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46. John W. Garver, "The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War," Parameters 22 (Spring 1992), 73-85, quotation on 75.

47. Sun Dongsheng, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 3 (1995), 42-48. Sun's indirect quotation of Mao's remarks is on p. 44. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly journal published by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and the Central Archives. It often contains important party documents. Sun Dongsheng is a researcher at the Central Documentary Research Office.

48. Mao's conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 582.

49. Yuan Dejin, "The Evolution of Mao Zedong's Theory of War and Peace since the Founding of New China," Junshi lishi [Military History] 4 (1994), 36. 50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, development and consequences of the Third Front, see Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," The China Quarterly 115 (September 1988), 351-386.

51. For the complete text of the report, see Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 34-35.

52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in ibid, 33. 53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19 August 1964, see ibid., 33-34.

54. Mao's remarks are quoted in Sun, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," 45.

55. Sun, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," 44.

56. Naughton, "The Third Front," 368.

57. Mao's conversation with He Long, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu, 28 April 1965, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Writings] 6 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press and Central Document Press, 1993), 6:404.

58. For Snow's version of his conversation with Mao, see Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Random House, 1971), 215-216. For the Chinese version, see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 544-562.

59. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 341.

60. Ibid., 341-342; Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:403. 61. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 455.

62. Liu Shaoqi's speech at the war planning meeting of the Central Military Commission, 19 May 1965, in Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.

63. The CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Zhu De nianpu [Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing: People's Press, 1986), 537-538.

64. Harry Harding, "The Making of Chinese Military Power," in William Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1973), 361-385; Uri Ra'anan, “Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate', 1965-1966," in Tang Tsou, ed., China in Crisis, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 23-71; Donald Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," in ibid., 237-268; Michael Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965

66," The China Quarterly 49 (January-March 1972), 32-75.

65. Barry Naughton has made a similar criticism. Naughton, "The Third Front," 370-371.

66. Luo Ruiqing, “The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism Too," Peking Review, 3 September 1965, 31-39; Lin Biao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," ibid., 9-30.

67. Xu Yan, Junshijia Mao Zedong [Military Strategist Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1995), 149; Huang Yao, Sanci danan busi de Luo Ruiqing Dajiang [Senior General Luo Ruiqing who Survived Three Deaths] (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 1994), 263, 265, 270-271. This book is based on sources from the Central Archives, the PLA General Staff Archives, and the Ministry of Public Security Archives.

It is possible that the two articles published in Luo and Lin's names were written in response to Soviet arguments on war and peace. On 30 January 1965, Mao asked Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, Deputy Director of the Combat Department of the General Staff, to find a person well versed in political and military issues to prepare a commentary on the book Military Strategy edited by Soviet Chief of Staff V. D. Sokolovsky and published by the Soviet Defense Ministry's Military Press in 1962. See Mao to Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, 30 January 1965, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:402.

68. For a detailed discussion of the Luo-Lin dispute, see Huang, Sanci danan busi de Luo Riqing Dajiang, chapters 24-34. Allen Whiting attempts to establish a causal relationship between Luo's purge and China's foreign policy change in mid-1965. Citing the Vietnamese claim that China decided in June 1965 to provide no air cover for North Vietnam, Whiting argues that this timing dovetails with a major personnel change in the Chinese leadership: "At some point between May and September Luo Ruiqing fell from office, after which Lin Biao published a major treatise on guerrilla war implicitly rejecting Luo's forward strategy and with it any advanced air combat. Chinese ground support apparently came as a substitute form of help for Hanoi." Whiting, "Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy," 516. In fact, Luo did not fall from office until December 1965.

69. Michael H. Hunt has also criticized the emphasis on factions to account for Chinese foreign policy formation. He poses the question sharply: "Does the factional model transpose on China the competitive ethos of American politics and underestimate the restraining authoritarian and hierarchical qualities of China's political culture?" See Michael H. Hunt, "CCP Foreign Policy: 'Normalizing the Field," in Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds., Toward a History of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program, 1995), 163-191. The quotation is on p. 170.

