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CHINA'S ROAD TO
conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential normalization of Sino-American relations, THE KOREAN WAR
part of a life-and-death confrontation be- and the declassification of new archival docu
tween the Communists on the one hand and mentation. Building on Whiting's thesis, by Chen Jian the “free world” on the other.
scholars paid more attention to Chinese Com
The North Korean invasion of the South, munist Party (CCP) leaders' concerns for In October 1950, one year after the as viewed by President Harry Truman—and China's national security as the decisive establishment of the People's Republic of many later students of the Korean War— factor underlying their decision to enter the China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing represented the first step in a general Com- Korean War. They generally argued that leadership sent “Chinese People's Volun- munist plot to “pass from subversion” to Beijing did not welcome the Korean War teers” (CPV)to Korea to fight against United “armed invasion and war” in their scheme of because China faced difficult tasks of ecoNations forces moving rapidly toward the world conquest.2 Correspondingly, Beijing's nomic reconstruction and political consoliChinese Korean border. Although China's entrance into the Korean War was regarded dation at home and gave priority to liberatintervention saved Kim Il Sung's North as an action subordinate to Moscow's overall ing Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. Many of Korean Communist regime from imminent Cold War strategy. Scholars in the West these scholars stressed that Beijing's decicollapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing widely believed that Beijing's policy was sion to enter the Korean War was simply a leadership’s hopes of overwhelming the UN aggressive, violent, and irrational.
reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to forces. Therefore, when the Korean War In 1960, Allen S. Whiting published his the physical security of Chinese territory. ended in July 1953, Korea's political map landmark study, China Crosses the Yalu,3 And while most scholars believed that the remained virtually unchanged, while which has strongly influenced a whole gen- American decision to cross the 38th parallel America's military intervention in Korea eration of scholars. Using Western intelli- triggered China's intervention, some specuand China's rushing into a conflict with the gence sources and Chinese journal and news- lated that if UN forces had stopped at the United States finally buried any hope for a paper information, Whiting argued that un- parallel China would not have intervened.4 Sino-American accommodation, and the like the Soviet Union, Communist China had A large majority of Chinese scholars seem to Cold War in Asia entered a new stage char- not directly participated in the planning for share these assumptions, as can be seen in acterized by a total confrontation between the North Korean invasion of the South. Chinese publications on the “War to Resist the PRC and the United States that would After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whit- America and Assist Korea” that appeared in last nearly twenty years.
ing believed, Beijing tried to terminate the the 1980s.5 The newly established Chinese Com- conflict through political settlement, and only As a lecturer at Shanghai's East China munist regime faced enormous problems after the attempts for a political solution Normal University in the early 1980s and during its first year, including achieving failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin then during my pursuit of doctoral studies in political consolidation, rebuilding a war- necessary military preparations in early Sep- the United States, I became increasingly shattered economy, and finishing reunifica- tember. Whiting emphasized that after the interested in the emergence of Sino-Amerition of the country. Why then did Mao Inchon landing in mid-September, Beijing can confrontation in the late 1940s and early decide to assist North Korea in fighting a tried through both public and private chan- 1950s. In my study I too believed in the coalition composed of nearly all the West- nels to prevent UN forces from crossing the standard interpretation of China's reasons ern industrial powers? How was the deci- 38th parallel. Beijing entered the war only for entering the Korean War. Not until sion made? What were the immediate and after all warnings had been ignored by Wash- 1988-1990, when the work on my dissertalong-range causes leading to Beijing's deci- ington and General Douglas MacArthur and tion led me to fresh Chinese sources, did I sion to enter the Korean War? Finally, was therefore, in the Beijing leadership's view, begin to feel doubts. For example, to my there any opportunity that might have pre- the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was surprise, I found that early in August 1950, vented the direct confrontation between the severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded more than one month before the Inchon PRC and the United States? More than forty that Beijing's management of the Korean landing, Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadyears after the end of the Korean War, crisis was based primarily on the Chinese ership had been inclined to send troops to scholarly answers to these questions are still Communist perception of America's threat Korea, and China's military and political limited and remarkably inadequate. to China's national security. Lacking access preparations had begun even a month ear
In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly to Chinese archival materials, though, lier. I also found that the concerns behind the influenced by the intensifying Cold War, Whiting's study had to focus more on the decision to enter the Korean War went far generally viewed China's entrance into the analysis of the environment in which the beyond the defense of the safety of the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordi- Beijing leadership made their decision to go Chinese Korean border. Mao and his associnated Communist plot of worldwide expan- to war than on a close examination of the ates aimed to win a glorious victory by sion, believing that the entire international decision-making process.
