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amount of work with the French.” The main reasonably conclude that the USSR did its States Anatoly F.Dobrynin reported to Mosfactor behind Hanoi's choice of the French utmost to ensure a favorable outcome of the cow: “All indications are that his [Nixon's] capital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “the talks, naturally with due account of its own attempts to convince the USSR to help the opportunity to maintain contacts with Mos- interests.
USA in the settlement of the (Vietnam) cow from it.”45
Moscow continued to play an important conflict, will be repeated in the future, and The same factor was taken into account role at the Paris talks after Nixon came to this will probably be felt in the course of our by Moscow, which faced the task of keeping power in 1969. The Soviet leaders kept talks with this administration on other interthe sides at the negotiating table. With this abreast of the latest developments and did national issues, if not directly, then at least in aim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constant their best to influence the Vietnamese posi- the form of procrastination in the course of pressure on North Vietnam not to disrupt tion through the services of the USSR em- such talks or in decision-making on other the process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CC bassies in Hanoi and Paris. At his regular issues."50 and Soviet government sent a letter to the meetings with the leaders of the DRV and In this respect, however, former CIA WPV CC and DRV government stressing NLF delegations, the Soviet Ambassador in chief William Colby was probably right that the Paris talks were vitally important France, V.Zorin, asked the Vietnamese what when he wrote in his memoirs about his deep for achieving a settlement of the Vietnam questions they considered it necessary for
questions they considered it necessary for skepticism with respect to the Soviet Union's issue. The Soviet leaders also emphasized him to raise in his conversations with the ability to exert pressure on its friends, who that they were living through an important U.S. delegation. At the same time, Zorin were “stubborn and full of determination."51 period from the viewpoint of opportunities expressed his "desire" for the Vietnamese
expressed his “desire” for the Vietnamese Nevertheless, in spite of its limited opportufor diplomatic struggle, offering to put the side to put forward some specific proposals
side to put forward some specific proposals nities, the USSR managed to make a considentire weight of Soviet authority in the world on military issues and for the NLF to elabo- erable contribution to the peaceful settlein order to triumph in the political and rate a specific diplomatic program. Simulta- ment of the Vietnam conflict. So the signing diplomatic contest.46 In an effort to influ- neously, the Soviet ambassador in the DRV, of the bilateral agreement by the DRV and ence the North Vietnamese side and as a Shcherbakov, warned "the Vietnamese USA, on 27 January 1973, on the end of hedge against the DRV's sometimes unpre- friends" against following an extremist path, hostilities and restoration of peace in Vietdictable behavior, the Soviet Embassy in such as the temptation to pursue a purely nam, irrespective of all its weak points, was Hanoi offered to send experts on Vietnam- propagandist policy or to resort exclusively an important result of the efforts of Soviet ese affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Paris.47 to military methods in relations with the diplomacy as well. Moreover, Moscow reached an agreement USA.49
In conclusion, in assessing Soviet policy with the DRV leadership for the Vietnam- Richard Nixon's victory in the 1968 toward the Vietnam War in the 1964-1973 ese regularly to inform Moscow on the elections marked a turning point in U.S. period, including in the sphere of Sovietsituation at the talks and their future strat- policy toward the USSR, as the incoming American ties, it may be asserted that in spite egy, tactics, and plans. In turn, the USSR administration made every effort to obtain of all the difficulties, complications, and gave the Vietnamese exhaustive informa- greater Soviet involvement and cooperation human costs associated with the conflict in tion about U.S. intentions.
