(1) To establish a special committee on this case within the State Council. We suggest that the committee consist of thirteen people including Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, Luo Ruiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Zhang Jichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, Gu Mu, Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchun serves as Director, and Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing Deputy Directors. (2) In addition to the four areas mentioned by the War Department, our preparation measures also need to include universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutions, warehouses, government departments and institutions as well as civil shelters in cities and mines. We must follow Chairman's principle of "careful study and gradual implementation" in conducting our investigation into various areas as early as possible and pay attention to the following issues. (a) All new construction projects will not be placed in the First Front, especially not in the fifteen big cities with over a million population. (b) For those currently on-going construction projects in the First Front and particularly in the fifteen big cities, except those that can be completed and put into effective operation next year or the year after, all the rest must be reduced in size, undergo no expansion, and be concluded as soon as possible. (c) For existing old enterprises, especially those in cities with high industrial concentration, we must remove them or some of their workshops. Particularly for military and machinery enterprises, we must break them in two parts if possible, and shift one part to the Third and Second Fronts. If we can remove them as a whole, we must do that with careful planning and in steps. (d) Beginning in next year, no new large and medium-size reservoirs will be built. (e) For key national universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes in the First Front, if they can be removed, we must relocate them to the Third and Second Fronts with careful planning. If they can not be removed, we must break them into two parts. (f) From now on, all new projects, in whatever Front they will be located, must comply with the principle of dispersion, closeness to mountains, and concealment. They must not be concentrated in certain cities or areas. We have divided labor to deal with the above work: (a) The State Economic Commission and the State Planning Commission will be responsible for the arrangement of the industrial and transportation systems. (b) The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for preparation measures concerning railroad junctions. (c) The Office of National Defense Industry will be responsible for the arrangement of national defense industry. (d) The General Staff will be responsible for the division of the First, Second, and Third Fronts on the national level and for the arrangement of national defense fortifications and war preparation mobilizations. (e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be responsible for preparation measures concerning reservoirs. (f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and Han Guang will be responsible for the arrangement of universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes. (g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be re sponsible for the protection of city buildings and government departments and institutions. We will spend the months of September and October investigating the various aspects and produce detailed plans that can be implemented gradually. The special committee will synthesize the plans before submitting them to the Central Committee for inclusion in the general plan for the next year and in the Third Five-Year Plan. (3) We propose to revive the People's Anti-Air Committee. Premier104 should still serve as Director and Comrade Xie Fuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade Luo Ruiqing was Secretary General originally). The Ministry of Public Safety will be responsible for the daily work of the commit tee. We should restore the Planning Office for the Construction of Underground Railway in Beijing and carry out an active preparation for the building of underground railway in Beijing. In the meantime, we should consider the construction of underground railway in Shanghai and Shenyang. The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for this task. (4) If the central leadership approves the above suggestions, we propose to distribute our report along with the General Staff War Department report as well as Chairman's comments as guidelines to all Party Bureaus, to all provincial, municipal, and district Party committees, and to all Party committees within government ministries. Please inform us whether our report is can madmen carry out an extensive bombing, China will not sit still and wait to be killed. If they come from the sky, we will take action on the ground. Bombing means war, and war will have no boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to resolve the issue of war simply by relying on a policy of bombing. [Source: The Diplomatic History Research Office of the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Major Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), 445.] Document 5: Liu Shaoqi's Speech to the Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965. The enemy has many contradictions, weaknesses, and difficulties. Its problems are no less than ours. If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed. The enemy will find it difficult to invade. If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade. If it does not invade, we will not fight out. Such a prospect is not impossible. But we must work hard to achieve this goal. We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and longdistance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and are easy for us to strike. We should develop as early as possible new technology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. Our Red Flag 1 and Red Flag 2105 can shoot down the enemy's high-altitude airplanes. If we have assurance to shoot down high-altitude airplanes, we can have more assurance to knock down low-altitude ones. The enemy's strength lies in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On the other hand we should realize that the enemy lacks reasons and justifications in cuts us into parts will the leadership go to the mountains. It will not do that when China is not cut into parts. For instance, if the enemy does not occupy cities like Xian and Tongguan, Shaanxi109 will not create a Shaanan Military region and a Shaanbei military region. The leadership will decide on this matter after the enemy has invaded, and there is time to do that. There is also time to mobilize troops. At present, we can begin the organization of the militia....