70. For Mao's statements on the "Two Intermediate Zones," see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 506-509. See also Chi Aiping, "The Evolution of Mao Zedong's International Strategic Thought," in Dangde wenxian 3 (1994), 46-52; Li Jie, "Study of Mao Zedong's International Strategic Thought," in the International Strategic Studies Foundation, ed., Huanqiu tongci liangre [All Is the Same in the World] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1993), 116.

71. Mao Zedong, "Talks with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 4:99.

72. For a recent study of China's policy toward Angola and Mozambique, see Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93,” The China Quarterly 143 (June 1995), 387-422.

73. On Beijing's attempt to divide the Soviet-led bloc, see the putative memoirs of Enver Hoxha, Reflections on China, 2 vols., (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1979). For an overview of Chinese-Albanian relations, see Fan Chengzuo, "The 'Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter' in Chinese-Albanian Relations," Waijiao xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Foreign Affairs College] 3 (1993), 50-52.

74. Mao's conversation with the Chilean Journalist Delegation, 23 June 1964, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 529-533.

75. Mao's talk with delegates from Asia, Africa, and Oceania on 9 July 1964, in ibid, 534-539. These delegates came to China after participating in Pyongyang in the Second Asian Economic Forum.

76. For a good discussion of anti-imperialism in Chinese foreign policy, see Edward Friedman, "Anti-Imperialism in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post Cold War Era, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 60-74.

77. Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat, 161. 78. For a detailed, first-hand account of Zhou Enlai's visit to Moscow, see Yu Zhan, “An Unusual Visit: Remembering Zhou Enlai's Last Visit to the Soviet Union," Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 2 (1992), 85-91. It is also included in the Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., XinZhongguo waijiaofengyun [Episodes of New China's Diplomacy] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 3:14-30. Yu Zhan was Director of the Department of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 1964 and accompanied Zhou to Moscow. 79. The PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 428.

80. Zhou's conversation with Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan, 1 March 1965, in ibid., 438.

81. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 196566, 54.

82. The Vietnamese claim is quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Secrets of Former Friends," Far Eastern Economic Review (15 June 1979), 38-39. I have not seen any Chinese material that confirms the Vietnamese claim. 83. Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 [A Diplomatic History of China: The Period of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1988), 344.

84. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 196566,55.

85. Douglas Pike describes Hanoi's strategy to put the Sino-Soviet dispute to its own use in service of its war as "the alternating tilt gambit." See Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 54-55.

86. For Mao's reaction to Dulles' policy, see Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollections of Certain Important Decisions and Events], vol.

2 (Beijing: CCP Party School Press, 1993), 1137-1157. 87. For more discussions of Mao's attempt to use the escalation of the Indochina conflict to radicalize China's political and social life, see Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 361-365.

88. For a description of this problem, see Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model," 712-713. 89. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 60-68. 90. Ibid., 74-75.

91. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 102. 92. Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 607.

93. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung." The China Quarterly 35 (July-September 1968), 58-77; Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66, 285-304.

94. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 196566, 298-299. For Zhou's reception of the Vietnamese delegation led by Le Duan, see The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 491. 95. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 93-94, 96.

96. Garver, "The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War," 75.

97. Yang Chengwu.

98. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly journal published by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and the Central Archives. It often contains important party documents

99. Chief of Staff.

100. Deputy Prime Minister, Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation. 101. Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation. 102. Luo was also named Deputy Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation. 103. Mao Zedong.

104. Zhou Enlai.

105. These are the names of Chinese missiles.

106. A major railway trunk running east and west between Lianyungang and Lanzhou.

107. A major railway trunk running north and south between Beijing and Wuhan.

108. A major railway trunk running north and south between Tianjin and Nanjing. 109. A province in North China.

110. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Pham Van Dong.

Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn University at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994). This article is adapted from a paper prepared for presentation at the CWI HP Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia at the University of Hong Kong on 9-12 January 1995.

GAIDUK

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palpable improvement in Soviet-American relations following the shared fright of the 1962 Caribbean (Cuban missile) crisis, the Kremlin sought to minimize Soviet involvement in the Vietnam conflict, which was not only problematic from the viewpoint of possible foreign-policy advantages but was also fraught with possible new clashes between the USSR and the USA. Moreover, the Soviet leaders were apprehensive of radical views held by North Vietnam's leaders, who had a clearly pro-Chinese orientation.

