« 上一頁繼續 »
arkhivnykh dokumentov" (A Compilation of Archival facilities, and the development and produc- torate of the USSR CPC the level of funding, Documents). tion of an atomic bomb.
the size of the workforce, and the volume of 7. For one such decree, approved in September 1994,
3. That a Technical Council be created material-technical resources that it requires, see “Yeltsin's Directive on Declassification,” which I translated and introduced in CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall under the GKO's Special Committee to con- so that USSR Gosplan can include these 1994), 89, 100. For a more recent, though similar, duct a preliminary examination of scientific resources in the spending category listed as directive adopted by the Russian government, see “Ob
and technical matters submitted for review “Special Exenditures of the GKO.” ustanovleniya poryadka rassekrechivaniya i prodleniya srokov zasekrechivaniya arkhivnykh dokumentov
by the Special Committee, as well as an 8. That the chairman of USSR Gosplan, Pravitel'stva SSSR,” Sobranie zakonodatel'stva examination of plans for scientific research Cde. N. A. Voznesenskii, organize within Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow) 9 (27 February 1995), and accounts for it, plus technical designs of Gosplan a directorate to help carry out the 1539-1542.
installations, structures, and facilities for the assignments of the GKO's Special Commit-
That the dep. chairman of USSR 1. Vannikov, B. L. (chairman)
Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Borisov, be placed in DOCUMENT 1
2. Alikhanov, A. I. — academician (sci- charge of the aforementioned directorate, entific secretary)
and that he be relieved of other work for TOP SECRET
3. Voznesenskii, I. N. - corresponding Gosplan and the GKO.
9. That the financial expenditures and 4. Zavenyagin, A. P.
upkeep of the GKO's Special Committee, of STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
5. Ioffe, A. F. academician
the First Main Directorate of the USSR EDICT No. GKO-9887ss/op
6. Kapitsa, P. L. academician CPC, of the First Main Directorate's scien
7. Kikoin, I. K. — corresponding mem- tific research, design, and engineering orga20 August 1945 ber, USSR Academy of Sciences
nizations and industrial enterprises, as well Moscow, the Kremlin.
8. Kurchatov, I. V. academician as the work carried out by other agencies and 9. Makhnev, V. A.
departments at the behest of the Directorate, On a Special Committee Under the GKO's
10. Khariton, Yu. B.- professor are to be included in the union budget through Auspices
11. Khlopin V. G. - academician the category "Special Expenditures of the
4. That a special directorate be orga- GKO.” The State Defense Committee orders:
nized under the USSR Council of People's That financing of capital construction
Commissars—the First Main Directorate of for the First Main Directorate be carried out 1. That a Special Committee be formed
the USSR CPC, subordinated to the GKO's through the State Bank. under the GKO’s auspices consisting of
Special Committee—to exercise direct su- That the First Main Directorate and the C[omra]des.:
pervision over scientific research, develop- institutes and enterprises under its auspices 1. Beria, L. P. (chairman)
ment, and design organizations and indus- be freed from the registration of staffs in 2. Malenkov, G. M. trial enterprises for the use of atomic energy
financial organs. 3. Voznesenskii, N. A.
of uranium and the production of atomic 10. That Cde. B. L. Vannikov be con4. Vannikov, B. L. bombs.
firmed as the deputy chairman of the GKO's 5. Zavenyagin, A. P.
5. That the GKO’s Special Committee Special Committee and director of the First 6. Kurchatov, I. V.
be obligated to devise a work plan for the Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and that 7. Kapitsa, P. L.