(the rest of the speech is about how to organize the militia). In addition, there is the issue of increasing the size of troops. In order to build fortifications, we can organize some engineer units. After working for a period and completing fortifications, they can be dismissed. Troops engaged in agricultural production and divisions on semi war alert should also construct fortifications. Production troops are busy with agricultural work, but during slack seasons they should spend [Source: Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.] most of their time building fortifications. This means that they can work on fortifications for half a year in North China and for four to five months in the Yangtze valley. If war begins and we have to expand troops, we just need a mobilization. This matter will be easy. At the moment, we need to do a good job in organizing militia forces. What we cannot have time to prepare when war begins includes fortification construction, third fronts, bases as well as communications, a reconnaissance network, and new technology. We must pay attention to these issues. We should start work on the big Third Front, the small Third Front, material storage, state-of-the-art technology, scientific investigation, and research on new weapons. If we delay work on these matters, we will find ourselves unprepared later. To do these things needs time. As to the issues of the size of troops, the number of military regions, and a unified leadership between the local civilian government and the military, we can have time to deal with them when war begins. Some of the issues will be dealt with only after the enemy has invaded our country. In case that the enemy occupies the Longhai Railroad, 106 or the Yangtze valley, or the Jinghan Railroad 107, or the Jinpu Railroad 108, our country will then be divided into sections. If that happens, we have to practice a unified leadership of the party, the government and the army. But this will be decided at that time, not now. With trains and airplanes at its disposal, the enemy will not do things according to our methods. Only when that time comes will our leadership go to mountains. At present, the leadership must live in the city because it will be inconvenient if it does not live in the city. Only when a large number of enemy troops invades China and Document 6: Mao's Conversation with the Party and Government Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam110 20 October 1965. You are fighting an excellent war. Both the South and the North are fighting well. The people of the whole world, including those who have already awakened and those who have not awakened, are supporting you. The current world is not a peaceful one. It is not you Vietnamese who are invading the United States, neither are the Chinese who are waging an aggressive war against the United States. Not long ago the Japanese Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun published several reports filed by Japanese correspondents from South Vietnam. U.S. newspapers described these reports as unfair, thus provoking a debate. I am not referring to the Japanese Communist newspaper, Akahata. I am talking about Japanese bourgeois newspapers. This shows that the direction of the media is not favorable to the United States. Recently the demonstration by the American people against the American government's Vietnam policy has developed. At the moment it is primarily American intellectuals who are making trouble. But all this are external conditions. In fact what will solve the problem is the war you are fighting. Of course you can conduct negotiations. In the past you held negotiations in Geneva. But the American did not honor their promise after the negotiations. We have had negotiations with both Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. Rusk said that the United States has had most negotiations with China. But we stick to one point: the United States must withdraw from Taiwan, and after that all other problems can be easily resolved. The United States does not accept this point. China and the United States have been negotiating for ten years and we are still repeating the same old words. We will not give up that point. The United States once wanted to exchange press delegations with us. They argued that when we began with minor issues, we could better settle major problems later. We contended that only by starting from major issues could minor problems be easily resolved. You withdrew your armed forces from the South in accordance with the Geneva Accords. As a result, the enemy began to kill people in the South, and you revived armed struggle. At first you adopted political struggle as a priority supplemented by armed struggle. We supported you. In the second stage when you were carrying out political and armed struggles simultaneously, we again supported you. In the third stage when you are pursuing armed struggle as a priority supplemented by political struggle, we still support you. In my view, the enemy is gradually escalating the war; so are you. In the next two and three years you may encounter difficulties. But it is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need to take this possibility into consideration. So long as you have made all kinds of preparations, even if the most difficult situation emerges, you will not find it too far from your initial considerations. Isn't this a good argument? Therefore there are two essential points: the first is to strive for the most favorable situation, and the second to prepare for the worst. The Algerian experience can serve as a reference