in the process of achieving a peaceful settle- Southeast Asia, the superpowers avoided Nevertheless, despite its promises, ment in Vietnam. The newly elected U.S. grave crises, upheavals, or direct confrontaHanoi on several occasions confronted Mos- president and his national security adviser, tions in their bilateral relations—thus precow with a fait accompli. Yet, having Henry A. Kissinger, decided that all prob- serving a degree of general international "forgotten” to inform its ally about a planned lems in Soviet-American relations were stability and paving the way toward the action, the Vietnamese leadership neverthe- linked to the Soviet stand on the Vietnam U.S.-Soviet détente of the early-mid-1970s. less insisted on Moscow's immediate sup- issue. And if efforts in Moscow did not port. This happened, for instance, when the quickly or sufficiently pay dividends, Nixon 1. Space precludes a full listing of relevant titles here: NLF published its program of ten points and and Kissinger were prepared not to miss an
for detailed references see Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet
Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, established the Provisional Revolutionary opportunity to play "the Chinese card” to
forthcoming ). Government of South Vietnam (RSV PRG). make the Soviet leaders more tractable. 2. According to data of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Although Le Duc Tho met with Kosygin on Like his predecessors, Nixon was con- Affairs, in the period from 1961 to 1966 the Soviet the eve of the program's publication (during vinced that the USSR had unlimited control
Union supplied the NLF via the DRV as disinterested
assistance 130 recoilless weapons and mortars, 1400 a stopover in Moscow on his way to Paris), over Hanoi's policy and that as soon as it
machine guns, and 54,500 fire-arms with ammunition. the leading DRV negotiator never men- issued the appropriate orders, the Vietnam- Prior to 1965 the USSR supplied to North Vietnam tioned the planned steps. 48
ese leaders would be ready, willing, and German models of arms. (Top Secret Memorandum of However, in attempting to convince obliged to conclude the talks. As a result,
the Southeast Asia Department, USSR Foreign Minis
try, “Soviet Moral and Political Support of and Material Soviet leaders to exert greater pressure on each time the Paris talks reached a blind
Aid to the South Vietnam Patriots," 24 March 1966, Vietnam to achieve progress in the talks, alley, the White House turned to Moscow to SCCD, fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 50, delo (d.) 777, listy (II.) U.S. officials often forced an open door help find an acceptable escape route. After a 58-59.) This aid supplemented the economic assistance Assessing the steps taken by Moscow for meeting with Kissinger on 12 June 1969,
Moscow rendered to the DRV. China, in turn, in the
period from 1955 to 1965, supplied the DRV with the settlement of the Vietnam conflict along- when the American openly asked the USSR
economic assistance to the total value of 511.8 million side the difficulties it encountered in deal- for assistance to overcome the latest crisis in rubles, including 302.5 million rubles as gift. (Memoing with Hanoi's foreign policy, one may the talks, Soviet Ambassador in the United randum of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, "CPR's
(Chinese People's Republic's] Economic Assistance to the Socialist Countries,” 30 March 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 254, 1. 172.) 3. Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to France, SCCD, f. 4, op. 18, d. 582, St.-95/462 g., 14 February 1964. 4. International Department of the CPSU CC to the CC, 25 July 1964, SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, 1. 163-164. 5. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Defense to the CPSU CC, 14 July 1967, SCCD, f. 4, op. 59, d. 416, I. 119-120. 6. Top Secret Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, “On the Political Situation in South Vietnam and the Position of the DRV,” 19 November 1964, SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, 1. 253. 7. See, e.g. Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 157. 8. For further analysis of the impact of Khrushchev's overthrow on Soviet policy toward Vietnam, see the paper presented by Ilya V. Gaiduk to the conference on the Vietnam War held in October 1993 at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. 9. A memo, sent to the CPSU CC by I. Shchedrov, a Pravda correspondent in Southeast Asia, may serve as an indirect basis for such suppositions. In it Shchedrov analyzes the situation in the region in the first half of the 1960s from the viewpoint of Soviet and Chinese influence on the events in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. He not only criticizes the Soviet Union's restraint, shown before the end of 1964, and expresses concern in view of stepped-up activities by the PRC in those countries, but also offers a series of measures to improve the situation. In their time the top CPSU leadership familiarized themselves with that memo, and the following note by Boris Ponomarev testifies to this: "Please read this memo and submit proposals and measures on issues which call for them.” (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264.) 