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When Intellect And Intelligence Join, China (Berkeley, California, 1994). Was Solomon Adler A Communist? What Happens? Chen is a seasoned intelli
4. For an example of one Western country's exploita
tion of this raid in uncovering communist spy rings in Solomon Adler, chief intelligence agent for gence officer with high academic accom
England, see Anthony Cave Brown's biography of the U.S. Treasury Department in China dur- plishment as an economic historian. While Stewart Menzies, “C,” published in Britain as Secret ing WWII, was also prominent on his erudition has provided him with excellent Servant: The Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Head of McCarthy's communist list. In the 1950s, covers for intelligence operations, it was also
British Intelligence, 1939-52.
5. Stephen MacKinnon, “Richard Sorge, Agnes Elizabeth Bentley, a courier of a Soviet to become a source of his own demise. Chi
Smedley, and the Mysterious Mr. 'Wang’ in Shanghai, apparatus in Washington, further identified nese intellectuals are frequently willing to 1930-1932,” conference paper for the American HisAdler as a member of Soviet intelligence.11 serve the state, to be its ears and eyes, yet in torical Association, Cincinnati, 29 December 1988. Adler at the time denied Bentley's accusa- the end the state often turns against the intel
6. Niu Jun, From Yenan to the World (cong yanan lectuals without mercy. Chen Hansheng's 64-65; also Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong,
zouxiang shijie] (Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1992), tion. Surprisingly, in Chen's memoirs, as well as in some other recent Chinese docu- life thus becomes a classic example of this vol. 2. (Beijing: People's Press, 1961), 597-599. ments, Adler has resurfaced in Beijing as a supreme irony. While in Moscow in 1935 7. Interview with Edgar Snow, in Freta Utley, Odyssey bona fide communist intelligence official.12 and 1936, Chen witnessed the bloody purge
of A Liberal: Memoirs (Washington, D.C.: Washington
National Press, 1970), 213. According to these sources, Adler moved to of the intelligence apparatus in the Soviet
8. Bruce A. Elleman, “The 1940 Soviet-Japanese SeBeijing permanently in the late 1950s and Union by Stalin. Many of his Soviet com- cret Agreement and Its Impact on the Soviet-Iranian has since worked in various capacities in rades, some of them highly respected schol- Supply Route” (Working Paper Series in International CCP intelligence. Today, he is identified in ars, including the former Soviet Ambassador
Studies, 1-95-5, Hoover Institution, on War, Revolu
tion, and Peace), 1-3 Chinese documents as an “Advisor” to the to Beijing who originally recruited Chen in
9. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh External Liaison Department of the Central China in 1926, were shot by Stalin as traitors Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American ComCommittee of the CCP, the department that and foreign spies. Chen wrote in raw pessi- munism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995),
60-70. handles such well-known figures as Larry mism about the Soviet purge, “I could not
10. Senate floor speech by McCarthy, in Ralph de Wu-tai Ching of the CIA, who was arrested understand what was going on then. Yet it
Toledano, Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats (New York: by the FBI in 1983 for espionage, and com- was beyond my imagination that some thirty Arlington House Press, 1967), 185. mitted suicide in jail in 1986.
years later, this horrible drama would be re- 11. Text of testimony by Bentley, in Toledano, Spies, Were the Chinese Communists Part of played in China and I myself would be a
Dupes, and Diplomats, 132-133.
