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Interestingly, Stalin did not tell his sub- treaties, we must go all the way. It is true benefitted the USSR) in times of upheaval. ordinates about this turnabout in his attitude that for us this entails certain inconve- It also made the CCP leadership feel more toward signing a new treaty. On January 6, niences, and we will have to struggle secure in its international isolation. At the Mao met with Soviet Foreign Minister against the Americans. But we are al- same time, the treaty created a new revoluAndrei Vyshinsky, in the presence of ready reconciled to that.
tionary-imperial synergy in the Far East. Kovalev, the Chinese ambassador in Mos- Mao Zedong: With regard to this matter, The Chinese communists, backed by Moscow, and interpreters Nikolai Fedorenko we are only concerned by the fact that it cow, wanted to complete the reunification of and Shi Zhe, to discuss joint Sino-Soviet could lead to undesirable consequences the country and to carry the banner of revotactics at the United Nations, where the for the USSR.
lution further, to Burma and Indochina. For Nationalists continued to occupy China's
Stalin the alliance marked the end of the seat on the Security Council. When Mao Stalin sought to convince Mao that the status quo strategy of Yalta and the opening mentioned the necessity of a new treaty, Soviet Union would risk a conflict with the of a second Cold War against the United Vyshinsky repeated the official line that any United States for the sake of its new Asian States in the Far East. Notwithstanding the change in the 1945 treaty "could be used by ally. Yet, he wanted to extract from the fact that in both countries hundreds of milthe Americans and the British as a pretext Chinese a proper price for this willingness, lions of people yearned for peace and recon
a for revision of those parts of the treaty, primarily in the form of recognition of Soviet struction, the new alliance in reality sigwhose change would hurt the interests of the security interests in Manchuria. This time nalled military mobilization and confrontaSoviet Union and China. This is undesir- Stalin did not miscalculate. Mao now ac- tion—as events in Korea would soon demable and must not happen.”10 Soviet ac- cepted Stalin's proposal, put forth at the first onstrate. tions at the United Nations, however, had meeting, that the Soviet Union would retain already begun to reflect Stalin's new line: its legal rights in Port Arthur, at least until a
1. Shi Zhe's account is quoted in Chen Jian, China's
Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sinothe alliance with communist China against peace treaty with Japan was signed. The
American Confrontation (New York: Columbia Unithe U.S.-led coalition of capitalist states. Chinese leader also agreed to keep the Dairen versity Press, 1994), 79-80. At the second official meeting with port closed to the Americans.
2. P. Yudin, “Zapis besedy s tovarischem Mao," Mao (now accompanied by Zhou Enlai, The Chinese attempted to bargain when
Problemi Dalnego Vostok (Problems of the Far East] 5
(1994), 105-106. who had arrived in Moscow two days be- it came to Soviet rights to control the Chinese
3. This difference was previously noted in Sergei N. fore), on 22 January 1950, Stalin sounded Changchun railroad, the main strategic ar- Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain like a changed man. "We believe that these tery between the USSR and Liaotung (the Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, agreements (of 1945) need to be changed, Port Arthur peninsula). But Stalin and
CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 85-86, as one of
the authors, Sergei Goncharov, had seen the minutes of although earlier we had thought that they Molotov defended those rights tooth and
the Stalin-Mao talks, which were then still classified, in could be left intact,” he said. “The existing nail. During the talks on the ministerial the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow. agreements, including the treaty, should be level, the Soviet side succeeded in imposing 4. In an undated cable sent to Stalin during the 31 changed, because war against Japan figures on the PRC several secret agreements. The
January-7 February 1949 talks with Mao, apparently
near the end of the discussions, Mikoyan reported that at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war Additional Agreement to the treaty stipu- he had told the Chinese leader that the Soviet governis over and Japan has been crushed, the lated that “on the territory of the Far Eastern ment had decided to repeal this unequal (nespravedlivii] situation has been altered, and now the treaty region and the Central Asian republics, as treaty and withdraw its troops from Port Arthur as soon has become an anachronism.” The most well as on the territory of Manchuria and
as the peace treaty] with Japan will be concluded. But
if the Chinese communist party ... would find expedient salient feature of the discussion was the Xinjiang," both the USSR and the PRC
