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high-placed leaders ignore the competent unacceptability of German NATO member- never heard, but the rejection of Soviet rule judgment of specialists and as a result sacri- ship to George Bush in Washington only in in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of fice the very interests of the state trying for February 1990 and then conceding the Soviet state itself are what truly demolone thing—to that much quickly finish the Germany's right to remain in NATO without ished Soviet foreign policy. It is just these preparation of this or that treaty and light off receiving guarantees and concessions in re- events that Kornienko cannot bring himself fireworks in celebration.” turn.

to look at, and to ask whether he and his The conclusion of Kornienko's book, a Here Kholodnaia voina particularly suf- fellow professionals bear any responsibility shortened version of a case set forth earlier fers by comparison to Kornienko's 1992 for them. at greater length and in greater detail in collaboration with Marshal Sergei Nezavisimaia Gazeta (16 August 1994), is Akhromeev, former Chief of the General David Stone is a Ph.D. candidate in the what his argument has been leading to all Staff and one-time personal aide to Mikhail History Department of Yale University. along: the Gorbachev era as the epitome of Gorbachev. This earlier book, Glazami unprofessionalism in foreign policy. It is a marshala i diplomata (Through the Eyes of full-fledged condemnation of almost every a Marshal and a Diplomat] (Moscow, 1992), action undertaken by Gorbachev and covers in book-length form the Gorbachev CHEN HANSHENG'S MEMOIRS Shevardnadze from 1985 through the final years which Kornienko discusses in a chap- AND CHINESE COMMUNIST collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, ter. The lion's share is Akhromeev's work,

ESPIONAGE
Kornienko strives to discredit the idea that and he was a much more sensitive and forth-
Gorbachev offered something truly new and coming observer, on occasion even reveal-

by Maochen Yu revolutionary in international politics. As ing the details of Soviet tactics in arms conKornienko reminds us, it was Lenin who trol negotiations. While nearly as condem- Chen Hansheng, My Life During Four Eras first enunciated the principle of “peaceful natory of Gorbachev as Kornienko, [Sige shidai de wo) (Beijing: China Culture coexistence" with the capitalist world (as Akhromeev as Chief of the General Staff was and History Press (zhongguo wenshi chupan another form of class struggle), and Stalin in a position to truly appreciate the steady she], 1988). actively endorsed the idea of coexistence decline of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev with the West as late as 1951. Ever since a and the need for radical reform, though he Post-Mao China has been marked by a rough nuclear parity had been achieved in parted company with Gorbachev on how transition from a combination of totalitarithe 1960s, reasonable people on each side precisely reform needed to be implemented.

anism and socialism to one of had seen the need for an end to the arms race (Akhromeev killed himself in the wake of the

authoritarianism and a "socialist market and confrontation. Gorbachev's innovation failed coup of August 1991.) What Kornienko economy.” Along with this transition is the was not living in peace with the West, but misses in his evaluation of the Gorbachev gradual “withering away of the state,” which the unilateral“betrayal of the Soviet Union's years is precisely how desperate Gorbachev’s

in turn has resulted in a looser government vital interests.”

position was by the end of the 1980s. With control over publication on some historical Kornienko enunciates a number of spe- opposition to Gorbachev growing on all sides, issues previously considered taboo during cific examples of Gorbachev's craven be- an economy spiraling into free fall, Soviet the Mao era. One of the most fascinating havior-submission to the United States

troops on hostile ground in Eastern Europe, new academic interests in China is the sudover the Krasnoyarsk radar station and So- and the specter of nationalism haunting the den surge of materials on Chinese Commuviet acquiescence in the use of force against Soviet Union, Gorbachev simply had no

nist intelligence, triggered by a massive “poIraq-but his most substantial comments ground to stand on. It is this last factor- litical rehabilitation” of those Chinese Comare reserved for the reunification of Ger- nationalism—that Kornienko (and for that munist Party (CCP) intelligence veterans many. Kornienko, having passed over in matter Akhromeev) consistently ignores. It who were vanquished in Mao's ruthless camsilence the Soviet interventions in Czecho- seems he imagines that a stable end to the paigns. The publication of Chen Hansheng's slovakia and Hungary, takes pains to em- Cold War could have occurred with Eastern memoirs, My Life During Four Eras, is just phasize the right of the German people to Europe still occupied by Soviet troops, and

one of the telling examples. self-determination, free from outside influ- he never noticed that half the Soviet Union's Chen Hansheng became an agent for ence. His objection is to the manner in population was non-Russian.

