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community (see "Scholars Speak out on the CGP's work. His Majesty King Norodom of international law and this clearly affected Cambodia Holocaust," letter to the Wall Sihanouk wrote to CGP Manager Dr. Craig the interests of all states in general and Street Journal, signed by 29 Cambodia Etcheson on 21 July 1995, “I infinitely thank Cambodia in particular.” His Royal Highscholars and specialists, 13 July 1995). These the distinguished promoters of this research ness the First Prime Minister added, “The scholars represent virtually the entire field program, especially Dr. Ben Kiernan and Royal Government is determined to bring of Cambodian studies. Leading Cambodian yourself, for the care that you have mani- those responsible for the perpetration of scholars David P. Chandler, Milton E. fested, thanks to the 'Cambodian Genocide these heinous crimes against the Cambodian Osborne, and Michael Vickery have already Program,' in nourishing truth and promoting people to face justice.” In his closing ad

, provided help in various ways. Others who and assuring respect for human rights in my dress to the conference, His Excellency have responded positively to requests for country.”

Samdech Hun Sen summed up the view of information on their personal archival hold- Since the earliest days of the CGP in many participants by saying of the conferings include Justin Corfield, Mark Dodd, January 1995, the Royal Cambodian Gov- ence, “This is not about politics, it is about Stephen Heder, Henri Locard, and Judy ernment has been unreservedly supportive of ernment has been unreservedly supportive of justice. If we do not bring the Khmer Rouge

. Ledgerwood. Additional Cambodia schol- the mandate given to Yale University by the to justice for killing millions of people, then ars like David Ashley and Jason Roberts U.S. government. The Co-Prime Ministers, there is no point in speaking about human have generously offered to work with the the Deputy Prime Minister, the Co-Ministers rights in Cambodia.” CGP on a volunteer basis.

of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Co- Large numbers of ordinary Cambodian An Australian professional working Ministers of Defense, and the President of citizens seem to concur with the Co-Prime with the CGP has also initiated a project to the National Assembly have all pledged their Ministers. Many Cambodians in Cambodia, begin the computer mapping of Khmer personal and institutional cooperation with the U.S., and other countries have volunRouge prison and mass grave sites. This the CGP. Enthusiasm about the goals of the teered their assistance. Since June 1995, a project has now been funded by the Austra- program transcends political affiliation, with team of Cambodian volunteers in New Halian government at the level of A$24,300. support coming from the leadership of all ven, CT, has been preparing a biographical Additional funding is being sought. This is three parties represented in the government. index of Khmer Rouge political leaders and the first time anyone has attempted to con- But the cooperation of the Royal Govern- military commanders. As of September struct a comprehensive inventory of the ment has gone far beyond pledges. The 1995, Cambodian-American citizens' terror apparatus used by the Khmer Rouge Royal Government is providing the CGP groups in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, regime to murder up to two million people. with a wide range of resources to facilitate


Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, California, and In June, July, and August 1995, CGP our work in Cambodia and in the region at Texas have offered to compile witness testiDirector Ben Kiernan presented the large.

mony on behalf of the CGP. The thirst for Program's work-in-progress at the U.S. Fo- At the Striving for Justice Conference in justice is powerful among the survivors of rum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995, First Pol Pot's genocide. New York), at Monash University and the Prime Minister Samdech Krom Preah Consistent with these feelings of ordiUniversity of New South Wales (in Austra- Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Min- nary Cambodians and the policy of the govlia), and at the Foreign Correspondents' ister Samdech Hun Sen publicly committed ernment, the CGP has received from the Club in Phnom Penh. These occasions all the Royal Cambodian Government to bring Royal Cambodian Government significant produced new collaboration from foreign the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice for assistance to our research program. One of scholars and specialists, ranging from an their crimes against humanity. In his open- the most useful forms of this aid is the offer of a large biographic database to a ing address to the conference, the First Prime unprecedented assistance from the Royal promise of rare photographs of the Pol Pot Minister complimented the CGP, saying, Government in retrieving documentation leadership. The ability of the CGP to attract “On behalf of the Royal Government, on from Vietnam unavailable to researchers up the cooperation of Cambodia scholars, along behalf of Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime until now. In combination with previously with legal and technical experts worldwide, Minister, and on my own behalf, I would like unexamined archives from the Cambodian is a key factor in explaining the success of to express my deepest appreciation and warm- People's Party, Royal Government ministhe Program to date.