Committee and the First Main Directorate of he be discharged from his duties as People's 8. Makhnev, V. A.
the USSR CPC and measures to carry out Commissar of Munitions. 9. Pervukhin, M. G.
this plan, and to present it to the Chairman of That the following be approved as 2. That the GKO's Special Committee the GKO for approval.
deputy directors of the Main Directorate: be empowered to supervise all work on the
6. That the GKO's Special Committee - A. P. Zavenyagin — first deputy
— use of atomic energy of uranium:
take operative measures to ensure the fulfill- - N. A. Borisov — deputy - the development of scientific re
ment of tasks assigned to it under the present - P. Ya. Meshik – deputy search in this sphere;
edict; that it promulgate directives requiring - P. Ya. Antropov — deputy - the broad use of geological surveys fulfillment by agencies and departments;
A. G. Kasatkin deputy. and the establishment of a resource base for
and that when a government decision is 11. That the First Main Directorate of the USSR to obtain uranium, as well as the
needed, the GKO's Special Committee the USSR CPC and its enterprises and instiexploitation of uranium deposits outside the
should presents its recommendations directly tutes, as well as work carried out by other USSR (in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and
for the approval of the Chairman of the agencies and departments for it, are to be other countries); GKO.
controlled by the GKO’s Special Commit- the organization of industry to pro
The GKO’s Special Committee will tee. cess uranium and to produce special equip- have its own staff and funding estimates and Without special permission from the ment and materials connected with the use of
an expense account at the USSR State Bank. GKO, no organizations, institutes, or indiatomic energy; and
7. That the GKO's Special Committee viduals have any right whatsoever to interthe construction of atomic energy
define and approve for the First Main Direc- fere in the administrative or operational ac
tivities of the First Main Directorate and its Group) is to be set up to study archival directorate in the Federal Security Service of enterprises and institutes, or to demand in- documents connected with the history of the the Russian Federation; formation about its work or work carried out development of nuclear weapons in the USSR B. V. LITVINOV — senior designer at at the behest of the First Main Directorate. and to devise recommendations for their the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All records of such work are to be directed declassification. The Working Group is to All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of only to the GKO's Special Committee. consist of the following:
Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Min12. That within 10 days the Special L.D. RYABEV — first deputy Minister istry of Russia; Committee be instructed to provide recom- of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation V. M. OREL director of the S. I. mendations for approval by the Chairman of (director of the Working Group);
Vavilov Institute of the History of Natural the GKO concerning the transfer of all nec- R. G. PIKHOYA — director of Science and Technology, Russian Academy essary scientifc, design, engineering, and Rosarkhiv (deputy director of the Working of Sciences; production organizations and industrial en- Group);
V. A. PIDZHAKOV - deputy head of terprises to the First Main Directorate of the G. A. TSYRKOV head of a main the Central Physics and Technical Institute USSR CPC, and to affirm the structure, directorate in the Atomic Energy Ministry of at the Defense Ministry of Russia; organization, and number of workers on the Russia (deputy director of the Working
Yu. B. KHARITON — honorary restaffs of the Committee and the First Main Group);
search director of the Russian Federal Directorate of the USSR CPC.
V. V. ALEKSEEV director of the Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scien13. That Cde. Beria be instructed to Institute of History and Archaeology of the tific Research Institute of Experimental Phystake measures aimed at organizing foreign Urals Division of the Russian Academy of
Urals Division of the Russian Academy of ics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia. intelligence work to gain more complete Sciences;
2. Within three months, the Atomic technical and economic information about V. I. ANIKEEV deputy head of a Energy Ministry of Russia, the Defense Minthe uranium industry and about atomic direcorate in the Foreign Intelligence Ser- istry of Russia, the State Committee on the bombs. He is empowered to supervise all vice of Russia
Defense Industry of Russia, the Federal Seintelligence work in this sphere carried out V.V.BOGDAN-chief of affairs at the curity Service of the Russian Federation, the by intelligence organs (NKGB, RUKA, etc.). Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia,
A. A. BRISH - senior designer at the Rosarkhiv, and the Russian Academy of Chairman of the State Defense Committee All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Sciences will prepare, and present to the
J. STALIN Automation, Atomic Energy Ministry of Working Group, lists of archival documents