an immediate withdrawal of (Soviet] troops (from Port omnipresence of the Japanese threat and a “would not provide to foreigners the rights Arthur), then the USSR was ready to do so. As to the virtual absence of discussion of the United for concessions, and would not tolerate ac- accord on the Chinese-Changchun railroad, we (the States and the new American policy; nor did tivities of industrial, financial, trade and other
Soviet) do not consider this treaty unequal, since this
railroad had been built primarily with Russian means. anybody then raise Acheson's speech of enterprises, communities and organizations,
Perhaps ... in this treaty the principle of equal rights is January 12. Only later, during the discus- with the participation, directly or indirectly, not fully observed, but we are ready to consider this sion of the specific provisions of the new of the (financial] capital of the third countries question and decide it with the Chinese comrades in a treaty, did the following exchange occur: or the citizens of those countries."Il The fraternal manner.” See Archive of the President, Rus
sian Federation (APRF), f. 39, op. 1, d. 39, 11. 78-79, as Chinese also signed a “Protocol on the unim
quoted in Andrei Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia missiia A.I. Mao Zedong: We must act so as to take peded transportation of Soviet troops and Mikoyana v Kitai” (Secret Mission of A.I. Mikoyan to into account the interests of both sides, military property on the Chinese Changchun China), Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 3 (1995), 94-105, China and the Soviet Union. railroad in case of the threat of war in the Far
quotation on p. 100; see also Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia
missiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai,” Problemy Dalnego Stalin: True. We believe that the agree- East.” This secret agreement allowed the
Vostoka 2 (1995), 97-111. ment concerning Port Arthur is not eq- Soviets to transport troops and military equip- 5. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partuitable.
ment and supplies quickly, without paying ners, 91, 247-249. Mao Zedong: But changing this agree- any tariffs to the Chinese and without any
6. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Con
versations with Felix Chuev, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: ment goes against the decisions of the Chinese customs control. 12
Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 81; for the original Russian see Yalta Conference?!
The Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed on 14 Felix Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovim (One hunStalin: True, it does—and to hell with February 1950, satisfied Stalin's search for dred and forty conversations with Molotov) (Moscow: it! If we make a decision to revise the preservation of the status quo (where it
TERRA, 1991), 114.
7. See the text of Mao's cable to Beijing of 2 January
WESTAD continued from page 7
not received any answer from these governments We are waiting for your answer.
We think we will give the following answer:
negotiations on CCP terms. The result will be We also think that your answer, in case you that the CCP agrees to the peace negotiations and will be asked for it, should be something like this: it will be impossible to accuse it of being eager to
continue the civil war. The Guomindang, howThe Chinese Communist party has al- ever, will receive the blame for breaking the ways been a supporter of peace in China, peace talks. Thus, the peace maneuver of the because the civil war in China had not Guomindang and the USA will be frustrated, and been started by it, but by the Nanjing you will be able to continue your victorious war government, which should bear all re- of liberation. sponsibility for the consequences of the
We are waiting for your answer. war. The Chinese Communist party is in favour of talks with the Guomindang, Filippov (Stalin) but without the participation of those war criminals who provoked the civil (Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 97-99.) war in China. The Chinese Communist party is in favour of the direct negotiations with the Guomindang, without any foreign mediators. The Chinese Com
Mao Zedong to Stalin, 13 January 1949 munist party especially finds it impossible to accept the mediation by a for- Comrade Filippov, eign power which takes part in the civil war against the Chinese Popular Libera
I received your telegram of January 10. tion forces with its armed forces and
1. We think that the government of the navy, because such a power cannot be USSR should give the following answer to the regarded as neutral and impartial in the note by the Nanjing government proposing that liquidation of the war in China.
the USSR accepts mediation in the termination of
the civil war in China: We think that your answer should be ap
The government of the USSR has proximately like this. If you do not agree, let us always wished, and still wishes, to see know of your opinion.