est congratulations to the Office of Cambo- tries, and private archives now being opened Cambodian Reception of the CGP. dian Genocide Investigation and Yale Uni- to the CGP in Cambodia, a wealth of new Cambodian leaders have complained for versity for embarking on the two years data pertaining to criminal culpability duryears that the outside world had not recog- programme of documentation, research and ing the Khmer Rouge regime seems destined nized the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and training on the Cambodian genocide. I would to come to light. It is the expressed policy of the tragedy of the Cambodian people. The also like to express my sincere thanks equally the Royal Government to assist the CGP in initiation of the Cambodian Genocide Pro- to the United States to create the Cambodian uncovering such important information. gram helped answer this complaint on an Genocide Justice Act and its appointment of Evaluation. To ensure objectivity and international scale. This measure of recog- Yale University to carry out the two year quality control, the CGP has instituted a

a nition sparked a new willingness among the programme."

rigorous two-tier system of program evaluCambodian political elite to squarely face Substantively, the First Prime Minister ation. In the first tier, the Steering Group of the darkest chapter of Cambodian history. argued, “The international crimes of the the Department of State's Office of CamboCambodians have become full partners in Khmer Rouge violated the most central norms dian Genocide Investigations conducts peri

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odic external reviews of CGP operations.

CAMBODIAN ARCHIVES very unlikely that a reply will be sent even if As a basis for these evaluations, in May 1995

continued from page 260

the letter is received), but I was able to obtain CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson produced

permission in Phnom Penh without great a 209-page Implementation Plan outlining Jarvis and Peter Arfanis, who visited the

difficulty. It may, however, take a few days. the Program's strategy for achieving its ob

archives at the end of 1992 were “dismayed (The first time I applied on the Friday before jectives. The first external evaluation, held at what we saw.... Valuable records from

a holiday week. Nevertheless, permission to in June 1995, termed the progress of CGP the French colonial days are on the floors

use the archives was received the Monday operations "excellent" (Time Magazine, 26 and shelves rotting away. About 50% of the

following the holidays.) June 1995). records—and there are about 2000 linear

The archives is open only about four or CGP also carries out an internal review metres of records all up—are either wrapped

five hours per day. Many documents remain process, staffed by distinguished experts in in brown paper or still in their original boxes.

wrapped in paper. The documents theminternational law and genocide investigaThe boxes have been constructed from acidic

selves are often in very fragile condition, tion, such as Professor Cherif Bassiouni, pasteboard, starch-filled cloth, and protein and insects sometimes scurry out from among former Chair of the United Nations Comadhesive which has promoted insect infiltra

the pages. There is no working electricity in mission of Experts for the inquiry on violation, mainly termites and beetle larvae. Other

the building, and plumbing is rudimentary. tions of international humanitarian law in records are sitting unwrapped gathering dust,

Miss Kim Ly, the archivist, is helpful, as are the Former Yugoslavia (predecessor to the mould and also being attacked by insects."4

other members of the staff. Kim Ly underYugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal). The first

By the end of 1994, conditions were still

stands French and some English. round of internal evaluation of CGP operafar from good. During my two visits to the

In May 1994, there were few researchtions began in June 1995. This evaluation archives that year, stacks of books, most

ers (often I was alone in the building), and has already produced numerous useful ideas beyond repair, still stood on the floor of the

the rainy season added to a sense of gloom for improving various aspects of our operalibrary's storage areas and in the archives.

and foreboding resulting from reports of tions, and yielded an overall positive apWrapped and unwrapped documents re

rebel Khmer Rouge gains in the countryside. praisal of CGP progress. According to one mained on dusty shelves in the archives, and