the Comintern in 1926 while a young profeswhich this unification took place and the Kornienko, then, continues to be a de- sor at Beijing University (p.35). His life as status of the resulting German state. Why, voted patriot of the collapsed empire he

a communist intelligence official spans many he asks, should Germany remain in NATO served for four decades. While there is likely decades of the 20th century and involves and why should NATO troops remain in some truth to his assertions that Gorbachev some of the most important espionage cases. Germany with Soviet troops completely might have driven marginally harder bar- Chen Hansheng's memoirs add some new evacuated from Eastern Europe? The fact gains with the West than he in fact did, the and revealing dimensions to the present unthat Germany has stayed in NATO he at- real significance of any diplomatic triumphs derstanding of the much debated history of tributes to the absolutely incompetent way Gorbachev might have achieved is question- Chinese and international communism. In in which Gorbachev handled the German able. What can any diplomat achieve when

an authoritative manner, this publication question, avoiding the enunciation of any the state he or she represents crumbles away? helps answer many nagging questions long clear policy until too late, insisting on the Kornienko can complain that his voice was

in the minds of historians, chief among which

a

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are the following:

from Moscow. In 1935, when the Soviet significant contribution to reconnecting this To What Extent Were the Chinese Com- Union was threatened by rising fascism in CCP-Moscow tie. munists Involved in Soviet-Dominated Com- Europe and Asia, the CCP followed Was Agnes Smedley A Comintern Agent? munist International Espionage in China in Moscow's order to adopt a policy of a “United Despite vigorous denials by Smedley herthe 20th Century? Recent memoirs in Chi- Front" (Popular Front) with the Nationalists self, Chen Hansheng discloses unequivonese, notably by Chen Hansheng and Shi in a joint effort to fight Japanese expansion cally that Smedley was no less than an agent Zhe,2 suggest that the Chinese Communists in Asia. Yet, when Stalin stunned the world of the Comintern (p.52). (Historian Stephen were deeply involved. In the 1930s and by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in late Au- MacKinnon has only established that 1940s, for example, as the Shi Zhe memoirs gust 1939, the United Front policy collapsed Smedley was Sorge's mistress in Shanghai.) reveal, both the NKVD and GRU of the in China. Mao Zedong followed Stalin most Further, we also know from Chen's memUSSR and the Department of International closely among all the Comintern party chiefs, oirs that Smedley was involved in every Res. (OMS) of the Comintern ran a large spy hailing the Hitler-Stalin deal as a major major step of the Sorge group's espionage training school in Yanan; Chinese Commu- victory against the West and the partition of activities. In fact, it was Smedley herself nist spies penetrated deep into the National- Poland as necessary for the communist who recruited Chen into Sorge's Tokyo opists' (GMD) wartime intelligence organiza- cause. In January 1940, Mao Zedong pro

6

erations (p.58). Recent Comintern archives tions for Moscow.3 Chen Hansheng's story claimed that “the center of the Anti-Soviet also confirm Smedley's identity as a further illustrates this Moscow-Yanan tie. movement is no longer Nazi Germany, but Comintern agent.