proposed for declassification and for incluDistributed to Cdes.:
V. N. VERKHOVTSEV head of a sion in an official compilation of archival Beria, Molotov, Voznesenskii,
command sector in a main directorate of the documents pertaining to the history of the Malenkov, Mikoyan: all points; Borisov: General Staff of the Russian Federation development of nuclear weapons in the USSR 8, 10; Zverev, Golev: 9; Meshik, Armed Forces;
during the period through 1954. Abakumov, Antropov, Kasatkin: 10;
G. A. GONCHAROV department 3. In the third quarter of 1995, the Pervukhin: 1, 10; Merkulov, Kuznetsov head at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center Working Group will determine a thematic (RUKA): 13; Chadaev: 4, 9, 10, 11. and the All-Russian Scientific Research In- way of dividing archival documents pro
stitute of Experimental Physics, Atomic En- posed for declassification in accordance with ergy Ministry of Russia;
established procedures and for inclusion in Yu. V. GRAFOV - deputy head of a an official compilation of archival docuDOCUMENT 2 directorate of the Navy;
ments pertaining to the history of the devel
S. A. ZELENTSOV — consultant for a opment of nuclear weapons in the USSR Directive of the Government of the main directorate of the Defense Ministry of during the period through 1954, and will Russian Federation Russia;
prepare a general list of these documents. No. 728-r, Issued on 24 May 1995 in
E. A. IVANOV deputy head of a 4. In the fourth quarter of 1995, the Moscow
section in the Department of Defense Indus- State Technology Commission of Russia, in
try, Administrative Staff of the Government conjunction with the Atomic Energy MinisToimplement the decree “On the Prepa- of the Russian Federation;
try of Russia, the DefMin of Russia, the ration and Publication of an Official Compi- A.P. KALANDIN - deputy chairman State Committee on the Defense Industry of lation of Archival Documents Pertaining to of the State Technology Commission of Russia, the Federal Security Service of the the History of the Development of Nuclear Russia;
Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Weapons in the USSR," issued on 17 Febru- N. I. KOMOV — senior specialist in a
a Service of Russia, Rosarkhiv, and the Rusary 1995 by the President of the Russian main directorate of the Atomic Energy Min- sian Academy of Sciences will, on the basis Federation: istry of Russia;
of established procedures, arrange for the 1. A Working Group of the Govern- V. N. KOSORUKOV senior engi- declassification of archival documents perment Commission on the Comprehensive neer in a main directorate of the Defense taining to the history of the development of Solution of the Problem of Nuclear Weap- Ministry of Russia;
nuclear weapons in the USSR during the ons (referred to hereinafter as the Working A. A. KRAYUSHKIN head of a period through 1954, drawing on the list
specified in Point 3 of this directive.
3. After that date, Chinese press reports The form of reporting in the Chinese press was 5. The Atomic Energy Ministry of were virtually identical to the coverage in
obviously geared toward the Chinese reader. Even Russia is responsible for providing organi- Other Communist countries, all of which
though the Chinese people were following the zational and technical support for the activ- condemned the Hungarian revolution and
crisis in Hungary very closely, it is quite natural ity of the Working Group and for the prepa- strongly supported the Soviet invasion. Until
that for the Chinese people the crisis seemed more
distant than it did for, say, the peoples of the ration of materials needed to publish an November 2, however, the Chinese press
European People's Democracies. In addition, the official compilation of archival documents was bolder and more evenhanded in its treat
Anglo-French aggression against Egypt at that pertaining to the history of the development ment of the Hungarian crisis than the other time was given priority coverage in the Chinese of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the East-bloc newspapers were, as Liebermann's press. This explains why until the formation of the period through 1954.
report makes clear. The East German diplo- Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants’ Govern6. The Russian Committee on the Press mat even expressed anxiety about the detail
ment, much more information about Hungary and Publishing, in conjunction with the of Chinese coverage, saying that “they would
appeared in the Chinese press than in the GDR
press. Under the special conditions of the PRC, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia, is to have been better off leaving out” some of the
they can pursue this type of reporting without fear ensure the publication in 1996 of an official most vivid descriptions of the revolutionary
that it will cause agitation and disquiet among the compilation of archival documents pertain- ferment. Liebermann left no doubt that the Chinese people of the sort one can detect among ing to the history of the development of kind of reports featured in the Chinese press
some of the GDR citizens currently here in Penuclear weapons in the USSR during the would have been unacceptable in East Ger- king. period through 1954. Funding is to come many.