But by December the Khmer Rough threat evaluator, “Your thoughtful and methodical insect damage was evident everywhere. Nev

seemed to have receded. Now government explanations for the preparation of such a ertheless, thanks to the dedication of some

officials and private citizens did come by to Cambodians and some foreign (mainly Ausproject should serve as a model for the

consult the archive's records. School childocumentation and analysis of crimes against tralian) assistance, there have been improve

dren also visited. The library was heavily humanity in other countries.... The training ments, and the archives can in any event be

used, especially in December when there used. There are now typescript guides to program designed to support the project is

very well attended celebration of the outstanding."

some of the more important documentary library's seventieth anniversary. Perhaps Summary. In 1994 the prospect of a collections, and proper archival storage

this is a hopeful sign of Cambodia's returnboxes, a gift from Australia, are increasingly ing health. trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders seemed remote. Now, through the work of the Cam

being used.

The archives contain numerous, if eclecbodian Genocide Program, it has become a

1. Peter Arfanis and Helen Jarvis, “Archives in Cambostrong probability. In 1994, the information tic, works including official journals, the

dia: Neglected Institutions," Archives and Manuscripts United States Civil Code, Russian encycloresources and legal evidence necessary for a

(Australia) 21:2 (1993), 252-62.

2. Ibid., 255. George Smith, a librarian employed by the judicial accounting of the genocide had yet pedias, and works from the French period. to be identified or assembled, and the re

state of Alaska, made the same point in a paper delivMore significant are the collections of pub

ered at the “Seminar on the Khmer Culture's Revival," lished and unpublished documents that have quired legal skills did not yet exist. These

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 21 December 1994. prerequisites are now well on the way to

survived. The bulk of the collection consists 3. Helen Jarvis, “The National Library of Cambodia:

of those colonial records which the French Suriving Seventy Years of Drastic Socio-Economic ward fulfillment. By the end of 1996, when did not take with them when they left, par

Impact,” Paper delivered at CONSAL9, the Ninth Conthe CGP's mandate will expire, an interna

gress of Southeast Asian Librarians, Bangkok, Thaitional Cambodian genocide tribunal may ticularly records of the Résidence Supérieure

land, 2-6 May 1993. have already commenced functioning. By

du Cambodge. Some of the manuscripts 4. Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambodia,” 256-57. date to the late nineteenth century and con

5. For a more complete description of the archive's then, the CGP will certainly have provided

holdings, see Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambothe scholarly and legal resources for Cambocern a wide range of mostly domestic mat

dia." dians to pursue their own justice for the

ters. These, along with some printed Forvictims of the Khmer Rouge regime. In eign Affairs records from the 1950s and short, the Cambodian Genocide Program 1960s, were the documents most useful to

Kenton J. Clymer, professor of history and me. However, other records concern the has taken major steps to fulfill its own three

department chair at the University of Texas Buddhist Institute, Norodom Sihanouk, and part mandate: to expose and document the

at El Paso, is researching a history of U.S.crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and to hold the the Khmer Rouge period.5

Cambodian relations. His most recent book

Permission is required to use the arperpetrators accountable.

is Quest for Freedom: The United States and chives, and prospective researchers need to

India's Independence (New York: Columapply at the Council of Ministers. There is

bia University Press, 1995). no fee. Writing ahead might be useful it is



ing World War II. When the GKO was for Internal Affairs (NKVD) since 1941, DOCUMENTING THE EARLY disbanded on 4 September 1945, the Special serving with the rank of general. SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS Committee was recast as a “Special Commit- Fourth, Vannikov was appointed chairPROGRAM

tee of the USSR Council of People's Com- man of the Technical Council, and Alikhanov

missars.” (The Council of People's Com- was appointed the scientific secretary of the by Mark Kramer

missars was itself renamed the USSR Coun- Council. The text of Stalin's edict does not

cil of Ministers in March 1946.) Shortly after bear out David Holloway's assertion (in Two recent developments pertaining to Beria's arrest on 26 June 1953, the Special Stalin and the Bomb, p. 135) that Pervukhin, the early Soviet nuclear weapons program- Committee of the USSR Council of Minis- Zavenyagin, and Kurchatov were appointed the declassification of an edict promulgated ters (as it was then known) was dissolved, deputies to Vannikov on the Council. In by Josif Stalin in August 1945, and the and the staff and organizations under its fact, Pervukhin, as noted above, was not on issuance of a directive by the Russian gov- control were transferred to the newly formed the Technical Council at all. Zavenyagin ernment in mid-1995—are worth noting. Ministry of Medium Machine-Building. and Kurchatov were members of the CounEach development is covered here briefly, Second, the edict provided for the cre- cil, but were not listed as deputy chairmen. and the relevant documentation is provided ation of a Technical Council, which was to