China as a peaceful, democratic and As for your visit to Moscow, we think that in united country. But it is for the people the view of the abovementioned circumstances of China itself to choose the way to you should, unfortunately, postpone your trip achieve peace, unity and democracy in again for some time, because your visit to Mos- China. The government of the USSR, cow in this situation would be used by the en- relying on the principle of noninterferemies to discredit the Chinese Communist party ence in the other countries' internal as a force allegedly dependent on Moscow, which, affairs, cannot accept mediation becertainly, could bring no benefit to the Commu- tween the two sides in the civil war in nist party of China or to the USSR.
a divided China. The visit of Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan to the CCP headquarters later that winter did not do much to mitigate mutual suspicions; indeed, Mao on several occasions during the decades to come referred to this episode as an example of Soviet duplicity.
The documents were translated from Russian by Maxim Korobochkin; see also S.L. Tikhvinskii, "Iz Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949g.", Novaya i noveisha istoriya 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.
2. We think that although the USA, England, and France, and especially the USA, are very willing to take part in mediation to terminate the war in China and thus achieve their goal—to preserve the Guomindang regime—the governments of these countries, especially the US government, have already lost their prestige among the Chinese public, and as the victory of the PLA nationwide and the downfall of the Guomindang regime is already in sight—it seems questionable whether they still wish to continue their assistance to the Nanjing government and thus further offend the PLA.
Only the USSR has a very high prestige among the Chinese people, so if the USSR in its reply to the note by the Nanjing government will take the position outlined in your telegram of January 10, it would make the USA, England and France assume that participating in mediation is an appropriate thing, and give the Guomindang a pretext for scolding us as warlike elements.
And the broad popular masses, which are displeased with the Guomindang and hope for an early victory of the PLA, would find themselves in despair.
If therefore it is possible for the USSR, in view of overall international relations, to make its reply along the lines which we are proposing, we would wish very much that you approve of our proposals. By doing so, you will help us enormously.
party and its troops, and that would lead to the We are deeply concerned by the fact that this political death of the Guomindang leaders and the deception will have a large influence on the people total disintegration of the Guomindang army. and make us start another political detour, i.e. to Second, because they know that the Communist refrain from rejecting peace negotiations with the party will not make peace with the Guomindang, Guomindang. We are delaying the creation of the as it cannot abandon its principal policy of liquicoalition government. Our principal objective is dation of the Guomindang and its troops. to make the Americans and the Guomindang put So what does Nanjing want after all? It all their aces on the table, while we keep our aces wants not peace with the Communist party, but an until the last moment.
armistice, a temporary termination of hostilities We have recently published a list of war to use the armistice as a respite to restore order criminals, 43 persons, unofficially (a statement by among Guomindang troops, to fortify the south a person of authority). The PLA has not yet issued bank of the Yangzi, to ship armaments from the an order to arrest these war criminals.
USA, to reinforce and then to break the truce and On January 1 Jiang Jieshi delivered his peace deliver a blow on the People's Liberation forces, proposal. We gave an unofficial answer to this, blaming the Communist party for the breakdown too (an editorial article by a journalist). To sum of negotiations. Their minimal wish is to prevent up, we have left some room for a volte face, to see the total defeat of the Guomindang forces by the how the Chinese people and international opinion Communist party. would react to the Guomindang's deceptive nego- This is the basis of the current deception tiations.
policy of Nanjing and the USA. But now we are inclined towards rejecting 3. How can one respond to this maneuver by the peace deception by the Guomindang with full Nanjing and the USA? Two replies are possible. righteousness, because now, as the balance of First reply: to reject the Nanjing peace proposals class forces in China has already changed irre- openly and directly, thus declaring the necessity versibly and the international opinion is also of the continuation of civil war. But what would unfavourable to the Nanjing government, the PLA that mean? That means, first, that you had put will be able to cross the Yangzi this summer and your principal ace on the table and surrendered a start the offensive towards Nanjing.
very important weapon—the banner of peace It looks like we do not have to make one more into the hands of the Guomindang. It means, political detour. In the present situation this second, that you are helping your enemies in maneuver would be damaging rather than benefi- China and outside China to accuse the Commucial.
nist party as the advocate of continuing the civil 4. Thank you for asking for our opinion on war, and to praise the Guomindang as the desuch an important issue. If you do not agree with fender of peace. It means, third, that you are my opinion as expressed here or would introduce giving the USA an opportunity to brainwash corrections, please let me know.
public opinion in Europe and America on the
lines that no peace is possible with the CommuMao Zedong
nist party, because it does not want peace, and that the only way to achieve peace in China is to organize an armed intervention by foreign pow
ers like the intervention which had taken place in Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 January 1949 Russia for four years from 1918 to 1921.