Although the Chinese press during the early from outlays in the Federal budget for the The concluding paragraph of Lieber- days was factual and objective in its reports on the periodical press and publishing outlets. mann's report is intriguing insofar as it re
crisis in Hungary, there were some things reveals high-level East German concerns about
ported in the press that they would have been
better off leaving out, even if one takes account of Chairman of the Government of the China's efforts to establish a “special posi
the special conditions in the PRC. Two examples Russian Federation tion' within the socialist camp" and about
will suffice to illustrate this point. V. Chernomyrdin Beijing's general commitment to the Com
1) The “People's Daily” on 1 Nov. quoted the munist bloc. Although Liebermann assured following passage from a speech by Nagy: “The his superiors that China “stands solidly be- continual growth of the revolution in our country hind” the socialist camp and “is not taking
has brought the movement of democratic forces to RESEARCH NOTE: SECRET EAST GERMAN REPORT
2) The “People's Daily” on 1 Nov. also reported ON CHINESE REACTIONS
that Nagy on 30 Oct. had commenced negotiaTO THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLT implies that some officials in Eastern Eu
tions with representatives of the armed forces rope already sensed that the "steadfast alli
committee of the freedom fighters and the revoluance" between the Soviet Union and China Introduced and Translated
tionary committee of the revolutionary intelligenby Mark Kramer
might one day be called into question. tsia and students.
Thus, the document is valuable in show- A clear statement about the crisis in Hungary Following are excerpts from a docu- ing how even a seemingly arcane item from was published in a lead article in the “People's ment prepared by a senior East German the East-Central European archives can shed
Daily” on 3 Nov. In this lead article, which covers
the Soviet Union's declaration on ties with socialdiplomat, H. Liebermann, a few weeks after light on the dynamics of Sino-Soviet rela
ist countries, a portion concerns the crisis in Soviet troops crushed the revolution in Hun- tions.
Hungary: "The Chinese people are wholeheartgary in 1956. The full report, entitled, “Berich
edly on the side of the honest Hungarian workers uber die Haltung der VR China zu den No. 212/02/ Peking, 30 November 1956
and on the side of the true Hungarian patriots and Ereignissen in Ungarn," is now stored in File
resolute socialist fighters for Hungary. We are No. 120, Section IV 2/20, of the former East
dismayed to see that a small group of counterrevo
on the Stance of the People's Republic of German Communist party archives, known
lutionary conspirators are exploiting the situation
China toward the Crisis in Hungary as Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massen
with the aim of restoring capitalism and fascist organisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv The first report in the Chinese press about the
terror and of using Hungary to disrupt the unity of crisis in Hungary was published on 27.10.56. It
the socialist countries and undermine the Warsaw (SAPMDB, or SAPMO), in Berlin. (A copy
Pact.” of the document was recently located at the
should be noted that up through 2 Nov. this Berlin archive by Christian F. Ostermann,
information was published without commentary,
Judging by the stance of the PRC toward the researcher currently based at the National “People's Daily” on pages 5/6. Nevertheless,
crisis in Hungary, one again can confidently emSecurity Archive in Washington, D.C., and
phasize that the PRC stands solidly behind the through daily published reports (except on 30 provided to the author by CWIHP.) Oct., when nothing about Hungary was published
camp of socialism and friendship with the Soviet Liebermann's six-page report, compiled
Union. It is also clear that the PRC is not taking up in “People's Daily") the PRC informed the Chiat the request of the East German Foreign nese people in detail about the crisis in Hungary.