Fifth, the other new subordinate organ at the end.

report directly to the GKO's Special Com- created by Stalin's edict-a First Main Di

mittee. Until now, Western experts such as rectorate of the Council of People's ComThe Establishment of Beria's David Holloway had thought that the Tech- missars—also was placed under Vannikov's Special Committee

nical Council was set up as an integral part of supervision, and Zavenyagin was appointed

the newly-created First Main Directorate of a first deputy. Vannikov and Zavenyagin Exploration of the basic processes in- the Council of People's Commissars (an thus enjoyed the distinction of serving on all volved in nuclear fission began in the Soviet entity that is discussed below). A close look three of the main bodies created by Stalin's Union well before World War II, and seri- at Stalin's edict shows that on this point edict. Four officials who were not on either ous work aimed at building nuclear weap- Holloway was incorrect. The Technical the GKO's Special Committee or the Techons was initiated at a top-secret research Council was established as a separate body nical Council were appointed deputy heads facility in Moscow, known simply as Labo- under the Special Committee, not under the of the First Main Directorate: Nikolai ratory No. 2, in early 1943. Over the next First Main Directorate (which itself was sub- Borisov, the deputy chairman of Gosplan; two years the Soviet nuclear bomb program ordinated to the Special Committee). Pyotr Meshik, the head of the NKVD's ecowas spurred on by intelligence disclosures Third, of the nine members of the GKO's nomic directorate and deputy head of the about the Manhattan Project in the United Special Committee, five were also members “Smersh” Main Counterintelligence DirecStates, but it was not until after the fighting of the 11-man Technical Council. The ex- torate; Andrei Kasatkin, the First Deputy ended—and the technical feasibility of ceptions were Beria, Georgii Malenkov, People's Commissar for the Chemical Innuclear weaponry had been vividly demon- Nikolai Voznesenskii, and Mikhail dustry (which Pervukhin headed); and Pyotr strated by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima Pervukhin. (N.B.: Nikolai Voznesenskii, Antropov, a geologist and deputy member

, and Nagasaki—that an all-out program was the director of the State Planning Commit- of the GKO. Antropov was placed in charge launched in the USSR. On 20 August 1945, tee—known as Gosplan for short-should of a commission responsible for the explorathe supreme leader of the Soviet Union and not be confused with the distinguished physi- tion and mining of uranium. chairman of the wartime State Defense Com- cist Ivan Voznesenskii, who was a member Sixth, the document was forthright about mittee (GKO), Josif Stalin, formed a nine

a of the Technical Council.) It stands to reason the need for the Soviet Union to ensure member “Special Committee" under the that the three senior political officials on the access to foreign sources of uranium, inGKO’s auspices to oversee the whole So- Special Committee-Beria, Malenkov, and cluding deposits “in Bulgaria, Czechoslovaviet bomb effort. The Special Committee Nikolai Voznesenskii—would not have been kia, and other countries." Although it did was placed under the direction of Stalin's included on the Technical Council, but not specifically mention eastern Germany as top aide, Lavrentii Beria, the notorious se- Pervukhin's absence is somewhat more puz- a source of uranium, the Soviet zone in cret police chief. The edict that Stalin issued zling, since he was in charge of the USSR's Germany (which was transformed into the (No. GKO-9887ss/op) to establish the Spe- chemical industry at the time. The Technical German Democratic Republic in 1949) becial Committee and its two main subordi- Council consisted predominantly of re- came the largest supplier by far for the nate organizations was declassified and pub- nowned physicists: Igor Kurchatov, Pyotr Soviet bomb program. The importance of lished in the July August 1995 issue of Kapitsa, Abram Ioffe, Abram Alikhanov,

uranium in Soviet policy toward Germany in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal ("Military- Yulii Khariton, Isaak Kikoin, and Ivan the late 1940s should not be underestimated, Historical Journal"), pp. 65-67. The full Voznesenskii. The other four members in- as Norman Naimark points out in his recent text is provided below in translation. cluded a radiochemist, Vitalii Khlopin, and book, The Russians in Germany: A History

