; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian,
occurred, creating serious resentments among the peas- 69; Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue kangmei shilu (A Factual
ant population against the party. Hoang, Canghai yisu, Record of Assistance to Vietnam against the United
279-285. Truong Chinh was often regarded by West- States) (Beijing: International Culture Press, 1990), 25.
ern observers as a member of the “pro-Chinese" wing Wang Xiangen was a secretary at the headquarters of the
of the VWP.

PLA Engineering Corps in the late 1970s and is cur9. Pei, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949- rently working with the PLA General Staff. His book 1956, 94.

contains much useful data on the role of Chinese army 10. For Zhou's visit to Hanoi, see the PRC Foreign engineer troops in Vietnam. Ministry's Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., 20. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [A 21. Ibid. Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 22. Li Ke, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese 1949-1975) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," Junshi 169-170; Huang Zheng, Hu Zhiming he Zhongguo (Ho lishi (Military History] 4 (1989), 30. This bi-monthly Chi Minh and China] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, journal is published by the Chinese People's Revolu1987), 182-183. Zhou's quote is taken from Han tionary Military Museum in Beijing. Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of 23. Interview with a Chinese military history researcher, Modern China, 1898-1976(New York: Hill and Wang, Beijing, 13 July 1995. 1994), 260.

24. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming 11. Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, zhong de renmin jiefangjun (The People's Liberation Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 102-104. Army during the Cultural Revolution) (Beijing: CCP 12. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. Ac- Historical Materials Press, 1989), 409. cording to a recent study by William J. Duiker, Le 25. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The Duan as General Secretary was “a powerful advocate United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 2nd of an aggressive strategy to achieve national reunifica- ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 117-119. tion with the South.” At the Fifteenth Plenum of the 26. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. VWP held at the end of 1958, the Central Committee 27. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, adopted a new policy which advocated a return to Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng of revolutionary war to unify the South. But the new line the CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham also included the ambivalence that had shaped atti- Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang tudes in Hanoi from the time of the Geneva Confer- Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; and ence. Though urging a return to revolutionary war, the Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, and Central Committee report, which was not issued until Phoumi Vongvochit of the Lao People's Revolutionary May 1959, asserted that the “political strength of the Party. The PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History masses” would remain the principal from of struggle, Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong although it would now be supplemented by low-level dashiji, 1949-1975, 413. military operations conducted by local guerrilla forces 28. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin and village self-defense units of the type that had been jiefangjun, 408. employed during the August 1945 Revolution. Will- 29. Chen, “China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," iam J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Con- 364. flict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 30. Allen S. Whiting, “How We Almost Went to War 1994), 235. It is possible that China's advice for cau- with China,” Look, 29 April 1969, p. 76; Melvin Gurtov tion in waging revolutionary struggle in the South and Hwang Byong-moo, China Under Threat: The contributed to the ambivalence in Hanoi's policy. Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns 13. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict Hopkins University Press, 1980), 160-161. in Indochina, 265.

31. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese 14. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67. Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 30. 15. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict 32. Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat: The Poliin Indochina, 266.

tics of Strategyand Diplomacy, 162; Herring, America's 16. For Pham Van Dong's visit to China, see the PRC Longest War, 128-131. Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, 33. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History

Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong
dashiji, 1949-1975, 445; Xue and Pei, Dangdai
Zhongguo waijiao, 160-161.
34. Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingjiao, chief comp., Dangdai
zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Work
of the Contemporary Chinese Armed Forces] (Beijing
Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 1:539-40; Li and
Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun,
415; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69-70;
Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis-
tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31.
35. Han and Tan, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi
gongzuo, 539-540; Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 44;
Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis-
tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31.
36. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161.
37. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 45.
38. Ibid. 35, 44; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong
de renmin jiefangjun, 422. R. B. Smith also mentions
Ho's meeting with Mao in Changsha. He dates the
meeting at May 16-17. His source is the diary of Ho's
personal secretary. See R. B. Smith, An International
History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of
a Limited War, 1965-66 (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1991), 139.
39. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 46-48. According to
Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, to facilitate the transporta-
tion of materials to Vietnam, Beijing in 1965 also
established a special leadership group in charge of
transportation to Vietnam. Luo Ruiqing was director.
Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Yang Chengwu, Li Tianyou,
Fang Yi, Li Qiang, and Liu Xiao were vice-directors. Li
and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun.
413.
40. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin
jiefangjun, 417.
41. Quoted in Smith, An International History of the
Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited
War, 1965-66, 171. According to Luu Doan Huynh,
from the International Relations Institute of the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Beijing informed
Hanoi in June 1965 that it would not be able to defend
North Vietnam from U.S. air attacks. Quoted in Allen
Whiting, “China's Role in the Vietnam War," in Jayne
Werner and David Hunt, eds., The American War in
Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia
Program, 1993), 71-76.
42. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161; Guo,
Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 70.
43. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese
Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31;
Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69. For a
description of the Chinese use of the Cambodian port of
Sihanoukville to send military supplies to the National
Liberation Front in South Vietnam between 1966-
1967, see Kang Daisha, “My Days in Cambodia," in
Cheng Xiangjun, ed., Nu waijiaoguan [Women Diplo-
mats) (Beijing: People's Sports Press, 1995), 482-483.
Kang Daisha is the wife of Chen Shuliang, who was the
Chinese ambassador to Cambodia between 1962-1967.
For a detailed treatment of Chinese aid to the DRV
between 1965-1969, see Chen, "China's Involvement
in the Vietnam War," 371-380.
44. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 71.
45. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deter-
rence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1975), 186; idem., “Forecasting Chi-
nese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,”
in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds.,
Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), 506-523.

46. John W. Garver, "The Chinese Threat in the Viet- 66," The China Quarterly 49 (January-March 1972),
nam War,” Parameters 22 (Spring 1992), 73-85, quo- 32-75.
tation on 75.

65. Barry Naughton has made a similar criticism.
47. Sun Dongsheng, “The Great Transformation in the Naughton, "The Third Front,” 370-371.
Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Con- 66. Luo Ruiqing, “The People Defeated Japanese Fas-
struction," Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 3 cism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism
(1995), 42-48. Sun's indirect quotation of Mao's re- Too,Peking Review, 3 September 1965, 31-39; Lin
marks is on p. 44. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People's War,” ibid.,
journal published by the CCP Central Documentary 9-30.
Research Office and the Central Archives. It often 67. Xu Yan, Junshijia Mao Zedong [Military Strategist
contains important party documents. Sun Dongsheng is Mao Zedong](Beijing: Central Document Press, 1995),
a researcher at the Central Documentary Research 149; Huang Yao, Sanci danan busi de Luo Ruiqing
Office.

Dajiang (Senior General Luo Ruiqing who Survived 48. Mao's conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 Three Deaths) (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 1994), November 1968, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the 263, 265, 270-271. This book is based on sources from Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao the Central Archives, the PLA General Staff Archives, Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works and the Ministry of Public Security Archives. of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Central Document Press and It is possible that the two articles published in Luo World Knowledge Press, 1994), 582.

and Lin's names were written in response to Soviet 49. Yuan Dejin, “The Evolution of Mao Zedong's arguments on war and peace. On 30 January 1965, Mao Theory of War and Peace since the Founding of New asked Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, Deputy Director China,Junshi lishi (Military History] 4 (1994), 36. of the Combat Department of the General Staff, to find 50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, develop- a person well versed in political and military issues to ment and consequences of the Third Front, see Barry prepare a commentary on the book Military Strategy Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization edited by Soviet Chief of Staff V. D. Sokolovsky and in the Chinese Interior,The China Quarterly 115 published by the Soviet Defense Ministry's Military (September 1988), 351-386.

Press in 1962. See Mao to Yang Chengwu and Lei 51. For the complete text of the report, see Dangde Yingfu, 30 January 1965, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, wenxian 3 (1995), 34-35.