any sort of “special position" within the socialist
camp, as certain Western circles would have preMinistry, traces Chinese press coverage of This information, however, was not enough to
ferred. The stance of the People's Republic of events in Hungary from late October to mid- provide a clear picture of the crisis. This situation
China toward the crisis in Hungary was no differNovember 1956. The portions translated
remained essentially unchanged until the forma-
ent from the stance of the other socialist countries. here pertain to coverage through November
“A VOICE CRYING
are a sterling example, concentrating par- Though he claims to have based his accounts IN THE WILDERNESS”:
ticularly on moments when diplomats' pre- on his own experiences and on his conversaTHE PROFESSIONAL'S REVENGE rogatives were violated, whether by party tions with other Soviet diplomats, in particu
functionaries, military officers, or the high- lar Gromyko, the reader finds little from an by David R. Stone
est leadership of the Soviet state. After insider's point of view. As a low-ranking
Henry Kissinger's April 1972 visit to Mos- diplomat, Kornienko may indeed have seen Georgii Markovich Kornienko, Kholodnaia cow, in which he worked closely with and done little worthy of reporting. Even so, voina: svidetel’stvo ee uchastnika (The Cold Kornienko, the innocuously bland final state- an occasional personal glimpse of life in War: Testimony of a Participant] (Moscow: ment noted that talks had been “open and Soviet intelligence and the diplomatic corps International Relations, 1995).
productive.” N. V. Podgornyi, Chair of the slips through. Kornienko relates, for ex
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and thus ample, that hawkish officials in the KGB, After a Soviet fighter plane shot down nominally Soviet head of state, objected to hoping to present Stalin with a translation of Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September this positive spin on Soviet-American rela- George Kennan's seminal 1947 Foreign Af1983, Georgii Kornienko was assigned by tions despite his complete ignorance of di
tions despite his complete ignorance of di- fairs article, “The Sources of Soviet Conhis superior Foreign Minister Andrei plomacy. Only Kissinger's acquiescence duct,” in which "containment” was transGromyko to prepare TASS's official press avoided more serious diplomatic conse- lated as "suffocation," pressured Kornienko release on the incident. In particular, quences. Still later, as political instability in to spice his translation. The cooler heads of Gromyko instructed Kornienko to claim Afghanistan grew at the end of the 1970s, the Kornienko and his fellow translators sucthat the Soviet Union had absolutely no universal opinion within the Soviet Foreign ceeded in standing up for the integrity of the knowledge of the fate of the airliner, though Ministry against military intervention was translator's art. the Soviet leadership was quite certain that disregarded—Andropov and Ustinov even- These earlier chapters are most noteit had indeed shot down the plane. Kornienko tually browbeat Gromyko into agreeing to an worthy for the general theory Kornienko vehemently protested that the truth of the invasion, Kornienko informs us, producing a offers of the Cold War and its origins, which matter would inevitably come out and that bloody and ultimately frustrating war with has a direct bearing on his interpretation of the best course was to reveal just that: the disastrous consequences at home and abroad. how the Cold War ended. For Kornienko. Soviet Union had shot down an unidentified Despite these tales of underappreciated there were no vast impersonal forces or intruder in the full conviction that it was an diplomats, Kornienko's book is surprisingly inevitable class contradictions dictating the American spy plane. Gromyko was indeci- unrevealing about the inner workings of So- growth of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Neither class sive, but invited Kornienko to call KGB viet foreign policy; while discussing Ustinov struggle nor geopolitical necessity mandated head Yurii Andropov to state his case. In and Andropov's pressure on Gromyko for confrontation. Soviet policy in Eastern EuKornienko's opinion, Andropov was pre- intervention in Afghanistan, he never satis- rope was also no obstacle to normal relapared to accept an honest account of the factorily explains why they themselves had tions, as Kornienko argues that American event, but was swayed by Defense Minister abandoned the general conviction that mili- methods in Japan did not differ from Stalin's Dmitrii Ustinov, long-time master of Soviet tary intervention in Afghanistan was a ter- methods in Eastern Europe. (Poles and defense industry, and the Soviet military rible idea. Extraordinarily cagey, he never Czechoslovaks might be puzzled here at leadership. At the meeting to make the final draws upon personal experience or Soviet their implicit inclusion in the camp of dedecision, Ustinov won this internal battle documentary evidence when a Western sec- feated Axis powers.) Instead, the Cold War and Kornienko was only “a voice crying in ondary source will do. Personal observa- stemmed from the pragmatic Roosevelt's the wilderness.” The consequences proved tions in his work serve either to prove his
tions in his work serve either to prove his untimely death and his replacement by the Kornienko right; a human tragedy was turned own acuity and point up the mistakes of ideologue Truman. Kornienko notes by the Soviet leadership’s short-sightedness others or to disparage the talents and charac- Truman's notorious suggestion that the Naand the Reagan Administration's intense ter of those Kornienko worked with. His zis and Soviets be left to kill each other off; criticism into a public-relations disaster for memoirs produce the impression that he likes it so much he repeats it twice. the USSR.