We think that a direct and overt answer is To Comrade Mao Zedong.
good when you are dealing with honest people,
but when you have to deal with political swinWe received your long telegram on the dlers, like the Nanjing people, a direct and overt Nanjing peace proposal.
answer can become dangerous. 1. Certainly it would be better if the Nanjing But a different answer is also possible. i.e.: government's peace proposal did not exist at all, a) to accept the desirability of a peace settlement if this whole peace maneuver by the USA was in China; b) to conduct negotiations without nonexistent. Clearly, this maneuver is disagreable, foreign mediators, as China is a sovereign counbecause it can bring some trouble to our common try and has no need for foreign mediators; c) to cause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver does conduct negotiations between the Communist exist, it is a fact and we cannot close our eyes on party and the Guomindang as a party, not with the this fact, we have to accept it.
Nanjing government, which is) bearing the blame 2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal by for starting the civil war and thus has lost the Nanjing and the USA is a manifestation of a confidence of the people; d) as soon as the parties policy of deception. First, because Nanjing does come to an agreement on the problems of peace not really want peace with the Communist party, and of the government of China, the hostilities as the peace with the Communist party would would be terminated. mean the rejection by the Guomindang of its Can the Guomindang accept these condiprincipal policy of liquidation of the Communist tions? We think it cannot. But if the Guomindang
3. One should think thoroughly whether it is possible to let people from the Nanjing government, including war criminals, take part in peace negotiations with us. As of now we are inclined toward the following position: the unconditional surrender of the Nanjing government is necessary to give the people of China a real peace as soon as possible.
By starting the war, the Nanjing government committed a great crime—it has lost the confidence of the nation. To reach an early termination of war and a peace settlement the Nanjing government should surrender its powers to the people. It has no reason for procrastinating.
We think that if we now would start peace negotiations with people like Zhang Zhizhong or Shao Lizi and enter into a coalition government with these people, that would be the exact fulfillment of the US government's wishes.
And that would bring much dissent among the people of China, the democratic parties and popular organizations and even within the CCP, and would be very damaging for our current position of having all virtue on our side.
Starting from July 1946 we have been cautiously paying attention to the deceptive character of the negotiations which the US government and the Guomindang would inevitably start after the military defeat of the latter, and to the degree of influence which this deception has on the
The Official Statement on the Soviet Government's Answer to the Note by the Nanjing Government (Izvestia, 18 January
will not accept these conditions, the people will (Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 110-113.)
But let us assume the impossible and imag- 1. I was glad to receive your supplementary ine that the Guomindang had accepted these telegram of January 11. On the principal line (the terms. What should the Communist Party's plans breakdown of large scale negotiations with the of actions be like?
Guomindang (GMD), the continuation of the First, it would be necessary to refrain from revolutionary war to the end) we agree with you terminating the hostilities and then to create the completely. central coalition government organs in such a Today we published eight conditions under way that approximately three fifths of seats in the which we (would) agree to enter into peace negoConsultative Council and two thirds of the posts tiations with the Guomindang. These conditions in the government would be retained by the are put forward against the five reactionary conCommunists, and the other seats and posts would ditions which Jiang Jieshi mentioned in his peace be distributed between other democratic parties proposal of January 1. and the Guomindang.
Several days ago already the Americans Second, it is necessary that the posts of the sounded out our opinion—whether we would prime minister, Commander in Chief, and, if wish to conduct peace negotiations with the possible, that of the president, be occupied by Guomindang without the 43 war criminals. So Communists.
this sole condition-negotiating without war Third, the Consultative Council should de- criminals—is no longer sufficient to undermine clare this coalition government the only govern- the intrigue of the Guomindang peace negotiament of China, and any other government, pre
tions. tending to be the government of China, should be 2. [This point dealt with the work of the CCP declared a rebel group, subject to be disbanded. radio station.)