9 Chen was recruited by the Russians as a among the so-called democratic countries."7 Was Owen Lattimore A Communist Spy? Comintern intelligence agent in 1926. One The modus vivendi of communism and fas- Lattimore topped Senator Joseph McCarthy's year later, the warlord Zhang Zuolin raided cism in late 1939 created such intense fric- list of alleged communist spies in the early the Soviet Embassy in Beijing which was tion between the Chinese Nationalists, who 1950s. McCarthy accused Lattimore of not being used as an intelligence base. This raid had been engaged in an all-out and bitter war only having manufactured a Far East policy exposed a large international espionage with the Japanese imperial army in China, leading to the loss of China to the commuscheme controlled by Moscow.4 Chen and the Chinese Communists, who were nists, but also of being a “top Soviet agent.” Hansheng then fled to Moscow and returned following Stalin's rapprochement with Ger- Chen's memoirs provide surprising insights to China in 1928 to become a member of the many, whose ally was Japan, that in early on this matter from the perspective of a well-known Richard Sorge Spy Ring, then 1940, an army of communist troops was communist intelligence agent. After Chen based in Shanghai. When Sorge was reas- ambushed by the Nationalists in Southern fled from Tokyo to Moscow in 1935 to signed by Moscow to Tokyo, Chen went Anhui, an event which essentially ended the prevent the Sorge Ring's operations from along and worked closely with Ozaki Hozumi superficial United Front. Yet when Hitler exposure, Owen Lattimore, then the editor and others of the ring until 1935, when the attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, of the New York-based journal Pacific Afunexpected arrest of a messenger from Mos- Stalin reversed his policy on the Popular fairs, the mouthpiece of the Institute of Pacow almost exposed Chen's real identity. Front: all member parties of the Comintern, cific Relations (IPR), asked the Soviet Union, Chen sensed the danger and fled to Moscow both in Europe and in Asia, were now or- a member nation of IPR, for an assistant again (pp.61-62). For much of his early life, dered to fight fascism. Unfortunately, in (p.63). In 1936, Moscow recommended he was directly controlled by Moscow, and China this did not mean the re-establishment Chen Hansheng to Lattimore, who readily highly active in international intelligence. of the former United Front against the Japa- accepted the nomination. Chen then went to Chen's identity as a Comintern agent was so nese, because the Soviet Union had already New York, this time under the direct control important and secret that Richard Sorge, signed the notorious Neutrality Pact with of Kang Sheng, who was also in Moscow, to during his marathon interrogation in Tokyo Japan. The Chinese Nationalists, not the work with Lattimore from 1936 until 1939, by the Japanese police, never gave out Chen's Japanese, remained the CCP's main enemy. when Chen was reassigned by Kang Sheng real name to the Japanese." 5

In fact, a stunning recent discovery at to a Hong Kong-based operation. What Was the True Relationship Be- the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives of a However, Chen states in his memoirs tween the Soviets and the Chinese Commu- secret Soviet-Japanese treaty at the outset of that Lattimore was kept in the dark as to his nists during WWII? Some historians have WWII reveals a deeply conspiratorial scheme true identity as a Communist agent directly minimized the extent and importance of the worked out between Moscow and Tokyo. dispatched from Moscow (p.64). Lattimore's relationship between the Chinese Commu- On 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese scholarly activities were only to be used as a nist Party and the Soviet Union during World diplomats reached a secret deal that stipu- cover for Chen. Further, Kang Sheng speWar II. Chen Hansheng's memoirs and lated, “The USSR will abandon its active cifically instructed Chen that while in New other recently available documents from vari- support for Chiang (Kai-shek; Jiang Jieshi] York, his position at the IPR should only be ous sources fundamentally challenge this and will repress the Chinese Communist used as a means of getting a salary; and that interpretation.

Party's anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Chen's real task was to help Rao Shushi, a Instead, these new publications show Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chi- Comintern and CCP chief also in New York, that from the very beginning the CCP was nese Communist Party will retain as a base organize underground activities (p.65). intrinsically connected with the international the three (Chinese) Northwest provinces Therefore, Chen's memoirs seem to clear communist movement centered in Moscow. (Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia)."8

Lattimore from any complicity associated Every major step of the CCP followed orders Chen Hansheng's memoirs has made a with Chen Hansheng's secret operations in

New York.

When Intellect And Intelligence Join, Was Solomon Adler A Communist? What Happens? Chen is a seasoned intelli