Kornienko had no friends, was particularly Kornienko asks rhetorically, “Was another Moments like these, in which political unimpressed by Brezhnev, Ford, and Reagan, path possible? It seems to me yes. But leaders ignore at their peril the advice of and of all those he dealt with admired only Truman consciously rejected it.” That is, their professional advisors, recur frequently Gromyko and Andropov. This does not confrontation was a specific political choice, in Kornienko's memoirs. Covering his over mean that Kornienko's book is without value, and one for which the Soviets bore at least forty years of serving the Soviet state from but it must be used to understand the mind- some measure of responsibility, for “if the junior translator in intelligence work to set and mental world of a member of the American side said 'A' in the Cold War, then Deputy Foreign Minister, Kornienko's ob- Soviet foreign policy elite, not to find new Stalin didn't hold himself back from saying servations are those of a Soviet patriot intent facts and revealed secrets.
'B'." Since the West never seriously underon settling scores both with the West and Kornienko's first three chapters, on the took an end to the Cold War, when the end with his Soviet comrades. It is perhaps a sources of the Cold War, on the Eisenhower finally did come under Gorbachev, the only universal failing of memoirs that they em- presidency, and on Kennedy and Khrushchev,
presidency, and on Kennedy and Khrushchev, possible explanation was unilateral Soviet phasize those times when the hero-author is offer very little that is new or especially surrender. right and all about are mistaken; Kornienko's interesting to students of the Cold War. Chapter 4 on the Cuban missile crisis is
nearly as frustrating as the first three in terms of the most important stages of détente- Soviet efforts in foreign policy were saboof lacking new revelations. Kornienko ap- Kissinger's secret visit to Moscow, Nixon's taged by bungling and short-sightedness. proves the document collections that have Moscow summit and Ford's Vladivostok He tells us that West German Chancellor been published since the advent of glasnost, summit with Brezhnev-only to comment Helmut Schmidt suggested to Aleksei but does not enrich the story they tell with bitingly on Brezhnev and Ford's lack of Kosygin that the replacement SS-20s be any significant new information of his own. mental ability, or to claim that Kissinger limited to a quantity significantly less than Despite serving as a counselor in the Soviet deliberately scheduled meetings in Moscow the outgoing SS-4s and SS-5s, given the Union's Washington embassy during the to keep his deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt away qualitative superiority of the new missiles, crisis, Kornienko tells us little of his own from discussions on the Middle East (alleg- and that this policy be linked explicitly to an experiences. He does relate (as does then- edly due to fear of Sonnenfeldt's "zionist attempt to head off a new arms race in Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in inclinations").
Europe. Kornienko, an invited guest at the his recently published memoirs) that the Détente was short-lived. In Kornienko's Politburo meeting that discussed Schmidt's Soviet embassy was kept in complete igno- interpretation, the beginning of the end was suggestion, spoke above his station and out rance of the installation of Soviet missiles in the 1975-76 Angolan Civil War; Carter's of turn to support this initiative. Ustinov Cuba, and was in fact unwittingly used to presidency only furthered the deterioration challenged him with the possibility of an pass along disinformation.