12. See Adler's photo in Chen's memoirs, and Selected the International Communist Movement or target of the persecution” (p.64). During the
Shanghai Culture and History Materials (Shanghai Merely “Agrarian Reformers” in the 1930s Cultural Revolution, Chen did not escape the wenshi ziliao xuanji]43 (April 1983), Shanghai People's and 1940s? Chen Hansheng's memoirs Dictatorship of the Proletariat. From 1966 to Press. provides much new information about the
13. For more details on this, see Maochen Yu, American 1968, Chen was put under house arrest. His
Intelligence: OSS in China. Chinese Communist Party's extensive in- wife was tortured to death in late 1968. By
14. Many top leaders of the CPUSA, including Earl ternational connections. Besides the Sorge 1971 when Chen was allowed to leave the
Browder and Eugene Dennis, had served as Comintern and Lattimore cases, Chen served as a chief “thought reform” Cadre School in remote agents in China. See Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret communist intelligence officer in Hong Hunan province, he had become almost com
World of American Communism 8, 12. Kong in the late 1930s and early 1940s, pletely blind. running a cover organization funnelling huge
Maochen Yu, who teaches history at the U.S. amounts of funds—$20 million in two and
Naval Academy, is completing for publicaa half years—from outside China to Yanan, 1. The most revealing case was the rehabilitation of Pan mostly for the purpose of purchasing Japa- Hannian in 1982, after which a large amount of materi
tion a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation on nese-made weapons from the “Puppet"
als on Pan's role as a Comintern intelligence chief in the OSS in China during World War II.
China and CCP spymaster during WWII became availtroops in North China, with considerable
able for scholars. For more details, see the article by this Japanese acquiescence.13 When wanted in
author, “OSS in China: New Information About An Old 1944 by the Nationalist secret police for Role,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counpro-Soviet activities in Guilin (China), Chen
terintelligence, Spring 1994, pp.94-95
2. Shi Zhe, Alongside the Great Men in History: Memwas rescued by the British and airlifted to
oirs of Shi Zhe (zai lishi juren shengbian:shizhe huiyi lu] India where he was miraculously put on the Beijing: Central Documents Press (zhongyang wenxian payroll of British intelligence in New Delhi. chupan she], 1991. Shi Zhe served as an OGPU (NKVD Between 1946 and 1950, while undercover
since 1934) agent for nine years in the Soviet Union until as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins subsequently worked as Mao's intelligence aid in charge
he was dispatched from Moscow to Yenan in 1940. He University in Maryland, Chen became
of encoding and decoding the heavy secret communicaBeijing's secret liaison with the Communist tions between Mao and Stalin during WWII, and as a Party of the U.S.A.(CPUSA) (p.81).14 After Chinese-Russian interpreter. Shi Zhe also was Kang
Sheng's deputy at the Social Affairs Department (SAD) the CCP took over mainland China, Chen
and the chief liaison in Yenan between the NKVD team was summoned back from America to
and the SAD. Beijing by Zhou Enlai in 1950 and has 3. Yan Baohang and others' aggressive intelligence remained a major figure in his own business penetration into the GMD, see the doctoral dissertation
by this author entitled American Intelligence: OSS in for much of the rest of his life.
THE 1980-1981 POLISH CRISIS: Yakov Grishin's narrative, is often problem- and the debate is likely to continue for many THE NEED FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS atic. Robert Zuzowski's volume provides years to come. cogent insights into the origins and func
Zuzowski devotes less attention than by Mark Kramer tions of the Workers' Defense Committee
Bernhard to Laba's thesis, and as a result his (KOR) and Grishin's monograph has a few
book leaves some key questions unresolved. Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and bright moments, but neither book offers as
For example, Zuzowski acknowledges that Opposition in Poland: The Workers' De- much as one might hope.
when the decisive moment came in midfense Committee "KOR” (Westport, CT: Zuzowski's study of the origins, activi
1980, top KOR members were skeptical Praeger, 1992).
ties, and consequences of KOR is enriched about the prospects for achieving a genu
by citations from a wide range of open and inely independent trade union. (Some KOR Ya. Ya. Grishin, Dramaticheskie sobytiya v underground publications. Of necessity, his
officials even hoped that striking workers Pol'she, 1980-1981 88 (Kazan: Izdatel'stvo book relies extensively on (and overlaps would not press too hard for this goal, lest it Kazanskogo Universiteta, 1993).
with) Jan Jozef Lipski's acclaimed two- become a pretext for a harsh crackdown.)