The extent of the difference in the positions held by the two countries became clear after a visit to Moscow in Jan.-Feb. 1964 by a delegation of the Workers Party of Vietnam (WPV), led by Le Duan, the party's First Secretary. The DRV Communists came out in support of their Chinese colleagues with such zeal and expressed such radical ideas about the role of the national liberation movement in Third World countries that their Moscow interlocutors were obliged to switch from "the patient explanation of the CPSU stand and the general line of the world communist movement" to direct warnings about the possible consequences such views could have for "the Vietnamese friends"" relations with the Soviet Union.3

Further evidence that the two sides were slowly but surely drifting apart surfaced during a July 1964 visit to Moscow by an NLF delegation at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The representatives of the patriotic forces of South Vietnam presented to the Soviet leaders a number of requests and proposals, including requests for increased supplies of arms and ammunition. They also expressed a desire that a permanent mission of the NFLSV be opened in the USSR. The CPSU CC viewed skeptically all those requests. In his report to the CC about that delegation's visit, D. Shevlyagin, deputy head of the CC International Department, advised that no definite answer about the opening of such a mission be given and that all talks be held exclusively via the North Vietnamese state agencies. In view of this, it was decided not to receive the delegation at the CPSU CC, for that would have raised the awkward necessity for the Kremlin leaders to state in clear terms their stand on the above-mentioned issues. CC Secretary Boris Ponomarev, who was the

curator of relations between the CPSU and other parties, accepted that advice.4

Meanwhile, faced with the Soviet leadership's unwillingness to plunge into the Southeast Asian conflict, Hanoi redoubled its efforts to improve relations with China. According to the information of the Soviet Defense Ministry, PRC and DRV officials opened talks in 1964 on a bilateral treaty of military cooperation. North Vietnam hosted a delegation of PRC military leaders, led by the Defense Minister, and in December 1964 a bilateral treaty was signed which provided for the introduction of PRC troops to the DRV.5 Prior to that, the DRV General Staff had informed the Soviet military attaché in Hanoi that there was no longer any need for Soviet military experts to stay in the country and they should leave the DRV without replacement by other Soviet advisors as soon as they completed their current business.6 The rapprochement between Hanoi and Beijing was facilitated by common views on the need to fight against "U.S. imperialism." Although the North Vietnamese leaders never fully trusted China (as later conflicts demonstrated), coolness in relations with the Soviet Union predetermined their official position.7

Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 marked a turning point in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations.8 For reasons that remain unclear, the Soviet Union made an aboutface and again oriented itself toward closer cooperation with North Vietnam. Probably Leonid I. Brezhnev and his entourage feared a loss of Soviet influence in the region, particularly in the context of the mounting differences between Beijing and Moscow which threatened to develop into an open conflict. In that context, the consolidation of China's position in Southeast Asia at the USSR's expense posed a potential threat to the Soviet authority in the world communist movement. Furthermore, the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in November 1963 and advent to power of Lyndon B. Johnson (whose election as president in 1964 was regarded in the USSR as an indicator of greater right-wing influence in American politics) dimmed the hopes of improvement in Soviet-American relations that had arisen in the last year of Kennedy's life. This development offered a certain freedom of action to Moscow's new leadership, which had reverted to the policy of confrontation-a policy which was, in turn,

facilitated by Johnson's escalation of U.S. on only one communist patron. Rather, after involvement in Vietnam.

From late 1964 on, Soviet policy with respect to Vietnam pursued several goals. First and foremost, the USSR emphasized moral and political support to what it described as the Vietnamese people's war against American aggression. The Soviet mass media now promptly and frequently carried official statements by Soviet leaders denouncing U.S. aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, no longer delaying as it had with TASS's statement on the Tonkin Gulf incident. Steps were taken to expand contacts both with Hanoi and representatives of the South Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, accordingly, the CPSU CC now approved the opening in Moscow (at the Soviet AfroAsian Solidarity Committee), on 24 December 1964, of a permanent mission of the NFLSV.