driving the Americans off the Korean peninCommunist movement was under the con- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a more sula. It was no longer possible to accept the trol of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor critical perspective on the Sino-American well-established view of Chinese and AmeriPyongyang had the freedom to make their confrontation in Korea emerged in the wake can historians. own foreign policy decisions. The Korean of the American debacle in Vietnam, the
continued on page 85
The leadership of the DPRK and the No. 362/sh
People's Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong, CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405840/sh. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
Pak Il U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen) From Pyongyang Sent 4.7.50 0:05 1.7.50
correctly evaluate the complicated military- Received 4.7.50 3:55
political situation in Korea, believe in full Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, victory and are directing all efforts toward a of the Armed Forces 4.7.50 4:10 List 104 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, subsequent broad attack on the south of Ko- To Comrade FYN-SI (Stalin). Delo 3, Papka 11, l. 107]
Today July 3 I met with KIM IL SUNG
KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG and PAK HON-YONG. 16.1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov understand the difficulties for Korea elicited At the beginning of the conversation to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on by the entrance of the Americans into the war KIM IL SUNG described the situation at the North Korea
against the DPRK and in connection with front. In his opinion the troops are moving
this they are taking the necessary measures to very slowly, especially in the Central direcCiphered telegram No. 405809
stabilize human and material resources for tion. The troop crossing was disorganized, From Pyongyang. Sent 2.7.50 04.00. the war.
although there was a minister in place there. Received 2.7.50 05.47.
KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about He expressed dissatisfaction with his [the Sent to the 8th Administration of the General forming additional infantry, tank, and naval minister's] work. Staff of the Armed Forces. 2.7.50 05.55 units and formations. They intend to intro- Further, noting the seriousness of the By wire.
duce universal military service in the DPRK. situation at the front and in the liberated Extremely Urgent.
However, some portion of the leading territories and the danger of landings by To Comrade FYN SI (Stalin]
figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHÔN American troops in the rear or at North To No. 362.
MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties Korean ports or airborne landings of troops, I report about the political mood of the of conducting a war against the Americans he asked me to report to you his request for northerners in connection with the interven- with the forces of Korea and in a cautious quick delivery of arms in the following tion of the Americans.
way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL amounts: 50,000 rifles; 5,000 PPSh subWith the beginning of the successful SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on machine guns, 5,000 PPS [sub-machine military operations of the People's Army, this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG guns); 1,500 light machine guns; 350 heavy and especially after the liberation of the city reported to me these facts, about a conversa- machine guns; 20082mm mortars; 78 120mm of Seoul, the mood of the population was tion of KIM TU-BONG and KHON MEN mortars, 80 76mm ZIS-3 artillery pieces; 24 characterized by great general political en- KHI with KIM IL SUNG.)
122mm howitzers; 60 37mm anti- aircraft thusiasm.
The rightist and centrist figures that are guns; 120 machine guns; 500 trucks. The population of the liberated regions entering the government of the DPRK are All these arms are needed for the formain the main greeted the People's Army warmly supporting all measures of the government, tion of two divisions, 12 battalions of maand in every way cooperated with the mea- but so far are not displaying the necessary rines and for the formation of security desures it took. Organs of power are being direction of activity in the mobilization of tachments. created everywhere—people's committees, their parties in the south of the country.
Because of American air attacks on the social-political organizations, they have re- I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that railroad stations in the region of Kanko, stored production and trade. At this time the government of the USSR has satisfied his Seisin, he asked that the arms be sent on an even the reactionary elements did not take request for arms and ammunition.
accelerated schedule through Manchuria action against the measures of the govern- The general situation in the KNP (Ko- (along the route of] Andong-Singisiument of the DPRK and the People's Army. rean People's Republic, apparently a mis- Pyongyang
The successful attack of the People's spelling of DPRK) continues to remain fa- He also communicated that they have Army activated the partisans, at present the vorable and makes it possible to continue the begun fitting out reserve regiments and 2 partisan movement is developing widely in active offensive of the People's Army. tank brigades and that these need arms and the rear of the South Korean army. No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV.
tanks. However, in connection with the wide- 1.7.50.