volume history of the Workers' Defense This is difficult to square with the author's Many books about the rise of Solidarity Committee, which was first published in contention that “KOR significantly contribin Poland and the subsequent martial-law 1983. Zuzowski's analysis, however, has uted to the formation of Solidarity and to its crackdown have been published in the West, three advantages over Lipski's book. First, performance, shaping the union's program, but nearly all of them appeared in the early as one would expect, Zuzowski is more
structure, and strategy (p. 169). Nor does to mid-1980s. In recent years, particularly detached and critical than Lipski, whose Zuzowski explain why so many workers since the collapse of Communism in Eastern perspective as one of the co-founders and
who had probably never heard of KOR and Europe, scholarly interest in the 1980-81 leading members of KOR was unavoidably
never seen its publications were neverthePolish crisis has largely subsided. Although reflected in his lengthy account. Second,
less ready to demand a wide array of fundaa few laudable books about the origins of Zuzowski's book extends chronologically mental political changes. It may well be, as Solidarity, notably those by Roman Laba well beyond Lipski's, which ended with both Zuzowski and Bernhard argue, that (The Roots of Solidarity), Lawrence C. KOR’s formal dissolution in September KOR decisively changed the broader milieu Goodwyn (Breaking the Barrier), and 1981. Third, Zuzowski uses his case study in which the strikes of 1980 occurred and Michael H. Bernhard (The Origins of De- of KOR to derive broader conclusions about
that this helped Polish workers eschew viomocratization in Poland), were published in the nature and methods of political dissent in lence and sustain an organized protest movethe early 1990s, the large majority of West- highly authoritarian societies. His discus- ment. But it is not clear that the evidence ern scholars no longer seem interested in sion of the term "intelligentsia” and his produced by Zuzowski is enough to contrareexamining the dramatic events of 1980- overall analytical framework are not always
vene Laba's basic point. 81. Even in Poland only a handful of ex- persuasive, but his assessment provides a This reservation notwithstanding, the perts, mainly those connected with the par- useful basis for historical and cross-country surveys of KOR that Zuzowski and Bernhard liamentary Committee for Constitutional comparisons.
provide, combined with Laba's earlier book, Oversight, are still devoting much effort to a Hence, the overlap with Lipski's book
are about as far as one can go with nonreassessment of the 18-month confrontation does not really detract from Political Dis
archival sources. Both authors have done an that followed the emergence of Solidarity in sent and Opposition in Poland. A more
admirable job of poring over KOR's publithe summer of 1980. The dearth of academic serious problem arises, however, from the
cations and other dissident works as well as interest in the Polish crisis is ironic, for it is overlap with a recent book by Michael relevant secondary sources. Both have only now, when the archives in Poland, Bernhard (cited above), which was pub- brought new analytical perspectives to bear Russia, and other former Communist coun- lished at almost the same time as Zuzowski's
on their topic. Now that Zuzowski's and tries have become accessible and when a monograph. Bernhard's volume, like
Bernhard's books have appeared, other schollarge number of valuable first-hand accounts Zuzowski's, focuses on the origins and po
ars who wish to write about KOR will have of the crisis have appeared, that a fuller and litical significance of KOR. Both books
to draw on recently declassified materials in more nuanced analysis of the events of 1980- depict the Workers' Defense Committee as
the Archiwum Akt Nowych and other ar81 is finally possible. a crucial factor in the rise of Solidarity and a
chives in Poland (materials not consulted by For that reason alone, the two books leading influence on the opposition move- Zuzowski or Bernhard) if they are going to under review could have made a far-reach- ment in 1980-81. This view of KOR's add anything of significance to the historical ing contribution. Both were completed after importance has been accepted by many schol- record. . several of the former East-bloc archives had ars, but it has been challenged in recent years Zuzowski's failure to make use of newly been opened and after the initial spate of by Roman Laba, who has claimed that Pol- released documentation is regrettable, but memoirs and other first-hand accounts of the ish workers, rather than Polish intellectuals, by no means wholly unreasonable. Several Polish crisis had appeared. But unfortu- provided the overwhelming impetus for Soli- features of his book (e.g., his frequent use of nately, neither author has made any use of darity and were themselves responsible for
the present tense to describe things that archival sources. Although both draw on at shaping the union's agenda. Laba's publica- ceased to exist after 1989) suggest that he least a few of the new first-hand accounts, tions (including the book cited above) have
wrote most of the text in the 1980s before the the use of this new evidence, especially in prompted spirited replies from Bernhard,
continued on page 294
THE SUDOPLATOV CONTROVERSY (Cont.)