6:402. 52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in ibid, 33. 68. For a detailed discussion of the Luo-Lin dispute, see 53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19 Huang, Sanci danan busi de Luo Riqing Dajiang, August 1964, see ibid., 33-34.

chapters 24-34. Allen Whiting attempts to establish a 54. Mao's remarks are quoted in Sun, “The Great causal relationship between Luo's purge and China's Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our foreign policy change in mid-1965. Citing the VietCountry's Economic Construction,” 45.

namese claim that China decided in June 1965 to 55. Sun, “The Great Transformation in the Strategic provide no air cover for North Vietnam, Whiting argues Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction,” that this timing dovetails with a major personnel change 44.

in the Chinese leadership: “At some point between May 56. Naughton, “The Third Front,” 368.

and September Luo Ruiqing fell from office, after 57. Mao's conversation with He Long, Luo Ruiqing, which Lin Biao published a major treatise on guerrilla and Yang Chengwu, 28 April 1965, in Mao Zedong war implicitly rejecting Luo's forward strategy and junshi wenji (Collection of Mao Zedong's Military with it any advanced air combat. Chinese ground supWritings) 6 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press and port apparently came as a substitute form of help for Central Document Press, 1993), 6:404.

Hanoi." Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy," 58. For Snow's version of his conversation with Mao, 516. In fact, Luo did not fall from office until December see Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: 1965. Random House, 1971), 215-216. For the Chinese ver- 69. Michael H. Hunt has also criticized the emphasis on sion, see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central factions to account for Chinese foreign policy formaDocumentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong tion. He poses the question sharply: “Does the factional waijiao wenxuan, 544-562.

model transpose on China the competitive ethos of 59. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin American politics and underestimate the restraining jiefangjun, 341.

authoritarian and hierarchical qualities of China's po60. Ibid., 341-342; Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:403. litical culture?” See Michael H. Hunt, “CCP Foreign 61. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Policy: ‘Normalizing the Field,'"' in Michael H. Hunt Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong and Niu Jun, eds., Toward a History of Chinese Comdashiji, 1949-1975, 455.

munist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities 62. Liu Shaoqi's speech at the war planning meeting of and Interpretive Approaches (Washington, DC: the Central Military Commission, 19 May 1965, in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.

Asia Program, 1995), 163-191. The quotation is on p. 63. The CCP Central Documentary Research Office, 170. comp., Zhu De nianpu (Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing: 70. For Mao's statements on the "Two Intermediate People's Press, 1986), 537-538.

Zones," see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP 64. Harry Harding, “The Making of Chinese Military Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Power," in William Whitson, ed., The Military and Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 506-509. See also Chi Aiping, Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: “The Evolution of Mao Zedong's International StratePraeger, 1973), 361-385; Uri Ra'anan, “Peking's For- gic Thought," in Dangde wenxian 3 (1994), 46-52; Li eign Policy ‘Debate', 1965-1966," in Tang Tsou, ed., Jie, “Study of Mao Zedong's International Strategic China in Crisis, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Thought,” in the International Strategic Studies FounPress, 1968), 23-71; Donald Zagoria, “The Strategic dation, ed., Huanqiu tongci liangre (All Is the Same in Debate in Peking,” in ibid., 237-268; Michael Yahuda, the World) (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1993), 1“Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965- 16.