Several points about the document are three highly capable industrial managers and of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945worth noting:

engineers: Boris Vannikov, Avraamii 1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University First, Stalin's edict placed the Special Zavenyagin, and Vasilii Makhnev. Press, 1995), pp. 235-250.2 Committee under the control of the GKO, Zavenyagin, among other things, had been a Seventh, the GKO's Special Committee the supreme organ in the Soviet Union dur- deputy to Beria at the People's Commissariat was given almost unlimited discretion over



its own funding and operations, a sign of the cables recently declassified by the U.S. Na- gazeta on 7 June 1995 (p. 5), listed 20 overriding priority that Stalin attached to the tional Security Agency, see below). individuals who were given responsibility development of nuclear weapons. An entire Merkulov had been giving periodic reports for "studying archival documents and develdirectorate was set up within Gosplan to to Beria before August 1945 about the tech- oping proposals concerning their ensure that all necessary resources were nical progress of the Manhattan Project and declassification" for an official anthology. available. Despite the ravages of the war and about the prospects of locating adequate The full text of that directive, including the the need for mass reconstruction, no ex- stores of fissionable material. In mid-Octo- 20 members of the Working Group, is feapense was spared in the drive to build a ber 1945, shortly after the GKO's Special tured below. nuclear bomb. Although the extravagance Committee was formed, Merkulov sent a The combination of Yeltsin's decree of Beria's efforts proved troubling to some follow-up report to Beria, which drew on and Chernomyrdin's directive provides some of the participants, their objections were on elaborate information supplied by the spy cause for concern. The announcement of practical, not moral, grounds. Pyotr Kapitsa Klaus Fuchs in June and September. The plans for an official anthology is a welcome cited this matter (as well as his sharp per- report provided a detailed technical over- step, but unless it is followed by a more sonal differences with Beria) when he wrote view of the design, dimensions, and compo- systematic declassification of archival maa letter to Stalin in November 1945 asking to nents of a plutonium bomb (the type of bomb terials, the proposed anthology will give be removed from the program. Kapitsa dropped on Nagasaki). In subsequent only a very limited—and perhaps misleadargued that the path chosen by Beria was months, Merkulov and Kuznetsov contin- ing-depiction of the early Soviet nuclear “beyond our means and will take a long ued to furnish invaluable data about bomb weapons program. Unfortunately, judging time," and he insisted that a “methodical and technology and uranium supplies. The in

technology and uranium supplies. The in- from the instructions approved by Yeltsin well-planned" program would enable the clusion of Point 13 in Stalin's edict is one and Chernomyrdin, it appears that, at least Soviet Union to build nuclear weapons further indication of the crucial role of intel- for now, no broader release of documents is "quickly and cheaply."3

ligence in the Soviet nuclear bomb program. under consideration. Eighth, Stalin's edict specified the need

The composition of the Working Group for increased espionage vis-a-vis the U.S.

The Russian Government's

also does not bode well. The affiliations and nuclear program. Until this time, responsi

May 1995 Directive

backgrounds of most of the 20 members bility for Soviet foreign intelligence had

imply that archival openness will not be been spread among several agencies (and On 17 February 1995 Russian President their paramount concern: the NKVD's role in the process was very Boris Yeltsin issued a decree “On the Prepa

The panel is chaired by Lev limited), but the edict gave Beria direct con- ration and Publication of an Official Compi- Dmitrievich Ryabev, a first deputy Minister trol over all nuclear espionage carried out by lation of Archival Documents Pertaining to of Atomic Energy. Ryabev has decades of Soviet intelligence organs, including the the History of the Development of Nuclear experience in the Soviet/Russian nuclear People's Commissariat on State Security Weapons in the USSR."5 This decree (No. weapons program, including several years (NKGB, later renamed the Committee on 180) was published in the 1 March 1995 (beginning in 1986) when he served as head