10. Political Report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 1. 148. 11. Memorandum, "Soviet Moral and Political Support,” SCCD, f.5, op. 50, d. 773, 1.59; Soviet Embassy in Hanoi Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 1. 148. 12. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 331, 1. 26. 13. Shchedrov Memorandum, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264, 1. 96. 14. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 1. 130. 15. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Embassy in Hanoi interpreter M. Isaev and Ho Hai Thuy, 25 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 261, 1. 167. 16. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Commercial Shipping for the CPSU CC, 18 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 1. 38-41. The report by the Ministry of Commercial Shipping was a source of concern by the Soviet leadership. It was decided to make use of the information contained in it, in the course of talks with the DRV party and government delegation to be held in Moscow (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 1. 43). 17. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, 1. 109. 18. Memorandum from Izvestia correspondent M. llyinskii for CPSU CC, 29 January 1968, SCCD, f. 5., op. 60, d. 368, 1. 19. 19. Memorandum from Committee of State Security (KGB), 21 February 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 511. Regrettably, this document is kept in a “special dossier,” so we have had no opportunity as yet to study it. 20. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966,
SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 1. 141, 259. 21. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, 1. 104. 22. A memo by Defense Minister Grechko to Brezhnev serves as testimony to this fact. Grechko wrote that on 30 March 1968 a U.S. F-111 A plane was brought down by an anti-aircraft Dvina complex in the area of Hanoi. He also mentioned measures, adopted by Soviet experts to improve the anti-aircraft complexes after they had obtained information about the use of high-speed aircraft (up to 3700 km per hour) by the US air forces (SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 232, 11. 9-10). 23. Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Southeast Asia Department S. Nemchina and Head of the NFLSV Permanent Mission in Moscow Dang Cuong Minh, 2 September 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 416, 1. 139. 24. Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, 14 March 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 329,1. 43. 25. Memorandum from the State Committee on the Economic Relations (GKES), “On the Economic and Technical Assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” 29 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 11. 54-55; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, 1.48; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459,1. 123; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, 1. 104. 26. Washington's first attempts to reach agreement with the DRV leaders were made back in 1962, under President Kennedy's administration, so we can only suppose what could be the results of those contacts, had President Kennedy been alive. A. Goodman, for instance, believes that as a result of President Kennedy's assassination, the USA lost an opportunity to reach agreement with Hanoi.(A.E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), 14.) 27. To this testifies the KGB information of President Johnson's talks with Italian Foreign Minister A. Fanfani (SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 690, 1. 93). 28. KGB Memorandum, 11 December 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 558, 1. 178-179. 29. Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), USSR Ministry of Defense, to CPSU CC, 23 August 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 262, 11. 237-238. (For an English translation of this document, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993) 61-62.) 30. The most complete records of these and other secret Vietnam peace efforts during the period 1964-68, based on classified U.S. government records, can be found in George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983). MARIGOLD and SUNFLOWER are covered in greater detail, using additional Soviet and U.S. sources, in Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (forthcoming). 31. KGB Memoranda, 5 and 21 July 1965 and 7 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 379, 389, 533. 32. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 33. Political letters from Soviet embassies were in fact detailed reports of the situation in the respective countries, their domestic and foreign policy, and usually written in connection with particular events. 34. Political Letter, "Soviet-North Vietnamese Relations after the April 1968 Talks,” 1 September 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, 1. 114; see also SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, 11. 129, 131-132, 133.