And, finally, the coalition government should 3. Since the publication of the Guomindang's order both your troops and the Guomindang troops peace proposals there has been much fuss in the to swear allegiance to the coalition government GMD-controlled areas and the population is en and that hostilities against the troops which had masse demanding peace from the Guomindang, given the oath would be terminated immediately, reproaching the Guomindang that its peace conwhile they would be continued against the troops ditions are too severe. which had refused to give the oath.
The agitation and propaganda organs of the It seems unlikely that the Guomindang would Guomindang are hastily explaining why the agree to these measures, but if they would not, it Guomindang needs to preserve its legal status would be also detrimental for them, because they and its army. We think that this disorder in the would be totally isolated, and these measures Guomindang-controlled regions will be increaswould be carried out without them.
ing further. 4. This is our understanding of the issue and our advice to you. Maybe we were not able to Mao Zedong present our advice clearly enough in our previous telegram.
(Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 104-105.) We ask you to regard our advice as advice only, which does not impose any obligations on you and which you can accept or turn down. You can be sure that your rejection of our advice will Stalin to Mao Zedong, 15 January 1949 not influence our relations and we will remain your friends as we have ever been.
To Comrade Mao Zedong. 5. As for our answer to the Nanjing mediation proposal, it will be in the spirit of your We have just received your last short teleproposals.
gram, which shows that we now have unanimous 6. We still insist that you postpone tempo
opinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace prorarily your visit to Moscow, as your presence in posal and that the Communist Party of China has China is essential now. If you want we can already started its “peace” campaign. Thus, the immediately send an authoritative member of the matter is now closed. Politbureau to Harbin or some other place to negotiate on issues of interest to you.
On January 8 the Chinese Foreign Ministry presented a memorandum to the Soviet Embassy in China, containing an appeal by the Chinese government to the Soviet government to act as a mediator in the peace negotiations between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist party. As the Soviet Ambassador was informed, the Chinese government had sent a similar appeal to the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France.
On January 17 the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR cmrd. Vyshinsky A. Ya. received the Chinese Ambassador in the USSR Mr. Fu Bing Ciang and gave him the answer of the Soviet government, which points out that the Soviet government, always loyal to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, does not regard it expedient to accept the mediation mentioned in the memorandum.
The answer of the Soviet government notes that the restoration of China's integrity as a democratic peace-loving state is the affair of the Chinese people itself and that this integrity could be probably best achieved by the direct negotiatiations between the internal forces of China, without foreign interference.
(Source: Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-57. Collection of documents (Moscow, 1959), p. 209.)
IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979
On 17-20 September 1995, in Lysebu, Norway, the Norwegian Nobel Institute hosted an oral history conference on the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The gathering, which included scholars and former Soviet and American officials, was a continuation of the Carter-Brezhnev Project (see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1994), p. 140) to explore the collapse of superpower detente in the late 1970s and its possible implications for Russian-American relations. The principal organizer of the Project is Dr. James G. Blight, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. Efforts to obtain declassified documentation from U.S., Russian, and other sources has been led by the National Security Archive and CWIHP. A report on the results of the conference, including translations of newly-available East-bloc documents on Afghanistan, will appear in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.