71. Mao Zedong, “Talks with the American Correspon-
dent Anna Louise Strong," in Selected Works of Mao
Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965),
4:99.
72. For a recent study of China's policy toward Angola
and Mozambique, see Steven F. Jackson, "China's
Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and
Mozambique, 1961-93,The China Quarterly 143 (June
1995), 387-422.
73. On Beijing's attempt to divide the Soviet-led bloc,
see the putative memoirs of Enver Hoxha, Reflections
on China, 2 vols., (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1979). For an
overview of Chinese-Albanian relations, see Fan
Chengzuo, “The 'Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Win-
ter' in Chinese-Albanian Relations," Waijiao xueyuan
xuebao (Journal of Foreign Affairs College) 3 (1993),
50-52.
74. Mao's conversation with the Chilean Journalist
Delegation, 23 June 1964, in the PRC Foreign Ministry
and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp.,
Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 529-533.
75. Mao's talk with delegates from Asia, Africa, and
Oceania on 9 July 1964, in ibid, 534-539. These del-
egates came to China after participating in Pyongyang
in the Second Asian Economic Forum.
76. For a good discussion of anti-imperialism in Chi-
nese foreign policy, see Edward Friedman, “Anti-Im-
perialism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S.
Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Rela-
tions in the Post Cold War Era, 3rd ed. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994), 60-74.
77. Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat, 161.
78. For a detailed, first-hand account of Zhou Enlai's
visit to Moscow, see Yu Zhan, “An Unusual Visit:
Remembering Zhou Enlai's Last Visit to the Soviet
Union,” Dangde wenxian (Party Documents] 2 (1992),
85-91. It is also included in the Foreign Ministry Dip-
lomatic History Research Office, comp., Xin Zhongguo
waijiaofengyun (Episodes of New China's Diplomacy]
(Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 3:14-30. Yu
Zhan was Director of the Department of the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe of the Chinese Foreign
Ministry in 1964 and accompanied Zhou to Moscow.
79. The PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History
Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong
dashiji, 1949-1975, 428.
80. Zhou's conversation with Ho Chi Minh and Le
Duan, 1 March 1965, in ibid., 438.
81. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam
War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-
66, 54.
82. The Vietnamese claim is quoted in Nayan Chanda,
“Secrets of Former Friends," Far Eastern Economic
Review (15 June 1979), 38-39. I have not seen any
Chinese material that confirms the Vietnamese claim.
83. Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 (A Diplomatic
History of China: The Period of the People's Republic
of China, 1949-1979) (Zhengzhou: Henan People's
Press, 1988), 344.
84. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam
War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-
66, 55.
85. Douglas Pike describes Hanoi's strategy to put the
Sino-Soviet dispute to its own use in service of its war
as “the alternating tilt gambit.” See Douglas Pike,
Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 54-55.
86. For Mao's reaction to Dulles' policy, see Bo Yibo,
Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (Recollec-
tions of Certain Important Decisions and Events), vol.

2 (Beijing: CCP Party School Press, 1993), 1137-1157.

GAIDUK

curator of relations between the CPSU and 87. For more discussions of Mao's attempt to use the escalation of the Indochina conflict to radicalize China's

continued from page 232

other parties, accepted that advice. 4 political and social life, see Chen, “China's Involve

Meanwhile, faced with the Soviet ment in the Vietnam War,” 361-365.

palpable improvement in Soviet-American leadership’s unwillingness to plunge into 88. For a description of this problem, see Zhai, “Trans- relations following the shared fright of the the Southeast Asian conflict, Hanoi replanting the Chinese Model,” 712-713.

1962 Caribbean (Cuban missile) crisis, the doubled its efforts to improve relations with 89. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 60-68. 90. Ibid., 74-75.

Kremlin sought to minimize Soviet involve- China. According to the information of the 91. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 102. ment in the Vietnam conflict, which was not Soviet Defense Ministry, PRC and DRV 92. Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 607.

only problematic from the viewpoint of pos- officials opened talks in 1964 on a bilateral 93. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, “The Dilemma of

sible foreign-policy advantages but was also treaty of military cooperation. North VietMao Tse-tung,” The China Quarterly 35 (July-September 1968), 58-77; Smith, An International History

fraught with possible new clashes between nam hosted a delegation of PRC military of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a the USSR and the USA. Moreover, the leaders, led by the Defense Minister, and in Limited War, 1965-66, 285-304.