Second, Soviet material assistance (economic and, primarily, military) to the DRV and NLF expanded. Soviet military supplies in the period from 1963 to 1967 (particularly after 1965) exceeded one billion rubles, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi. 10 Prior to 1965, German models of arms were sent to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union, but from then on the Kremlin provided only Soviet-made arms to the "Vietnamese friends," including the latest designs of surface-to-air missiles, jet planes, rockets, and field artillery, as well as a large array of especially sophisticated arms and combat hardware for the DRV air defense system. 11 And Soviet economic and military assistance to Vietnam kept on increasing. According to estimates of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, by 1968 Soviet material assistance accounted for 50 percent of all aid to the DRV, and as of 1 January 1968 the total value of Soviet assistance over that period was in excess of 1.8 billion rubles, with military supplies accounting for 60 percent. 12

Such a turnabout in Soviet policy with respect to cooperation with Vietnam was received with satisfaction by the Hanoi leaders, who increasingly stressed the importance of Soviet moral, political, and material assistance in their conversations with the officials of the Soviet Embassy and those of other socialist countries. However, the North Vietnamese leaders' appreciation for this largesse by no means signified that they would now take the USSR's side in the SinoSoviet dispute, or otherwise rely exclusively

Moscow changed its attitude to the DRV, Hanoi took steps to secure maximum profit by exploiting its friendship with both of its mighty allies-the PRC and the USSR-as they competed for influence in Southeast Asia. Precisely this policy was pursued by the WPV Central Committee grouping which was formed in late 1964-early 1965 and included Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap.13 This group sought to rid North Vietnam of China's excessive wardship, on the one hand, and, on the other, to avoid any kind of dependence on the Soviet Union. As a result, in that period reports by Soviet representatives in Vietnam, the USSR Defense Ministry, and the KGB regarding reduced Chinese influence in the DRV were accompanied by complaints of insincerity, egoism unmanageability on the part of "the Vietnamese friends.”

For instance, back in 1966, in his analysis of the prospects of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Ilya Shcherbakov pointed out: "Just as before, the Embassy believes that the process of promotion of our relations with the WPV and the DRV will hardly be steady or rapid in view of the policy pursued by the Vietnamese comrades. This was, regrettably, confirmed in the past few years. Even the manifestation of a more serious discord between the WPV and the Communist Party of China will not probably mean automatic or proportionate Soviet-Vietnamese rapprochement. The year 1966 showed once more that we are obliged constantly to display initiative and unilaterally, as it were, drag the Vietnamese comrades to greater friendship and independence." The ambassador then stressed the "general positive nature" of the WPV's tendency for independence but WPV's tendency for independence but pointed to its negative aspects, primarily to indications that the Vietnamese conducted its foreign policy, including its relations. with Moscow, from a narrow, nationalistic viewpoint. Soviet aid was regarded by Hanoi exclusively from the standpoint of their benefit to Vietnam, rather than for the good of the international socialist cause. 14

This undercurrent of tension in SovietNorth Vietnamese relations, produced by what Moscow viewed as Hanoi's parochial perspective, cropped up repeatedly. In 1966, for example, the North Vietnamese expressed for example, the North Vietnamese expressed indignation at the partial reduction of Soviet

and U.S. military contingents in Germany. Why? Because, they explained, the Soviet troops had allegedly been transferred to the Soviet-Chinese border, which provoked tensions there and diverted Beijing from North Vietnamese military requirements, and the U.S. troops were immediately transferred to South Vietnam. 15

The Vietnamese side's egoism and its desire (in the words of a Soviet Embassy political letter) “to have a monopoly on the correct assessment and methods of solution to the Vietnam conflict," often verged on cynicism. Indicative in this respect was a complaint by the Soviet Ministry of Commercial Shipping, dated 18 July 1966, sent to the CPSU CC, in connection with the actions by the Vietnamese in Haiphong, the DRV's chief port. The port authorities, the ministry complained, had artificially delayed the unloading of Soviet vessels, evidently believing that the longer they held the largetonnage vessels flying the Soviet flag in the port and its vicinity, the less risk of damage they would run of U.S. bombing raids. Moreover, they usually placed those Soviet vessels in close proximity to the most dangerous areas (e.g., near anti-aircraft guns), in hopes of ensuring their safety during air raids. Moreover, during air raids Vietnamese military boats lurking behind Soviet vessels fired at the enemy, thus making the Soviet "shields" the targets of U.S. bombers (and those vessels contained loads of cargoes meant as assistance to “the embattled Vietnamese people"). The clearly outraged ministry officials demanded that Soviet commercial vessels be kept out of danger while discharging their noble mission. 16