for you. Possibly in the fourth or fifth year of their war, some Algerian leaders became worried. At that time, their Prime Minister Arbas came to talk with us. They said that Algeria had a very small population of ten million. A million had already died. While the enemy had an army of 800,000, their own regular forces possessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops. To add the guerrillas, their total forces were less than 100,000. I told them at the time that the enemy was bound to defeat and that their population would increase. Later, after negotiations France began to withdraw its troops. Now it has completed the withdrawal, only leaving behind a few small naval bases. The Algerian revolution is a national democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie. Our two parties are Communist. In terms of mobilizing the masses and carrying out people's war, our two parties are different from Algeria. I talked about people's war in my article. Some of the statements refer to specific problems of ten to twenty years ago. Now you have encountered some new conditions. Many of your methods are different from our methods in the past. We should have differences. We also learn about war gradually. At the beginning we lost battles. We have not done as smoothly as you have. I have not noticed what issues you have negotiated with the United States. I only pay attention to how you fight the Americans and how you drive the Americans out. You can have negotiations at certain time[s], but you should not lower your tones. You should raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared that the enemy may deceive you. We will support you until your final victory. The confidence in victory comes from the fighting you have done and from the struggle you have made. For instance, one experience we have is that the Americans can be fought. We obtained this experience only after fighting the Americans. The Americans can be fought and can be defeated. We should demolish the myth that the Americans cannot be fought and cannot be defeated. Both of our two parties have many experiences. Both of us have fought the Japanese. You have also fought the French. At the moment you are fighting the Ameri cans. The Americans have trained and educated the Vietnamese people. They have educated us and the people of the whole world. In my opinion it is not good without the Americans. Such an educator is indispensable. In order to defeat the Americans, we must learn from the Americans. Marx's works do not teach us how to fight the Americans. Nor do Lenin's books write about how to fight the Americans. We primarily learn from the Americans. The Chinese people and the people of the whole world support you. The more friends you have, the better you are. [Source: The People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong Waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Central Documentary Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 570-573.] Document 7: Mao's Conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968. Because there has been no battle to fight recently, you want to negotiate with the United States. It is all right to negotiate, but it is difficult to get the United States to withdraw through negotiations. The United States also wants to negotiate with you because it is in a dilemma. It has to deal with problems of three regions: the first is the Americas-the United States, the second is Europe, and the third is Asia. In the last few years the United States has stationed its major forces in Asia and has created an imbalance. In this regard American capitalists who have investments in Europe are dissatisfied. Also throughout its history the United States has always let other countries fight first before it jumps in at halfway. It is only after World War Two that the United States has begun to take the lead in fighting, first in the Korean War and then in the Vietnam War. In Vietnam the United States is taking the lead, but it is followed by only a small number of other countries. Whether the war is a special war or a limited war, the United States is totally devoted to it. Now it cannot afford to pay attention to other countries. Its troops in Europe, for example, are complaining, saying that there is a shortage of manpower and that experienced soldiers and commanders have been removed and better equipment has been relocated. The United States has also redeployed its troops from Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia. Did not the United States claim that it has a population of two hundred million? But it cannot endure the war. It has dispatched only several hundred thousand troops. There is a limit to its troops. After fighting for over a dozen years you should not think about only your own difficulties. You should look at the enemy's difficulties. It has been twenty-three years since Japan's surrender in 1945, but your country still exists. Three imperialist countries have committed aggression against you: Japan, France, and the United States. But your country has not only survived but also developed. Of course imperialism wants to fight. One purpose for its war is to put out fire. A fire has started in your country, and imperialism wants to put out that fire. The second purpose is to make money through producing munitions. To put out fire they must produce fire-extinguishing machines, which will bring about profits. Every year the United States expends over 30 billion dollars in your country. It has been an American custom not to fight a long war. The wars they have fought average about four to five years. The fire in your country cannot be put out. On the contrary, it has spreaded. Capitalists in the United States are divided into factions. When this faction makes more profit and that faction make less profit, an imbalance in bootysharing will occur and trouble will begin domestically. These contradictions should be exploited. Those monopolized capitalists who have made less money are unwilling to continue the war. This contradiction can be detected in election speeches made by the two factions. Especially the American journalist Walter Lippmann has published an article recently, warning not to fall into another trap. He