a Solomon Adler, chief intelligence agent for gence officer with high academic accomthe U.S. Treasury Department in China dur- plishment as an economic historian. While ing WWII, was also prominent on his erudition has provided him with excellent McCarthy's communist list. In the 1950s, covers for intelligence operations, it was also Elizabeth Bentley, a courier of a Soviet to become a source of his own demise. Chiapparatus in Washington, further identified nese intellectuals are frequently willing to Adler as a member of Soviet intelligence.11 serve the state, to be its ears and eyes, yet in Adler at the time denied Bentley's accusa- the end the state often turns against the inteltion. Surprisingly, in Chen's memoirs, as lectuals without mercy. Chen Hansheng's well as in some other recent Chinese docu- life thus becomes a classic example of this ments, Adler has resurfaced in Beijing as a supreme irony. While in Moscow in 1935 bona fide communist intelligence official. 12 and 1936, Chen witnessed the bloody purge According to these sources, Adler moved to of the intelligence apparatus in the Soviet Beijing permanently in the late 1950s and Union by Stalin. Many of his Soviet comhas since worked in various capacities in rades, some of them highly respected scholCCP intelligence. Today, he is identified in ars, including the former Soviet Ambassador Chinese documents as an “Advisor” to the to Beijing who originally recruited Chen in External Liaison Department of the Central China in 1926, were shot by Stalin as traitors Committee of the CCP, the department that and foreign spies. Chen wrote in raw pessihandles such well-known figures as Larry mism about the Soviet purge, “I could not Wu-tai Ching of the CIA, who was arrested understand what was going on then. Yet it by the FBI in 1983 for espionage, and com- was beyond my imagination that some thirty mitted suicide in jail in 1986.

years later, this horrible drama would be reWere the Chinese Communists Part of played in China and I myself would be a the International Communist Movement or target of the persecution" (p.64). During the Merely "Agrarian Reformers" in the 1930s Cultural Revolution, Chen did not escape the and 1940s? Chen Hansheng's memoirs Dictatorship of the Proletariat. From 1966 to provides much new information about the 1968, Chen was put under house arrest. His Chinese Communist Party's extensive in- wife was tortured to death in late 1968. By ternational connections. Besides the Sorge 1971 when Chen was allowed to leave the and Lattimore cases, Chen served as a chief "thought reform” Cadre School in remote communist intelligence officer in Hong Hunan province, he had become almost comKong in the late 1930s and early 1940s, pletely blind. running a cover organization funnelling huge amounts of funds—$20 million in two and a half years—from outside China to Yanan,

1. The most revealing case was the rehabilitation of Pan mostly for the purpose of purchasing Japa- Hannian in 1982, after which a large amount of materinese-made weapons from the "Puppet"

als on Pan's role as a Comintern intelligence chief in

China and CCP spymaster during WWII became availtroops in North China, with considerable

able for scholars. For more details, see the article by this Japanese acquiescence. 13 When wanted in

author, “OSS in China: New Information About An Old 1944 by the Nationalist secret police for Role,International Journal of Intelligence and Counpro-Soviet activities in Guilin (China), Chen terintelligence, Spring 1994, pp.94-95

2. Shi Zhe, Alongside the Great Men in History: Memwas rescued by the British and airlifted to

oirs of Shi Zhe (zai lishi juren shengbian:shizhe huiyi lu] India where he was miraculously put on the Beijing: Central Documents Press (zhongyang wenxian payroll of British intelligence in New Delhi. chupan she), 1991. Shi Zhe served as an OGPU (NKVD Between 1946 and 1950, while undercover

since 1934) agent for nine years in the Soviet Union until as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins subsequently worked as Mao's intelligence aid in charge

he was dispatched from Moscow to Yenan in 1940. He University in Maryland, Chen became

of encoding and decoding the heavy secret communicaBeijing's secret liaison with the Communist tions between Mao and Stalin during WWII, and as a Party of the U.S.A. (CPUSA) (p.81).14 After

Chinese-Russian interpreter. Shi Zhe also was Kang

Sheng's deputy at the Social Affairs Department (SAD) the CCP took over mainland China, Chen

and the chief liaison in Yenan between the NKVD team was summoned back from America to

and the SAD. Beijing by Zhou Enlai in 1950 and has 3. Yan Baohang and others' aggressive intelligence remained a major figure in his own business

penetration into the GMD, see the doctoral dissertation

by this author entitled American Intelligence: OSS in for much of the rest of his life.