No less complicated was the situation concerning Soviet-North Vietnamese military cooperation. The USSR Defense Ministry and embassy in Hanoi repeatedly informed Moscow about "the Vietnamese friends' insincere attitude" toward the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, and the Soviet Defense Ministry. They pointed out that they received slanted reports from the People's Army of (North) Vietnam regarding the situation in South Vietnam, belittling the role and importance of Soviet military assistance to the DRV and discrediting the performance of Soviet arms and military hardware. They also reported that the North Vietnamese had raised obstacles in the way of Soviet military experts who wished to inspect U.S. military hardware, and displayed

other signs of distrust and suspiciousness toward Soviet Defense Ministry representatives. The Soviet leadership was informed about violations of storage rules for Soviet military hardware, wasteful use of missiles and ammunition, and neglect of Soviet experts' advice on the rules of exploitation of military hardware, which led to its spoilage. All this coincided with Hanoi's requests for more assistance, but the DRV leaders evidently saw no contradiction in this: It was pointed out in the 1970 political report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi that, while "attaching great importance to the Soviet military assistance, the command of the People's Army of Vietnam at the same time regarded it exclusively as the obligatory discharge of its internationalist duty by the Soviet Union."17

All the above-mentioned facts suggest how complicated and contradictory SovietVietnamese relations were, and demonstrate the great discrepancy between the scale of Soviet assistance to Vietnam and the degree of Soviet influence on Hanoi's policy. As a Vietnamese journalist in his conversation with M. Ilyinsky, an Izvestia correspondent, put it: "Do you know," the Vietnamese journalist asked, "what is the Soviet Union's share in total assistance, received by Vietnam, and what is the share of Soviet political influence there (if the latter can be measured in percent)? The respective figures are: 7580 percent and 4-8 percent." The Soviet journalist noted: "If the Vietnamese journalist has exaggerated the former figures (by 15-20 percent), the share of Soviet influence is probably correct."18

Sino-Vietnamese relations were no less complicated and contradictory. That Moscow monitored their development closely is testified to by the vast number of reports in the CPSU CC archives on this subject, sent by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, the KGB, and the Military Intelligence Agency (GRU) of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. An early sign of the incipient discord between the two countries seems to have appeared in a still-classified 21 February 1966 KGB report to the CPSU CC stating that Chinese leaders were concerned about the WPV's increasingly independent foreign policy, especially in relations with the PRC and the conduct of the war. 19 And the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi pointed out in its 1966 report that, although the WPV tendency to settle the Vietnam issue inde

pendently from China was not yet pronounced, the DRV's trust in Beijing had already been undermined. However, the report admitted that one could hardly hope for the WPV leadership to display initiative to opt for one patron over the other, for "the comrades probably have not yet risen to the comrades probably have not yet risen to the level of clear-cut choice.” In view of this, the Soviet Embassy set itself the task "to render all-round assistance to the Vietnam leadership in its adoption of an independent stand on the issues of home and foreign policy." That "independent" policy naturally was meant to be independent from China, for the report then underlined the need "to react more firmly to any action by Vietnamese comrades which may be directly or indirectly damaging to Soviet-Vietnamese friendship."20

Sino-Vietnamese contradictions tended to sharpen as the DRV leadership came to realize the need for a diplomatic settlement with the USA. The DRV's consent to hold talks with Washington in 1968 profoundly irritated Beijing, which was dead-set against any compromise settlement leading to a cessation of hostilities. To advance its more militant policy, the Chinese leaders began to expand separate contacts (bypassing Hanoi) expand separate contacts (bypassing Hanoi) with the NLF, urging it to carry on protracted warfare. Moreover, the PRC started to obstruct carriages of Soviet arms and ammunition delivered by rail through Chinese territory, with the express aim of undermining Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Although the PRC leadership's approach to the talks issue later softened, Sino-Vietnamese relations remained strained.