1 September 1995
ered it: several years ago already Professor It will be useful to pose still one quesTo the Editor:
Igor Golovin mentioned this operation of tion. Was the U.S. government decision to
Beria's department in the Soviet press. publish in the summer of 1945 Henry Smyth's I read with great interest “The I do not believe it possible here to dwell well-known treatise “Atomic Energy for Sudoplatov Controversy” in the CWIHP particularly on Sudoplatov's new fantasies, Military Purposes” really dictated by a wish Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 155- contained in his letter to the Bulletin and to share atomic secrets with the Soviet Union? 158). In its own time I also read Special which repeat his Appendix Eight of the pa- Especially since from the point of view of Tasks with no less interest.
perback edition of Special Tasks (p. 491). informativeness it exceeded by many times I believed earlier and now presume that In such way as was already, for ex- Bohr's responses to Terletskii's questions. the appearance of the recollections of such ample, analyzed by me, it was shown that the
ample, analyzed by me, it was shown that the Responding to this principal issue, it is easier a high-ranking employee of the Stalinist reader should very, very critically regard to understand why the attempts to find nonNKVD is an outstanding event, no matter Sudoplatov's “improvisations:” the princi- existent “flaws,” from the point of view of what they are like in terms of quality. In any pal defect of the “recollections” was evident the demands of secrecy, in Niels Bohr's case, such recollections better than any- even in a "limited space.” Here the assis- responses, are continuing. And in precisely thing else characterize the era, and the story- tance and co-authorship in the drafting of the same way, it will become clear why the teller. We can only be sorry that the recol- Special Tasks of such brilliant journalists as efforts to defend the indefensible fantasies lections, of, for example, Lavrentii Beria, Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, of Sudopatov are continuing. do not exist.
and the fact that the flattering foreward to Finally, let's turn to the eloquent acOf course, I cannot read without a smile this book belongs to the pen of the famous knowledgment of the former Soviet intelliPavel Sudoplatov’s “assertion" that in the historian Robert Conquest, are powerless. gence officer Col. Mikhail Liubimov (Top development of my career I am obliged Of course, the point of view of the Secret 3 (1994), 27): "Reading Sudoplatov, "through KGB connections." This is a Schecters is interesting, when they assert one ought to remember that in intelligence desperate (consistent with the time!) lunge, that “the battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov's activity (possibly like science) there is an a relic of the past, at a time when it is already memoirs continues. On one side are Russian inclination to twist facts, particularly beimpossible, as was done in the Stalinist scientists who fear the downgrading of their cause under the conditions of the totalitarian time, to register innocent people as German, prestige and a threat to the medals they regime it was easy to do without fear of English, and other "spies," and to make received for building the atomic bomb" (Spe
received for building the atomic bomb” (Spe- consequences. An intelligence officer or short work of them. Now this relapse of the cial Tasks, Addendum, Paperback Edition). agent could meet and talk with Oppenheimer past is nothing more than an expressive And in “The Sudoplatov Controversy,” they or with Fermi, who would not have had any coloring on the portrait of Sudoplatov him- even introduce a list of former intelligence idea to whom they were talking, and then self. And it is evidence of the fact that my operatives and historians who, evidently, do later they could give them a code name and article offended him very much.