Further in the conversation he asked spread American propaganda over the radio, Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, advice about how better to organize troop which is directed against the DPRK, and the Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, command in the complicated situation. Since frequent attacks by American planes on popu- File of 8th Department.
the People's Army is fighting against Amerilation points, industrial and military sites in
can troops, he considers it necessary to North and South Korea, the political mood of (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, strengthen the leadership of the army. the population is somewhat worsening. Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Further he asked advice about how bet
Individual attitudes of lack of belief in 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 107-110) ter to organize troop command and what kind the final victory have appeared, and in the
of organizational command structure to liberated regions a certain (small) portion of 17.4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov
17.4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov choose so that the General Staff is brought the population is taking a wait and see posi- to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il closer to the troops. tion. Sung and Pak Hon-Yong
After consulting with General
VASILIEV we proposed the following struc- this measure will yield positive results. 19.6 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si ture:
The staff of the front will move to Seoul (Stalin) to Shtykov 1. To create two army groups headed by in the near future. Military Councils composed of: a com- I ask your permission:
8th Department of the General Staff of the mander, a member of the Military Council 1. To have two advisers in every army Armed Forces of the USSR and a chief of staff.
group (adviser for the group commander and CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 35678 To place 4-6 units under the command adviser for the artillery commander). Pyongyang. To Comrade Shtykov. of each army group.
2. I ask your permission for the main To No. 439/sh 2. To create a front headquarters headed military adviser Comrade VASILIEV to go 1. The arms will be sent through Manby a commander of the front, a chief of staff to Seoul with a group of officers, together churia, Andong, Singisiu. and a member of the Military Council of the with the staff of the front, and to be perma- 2. Concerning the location of the chief front. nently located there with the staff.
military adviser VASILIEV, we consider it The front headquarters should be cre- 3. I ask you to hasten the resolution of the more useful for him to be in Pyongyang. ated from the facilities and personnel of] the questions touched on.
3. We will give fully the arms, tanks and General Staff.
other military equipment for 2 divisions, 2 3. To preserve the Ministry of National No. 439/sh.
tank brigades and 12 battalions, but we conDefense, since it already exists only in a 4.7.50.
sider that the main thing is not this but to fill reduced form.
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, out the existing divisions and to increase The Ministry's task should be the sup- Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin.
their strength approximately to 12,000. It is ply of combat troops with everything needed
necessary to have attached to the divisions an (foodstuffs, fuel, transport, ammunition) as (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, apparatus for the formation of troops, which well as the training of reserves, new troop Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis would receive the reinforcements, check and formation and the organization of anti-air- 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 111-1141 train them and after this, transfer them to craft defense for the northern part of the
reinforce the divisions. This is the main republic.
18.5 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippoy thing. 4. To appoint Kim Il Sung as Supreme (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou
FYN-SI (Stalin) Commander of troops. He agreed with our Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the No. 374/sh proposals.
People's Republic of China (PRC) N.V. 6.7.50 The restructuring will proceed without Roshchin)
copies: Stalin (2), Bulganin harm to the military operations on the front. He then asked our opinion about how Ciphered telegram No. 3172
(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, best to arrange the disposition of command - Beijing. Soviet Ambassador.
List 140 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, ing cadres.
To your No. 1112-1126.
Delo 3, Papka 11, List 116] From my part I proposed to appoint the Transmit to Zhou Enlai: following group commanders: Deputy Min- 1. We agree with the opinion of the 20.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov ister in charge of artillery Mu Den for the left Chinese comrades regarding the mediation to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from flank
group, and for the commander of the of India on the question of the entry of people's Kim Il Sung to Stalin right flank group Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of
Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of China into the membership of the UN. the General Staff (presently commanding an 2. We consider it correct to concentrate CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh operational group). To appoint as com- immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chi- From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26 mander of the front the Deputy Chairman of nese-Korean border for volunteer actions in Received 8.7.50 11:15 the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of North Korea in case the enemy crosses the Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff Industry, Kim Cha'ek (he knows military 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35. affairs, was a partisan and served in the for these units.
