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COLD WAR

INTERNATIONAL

HISTORY PROJECT

Issues 6-7

BULLETIN

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Winter 1995/1996

THE COLD WAR IN ASIA

Cái chiến tranh nguội Châu Á

ЗАПИСЬ

НЕСЕКРЕТНО

БЕСЕДЫ ТОВАРИЩА СТАЛИНА И.В. С ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЕМ

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОГО НАРОДНОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА КИТАЙСКОЙ

1

НАРОДНО. РЕСПУБЛИКИ МАО ЦЗЭ-ДУНОМ 16 декабря 1949 г

ора на общие

아시아에서의 냉전

следующ го содержания

Товарищ Мао Цзе-дун: Главнейшим вопросом в настоящее

время является вопрос об обеспечения мира. Китай нунцается

В моном передышке продолзительностью в 3-5 лет,

HOOVER

была бы использована дл

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Становления предвоенного уров-

На экономики и стабилнаацки общего положения в стране. Ре-

MAY 2 8 1997 в находится в зависимости

о перспектив на мир. В связи с этим ЦК КТК поручило мне

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с том, каким образом и

несколько обеспечен международный мир.

Товарищ Сталин: В Китае, таким образом, идет война за

Вопрос о мире более всего занимает и Ссветский Сока,хр-

о мир существует уже в течение четырех лет. Что ка-

непосредственной угрозы для него в настоя -

ХОЛОДНАЯ ВОЙНА В АЗИИ

CBETC

Дее время не

у она к войне

жет: Япония еще не стало на ноги и поэто

больше с его войны Зохи

; Америка, хотя и кричит о войне,но

сти с Китаем некому всевать
Кета"?

в Европе запуганы войной; в судно-
что Ким Ир Сен пойдет на

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The Cold War

International History Project

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by
governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives
on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on "the other side”—the former
Communist bloc-through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The
project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College)
and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I.
Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr.
Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George
Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International
Studies, headed by Ambassador Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers
are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not
constitute CWIHP's endorsement of authors' views. Copies are available free upon request.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin

Issues 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996)

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
1000 Jefferson Drive, SW

Washington, D.C. 20560

Tel.: (202) 357-2967

Fax: (202) 357-4439

e-mail: wwcem 123@sivm.si.edu

Editor: James G. Hershberg

Managing Editor: P.J. Simmons

Associate Editor: Bonnie Southwick

Researchers: Anne Chiorazzi, Helen Christakos, Andrew Grauer, Michelle King, Sara Kirchhoff,
Mark Torok

Special thanks to: Malcolm Byrne, Chen Jian, Mark Doctoroff, Ilya Gaiduk, Maxim Korobochkin,
Mark Kramer, Sasha Mansourov, Christian Ostermann, Priscilla Roberts, Danny Rozas, Kathryn
Weathersby, Odd Arne Westad, Vladislav Zubok

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Table of Contents

Stalin's Conversations With Chinese Leaders

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2 Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from

the Russian Archives, article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov.................

New Evidence on Sino-Soviet Relations

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The Emerging Disputes Betwen Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958,

introduction, translations, and annotations by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian............

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STALIN'S CONVERSATIONS

Talks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950, And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952

with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok

This issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin leads off with translations of five meetings between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and top leaders (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai) of the newly-created People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of the documents, which constitute some of the most intimate glimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet and Chinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closed archives of the communist world, are kept in the Russian Presidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. They were recently declassified by Russian authorities in connection with efforts to gather materials related to the Korean War for presentation by the Russian Government to South Korea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as well as many other Russian archival records concerning the Korean War which appear later in this issue of the Bulletin, as a consequence of its cooperation with a research project involving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia University, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

(Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained by CWIHP are available to researchers through the National Security Archive, a non-governmental documents repository, library, and research institute located on the seventh floor of The Gelman Library at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and will also be made. available through Columbia University.)

The documents that follow begin with transcripts of two conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950, during the Chinese leader's two-month visit to the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Those conversations came as the two countries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alliance following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and also constituted the first and only personal encoun

ter between these two communist titans and major figures of 20th-century world history.

Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscow between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September 1952, where issues on the table for discussion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and the relationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcripts yield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind of Stalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), one of the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over the USSR.

To assess the significance of these documents, the CWIHP Bulletin has assembled four specialists familiar with SinoSoviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, from various perspectives: Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale), author of China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Prof. Vojtech Mastny (Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, currently at the University of Hokkaido, Japan), author of The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953 (Oxford University Press, 1996), a forthcoming sequel to his Russia's Road to the Cold War, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Dr. Odd Arne Westad (Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute), author of Cold War and Revolution: Soviet American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Dr. Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), coauthor (with Constantine Pleshakov) of Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996).

Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHP by Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from Kathryn Weathersby and Chen Jian.

-Jim Hershberg, Editor, CWIHP Bulletin

WITH CHINESE LEADERS

I: Conversation between Stalin and
Mao, Moscow, 16 December 1949

[Classification level blacked out:
"NOT SECRET" Stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN COMRADE

I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONG
on 16 December 1949

After an exchange of greetings and a discussion of general topics, the following conversation took place.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The most important question at the present time is the question of establishing peace. China needs a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would be used to bring the economy back to prewar levels and to stabilize the country in general. Decisions on the most important questions in China hinge on the prospects for a peaceful future. With this in mind the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] entrusted me to ascertain from you, comr[ade]. Stalin, in what way and for how long will international peace be preserved.

Comrade Stalin: In China a war for peace, as it were, is taking place. The question of peace greatly preoccupies the Soviet Union as well, though we have already had peace for the past four years. With regards to China, there is no immediate threat at the present time: Japan has yet to stand up on its feet and is thus not ready for war; America, though it screams war, is actually afraid of war more than anything; Europe is afraid of war; in essence, there is no one to fight with China, not unless Kim Il Sung decides to invade China?

Peace will depend on our efforts. If we continue to be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps even longer.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Since Liu Shaoqi's return to China, CC CPC has been discussing the treaty of friendship, alliance

and mutual assistance between China and
the USSR.

Comrade Stalin: This question we can
discuss and decide. We must ascertain
whether to declare the continuation of the
current 1945 treaty of alliance and friend-
ship between the USSR and China, to an-
nounce impending changes in the future, or
to make these changes right now.

As you know, this treaty was concluded between the USSR and China as a result of the Yalta Agreement, which provided for the main points of the treaty (the question of the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was concluded, so to speak, with the consent of America and England. Keeping in mind this circumstance, we, within our inner circle, have decided not to modify any of the points of this treaty for now, since a change in even one point could give America and England the legal grounds to raise questions about modifying also the treaty's provisions concerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, etc. This is why we searched to find a way to modify the current treaty in effect while formally maintaining its provisions, in this case by formally maintaining the Soviet Union's right to station its troops at Port Arthur while, at the request of the Chinese government, actually withdrawing the Soviet Armed forces currently stationed there. Such an operation could be carried out upon China's request.

One could do the same with KChZHD [Chinese Changchun Railroad, which traverses Manchuria], that is, to effectively modify the corresponding points of the agreement while formally maintaining its provisions, upon China's request.

If, on the other hand, the Chinese comrades are not satisfied with this strategy, they can present their own proposals.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The present situation with regard to KChZhD and Port Arthur corresponds well with Chinese interests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate to effectively fight against imperialist aggression. In addition, KChZhD is a training school for the preparation of Chinese cadres in railroad and industry.

troops does not mean that Soviet Union refuses to assist China, if such assistance is needed. The fact is that we, as communists, are not altogether comfortable with stationing our forces on foreign soil, especially on the soil of a friendly nation. Given this situation anyone could say that if Soviet forces can be stationed on Chinese territory, then why could not the British, for example, station their forces in Hong Kong, or the Americans in Tokyo?

We would gain much in the arena of international relations if, with mutual agreement, the Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur. In addition, the withdrawal of Soviet forces would provide a serious boost to Chinese communists in their relations with the national bourgeoisie. Everyone would see that the communists have managed to achieve what [Nationalist Chinese leader] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] could not. The Chinese communists must take the national bourgeoisie into consideration.

The treaty ensures the USSR's right to station its troops in Port Arthur. But the USSR is not obligated to exercise this right and can withdraw its troops upon Chinese request. However, if this is unsuitable, the troops in Port Arthur can remain there for 2, 5, or 10 years, whatever suits China best. Let them not misunderstand that we want to run away from China. We can stay there for 20 years even.

Comrade Mao Zedong: In discussing the treaty in China we had not taken into account the American and English positions regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act in a way that is best for the common cause. This question merits further consideration. However, it is already becoming clear that the treaty should not be modified at the present time, nor should one rush to withdraw troops from Port Arthur.

Should not Zhou Enlai visit Moscow in order to decide the treaty question?

Comrade Stalin: No, this question you must decide for yourselves. Zhou may be needed in regard to other matters.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would like to decide on the question of Soviet credit to Comrade Stalin: The withdrawal of China, that is to draw up a credit agreement

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