not know atomic technology professionally, with dispatch submit the information to his In Special Tasks the episode connected but who applaud Sudoplatov. The truth, superiors and cast their deed in bronze.” A with Yaacov Terletskii's mission to Niels however, is that in the fact of the matter, the trusting man in the street could be misled by Bohr. My critical article, published in the “battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov" ended the report on the meeting between Terletskii Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994), touched only long ago. People understood that only spe- and Bohr. But for Liubimov, who saw that on that episode. Since I am not a specialist cialists, physicists-atomic scientists, are in a "in every line (of the report) the traditional, in Sudoplatov's professional element, but position to resolve whether or not Niels Bohr old-fashioned character of the operation is do have a definite conception of the Soviet gave atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. revealed,” it was as clear as two times two atomic project and its history, in this letter, Then why did the Schecters, while ig- equals four that “Sudoplatov would portray expressing myself, I will limit myself only noring the opinion of Russian physicists, not the whole trip to Bohr as a colossal success, to the mission to Niels Bohr.
wish to listen, for example, to one of the Beria would be pleased, and he will report I assert that nothing in Sudoplatov's leading U.S. authorities, the prominent par- everything to Joseph Vissarionovich (Stalin). version regarding this mission stands up to ticipant in the American atomic project, Prof. And Kurchatov would not dare to articulate a comparison with the facts (reason for the Hans A. Bethe? In a recent article in Scien- any doubts about the success of the operatrip, significance for the Soviet physicists of tific American together with his co-authors tion, [for] like other scientists, he is subordithe information which was brought; the observed: “Thus, the allegation that Bohr nate to the system. And just try to squeal shadow which Sudoplatov casts on Niels shared nuclear secrets with the Soviets is about the organs." Bohr, etc.), and it is a total hoax. Only the refuted by Beria's own account of the ennaked fact that the trip to visit Bohr really counter between his agent and Bohr.” (Sci- Sincerely, did take place remains certain. But even entific American, May 1995, p. 90.) Or does here Sudoplatov is not the one who discov- he too fear for his awards and prestige? Yuri N. Smirnov (Moscow)
To the Editor:
call a “leak” at the suggestion of a highly- social contact with me, I am in a better
placed church official. Simply put, having position than anyone else to say that Yuri In the letter from the well-known KGB invited an opponent of the victim to visit him Smirnov is a professional atomic scientist functionary Pavel A. Sudoplatov, published on some pretext, the police official slips who received his training at Arzamas-16, in the American journal Cold War Interna- him, as if by accident, a specially-prepared
him, as if by accident, a specially-prepared who took part in the design and testing of the tional History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Fall letter which refers to payments received 50-megaton nuclear bomb, who completed 1995, pp. 156-158), a suggestion or, rather, from the police department by the individual his doctoral work under the direction of the direct charge, is made against my colleague to be compromised.
well-known scientist D.A. Frankof many years, Yuri Smirnov, all of whose In this and similar situations, the “patri- Kamenetsky. During the period in which he scientific and literary efforts I have wit- otic" attitude of these employees towards worked at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, he nessed, that these efforts were in some way their agencies is touching. They of all people was responsible for a major line of research connected with the KGB. As is usual in such understand that the discovery of an into the peaceful use of nuclear explosions. cases, in place of evidence the letter pro- individual's links to their services lead to Such a list of accomplishments does not vides only murky references to a conversa- compromising him in the public's eyes, and require any embellishments, and any profestion between Sudoplatov and his former that this works. It is not clear whether they sional would be pleased to call it his own. It colleagues on this matter.
consider that such actions strengthen the was entirely natural that Yuri Nikolaevich, Fairly or unfairly, the reputation of the negative image of their agencies. Perhaps, as a possessor of such a rich and varied set of KGB, as well as that of similar agencies in considering its own reputation to be beyond experiences, would turn his sights to the other countries has always been very low. salvage, this is of no concern to them. history of science, and particularly the hisThere has never been a better way to ruin a Knowing Yuri N. Smirnov to be a histo- tory of nuclear explosive technology. These person in the eyes of public opinion and his rian of science, who has objectively evalu- efforts have borne fruit, as is witnessed by close friends than to suggest that he has ated the contribution of our agents in obtain- his string of publications. He is recognized connections with these services. ing "atomic secrets," who neither dimin
among historians of modern science, and no An unparalleled expert in the life of ishes nor exaggerates this contribution,
ishes nor exaggerates this contribution, attempts by Sudoplatov and his colleagues Russian bureaucrats and behind the scenes Sudoplatov and his colleagues, apparently, to blacken his reputation will stick. dealings, the author Nikolai Leskov, de- decided to "smear" Smirnov as a protective scribed a similar intrigue in his story Admin- measure.