By telegraph. Chinese brigade in Khabarovsk, is a very 3. Your report about flights of Soviet
To Comrade FYN-SI (Stalin). strong-willed, thoughtful and brave man). planes over Manchurian territory is not con- I received the following letter from KIM
To appoint as Chief of Staff of the front firmed. An order was given not to allow such IL SUNG addressed to us. Kan Gen, who is now Chief of the General flights.
"To the Chairman of the Council of Staff.
Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo ComThe Minister of National Defense will No. 373/sh
rade Stalin, I.V. remain in his post. He will manage the 5.7.50
I ask that you accept the expression of formation of new units and the organization Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluof anti-landing defense, and also supplying
able assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, troops with everything needed.
(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, continually render to our people in their They want this measure to be passed List 79 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, struggle for independence. through the military committee on July 4 or Delo 3, Papka 11, List 115]
Being confident of your desire to help 5. I judge that in this complicated situation
the Korean people rid themselves of the American imperialists, I am obliged to ap- “1. The English have officially appealed Si (Stalin) to Shtykov peal to you with a request to allow the use of to us through their ambassador in Moscow 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of and declared that they, being bound by the 8th Department of the General Staff of the the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of decision of the Security Council, cannot now Armed Forces of the USSR the 2nd Army Group, since the national mili- make proposals regarding a peaceful settle- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 37219/sh tary cadres have not yet sufficiently mas- ment of the Korean question, but if the Ko- Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador. tered the art of commanding modern troops. rean People's Democratic Republic with- Advise the Koreans immediately to re
Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chair- draws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this ply to (UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie man of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK. could hasten a peaceful resolution of the that the Korean army is strictly adhering to Pyongyang. 8 July 1950. Korean question.
the Geneva convention with regard to prisThe English ask the Soviet government oners, and that they should) let the Koreans SHTYKOV to express its opinion.
make a statement in the press exposing the No. 481/sh
We consider such a demand by the En- slander of the American press regarding poor 8.7.50
glish to be impertinent and unacceptable. treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, We intend to reply that the Korean ques- would be good for someone among the prisMikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin
tion has become too complicated after the oners to make a statement on the radio that
armed foreign intervention and that such a the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, complex question can be resolved only by very good.
: Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis the Security Council with the participation of
FYN-SI (Stalin] 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151]
the USSR and China and with the summon- No. 4.4781
ing of representatives of Korea in order to Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov. 21.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov hear their opinion.
13.7.50 (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin Communicate your views. in PRC transmitting message to Mao As regards the statement of the Indian (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Zedong ambassador, we have decided not to answer
List 148] him, since they made it clear that his stateCIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3231 ment is his personal opinion, in which the 24. 14 July 1950, handwritten letter, Kim BEIJING. Soviet Ambassador. Indian government is not involved.
Il Sung to Soviet Government (via Shtykov) Only by telegraph
2. It is not known to us whether you have Sent 18:40 8.7.50
decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on To the Extraordinary and PlenipotenDelivered 8.7.50
the border with Korea. If you have made tiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Communicate to MAO ZEDONG that such a decision, then we are ready to send Comrade Shtykov, T.F. the Koreans are complaining that there is no you a division of jet fighter planes—124 I ask you to transmit to the Government representative of CHINA in KOREA. A pieces for covering these troops.
of the USSR the following: representative should be sent soon, so that it We intend to train Chinese pilots in two In connection with the appeal of the will be possible to have communications and to three months with the help of our pilots English to the Government of the USSR with resolve questions more quickly, if, of course, and then to transfer all equipment to your a demand about the withdrawal of troops of MAO ZEDONG considers it necessary to pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the Korean People's Army to the 38th paralhave communications with KOREA. the aviation divisions in Shanghai.
lel, the Government of the DPRK considers, FILIPPOV (Stalin). Communicate your opinion.”
as does the Soviet Government, that such a No. 379/sh.
demand of the English is impertinent and Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
unacceptable. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
We are in full agreement with the opin(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331,
ion of the Soviet Government that the KoList 82 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331,
rean question (should be) discussed in the Delo 3, Papka 11, List 117]
List 85 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Security Council with the participation of the
USSR and China and with the summoning of
Listy 149-150) The same note was sent to take measures) quickly to clear the entire
Kim Il Sung on July 13, but without the territory of Korea of American interventionCIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305
section about the Indian ambassador. ists. BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph (AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of SOVIET AMBASSADOR Sent 03:15 11, II. 153-154)
the DPRK 13.7.50
Kim Il Sung. Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO
14.7.50. ZEDONG the following:
23. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn
(Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 826, tional and intelligence departments of the Korean comrades at the present time. Listy 108-109]
PVO district; Adviser to the Chief of Staff of 3. Advise Comrade Kim Il Sung not to
the VVS can advise the work also of the Chief scatter the air force, but to concentrate it on 25. 25 July 1950, ciphered telegram, of the Operational Department of the Staff of the front. It is necessary that each attack by Vyshinsky to Roshchin transmitting mes- the VVS district.