of U.S.-Soviet relations already begun and American arms buildup even after conciliaThe meat of Kornienko's story is his represented another missed chance at an end tory Soviet gestures. Even in this worst-case role in one of the key moments of the crisis: to the Cold War. The main obstacle to outcome, Kornienko believed, any tempoKhrushchev's two letters to Kennedy, the improving relations, in Kornienko's account, rary advantage the Americans might gain in first of 26 October 1962 promising with- was not Carter's concern for human rights, medium-range missiles would be far outdrawal of Soviet missiles in return for an which was irritating but rather insignificant weighed by the beneficial effects of the American pledge of non-intervention in to Soviet leaders, but instead more concrete resulting strains in the Western alliance and Cuba, the second of the next day addition- issues of international politics. While Carter strengthening of Western Europe's antially demanding the corresponding with- himself might have been prepared for a more nuclear movement. With Brezhnev too feeble drawal of American missiles from Turkey. open-minded approach to the Soviet Union, to make his presence felt, and Gromyko's According to Kornienko, his own detective the Carter Administration, hamstrung by refusal to speak up for Kornienko, Ustinov work played a central role in Khrushchev's unnamed (but easily identifiable) hawks simply proved too powerful. Once again decision to sharpen his demands. Soviet within its ranks, was not prepared for a full Kornienko, the lone voice of reason, had his intelligence sources reported a conversation settlement. The United States' fundamental advice unthinkingly disregarded, and the with an American journalist on his immedi- goals still included superiority not equality upgrade went forward as planned. ate departure for Florida to cover the immi- in arms control policy, and even the Carter- The second half of Chapter 10 examnent American invasion. Hearing these re- brokered Camp David accord only under- ines the fate of the SS-23 “Oka" missile. ports as well as taking into account the mined the chances for a general Mideast This is one episode of the Cold War whose heightened alert status of American armed peace via U.S.-Soviet joint action, Kornienko significance is interpreted in radically difforces, Khrushchev accordingly acted to calm alleges.
ferent ways on either side of the former iron the situation by sending his first letter. Chapters 8 and 9 cover the war in Af- curtain. Barely noticed in the West, Kornienko himself knew the journalist, ghanistan and the downing of KAL 007 as Gorbachev and Shevardnadze's decision to scheduled lunch with him (itself proving discussed above; Chapter 10 brings us to the include the SS-23 with its 400km range in that the journalist was not due for immediate Reagan years and the beginnings of glasnost, the list of intermediate range (that is, with
, departure), and convinced himself that the for which Kornienko has saved his bitterest range 500 km and higher) missiles slated for earlier intelligence reports of imminent in- venom. His target is not Stalin, Brezhnev, or elimination is the touchstone of Russian vasion had been mistaken. Armed with any Western cold warrior, but his last two military and conservative condemnation of Kornienko's information, Khrushchev felt superiors: Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Gorbachev, what one officer terms the “crime prepared to drive a harder bargain with the Shevardnadze. In Chapter 10 and his con- of the century." While the opposition to Americans.
clusion, he presents the case for the prosecu- Gorbachev can hardly argue that the elimiChapter 5 on the prelude to détente and tion in Mikhail Gorbachev's treason trial. nation of a single missile system was the root Chapter 6 on détente itself offer slightly Traitor is not too strong a word to express cause of the downfall of the Soviet Union, more. Détente came not from any alter- Kornienko's evaluation of Mikhail they do see the case of the Oka as an example ations on the Soviet side, but from Nixon and Gorbachev, but Kornienko admits that blun- of all the worst in Gorbachev's diplomacy: Kissinger's decision to undertake a more ders began before Gorbachev took power in unpreparedness, unwillingness to listen to pragmatic and conciliatory policy towards 1985. Chapter 10 first examines at the pre- expert opinion, and, most seriously, sacriMoscow. In early 1972, Kornienko worked Gorbachev decision to replace aging Soviet fice of Soviet national interests in the name closely with Henry Kissinger on the “Basic medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in of agreement, any agreement, with the West. Principles” statement on Soviet-American Europe with SS-20s.
Europe with SS-20s. In keeping with As Kornienko puts it, the inclusion of the relations. Despite being at the heart of Kornienko's general portrait of the late Oka under the provisions of a treaty that did political decision-making at the highest lev- Brezhnev years, in contrast with more effec- not concern it was “only one of the examples els, Kornienko strays from standard accounts tive policy under Stalin and Khrushchev, of what serious consequences occur when