China (Berkeley, California, 1994).
4. For an example of one Western country's exploita-
tion of this raid in uncovering communist spy rings in
England, see Anthony Cave Brown's biography of
Stewart Menzies, “C,” published in Britain as Secret
Servant: The Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Head of
British Intelligence, 1939-52.
5. Stephen MacKinnon, “Richard Sorge, Agnes
Smedley, and the Mysterious Mr. “Wang' in Shanghai,
1930-1932,” conference paper for the American His-
torical Association, Cincinnati, 29 December 1988.
6. Niu Jun, From Yenan to the World (cong yanan
zouxiang shijie) (Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1992),
64-65; also Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong,
vol. 2. (Beijing: People's Press, 1961), 597-599.
7. Interview with Edgar Snow, in Freta Utley, Odyssey
of A Liberal: Memoirs (Washington, D.C.: Washington
National Press, 1970), 213.
8. Bruce A. Elleman, “The 1940 Soviet-Japanese Se-
cret Agreement and Its Impact on the Soviet-Iranian
Supply Route” (Working Paper Series in International
Studies, 1-95-5, Hoover Institution, on War, Revolu-
tion, and Peace), 1-3
9. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh
Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Com-
munism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995),
60-70.
10. Senate floor speech by McCarthy, in Ralph de
Toledano, Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats (New York:
Arlington House Press, 1967), 185.
11. Text of testimony by Bentley, in Toledano, Spies,
Dupes, and Diplomats, 132-133.
12. See Adler's photo in Chen's memoirs, and Selected
Shanghai Culture and History Materials (Shanghai
wenshi ziliao xuanji]43 (April 1983), Shanghai People's
Press.
13. For more details on this, see Maochen Yu, American
Intelligence: OSS in China.
14. Many top leaders of the CPUSA, including Earl
Browder and Eugene Dennis, had served as Comintern
agents in China. See Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret
World of American Communism 8, 12.

Maochen Yu, who teaches history at the U.S. Naval Academy, is completing for publication a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation on the OSS in China during World War II.

a

THE 1980-1981 POLISH CRISIS: Yakov Grishin's narrative, is often problem- and the debate is likely to continue for many THE NEED FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS atic. Robert Zuzowski's volume provides years to come. cogent insights into the origins and func

Zuzowski devotes less attention than by Mark Kramer tions of the Workers' Defense Committee

Bernhard to Laba's thesis, and as a result his (KOR) and Grishin's monograph has a few

book leaves some key questions unresolved. Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and bright moments, but neither book offers as

For example, Zuzowski acknowledges that Opposition in Poland: The Workers' De- much as one might hope.

when the decisive moment came in midfense Committee KOR(Westport, CT: Zuzowski's study of the origins, activi

1980, top KOR members were skeptical Praeger, 1992). ties, and consequences of KOR is enriched

about the prospects for achieving a genuby citations from a wide range of open and inely independent trade union. (Some KOR Ya. Ya. Grishin, Dramaticheskie sobytiya v underground publications. Of necessity, h

, his

officials even hoped that striking workers Pol'she, 1980-1981 gg (Kazan: Izdatel'stvo book relies extensively on (and overlaps would not press too hard for this goal, lest it Kazanskogo Universiteta, 1993). with) Jan Jozef Lipski's acclaimed two

become a pretext for a harsh crackdown.) volume history of the Workers' Defense

This is difficult to square with the author's Many books about the rise of Solidarity Committee, which was first published in

contention that “KOR significantly contribin Poland and the subsequent martial-law 1983. Zuzowski's analysis, however, has

uted to the formation of Solidarity and to its crackdown have been published in the West, three advantages over Lipski's book. First, performance, shaping the union's program, but nearly all of them appeared in the early as one would expect, Zuzowski is more

structure, and strategy (p. 169). Nor does to mid-1980s. In recent years, particularly detached and critical than Lipski, whose Zuzowski explain why so many workers since the collapse of Communism in Eastern perspective as one of the co-founders and

who had probably never heard of KOR and Europe, scholarly interest in the 1980-81 leading members of KOR was unavoidably

never seen its publications were neverthePolish crisis has largely subsided. Although reflected in his lengthy account. Second, less ready to demand a wide array of fundaa few laudable books about the origins of Zuzowski's book extends chronologically mental political changes. It may well be, as Solidarity, notably those by Roman Laba well beyond Lipski's, which ended with

both Zuzowski and Bernhard argue, that (The Roots of Solidarity), Lawrence C. KOR's formal dissolution in September KOR decisively changed the broader milieu Goodwyn (Breaking the Barrier), and 1981. Third, Zuzowski uses his case study in which the strikes of 1980 occurred and Michael H. Bernhard (The Origins of De- of KOR to derive broader conclusions about