the People's Army on any portion of the front sage from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai The 38 advisers will leave for China begin with a number of decisive blows by soon.
attack planes on the troops of the enemy, that MID USSR
the fighter planes defend the troops of the Tenth Department Received 4 hours 30 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
Peoples Army from the blows of the enemy minutes 25/VII.1950
planes as much as possible. If it is necessary, Dispatched 5 hours 55 minutes 25/ (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, we can throw in additional assault aircraft VII. 1950 List 94]
and fighter aircraft for the Korean air force. CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov) No. 483/sh
Copy No. 1 To Stalin
8th Department of the General Staff of the
(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, On the authorization of Filippov, trans- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75021 Listy 5-6, 10-11 (original copy); and AVPRF, mit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we Pyongyang Soviet Ambassador.
Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy agree with the proposed procedure and time Verbally transmit the following to Kim Il 155-156) period for training Chinese pilots on jet Sung. If he demands it in written form-give planes.
it to him in written form, but without my 28. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Telegraph the fulfillment. signature.
Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with VYSHINSKY
1. The CC VKP(b) (Central Committee, Kim Il Sung 25.VII.50
All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] saCopies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, lutes Comrade Kim Il Sung and his friends for CIPHERED TELEGRAM Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy. the great liberational struggle of the Korean From Pyongyang. Sent 31.8.50 11:32
people which comrade Kim Il Sung is leading Received 31.8 17:27 (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, with brilliant success. CC VKP(b) has no Sent to the 8th Department of the General List 90]
doubt that in the soonest time the interven- Staff of the Armed Forces 31.8 17:35 tionists will be driven out of Korea with
By telegraph 26. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, ignominy.
FYN-SI (Stalin] Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai
2. Comrade Kim Il Sung should not be To No. 483/sh.
embarrassed by the fact that he does not have In accordance with your order of 29.8.50 CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962 solid successes in the war against the inter- I visited KIM IL SUNG and communicated Beijing
ventionists, that the successes are sometimes to him the contents of the telegram. KIM IL To Comrade Kotov
interrupted by delays in the advance or even SUNG listened to my communication and To No. 1726.
by some local set-backs. In such a war asked permission to write down its contents, Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the continuous successes do not occur. The Rus- which I dictated to him. reply to his telegram about military advisers. sians also did not have continuous successes
KIM IL SUNG received your letter very “To Comrade Zhou Enlai.
during the civil war and even more during the well, thanking you several times, underscorThe Soviet Government has satisfied war with Germany. The greatest success of ing that it is a very good letter. your request about sending Soviet military the Korean people is that Korea has now Afterwards he asked my agreement to advisers—specialists in PVO (Anti-Aircraft become the most popular country in the world summon [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon-Yong Defense) and VVS[Air Force to the Eastern and has turned into the banner of the move- and read him your telegram. and Northeastern military districts. 38 ad- ment in Asia for liberation from the imperial- After exchanging opinions with Pak visers will be sent to China, of which 10 will ist yoke. The armies of all enslaved peoples Hon-Yong he asked my opinion about
. be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists in will now learn from the Korean People's whether he can bring it to the notice of the Vys.
Army the art of bringing decisive blows to the members of the PolitSoviet (Political CounAs regards the remaining 26 advisers, Americans and to any imperialists. More- cil] of the CC, in connection with which he we consider that there is no special need to over, Comrade Kim Il Sung should not forget underscored that this is a very important send them, since the work of these advisers that Korea is not alone now, that it has allies, letter and he needs to communicate its concan be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent who are rendering and will render it aid. The tents since some members of the PolitSoviet to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief position of the Russians during the Anglo- are in a poor state of mind. It will be useful
. of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can French-American intervention in 1919 was to them to know the contents of this letter. advise the work of the Chiefs of the opera- several times worse than the position of the I replied that if he considers this neces