) State Security, or KGB), the Intelligence issue of Rossiiskaya gazeta, and an English

issue of Rossiiskaya gazeta, and an English of the Ministry of Medium Machine-BuildDirectorate of the Red Army (RUKA, later translation was provided in the Spring 1995 ing, the body now known as the Ministry of renamed the Main Intelligence Directorate, issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (p. 57). The Atomic Energy. (Although Ryabev curor GRU, of the Soviet General Staff), and decree stipulated that certain archival mate- rently is only a first deputy minister rather other unspecified intelligence bodies. Cop- rials were to be released for an official com- than a minister, his retention of a senior post ies of this part of the edict (Point 13) were pilation (sbornik) of documents (presum- in the former Soviet nuclear weapons comdistributed to Vsevolod Merkulov, the ably a single volume) on the Soviet Union's

ably a single volume) on the Soviet Union's plex is a sign of his trustworthiness and People's Commissar for State Security, and pursuit of nuclear weapons between 1945 political acumen.) As an institution, the

, Fyodor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, the chief of and 1954. It did not, however, provide for Ministry of Atomic Energy has been exthe RUKA. (Incidentally, the mention of any broader declassification of materials tremely wary of releasing documents that Kuznetsov's surname on the distribution list related to the early Soviet nuclear program. would shed any light on Soviet nuclear weapconfirms, for the first time, that he was head The February 1995 decree indicated ons developments. Ryabev has been among of Soviet military intelligence in the 1940s. that a Working Group was to be established those who have expressed the need for great Kuznetsov is described in Soviet military within one month (i.e., by mid-March 1995) caution." reference works as having been the deputy to begin considering which documents might *** One of the two deputy chairmen of chief of the General Staff from 1943 to 1949, be released for an official compilation. This the Working Group, G. A. Tsyrkov, is also a but he was never explicitly identified as head Working Group, formed under the auspices senior official in the Ministry of Atomic of the RUKA.)

of the Russian government's Commission Energy. Like Ryabev, Tsyrkov has been Both Merkulov and Kuznetsov had been for the Comprehensive Solution of the Prob- leery of divulging any information about overseeing a massive operation to gain intel- lem of Nuclear Weapons, was not actually Soviet nuclear technology and design pracligence about nuclear weapons technology, set up until 24 May 1995, some two months tices. as the newly released “Venona" documents behind schedule. Directive No. 728-R, *** Of the other 18 members of the amply show (for more about these docu- signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Working Group, five are senior officials ments, partially decrypted Soviet intelligence Chernomyrdin and published in Rossiiskaya from the Atomic Energy Ministry and five




are high-ranking military officers from the July 1995, contained numerous documents programs, and he provided useful informaMinistry of Defense, including the General that shed light on the activities of Soviet tion to David Holloway for the book Stalin Staff. The Defense Ministry, like the Atomic spies in the Manhattan Project. The disclo- and the Bomb. No doubt, Khariton is more Energy Ministry, has been highly skeptical sure of these materials may erode the tradi- inclined than the other panel members to as an institution about the merits of releas- tional secrecy about such matters in Mos- urge the release of extensive documentation, ing documents for scholarly purposes. Rus- cow. Second, some officials in the Russian especially materials that would shed light on sian military archivists have been especially security and intelligence organs may want to the role of espionage versus indigenous scidisinclined to release items pertaining to release sensitive documents to spotlight the entific achievements. But because he is in nuclear weapons, ostensibly because of con- role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear and his early 90s, it is unlikely that he will be able cerns about nuclear proliferation. (This thermonuclear bomb projects. A fierce de- to play a central role on the Working Group. policy can be taken to ludicrous extremes. bate emerged in Russia in the early 1990s Quite apart from obstacles posed by the When I worked in the Russian General Staff about the relative importance of espionage composition of the Working Group, it is archive in the summer of 1994, I was told versus indigenous scientific achievements in possible that the Russian government's dithat all documents pertaining to nuclear

the Soviet nuclear/thermonuclear programs. rective (and Yeltsin's decree) will go largely operations-just operations, not technol- Most observers in both Russia and the West unimplemented. Several impressive-lookogy-would be sealed off until the year now agree that information provided by So- ing decrees and directives about the 2046. I asked why that particular year was viet spies was vital in accelerating the con- declassification of archival materials have chosen, but no one seemed to know.) struction of the first Soviet fission bomb, but been issued by Yeltsin and the Russian gov