35. Memorandum from B. Ponomarev for the CPSU CC, “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends," attached to resolution of the CPSUCC Secretariat, SCCD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1240, Art. No. 113/10, 12 February 1974. 36. Sometimes the situation looked simply ridiculous. Mentioned in the list of materials, included in “special dossiers," is the draft decision on the reply to Le Duan's personal message to Brezhnev, presented by the CC Department and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 December 1974. There is the following note on the card of that document, written by Brezhnev's aide, Alexandrov: “to C-de K.U. Chernenko. Leonid Ilyich asked to hold a vote on this proposal (he has not read the text).” It turns out that top Soviet leaders signed documents either having learned the gist of the document at best, or having read only its title. 37. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Hanoi P. Privalov and Chairman of the Lao Dong Party's Committee on the Unification of the Country Nguyen Van Minh, 23 August 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264, 11. 173-174. 38. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, 1. 259. 39. For details, see Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, and Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (forthcoming). 40. KGB Memorandum, 28 January 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 680; Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador Shcherbakov and DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 15 February 1967,SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, 1. 145. 41. USSR Foreign Ministry, list of questions on which the Vietnamese comrades were informed, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, 1. 15. 42. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “Soviet-North Vietnamese Talks of April 1967 and the Policy of the PTV [Workers' Party of Vietnam) on the Settlement of the Vietnamese Problem,” August 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, 1. 263. 43. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 332, 1. 133-138. 44. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, 1. 30-31. 45. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Charge d'Affaires in the DRV V. Chivilev and Le Duan, 2 May 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 376, 1. 47. 46. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “Soviet-North Vietnamese Relations After the April 1968 Talks," SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, 1. 109. 47. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, 1. 31. 48. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459, 1. 117. 49. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador V. Zorin and Xuan Thuy and Tranh Byu Khiem, 21 February 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 460, 11. 56-60, 131-134. (For an English translation, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 62-63. 50. Memorandum of Conversation between A. Dobrynin and H. Kissinger, 12 June 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 558, 1. 103. (For an English translation of this document, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 63-67.) The contents of this conversation, as the note on the document testifies, were reported to Brezhnev, so the top Soviet leadership had been informed about Washington's intentions. 51. William Colby and James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago, N.Y., 1989), 335.
Ilya V. Gaiduk, a research scholar at the Institute of Universal History (IUH), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, is the author of The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, forthcoming). A recipient of fellowships from CWIHP and the Norwegian Nobel Institute, he originally presented the findings in this article to the January 1993 Conference on New Soviet Evidence on Cold War History in Moscow, organized by CWIHP and IUH. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Oganez V. Marinin, then a staff archivist at SCCD (now at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF]), in locating archival documents for this article.
RESEARCH IN MOSCOW
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Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnamcontinued from page 241
ese would eventually express a willingness to negotiate.
After returning to Warsaw, Michalowski Operation Lumbago
joined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts to
persuade the Vietnamese that a positive sigIn the early morning of 29 December nal of some kind was in their best interests. 1965, Jerzy Michalowski was awakened by Working through U.S. Ambassador John Polish military authorities, who informed Gronouski, they made it clear that a resumphim that U.S. Air Force One, with ambassa- tion of bombing raids in the North would dor Averell Harriman on board, was request- eliminate any chance for peace. Norman ing permission to land in Warsaw. Harriman's Cousins, a personal friend of Lyndon peace mission was part of a broad diplomatic Johnson, tried to play the role of intermedioffensive that coincided with the Christmas
ary in this process, but to no avail. To the bombing halt of 1965. A 14-point peace dismay of the Polish diplomats, the United plan, including immediate face-to-face ne- States resumed bombing raids on January gotiations, was presented to the Poles, with 31, and Operation Lumbago came to an the request that it be passed on to the North unsuccessful end. Vietnamese government. A meeting with Communist Party Secretary Wladislaw Operation Marigold Gomulka followed (Michalowski was not present, but he could hear Gomulka harangu- This was another attempt to bring the ing Harriman through a thick oak door). The United States and North Vietnam together in next day, Michalowski departed for Hanoi, secrecy and with a minimum of precondiwith intermediate stops in Moscow and tions. This time, Polish diplomats worked Beijing. Friends and co-workers were told closely with their colleagues from Italy. that his absence was due to a severe bout of Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end of lumbago.