Although discord between the Beijing and Hanoi leaderships affected Sino-Vietnamese relations, no major conflict between the two countries threatened a complete rupture during the course of the war. Vietnam still needed Chinese assistance and support, so it took steps to reduce or contain the level of tensions. The DRV's party and government leaders, as before, regularly visited Beijing to discuss with "the Chinese friends" important foreign policy issues. No matter how riled, Hanoi carefully avoided giving categorical assessments of Chinese policy either regarding the world communist movement or Soviet-Chinese relations. "The WPV leaders realize full well," the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi explained to Moscow, "that China is situated quite close to Vietnam, whereas the Soviet Union is far away. Viet

nam would be hard put to do without Chinese assistance in its struggle and in future peaceful construction. So it would be premature to ask the Vietnamese now to state their clear-cut position with respect to the USSR and China."21 And the following fact is quite indicative: Hanoi named Xuan Thuy, well-known for his pro-Chinese views and a past president of the Vietnamese-Chinese Friendship Association, as the head of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks.

The details of relations among the USSR, DRV, and PRC also throw light on the Soviet Union's relations with the USA. Soviet leaders could hardly react indifferently or simplistically to the Vietnam conflict and the dramatic escalation of American military activity in Southeast Asia. From a purely propaganda viewpoint, the conflict played into Soviet hands. While U.S. support for an unpopular neo-colonial regime in Saigon offered a ripe target for condemnation and undermined Washington's international stature, the USSR could simultaneously pose as a consistent fighter for the triumph of a just cause, acting in the spirit of proletarian internationalism-as evidenced by its moral-political, economic, and military assistance to North Vietnam—and also as a potential mediator in the forging of a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, the likely protracted nature of the conflict promised to sap the strength of the Soviet Union's principal rivals, distracting the United States and China and thereby enhancing Soviet security interests in other regions (especially Europe and the Soviet Far East).

Yet the Vietnam War also presented long-term difficulties and dangers for Moscow, especially to the extent that there was a real threat of its escalating from a local into a world war, if (as was sometimes speculated) the USA were driven to desperation and resorted to the use of nuclear weapons. In that case, the USSR could hardly have kept neutral-and yet retaliating against the United States might have led to disastrous consequences. All the same, even if no nuclear conflict broke out, the risk of a direct clash between the two superpowers arising from the Southeast Asian crisis was too great and this was precisely what the Soviet leadership wished to avoid at all costs. Plus, to the extent Kremlin leaders genuinely desired an improvement in relations with Washington, the war would inevitably serve as a distraction and potential sticking point.

There were naturally other "pros” and "cons" which Moscow must have taken into account in determining its policy toward the struggle: Military factors constituted one major positive incentive favoring a more active Soviet involvement, according to archival documents. There were two principal, interconnected perceived opportunities: Vietnam offered a live battlefield testing ground for Soviet military hardware, including the latest models, and also a chance to obtain a windfall of hard information about up-to-date U.S. weaponry, by inspecting the war booty captured or obtained by the DRV forces. The North Vietnamese air defense was fully equipped with modern Soviet hardware, whose effectiveness was shown by the fact that even the Vietnamese personnel managed to operate it successfully, despite a frequent lack of training or competence. Those systems were being constantly improved, taking into account the capabilities of U.S. warplanes.22 Apart from the antiaircraft defense system, the archival documents note, the North Vietnamese used the Soviet-made Grad artillery shelling systems, which were highly effective in attacks on U.S. bases, airfields, ammunition depots, etc.,23 as well as MiG-21 jets.

The Soviet military also relished the opportunity to pore over the latest U.S. military hardware. In accordance with a SovietNorth Vietnamese agreement signed in the spring of 1965, the Vietnamese undertook to transfer to the USSR models of captured U.S. military hardware for inspection. All difficulties notwithstanding, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, a total of 700 models were delivered to the USSR between May 1965 and January 1967. The embassy pointed out that the work done was very valuable: the CPSU CC adopted a decision to apply in Soviet industry of a number of selected and studied models.24