that this helped Polish workers eschew viomocratization in Poland), were published in the nature and methods of political dissent in lence and sustain an organized protest movethe early 1990s, the large majority of West- highly authoritarian societies. His discus- ment. But it is not clear that the evidence ern scholars no longer seem interested in sion of the term "intelligentsia” and his produced by Zuzowski is enough to contrareexamining the dramatic events of 1980- overall analytical framework are not always

vene Laba's basic point. 81. Even in Poland only a handful of ex- persuasive, but his assessment provides a This reservation notwithstanding, the perts, mainly those connected with the par- useful basis for historical and cross-country surveys of KOR that Zuzowski and Bernhard liamentary Committee for Constitutional comparisons.

provide, combined with Laba's earlier book, Oversight, are still devoting much effort to a Hence, the overlap with Lipski's book are about as far as one can go with nonreassessment of the 18-month confrontation does not really detract from Political Dis- archival sources. Both authors have done an that followed the emergence of Solidarity in sent and Opposition in Poland. A more

admirable job of poring over KOR's publithe summer of 1980. The dearth of academic serious problem arises, however, from the

cations and other dissident works as well as interest in the Polish crisis is ironic, for it is overlap with a recent book by Michael

relevant secondary sources. Both have only now, when the archives in Poland, Bernhard (cited above), which was pub- brought new analytical perspectives to bear Russia, and other former Communist coun- lished at almost the same time as Zuzowski's

on their topic. Now that Zuzowski's and tries have become accessible and when a monograph. Bernhard's volume, like

Bernhard's books have appeared, other schollarge number of valuable first-hand accounts Zuzowski's, focuses on the origins and po- ars who wish to write about KOR will have of the crisis have appeared, that a fuller and litical significance of KOR. Both books

to draw on recently declassified materials in more nuanced analysis of the events of 1980- depict the Workers' Defense Committee as the Archiwum Akt Nowych and other ar81 is finally possible.

a crucial factor in the rise of Solidarity and a chives in Poland (materials not consulted by For that reason alone, the two books leading influence on the opposition move- Zuzowski or Bernhard) if they are going to under review could have made a far-reach- ment in 1980-81. This view of KOR's

add anything of significance to the historical ing contribution. Both were completed after importance has been accepted by many schol- record. several of the former East-bloc archives had ars, but it has been challenged in recent years Zuzowski's failure to make use of newly been opened and after the initial spate of by Roman Laba, who has claimed that Pol- released documentation is regrettable, but memoirs and other first-hand accounts of the ish workers, rather than Polish intellectuals, by no means wholly unreasonable. Several Polish crisis had appeared. But unfortu- provided the overwhelming impetus for Soli- features of his book (e.g., his frequent use of nately, neither author has made any use of darity and were themselves responsible for

the present tense to describe things that archival sources. Although both draw on at shaping the union's agenda. Laba's publica- ceased to exist after 1989) suggest that he least a few of the new first-hand accounts, tions (including the book cited above) have

wrote most of the text in the 1980s before the the use of this new evidence, especially in prompted spirited replies from Bernhard,

continued on page 294

THE SUDOPLATOV CONTROVERSY (CONT.)

1 September 1995

ered it: several years ago already Professor It will be useful to pose still one quesTo the Editor:

Igor Golovin mentioned this operation of tion. Was the U.S. government decision to

Beria's department in the Soviet press. publish in the summer of 1945 Henry Smyth's I read with great interest “The I do not believe it possible here to dwell well-known treatise "Atomic Energy for Sudoplatov Controversy" in the CWIHP particularly on Sudoplatov's new fantasies, Military Purposes” really dictated by a wish Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 155- contained in his letter to the Bulletin and to share atomic secrets with the Soviet Union? 158). In its own time I also read Special which repeat his Appendix Eight of the pa- Especially since from the point of view of Tasks with no less interest.