*** Other members of the Working that espionage was of much less importance ernment over the past two years, but very Group include senior officials from the For- for the Soviet thermonuclear program. If the little has come of them.? Now that the politieign Intelligence Service, the Federal Secu- release of documents could show that the cal outlook in Russia is so uncertain, there is rity Service, the Department for the Defense extent of Soviet nuclear spying was even little chance that the archival situation will Industry, and the State Technical Commis- greater than previously thought, the Russian improve anytime soon. If anything, the sion. (The first two bodies are the main Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal increased strength of Communist delegates successors to the Soviet KGB, and the last Security Service might be somewhat less in the Russian parliament could lead to furtwo bodies are under the jurisdiction of the averse to the prospects of declassification. ther restrictions on access to major repositoRussian President's apparatus. The State *** Two heads of research institutes Technical Commission is housed in the same specializing in the history of science and If an official anthology of documents building as the General Staff of the Russian technology-V. V. Alekseev and V. M. about the early Soviet nuclear weapons proArmed Forces.) These four agencies have Orel-are included on the Working Group, gram is eventually published, it undoubthardly been noted as champions of archival but even if they are inclined to press for edly will contain many interesting and valuopenness. Documents held by the Foreign greater openness (which is by no means able materials. Even the release of indiIntelligence Service and Federal Security certain), they will be far outweighed by offi- vidual documents can add a good deal to the Service, in particular, have been kept tightly cials from the nuclear weapons complex and historical record (see above). But in the sealed away. The role of these two agencies military establishment.

absence of a wider declassification of relis bound to be critical in the release of *** Rudolf Pikhoya, the director of the evant items, the one-time compilation of an documentation, whether for an official an- Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), official anthology will not reveal as much thology or for other purposes. The Foreign is the only panel member from Rosarkhiv. about early Soviet nuclear developments as Intelligence Service archive houses the most Even if Pikhoya seeks the release of as many one might hope. sensitive documents on the role of espio documents as possible—and it is far from nage in the Soviet nuclear weapons pro- clear that he will—his influence on the Work

1. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet gram, and the Federal Security Service ing Group is inherently limited, despite his Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: archive contains documents generated by position as a deputy chairman. The most

Yale University Press, 1994), 135. Holloway's book is

by far the best source available on the early Soviet the Special Committee headed by Lavrentii valuable documents on the early Soviet

nuclear program. Beria from August 1945 until his arrest in nuclear weapons program are stored in ar- 2. See also Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 174-180. late June 1953 (see above). So far, there is chives outside Rosarkhiv's jurisdiction. 3.P. L. Kapitsa, Pis 'ma o nauke (Moscow: Moskovskii little indication that access to either agency's *** The presence of Yulii Khariton on

rabochii, 1989), 237-247. On Kapitsa's withdrawal

from the program, see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, document holdings will be expanded. the Working Group is encouraging, but it

138-144. However, two factors may induce the may be largely symbolic. Khariton, who was

4. Some new details about spies in the Manhattan Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal born in 1904, was one of the key physicists in Project are also available from Harvey Klehr, John Earl Security Service to be more willing to re- the early Soviet nuclear program, and is the

Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, eds., The Secret

World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale lease documents about nuclear espionage: only living member of the Technical Council

University Press, 1995), esp. 216-226. In addition, see First, the U.S. National Security Agency that was established in August 1945 to advise Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 82-88, 90-95, 102-108, has begun declassifying some of its huge Beria's Special Committee (see above). 129, and 137-138. collection of “Venona" transcripts of inter

5. In Russian: “O podgotovke i izdanii ofitsial'nogo Khariton has given lengthy written and oral

sbornika arkhivnykh dokumentov po istorii sozdanii cepted Soviet communications from 1939 testimony over the past few years about the

yadernogo oruzhiya v SSSR." through 1945. The initial batch, released in early Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb 6. The directive was published under the rubric “Sbornik

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