Introduction and Translations significant first months of the conflict. (Un- Vasilevsky on February 23 (document #4)
29th fortunately, some key materials from this supports accounts given by former DPRK by Kathryn Weathersby
period, particularly the months immediately military officers that Stalin began taking
preceding the war, have not yet become steps to strengthen the North Korean miliIn the previous issue of the Cold War available; for key documents from mid-Sep- tary forces even before Kim Il Sung's secret International History Project Bulletin (Issue tember to mid-October 1950, covering events trip to Moscow in April, by appointing Ma5, Spring 1995 pp. 1, 2-9), I described the from the Inchon landing to China's decision jor-General Vasiliev, a Hero of the Soviet collection of high-level documents on the to intervene in the war, see the article by Union and section chief for War Experience Korean War that Russian President Boris Alexandre Y. Mansourov elsewhere in this Analysis in the Soviet General Staff, to reYeltsin presented to President Kim Young issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) It then offers place Shtykov as principal military adviser Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also a more selective sample of documents from to the Korean People's Army (KPA).3 presented translations of six key documents spring 1951 through the end of the war, From Shtykov's telegram to Foreign from that collection that illuminate the deci- focusing primarily on Stalin's approach to Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on February 7
21 sion-making behind the outbreak of full
the armistice negotiations. As the reader will (document #2), we see how closely Stalin scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the quickly discover, these documents of high- supervised events in North Korea, deciding publication of the Spring 1995 Bulletin, the level decision-making within the Soviet gov- whether the DPRK could issue a bond, form base of documentary evidence on the Ko- ernment and within the Moscow-Beijing- an additional three infantry divisions, conrean War has been enriched even more by Pyongyang alliance shed light on many ques- vene the Supreme People's Assembly, or the release of virtually the entire collection tions about the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet send textile workers to the Soviet Union for of high-level documents on the war declas- alliance, Soviet relations with North Korea training. Documents #5-9 indicate the reasified by the Presidential Archive in Mos- (the Democratic People's Republic of Ko- son why the highly nationalistic Korean cow, which numbers approximately 1,200 rea, or DPRK), Soviet attitudes toward the communists allowed such interference in pages. Through a joint project of the Center United States, and the making of Soviet their country's affairs. As I discussed in the for Korean Research of Columbia Univer- foreign policy in general in the last years of previous Bulletin, prior to the Korean War, sity and the Cold War International History Stalin's life. In this brief commentary I will North Korea was dependent on the Soviet By Project, these documents are now available therefore not attempt to provide a close ex- Union for the substantial quantities of goods to all interested researchers. 1
amination of these documents, as I have in and the broad range of expertise needed to The Presidential Archive (known offi- two previous Bulletin articles (and a related construct a new socialist state out of an cially as the Archive of the President, Rus- article in The Journal of American-East Asian abruptly truncated portion of the former sian Federation, or APRF) is the repository Relations).2 Instead, I will point out some of Japanese empire. From 1945-1950, the only to which, during the Soviet era, the Kremlin the most important questions these new place to which the DPRK could turn for this leadership sent its most sensitive records for
sources address, provide additional back- support was the Soviet Union. Though many safekeeping and ready access. Its holdings ground information drawn from my research North Korean communists had close ties to are therefore more selective than those of in other Soviet archives, and offer some the Chinese communist party, the latter was the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, preliminary conclusions.
not in a position to aid its Korean comrades. the Central Committee of the Communist The documents presented below begin In early 1950, the new People's Republic of Party (CC CPSU), and the General Staff of where the records published in the previous China (PRC) government in Beijing led by the Soviet Armed Forces, the other major Bulletin left off, with Stalin's telegram to the Mao Zedong was itself forced to turn to repositories used by historians of the Cold Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang on 30 Janu- Moscow for economic and military aid. As War. The release of a large portion of the ary 1950 informing Kim Il Sung that he documents #11 and #13 indicate, in the spring APRF's documents on the Korean War con- would “assist” him in the matter of reunify- of 1950 Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung were sequently provides a critical addition to ing Korea by military means. Document #1 both interested in the possibility of developavailable evidence on the high-level deci- reveals that Kim Il Sung and Soviet Ambas
reveals that Kim Il Sung and Soviet Ambas- ing wider trade and closer communications sions and deliberations of the communist sador T.F. Shtykov interpreted Stalin's mes- between the PRC and the DPRK. Close side during this pivotal conflict.
sage as approval to plan an offensive cam- economic and military ties between This article presents translations of and paign against South Korea. The North Ko Pyongyang and Beijing developed after the commentary on a sizable portion of this rean leader received Stalin's telegram with Chinese entered the Korean War; they were recently-released APRF collection on the "great satisfaction” and informed Shtykov not in place prior to October 1950.4 Korean War. It begins with most of the that he would begin preparations for a meet- At Stalin's insistence, after secretly rereleased documents covering February 1950 ing with Stalin at which the details of the ceiving the Soviet leader's conditional green through January 1951, providing a close campaign would be worked out. Shtykov's light for an attack against South Korea durlook at the Soviet role in Korea during the telegram to Soviet Defense Minister A.M. ing a secret summit in Moscow in April (for