However, apart from obvious assets the USSR gained in the course of the Vietnam War, its expenditures were likewise enormous, primarily in the sphere of ever increasing material assistance to Vietnam. (See the figures cited above.) In 1966-1968 the Soviet Union undertook to render to the DRV economic assistance to the tune of 121.6 million rubles, but in fact the assistance was far greater in view of Hanoi's incessant requests for additional supplies. In 1968 Soviet assistance to the DRV totaled 524 million rubles, with 361 million rubles

transferred as a gift. Soviet assistance in 1969 was planned to remain on the same level (525 million rubles), but with the opening of peace talks and reduction of the scale of hostilities in Vietnam, part of the funds originally assigned for military deliveries was reallocated for other purposes, so Soviet assistance to Vietnam in 1969 totaled 370 million rubles and in 1970, 316 million rubles. 25

One negative factor, from the Soviet leaders' viewpoint, in decision-making on aid to the DRV was what they saw as the Vietnamese allies' unmanageability and unpredictability. Hanoi's independent course in relations with the USSR hardly inspired Moscow to greater enthusiasm in its support for the war, and as time went on, those Vietnamese properties might have led to undesirable consequences-perhaps an open break. So from that standpoint, at least, Moscow had every reason to favor an early cease-fire and political solution.

In fact, the hope for a peaceful settlement was shared by both Soviet and American leaders, and their tactics on this issue, paradoxically enough, were surprisingly similar. However, the Soviet government backed a settlement on Hanoi's terms, whereas the U.S. sought to ensure the maximum consideration of the Saigon government's interests. Moreover, of course, as a direct participant in the conflict, the United States could not possibly play the part of an arbiter, which remained a privilege of the Soviet Union. For this reason, with U.S. armed forces directly involved in hostilities, the Johnson Administration was obliged to rely on intermediaries in its attempts to convince Hanoi to sit down at the negotiating table rather than pursue a purely military outcome. And in this respect Washington pinned much of its hopes on the Soviet Union.26

U.S. leaders had every reason for such hopes, for they believed that since the USSR rendered massive and ever-growing military and economic assistance to Vietnam (of which Washington was well aware),27 so the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the DRV leadership. Both Johnson and, after January 1969, his successor Richard M. Nixon were convinced that Moscow would press Hanoi to agree to open negotiations, once Washington: 1) demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the Vietnam War was hardly in its interests; 2) seduced it by the

promise of cooperation with the United States; or, better still, 3) warned it that if Soviet cooperation were not forthcoming the United States might resort to rapprochement with China—or some optimal combination of all those approaches. When in retirement, Johnson disclosed his calculations as president in a conversation at his Texas ranch with Soviet citizens that was reported to the Kremlin leadership by the KGB in December 1969. The USSR could be instrumental in helping the United States to bring the Vietnam War to a conclusion, Johnson argued, for "if we take Soviet strategic, not tactical, interests, the end of the Vietnam War fully accords with the Soviet Union's interests," considering that, "after all, it is the United States, not Vietnam, which is the main partner of the USSR." And Johnson rejected the argument that the Soviet Union was not in a position to exert pressure on the DRV as groundless from the viewpoint of realpolitik. "It's highly doubtful for a country supplying Vietnam with 75 percent of [its] arms not to have real levers of influence on it," the ex-president was quoted as saying,28

Thus, the problem, from the U.S. perspective, consisted only in discovering how best to approach Moscow. The United States might have acted through official channels, since although Soviet-American relations were rather cool at that time, they were maintained. And the United States certainly probed what could be done in that direction. For instance, at an August 1966 meeting between Colonel C.C. Fitzgerald, a military attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, with officers of the Department of External Relations of the Soviet Defense Ministry, the American stressed the important role the USSR could play in the settlement of the Vietnam conflict as the initiator of and active mediator in peace negotiations. Col. Fitzgerald drew the attention of his interlocutors to the Johnson Administration's constant efforts to open talks, stating that the visit to Moscow of Senator Mike Mansfield and Averell Harriman's appointment as a special presidential advisor aimed at precisely this purpose.29 However, worried that a formal, top-level overture to Moscow might result in a rebuff or even denunciation by the Kremlin leaders, the White House opted not to run the risk, but to first sound out Soviet officials in order to ascertain their attitudes and try to reach agreement unoffi

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