Sincerely, istrative Grace. In this story, a police offi- As a colleague of Yuri Nikolaevich, cial wishing to compromise a provincial who began to work with me 35 years ago and Victor Adamsky public figure organizes what we would now to this day is in constant professional and Arzamas-16
THE KOREAN WAR:
On 24-25 July 1995, The Korea Society, Georgetown University, and the Korea-America Society sponsored a conference at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. on "The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record.” Papers were presented by leading scholars from Korea, China, Russia, and the United States.
To obtain further information or to order the conference report or participant papers, contact:
able for ordering:
9. The Korean War Paradigm, by Col. Harry G.
Summers (17 pages) 1. Civil is Dumb Name for a War, by Dr. James 10. China's Military Strategy During the Korean Matray (18 pages)
War, by Dr. Shu Guang Zhang (33 pages) 2. Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on the 11. Military Objectives and Strategies of Two Origins of the Korean War, by Dr. Kim Hakjoon Koreas in the Korean War, by Dr. Chang-Il Ohn (29 pages)
(18 pages) 3. Korean War of 1950-1953: Thoughts About 12. The Soviet Role in Prolonging the Korean the Conflict's Causes and Actors, by Dr. Valeri War, 1951-1953, by Dr. Kathryn Weathersby Denissov (14 pages)
13. Assessing the Conclusion and Outcome of the 4. Why and How China Entered the Korean War: Korean War, by Dr. Natalia Bajanova (13 pages) In Light of New Evidence, by Dr. Jian Chen (16 14. POWs, Soviet Intelligence and the MIA Quespages)
tion, by Mr. Paul Lashmar (14 pages) 5. Politics in Peril: The Truman-MacArthur Con- 15. The Politics of Conference: The Political troversy and the Korean War, by Prof. Roger Conference at Geneva, April 26-June 15, 1954, Dingman (35 pages)
by Dr. J.Y. Ra (31 pages) 6. Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, by 16. In Search of Essences: Labelling the Korean Dr. Evgueni Bajanov (23 pages)
War, by Dr. William Stueck (22 pages) 7. A Triangle of Kim, Stalin, and Mao in the Korean War, by Dr. Kim Chull-baum (27 pages) There is a fee of $5.00 for the conference 8. Notes on the Successive Strategies Employed report and $2.50 per paper; checks can be made During the Korean War, by Gen. Sir Anthony payable to the Korea Society. Farrar-Hockley (12 pages)
The Korea Society
The following conference papers are avail
MORE ON THE 1956 Polish CRISIS
9 October 1995
ment of Soviet forces based in Poland in his ...a number of comrades who are support
meeting with Marshals Konev and ers of a Polish-Soviet union...” (p. 40). To the Editor:
Rokossowski in the Soviet embassy on Octo
ber 19, also referred to in his memoirs (p. 41). Sincerely yours, I read the essay “Poland, 1956: The troop movements, which the Soviets Khrushchev, Gomulka and the Polish Octo- then claimed were a long-planned army "ex- Milton Leitenberg ber," by L.W. Gluchowski, and the accom- ercise" (p. 44), were certainly very much Senior Fellow panying documents in CWIHP Bulletin 5 larger than the "one military battalion” (p. Center for International and Security Stud(Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49, with enormous 40) that Rokossowski admitted to putting ies at Maryland (CISSM) interest, the reason for which will be evident "on alert” (p. 44). Gomulka's phrase is "the University of Maryland (College Park) in a moment.