Soviet leaders were apprehensive of radical December 1964 a bilateral treaty was signed 94. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam

views held by North Vietnam's leaders, who which provided for the introduction of PRC War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 196566, 298-299. For Zhou's reception of the Vietnamese

had a clearly pro-Chinese orientation. troops to the DRV.S Prior to that, the DRV delegation led by Le Duan, see The PRC Foreign The extent of the difference in the posi- General Staff had informed the Soviet miliMinistry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., tions held by the two countries became clear tary attaché in Hanoi that there was no longer Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 491.

after a visit to Moscow in Jan.-Feb. 1964 by any need for Soviet military experts to stay 95. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publish

a delegation of the Workers Party of Vietnam in the country and they should leave the ing Co., Inc., 1982), 93-94, 96.

(WPV), led by Le Duan, the party's First DRV without replacement by other Soviet 96. Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War," Secretary. The DRV Communists came out advisors as soon as they completed their 75.

in support of their Chinese colleagues with current business. The rapprochement be97. Yang Chengwu. 98. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly journal published

such zeal and expressed such radical ideas tween Hanoi and Beijing was facilitated by by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and about the role of the national liberation move- common views on the need to fight against the Central Archives. It often contains important party ment in Third World countries that their “U.S. imperialism.” Although the North documents

Moscow interlocutors were obliged to switch Vietnamese leaders never fully trusted China 99. Chief of Staff. 100. Deputy Prime Minister, Director of the State

from the patient explanation of the CPSU (as later conflicts demonstrated), coolness in Council Special Committee on war preparation. stand and the general line of the world com- relations with the Soviet Union predeter101. Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Director of the munist movement" to direct warnings about mined their official position.7 State Council Special Committee on war preparation.

the possible consequences such views could Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 102. Luo was also named Deputy Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation.

have for the Vietnamese friends' relations marked a turning point in Soviet-North Viet103. Mao Zedong. with the Soviet Union.3

namese relations.8 For reasons that remain 104. Zhou Enlai.

Further evidence that the two sides were unclear, the Soviet Union made an about105. These are the names of Chinese missiles.

slowly but surely drifting apart surfaced dur- face and again oriented itself toward closer 106. A major railway trunk running east and west between Lianyungang and Lanzhou.

ing a July 1964 visit to Moscow by an NLF cooperation with North Vietnam. Probably 107. A major railway trunk running north and south delegation at the invitation of the Soviet Leonid I. Brezhnev and his entourage feared between Beijing and Wuhan.

Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The rep- a loss of Soviet influence in the region, 108. A major railway trunk running north and south

resentatives of the patriotic forces of South particularly in the context of the mounting between Tianjin and Nanjing. 109. A province in North China.

Vietnam presented to the Soviet leaders a differences between Beijing and Moscow 110. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Pham Van number of requests and proposals, including which threatened to develop into an open Dong

requests for increased supplies of arms and conflict. In that context, the consolidation of

ammunition. They also expressed a desire China's position in Southeast Asia at the Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn Uni

that a permanent mission of the NFLSV be USSR's expense posed a potential threat to versity at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the

opened in the USSR. The CPSU CC viewed the Soviet authority in the world communist author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the skeptically all those requests. In his report to movement. Furthermore, the assassination Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, the CC about that delegation's visit, D. of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in No1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State Univer-Shevlyagin, deputy head of the CC Interna- vember 1963 and advent to power of Lyndon sity Press, 1994). This article is adapted tional Department, advised that no definite B. Johnson (whose election as president in from a paper prepared for presentation at

answer about the opening of such a mission 1964 was regarded in the USSR as an indithe CWI HP Conference on New Evidence

be given and that all talks be held exclusively cator of greater right-wing influence in on the Cold War in Asia at the University of via the North Vietnamese state agencies. In American politics) dimmed the hopes of Hong Kong on 9-12 January 1995.

view of this, it was decided not to receive the improvement in Soviet-American relations delegation at the CPSU CC, for that would that had arisen in the last year of Kennedy's have raised the awkward necessity for the life. This development offered a certain Kremlin leaders to state in clear terms their freedom of action to Moscow's new leaderstand on the above-mentioned issues. CC ship, which had reverted to the policy of Secretary Boris Ponomarev, who was the confrontation—a policy which was, in turn, ,

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