perback edition of Special Tasks (p. 491). informativeness it exceeded by many times I believed earlier and now presume that In such a way as was already, for ex- Bohr's responses to Terletskii's questions. the appearance of the recollections of such ample, analyzed by me, it was shown that the Responding to this principal issue, it is easier a high-ranking employee of the Stalinist reader should very, very critically regard to understand why the attempts to find nonNKVD is an outstanding event, no matter Sudoplatov’s “improvisations:” the princi- existent “flaws,” from the point of view of what they are like in terms of quality. In any pal defect of the “recollections” was evident

the demands of secrecy, in Niels Bohr's case, such recollections better than any- even in a “limited space.” Here the assis- responses, are continuing. And in precisely thing else characterize the era, and the story- tance and co-authorship in the drafting of the same way, it will become clear why the teller. We can only be sorry that the recol- Special Tasks of such brilliant journalists as efforts to defend the indefensible fantasies lections, of, for example, Lavrentii Beria, Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, of Sudopatov are continuing. do not exist.

and the fact that the flattering foreward to Finally, let's turn to the eloquent acOf course, I cannot read without a smile this book belongs to the pen of the famous knowledgment of the former Soviet intelliPavel Sudoplatov's "assertion" that in the historian Robert Conquest, are powerless. gence officer Col. Mikhail Liubimov (Top development of my career I am obliged Of course, the point of view of the Secret 3 (1994), 27): "Reading Sudoplatov, "through KGB connections." This is a Schecters is interesting, when they assert one ought to remember that in intelligence desperate (consistent with the time!) lunge, that “the battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov's activity (possibly like science) there is an a relic of the past, at a time when it is already memoirs continues. On one side are Russian inclination to twist facts, particularly beimpossible, as was done in the Stalinist scientists who fear the downgrading of their cause under the conditions of the totalitarian time, to register innocent people as German, prestige and a threat to the medals they regime it was easy to do without fear of English, and other “spies,” and to make received for building the atomic bomb" (Spe- consequences. An intelligence officer or short work of them. Now this relapse of the cial Tasks, Addendum, Paperback Edition). agent could meet and talk with Oppenheimer

. past is nothing more than an expressive And in “The Sudoplatov Controversy,” they or with Fermi, who would not have had any coloring on the portrait of Sudoplatov him- even introduce a list of former intelligence idea to whom they were talking, and then self. And it is evidence of the fact that my operatives and historians who, evidently, do later they could give them a code name and

a article offended him very much.

not know atomic technology professionally, with dispatch submit the information to his In Special Tasks the episode connected but who applaud Sudoplatov. The truth, superiors and cast their deed in bronze." A with Yaacov Terletskii's mission to Niels however, is that in the fact of the matter, the trusting man in the street could be misled by Bohr. My critical article, published in the "battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov" ended the report on the meeting between Terletskii Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994), touched only long ago. People understood that only spe- and Bohr. But for Liubimov, who saw that on that episode. Since I am not a specialist cialists, physicists-atomic scientists, are in a "in every line (of the report) the traditional, in Sudoplatov's professional element, but position to resolve whether or not Niels Bohr old-fashioned character of the operation is do have a definite conception of the Soviet gave atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. revealed,” it was as clear as two times two atomic project and its history, in this letter, Then why did the Schecters, while ig- equals four that “Sudoplatov would portray expressing myself, I will limit myself only noring the opinion of Russian physicists, not the whole trip to Bohr as a colossal success, to the mission to Niels Bohr.

wish to listen, for example, to one of the Beria would be pleased, and he will report I assert that nothing in Sudoplatov's leading U.S. authorities, the prominent par

leading U.S. authorities, the prominent par- everything to Joseph Vissarionovich (Stalin). version regarding this mission stands up to ticipant in the American atomic project, Prof. And Kurchatov would not dare to articulate a comparison with the facts (reason for the Hans A. Bethe? In a recent article in Scien- any doubts about the success of the operatrip, significance for the Soviet physicists of tific American together with his co-authors tion, [for] like other scientists, he is subordithe information which was brought; the observed: “Thus, the allegation that Bohr nate to the system. And just try to squeal shadow which Sudoplatov casts on Niels shared nuclear secrets with the Soviets is about the organs.” Bohr, etc.), and it is a total hoax. Only the refuted by Beria's own account of the ennaked fact that the trip to visit Bohr really counter between his agent and Bohr.” (Sci- Sincerely, did take place remains certain. But even entific American, May 1995, p. 90.) Or does here Sudoplatov is not the one who discov- he too fear for his awards and prestige? Yuri N. Smirnov (Moscow)

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