says that the United States has already fallen into a trap in Vietnam and that the current problem is how to find ways to climb out of that trap. He is afraid that the United States may fall into other traps. Therefore your cause is promising. In 1966, I had a conversation with Chairman Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou. At that time, the United States had already resumed attack on North Vietnam, but had not renewed bombing. I said that the United States might end the war that year because it was an American election year. No matter which president came to power, he would encounter the problem of whether the United States should continue the war or withdraw now. I believed that the difficulties that the United States faced would increase if it continued the war. Countries in all of Europe did not participate in the war. This situation was different from that of the Korean War. Japan probably would not enter the war. It might lend some help economically because it could make money by producing ammunition. I think the Americans overestimated their strength in the past. Now the United States is repeating its past practice by overstretching its forces. It is not just us who make this argument. Nixon has also said so. The United States has stretched its forces not only in the Americas and Europe but also in Asia. At first I did not believe that the United States would attack North Vietnam. Later the problem, he will have difficulties in winning another term of presidency. One more point. It is the puppet regime in South Vietnam who is afraid of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Some people in the United States have pointed out that the really effective government popular among the South Vietnamese people is not the Saigon government but the Liberation Front. This is not a statement attributed to someone in the U.S. Congress. It is reported by journalists, but the name of the speaker was not identified. The statement was attributed to a so-called U.S.government individual. The statement raises a question: Who represents the government with real prestige in South Vietnam? Nguyen Van Thieu or Nguyen Huu Tho? Therefore although the United States publicly praises Nguyen Van Thieu, saying that he will not go to Paris to attend the negotiations, it in fact realizes that problems can not be solved if the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam does not participate in the negotiations. In sum, in the past years the American I am in favor of your policy of fighting 1. Using recent Chinese sources, Chen Jian's "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," The China Quarterly 142 (June 1995), 357-387, provides an informative and insightful analysis of China's decision to assist Hanoi during the Vietnam War, but he does not address the historiographical controversy of whether there was a "strategic debate" in Beijing in 1965. Fresh materials released in China in 1994 and 1995 shed new light on this issue. 2. See Qiang Zhai, "Transplanting the Chinese Model: 3. Guo Ming, ed., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian 5. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese France] (Beijing: Liberation army Press, 1990), 126127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selected Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and Wei Guoqing as members of the Chinese delegation for the forthcoming discussions during Giap's second visit. See Mao to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16 October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419. Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had served as China's chief military advisor to the Vietminh in 1950, was not mentioned during Giap's first visit; evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chinese team to talk with Giap during his second trip. 6. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. 7. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi, 142-143. 8. During the Vietnamese land reform, an excessive persecution of so-called landlords and rich peasants occurred, creating serious resentments among the peasant population against the party. Hoang, Canghai yisu, 279-285. Truong Chinh was often regarded by Western observers as a member of the "pro-Chinese" wing of the VWP. 9. Pei, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 19491956, 94. 10. For Zhou's visit to Hanoi, see the PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [A Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), 169-170; Huang Zheng, Hu Zhiming he Zhongguo [Ho Chi Minh and China] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1987), 182-183. Zhou's quote is taken from Han Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898-1976 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 260. 11. Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 102-104. 12. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. According to a recent study by William J. Duiker, Le Duan as General Secretary was "a powerful advocate of an aggressive strategy to achieve national reunification with the South." At the Fifteenth Plenum of the VWP held at the end of 1958, the Central Committee adopted a new policy which advocated a return to revolutionary war to unify the South. But the new line also included the ambivalence that had shaped attitudes in Hanoi from the time of the Geneva Conference. Though urging a return to revolutionary war, the Central Committee report, which was not issued until May 1959, asserted that the "political strength of the masses" would remain the principal from of struggle, although it would now be supplemented by low-level military operations conducted by local guerrilla forces and village self-defense units of the type that had been employed during the August 1945 Revolution. William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 235. It is possible that China's advice for caution in waging revolutionary struggle in the South contributed to the ambivalence in Hanoi's policy. 13. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina, 265. 14. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67. 15. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina, 266. 