the operation. Poland's representative to the In Moscow, Michalowski met with For- International Control Commission, Janusz eign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who ex- Lewandowski, Italy's ambassador to South pressed support for the mission, but pre- Vietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Amdicted (correctly) that Chinese leaders would bassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the main try to sabotage it in any way they could. In protagonists in Saigon. Beijing, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Phase I of Marigold developed from a Bingnan angrily denounced any offers of discussion between Lewandowski and Prepeace and condemned Poland's participa- mier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 in tion in the American scheme. Michalowski Hanoi. Lewandowski learned that the North decided to terminate the meeting when Wang Vietnamese would be willing to begin peace became abusive. This stormy session was negotiations, provided the U.S. suspended followed by a lavish banquet, with many the bombing campaign. He relayed this cordial toasts and remarks. Arriving in Hanoi information to Orlandi who, in turn, notified on January 4, Michalowski was met by For- U.S. ambassador Lodge. The American side eign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, whose was anxious to know whether Hanoi would initial response to the American offers was make any overt sign of accommodation (such unenthusiastic. The Vietnamese, he claimed, as refraining from offensive military operawere doing well on the battlefield, and the tions in the South, or reducing traffic along time had not yet come to exploit these suc- the Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bombcesses at the negotiating table. The same ing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polish sentiments were echoed during the next two diplomats could obtain no assurances from days by Prime Minister Phan Van Dong (less Hanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries. . emphatically) and Party Secretary Ho Chi Phase II was a lengthier and more comMinh (in much stronger terms). plex operation that began when ambassador Michalowski's account of these discussions Lodge requested that Lewandowski present makes clear that the Poles were acting as a 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnamstrong advocates of the peace process, pre- ese. This time, an unconditional bombing senting the American plan in as favorable a halt would precede the substantive negotialight as possible. As he left Hanoi, tions. Rapacki and Michalowski under
Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov
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Prof. Alexander 0. Chubarian
stood the importance of this new develop- conveyed to Phan Van Dong by Poland's ment, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid ambassador Siedlecki. The Vietnamese, Brezhnev, who encouraged them to pro- still smarting from the bombing raids of ceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duanwent to early December, and under intense pressure Beijing at about the same time, where he from China, refused to discuss the matter received contradictory advice from Mao any further. Operation Marigold had failed. Zedong and Zhou Enlai.
The great hopes that were raised by Phan Van Dong's reply to Lewandowski Marigold, and its dramatic collapse, gave generated considerable excitement since it rise to many commentaries, explanations, contained a request to arrange an unprec- and to some finger-pointing. In his report, edented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw, Jerzy Michalowski provides a detailed rebetween the Americans and the North Viet- buttal of certain claims made by Henry Cabot namese. Rapacki and Michalowski began a Lodge in his memoirs. Michalowski had the series of consultations with John Gronouski, opportunity to discuss Marigold with Presito set the stage for these critical talks. From dent Johnson in September of 1967. LBJ did the beginning, however, difficulties emerged. not accept Michalowski's interpretation of First, the American side began to express the events, nor would he acknowledge the doubts about certain unspecified details of continuing determination of the North Vietthe 10-point plan as it had been recorded by namese to keep fighting. In time, he would Lewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese gov- change his views. ernment, opposed to any talks, increased its After personally witnessing some of the pressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all, unsuccessful attempts to end America's enthe tempo and brutality of American bomb- tanglement in Vietnam, after discussing the ing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up. events with many of the participants, and On December 13 and 14, the center of the after studying many of the relevant docucity was hit for the first time. Stunned by ments, Michalowski closes his report with a these attacks, the North Vietnamese with- strong indictment of U.S. policy. He is drew their offer to meet. In a dramatic convinced that Lyndon Johnson and his circle confrontation on December 19, when of hawkish advisors never understood how Gronouski accused the Poles of acting in bad diplomatic efforts could lead to the resolufaith, Rapacki's frustration overflowed: he tion of what they saw as an essentially milismashed his glasses down on the table, and tary crisis. Thus, the President's half-hearted they flew into the American ambassador's attempts to seek non-military solutions (such face. Operation Marigold appeared to be as Marigold) were doomed, mocking the dead.
hard work and good will of dozens of comThe Poles continued to hope that a basis mitted professional diplomats all around the for face-to-face talks still existed, however. world. They briefed UN General Secretary U Thant, Here is what Michalowski writes on the who promised to do whatever he could. last page of his report: They also contacted Pope Paul VI (using Italian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary).