Soviet Army stationed in Poland” (p. 44). Upon completion of the reading, how- In 1980 or thereabouts, I was given a ever, I was thoroughly puzzled by what I description of the same climactic meeting L.W. Gluchowski responds: saw as a major omission from the author's between the Soviet and Polish leaderships by introductory essay. Though the material a former Polish party and government offi- I would like to thank Mr. Leitenberg for appears in the documents and in footnotes to cial who had before 1956 been close to the his thoughtful comments on my documenthem, there is no mention at all in the body Polish First Secretary, Central Committee tary essay, “Poland 1956: Khrushchev, of the essay concerning one of the most Chairman and Prime Minister, Boleslaw Gomulka, and the Polish October,'” in the crucial aspects that determined the ultimate Bierut. That rendition adds information be- Spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. outcome of the confrontation between the yond that which appears in Gomulka's de- With regard to Mr. Leitenberg's comment Soviet and Polish communist party leaders scription to the Chinese party in Document 4. that he was "thoroughly puzzled” by "a in Warsaw. It concerns the movement of I recorded the comments at the time. The major omission from” my “introductory esSoviet military forces toward Warsaw, the note which a Polish official handed to say" concerning “one of the most crucial circumstances in which the Polish party Gomulka during the meeting with the Sovi- aspects that determined the ultimate outleadership learned of the movements, and ets and which informed him of the Soviet come of the confrontation," notably "the the threatened response of Polish military troop movements resulted from information movement of Soviet military forces towards units. It appears as a single line in Docu- reported to Warsaw by Polish military offic- Warsaw...[and] the circumstances in which ment 3 (p. 43), is amplified in Gomulka's ers ("colonels"). In addition, Polish Air the Polish party leadership learned of the rendition of the events to the Chinese in Force General Frey-Bielecki requested per- movements,” I shall be brief. Any discusDocument 4 (p. 44), and in footnote 61, mission to bomb the Soviet columns as they sion about the military aspects of the Sovietquoting Mikoyan's notes. The threatened converged on Warsaw. Some Polish Air Polish confrontation of October 1956 is response of Polish military units is not men- Force units apparently threatened such ac- bound to be controversial at this early stage tioned in the documents at all, or by the tion whether they received authority to do so of archival research in Poland. In any case, author.
or not. (As I recall, Frey-Bielecki agreed to I decided to let this set of documents speak Gluchowski also quotes two of the com- make the request when some of his officers for themselves, and no less than six endnotes ments in Khrushchev's memoirs; the first- informed him of those threats, telling him include extensive discussions of military “...the people of Warsaw had been prepared what they intended to do. With that, he matters during the crisis. Even Mr. to defend themselves and resist Soviet troops decided to approach the political leadership.) Leitenberg acknowledges that "the material entering the city...”—without asking what The Polish internal security forces were also appears in the documents and in the foot"Soviet troops,” from where; and the sec- preparing some sort of resistance. Gomulka notes to them.” Furthermore, in the body of ond—“...our own armed strength far ex- was the source of Khrushchev's assessment my essay, I noted: "Three days in October ceeded that of Poland, but we didn't want to that “the people of Warsaw had been pre- (18 to 20) 1956 resolved four outstanding resort to the use of our own troops”— with- pared to defend themselves.” Gomulka ap- and interrelated conflicts of the deout pointing out that it is belied by parently told him, in effect, “Leave us alone Stalinization period in Poland." The second Khrushchev's outburst at the October 19 and everything will be OK; if not, there will conflict I outlined reads as follows: "the meeting (quoted on page 40): "That number be a popular uprising." And the Russians Soviet threat to intervene militarily in the won't pass here. We are ready for active thought that the Poles would fight; in the affairs of the Polish Party ended with a intervention....I would like the comrades to words of the Polish official, “All the Czech compromise agreement on the part of the voice their views on this matter: interven- traditions are different.”
CPSU leadership and the PUWP leadertion or..."
One might add one more point. ship.” It is clear that I agree with Mr. It seems very likely, even obvious, that Gluchowski never comments on the propos- Leitenberg: “one of the most crucial asKhrushchev gave the order for the move- als for union, although Khrushchev refers to pects" of the confrontation in Warsaw had to