16. For Pham Van Dong's visit to China, see the PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 19491975, 313-314. Remarks by Mao and Zhou are taken from Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67. 17. Cong Jin, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue [Years of Twisting Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1989), 500-502. The author is a party history researcher at the Chinese National Defense University. See also Zhu Zhongli, Liming yu wanxia: Wang Jiaxiang wenxue zhuanji [Dawn and Dusk: A Literary Biography of Wang Jiaxiang] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986), 394-396. The author is the wife of Wang Jiaxiang. 18. Ma Qibin, Chen Wenbin, et al. Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian, 1949-1989 [The Forty Years of the Chinese Communist Party in Power, 19491989] (Beijing: CCP Party History Material Press, 1989), 213; Cong. Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 502; Zhu, Liming yu wanxia, 396-399. 19. Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1990), 159; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69; Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [A Factual Record of Assistance to Vietnam against the United States] (Beijing: International Culture Press, 1990), 25. Wang Xiangen was a secretary at the headquarters of the PLA Engineering Corps in the late 1970s and is currently working with the PLA General Staff. His book contains much useful data on the role of Chinese army engineer troops in Vietnam. 20. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. 21. Ibid. 22. Li Ke, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," Junshi lishi [Military History] 4 (1989), 30. This bi-monthly journal is published by the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Museum in Beijing. 23. Interview with a Chinese military history researcher, Beijing, 13 July 1995. 24. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The People's Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: CCP Historical Materials Press, 1989), 409. 25. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 2nd ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 117-119. 26. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. 27. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng of the CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Phạm Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; and Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, and Phoumi Vongvochit of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. The PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 413. 28. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 408. 29. Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 364. 30. Allen S. Whiting, "How We Almost Went to War with China," Look, 29 April 1969, p. 76; Melvin Gurtov and Hwang Byong-moo, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 160-161. 31. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 30. 32. Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy, 162; Herring, America's Longest War, 128-131. 33. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 445; Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 160-161. 34. Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingjiao, chief comp., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Work of the Contemporary Chinese Armed Forces] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 1:539-40; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 415; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69-70; Li, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 31. 35. Han and Tan, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo, 539-540; Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 44; Li, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 31. 36. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161. 37. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 45. 38. Ibid. 35, 44; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 422. R. B. Smith also mentions Ho's meeting with Mao in Changsha. He dates the meeting at May 16-17. His source is the diary of Ho's personal secretary. See R. B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 139. 39. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 46-48. According to Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, to facilitate the transportation of materials to Vietnam, Beijing in 1965 also established a special leadership group in charge of transportation to Vietnam. Luo Ruiqing was director. Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Yang Chengwu, Li Tianyou, Fang Yi, Li Qiang, and Liu Xiao were vice-directors. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 413. 40. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 417. 41. Quoted in Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66, 171. According to Luu Doan Huynh, from the International Relations Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Beijing informed Hanoi in June 1965 that it would not be able to defend North Vietnam from U.S. air attacks. Quoted in Allen Whiting, "China's Role in the Vietnam War," in Jayne Werner and David Hunt, eds., The American War in Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1993), 71-76. 42. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 70. 43. Li, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 31; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69. For a description of the Chinese use of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville to send military supplies to the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam between 19661967, see Kang Daisha, “My Days in Cambodia,” in Cheng Xiangjun, ed., Nu waijiaoguan [Women Diplomats] (Beijing: People's Sports Press, 1995), 482-483. Kang Daisha is the wife of Chen Shuliang, who was the Chinese ambassador to Cambodia between 1962-1967. For a detailed treatment of Chinese aid to the DRV between 1965-1969, see Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 371-380. 44. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 71. 45. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 186; idem., “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 506-523. |