Based on newly-revealed The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and to documents and memoirs, we now Washington, begging both sides to save the know that Secretary of State Dean peace process. Gronouski left Warsaw to Rusk was one of the chief “hawks” consult with President Johnson, while in the ornithological roster of PresiRapacki drafted an urgent appeal from mem- dent Johnson's advisors. Thus, the bers of the Polish Politburo to their counter- surprising nature of the event that I parts in Hanoi, calling for a reconsideration now relate in closing this account of the American proposals. As snowstorms of Polish peace initiatives in Vietclosed down airports all over Europe, nam. Gronouski returned to Warsaw unexpect
January 19, 1969 was the eve edly, and requested a meeting with Rapacki of the inauguration of President on Christmas Eve. He announced that all Richard Nixon. The departing Secbombing with 10 miles of the center of retary of State met with the WashHanoi had been suspended, and that he was ington diplomatic corps in a sad, ready to meet with a Vietnamese representa- but formal, ceremony on the sevtive in Warsaw. This message was promptly enth floor of the State Department
building. Following the toasts and sentimental speeches I was preparing to leave, when Dean Rusk's secretary informed me that he would like to have a few words with me in private.
Rusk was subdued as he spoke at length about his upcoming academic work, and his retirement plans. Then he said: "During my long tenure as Secretary of State, I'm sure I made many erroneous judgments and bad decisions. But my intentions were always pure, and I acted according to the dictates of my conscience. Thus, I have no regrets. Except for one thing—that in 1966 we did not take advantage of the opportunities and your role as go-between. We should have begun a negotiating process that, with your help, could have ended a conflict that has cost us so much blood and treasure, and that now has cost us the election. I wanted to say this to you today, to thank you for your efforts, and to ask that you convey my words to Minister Rapacki."
1. (Ed. note: For the declassified U.S. account of Operation Marigold, see George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), 209-370.]
CAMBODIA AND THE COLD WAR
THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL
SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS:
by Kenton J. Clymer
(Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the
Cambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, On a graceful boulevard radiating out Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center for from Wat Phnom in Cambodia's capital, International Human Rights, Yale University.] Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly renovated National Library of Cambodia. Built
Executive Summary by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24 December 1924), the library also housed the The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the country's archives. A separate archives documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of building, located directly behind the Na- Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement tional Library (and thus not visible from the “the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library, Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 it still awaits renovation. Designed with and January 7, 1979." [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year high ceilings, large windows, and electric mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit: ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated the best available technology for preserving 1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress books and manuscripts in tropical climates. Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to
During the French colonial period and organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime's crimes. The after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the 1975, the library and archives were admin-genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian istered jointly. In 1986, however, following Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference, the Vietnamese model, they were separated. chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21 The library is controlled by the Ministry of and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by Information and Culture, while the archives the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal reports to the Council of Ministries. 1 violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in
During the terrible period of the Khmer Cambodia. Cambodia's two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both Rouge (1975-78), the library and archives praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others, were home to pig keepers, who served the including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of Chinese advisers living in the hotel next Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers. door. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gardens. All of the staff from the library and 2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide archives, about forty people, fled. Only a Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators handful survived the Khmer Rouge regime, of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in and only two or three returned to work in the assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian library once the Khmer Rouge were driven genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the out in 1979.
Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites The library's holdings today are only a across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom fraction of what they were in 1975. But comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal may not have systematically destroyed books acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot's and documents.2 To be sure many books 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer were ruined, some simply pushed off the Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare shelves to make room for cooking pots, documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the others used for cooking fires or for cigarette first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages papers.3 Subsequent neglect and misman- on the Pol Pot regime. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of agement made matters worse, arguably much Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal worse. Many books that did survive the resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute Khmer Rouge years were improperly stored this complex research undertaking. and soon succumbed to insects and the elements. Two Australians archivists, Helen 3. Recreating Lost Histories
Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge continued on page 265