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With regard to the preparation of pilots (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, 802. for one bomber regiment, it is more conve- List 94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, To confirm the draft orders to Comrade nient to prepare them in the Korean school Delo 3, Papka 11, List 182)
Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to Comrade we have in the Far East Maritime Region.
Roshchin (attachment 2). The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber 45. 1 December 1950, ciphered telegram,
ECRET regiment, will also be given. Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
Attachment 1 3. We agree to accept an additional 120
to p.167(op) pr. PB No. 79 men in the Korean pilot school that we have CIPHERED TELEGRAM
New York in the Far East Maritime Region, to train BEIJING - SOVIET AMBASSADOR To Vyshinsky them as technicians and crew for attack To transmit to Comrade MAOZEDONG 802. We are answering point by point. planes.
Comrade MAO ZEDONG!
Regarding point one. We agree with 4. It is better that the Korean pilots I received your telegram No. 3153. your proposal. However, you should not receive flight training in the place where I thank you for the information about the make the stipulations you proposed, that the they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in state of affairs in China, in connection with Assembly has the right to review a question our Maritime Region.
the successful offensive of the Chinese of aggression if the Security Council turns If you agree with these proposals, corre- People's Liberation Army in Korea.
out not to be in a condition to fulfill its sponding orders will be given to our military Your successes gladden not only me and obligation regarding supporting peace. Such command.
my comrades in the leadership, but also all a stipulation would mean that we recognize FYN SI (Stalin)
Soviet people. Allow me to greet from the as having legal force the resolution of NoNo. 4/7556
soul you and your friends in the leadership, vember 3, which the Soviet delegation de20 November 1950
the People's Liberation Army of China and clared unlawful, as a contradiction of the UN Copies: Bulganin, Shtemenko, Stalin. the entire Chinese people in connection with Charter.
these enormous successes in their struggle Regarding point two. We agree with (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, against the American troops.
your proposal. As for the invitation to a Listy 90-91 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis I have no doubt that in the war against the representative of the Chinese People's Re5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 165-166] up-to-date and well-armed American army public to participate in the discussion of this
the Chinese army will receive great experi- question in the General Assembly, do not 44.22 November 1950, ciphered telegram, ence in contemporary warfare and will turn introduce a proposal about the invitation Kim Il Sung to Fyn Si (Stalin) via Shtykov itself into a fully up-to-date, well-armed, before you receive from us an additional
formidable army, just as the Soviet Army in order, which we will give after the governCIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600782/sh the struggle with the first-class-armed Ger- ment of the PRC makes it clear whether it From CORRESPONDENT No. 18 Sent man army received experience in contempo- considers it advisable for its representative to 22.11.50 6:30 Received 22.11 9:55 rary warfare and turned into an up-to-date participate in the discussion of this question Sent to 8th Department of General Staff of well-equipped army.
in the General Assembly. Armed Forces 22.11 10:02
I wish you further successes.
Regarding point three. We agree with By telegram
By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin).
TOP SECRET ing contents:
Attachment 2 “To Comrade FYN SI 46. 5 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Polit
to p.167(op) pr.PB No. 79 I received your telegram of 20.11.50 buro decision with approved orders to
Peking about the preparation of pilot cadres. We Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Soviet Ambassador fully agree with your opinions. Beijing (with message for Zhou Enlai)
Urgently visit Zhou Enlai and commuAccept, Comrade FYN SI, our deepest
nicate to him the following. gratitude for your tireless assistance to the ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY According to the report of Comrade Korean people in its struggle for its indepen- (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE Vyshinsky, the Americans will introduce dence.
No. P79/167 To
Malenkov, into discussion at the (UN General] AssemYours truly - KIM IL SUNG 21.11.50" Molotov, Gromyko
bly a question under the heading "The InterSHTYKOV December 1950
vention in Korea of the Central People's No. 35
Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the Government of the Chinese People's RepubCopies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, meeting of Politburo CC
lic.” Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, VKP(b) (Central Committee, All-Union Com- The Soviet delegation will express opKhrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, File munist Party (bolshevik)]
position to the inclusion of this question on of 8th Department
Decision of 5 December 1950 the agenda. If it nonetheless is included, the 167.- Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. Soviet Government needs to know the opinion of the government of the Chinese People's Lie:
of the Politburo CC VKP(b) (Central ComRepublic—whether it considers it advisable “Military operations in Korea will be mittee, All-Union Communist Party for its representative to participate in the ended under the following conditions: (bol'shevik)] discussion of the question raised by the 1. The withdrawal of all foreign troops
Decision of 7 December 1950. Americans in the General Assembly. If from Korea.
189. Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. Zhou Enlai asks what the point of view of the 2. The withdrawal of American troops 825. Soviet Government is on this question, you from the Taiwan strait and from the territory To confirm the proposed draft order to should answer that in this case, as well as in of Taiwan,
Comrade Vyshinsky. the case of the discussion of MacArthur's 3. The Korean question must be re
SECRETARY CC report in the Security Council, the Soviet solved by the Korean people themselves.
to p.189(op) pr.PB No. 79 Government considers it more advisable that 4. The participation of a representative New York the Chinese government not take part in the of the Chinese people's republic in the UN To Vyshinsky discussion of this question in the General and the exclusion from the UN of a represen- No. 825. Your proposal about the cessaAssembly.
tative of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek). tion of military activity in Korea we consider Telegraph the results.
5. Convening a conference of the minis- incorrect in the present situation, when AmeriA. Gromyko
ters of foreign affairs of the four great powers can troops are suffering defeat and when the
for the preparation of a peace treaty with Americans more and more often are advanc(Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Japan.
ing a proposal about a cessation of military Listy 19-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 6. If the five aforementioned conditions operations in Korea, in order to win time and 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 4-6)
for the cessation of military operations are prevent the complete defeat of the American
accepted, the five great powers can send their troops. 47. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram representatives to convene a conference for The draft of the Soviet delegation should from Roshchin conveying message from signing the conditions of an armistice.” include the following: Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government
Zhou Enlai transmitted the enumerated 1. The immediate withdrawal of all forconditions in written form.
eign troops from Korea. CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Further, Zhou stated that before sending 2. The resolution of the Korean question Copying Prohibited
the present conditions for cessation of mili- must be left to the Korean people themCopies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, tary operations in Korea, the Chinese gov- selves. Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, ernment wishes that Wu Xiu-quan consult The text of your preamble does not elicit Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Copy. with the government of the USSR and asks objections. From Beijing No. 35379 6 hours 55 minutes the Soviet government to express its opinion By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin). 7/XII 1950 on this question.
Zhou Enlai earnestly asked [me] to trans-
mit to the Soviet government that the Chi- (Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828,
nese government wishes to receive an an- Listy 23-24 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis SPECIAL swer today.
5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 7-8) On December 7 at 3:00 Beijing time I stated to Zhou Enlai that what was Zhou Enlai invited me to his [office) and communicated by him: the report, the condi
49. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram, transmitted the following in the name of the tions for ceasefire in Korea and the request Gromyko to Roshchin transmitting mesChinese government:
for an answer will be immediately brought sage from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai At Lake Success representatives from before the government of the USSR. India, England, Sweden and the general sec
MID USSR No. 23343 retary of the UN Trygve Lie have recently
Tenth department Received 19 hours 10 minappealed several times to the representative [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, utes 7/XII.1950 of the Chinese people's republic (General] Listy 17-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Dispatched 20 hours 40 minutes Wu Xiu-quan asking under what conditions 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 193-195) 7/XII.1950 it is possible to end the military operations in
Special No. 1691,1692 Korea.
48. 7 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Polit- CIPHERED TELEGRAM Their aspirations are to hold the position buro decision with approved message to To BEIJING To SOVIET AMBASSAin Korea at the 38th parallel. Vyshinsky in New York
DOR Not wishing to put ourselves in a disad
SPECIAL FILE vantageous position and having the goal of ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY
TOP PRIORITY holding the initiative in our hands and also (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE 2522. Immediately visit Zhou Enlai and showing assertiveness on this question, the No. P79/189 Copies to Malenkov, transmit to him the following: government of the Chinese people's republic Molotov, Gromyko.
“We completely agree with your condiintends to give the following instruction to 7 December 1950.
tions for a ceasefire in Korea. We consider Wu Xiu-quan for answering the representa- Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting that without the satisfaction of these conditions military activity cannot be ceased. In SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF Kimpo airport and control the port of addition, we consider that you should not be THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Chemul’po, but this will create more advantoo open and show all your cards too early ARMY
tageous conditions for the preparation of our before the representatives of the three states,
CIPHERED TELEGRAM troops for a spring offensive. who, frankly speaking, are spies of the USA. Copies: Stalin (2)
In order to achieve the aforementioned We think that the time has not arrived for From BEIJING Received 02 hours, 40 min- goals the following plan has been worked China to show all its cards, while Seoul is utes 8.1.1951
out: still not liberated. Moreover, the USA could
EXTREMELY URGENT T.
To leave 1 division of 1st corps of the use China's five conditions to box us on the
TO FILIPPOV (Stalin). People's Army for garrison duty in the city of ear by (making) a UN resolution. It is not I send you a copy of the telegram to Seoul. necessary to give this advantage to the USA. Comrade Kim Il Sung from Comrades Peng The main forces of the corps will be
We therefore think that it is possible at Dehuai, Kim Son and Pak II U, sent 24:00 4.1 deployed in the area of Toto, Tok-heiri, the present time to limit oneself to the fol- [January 4).
Dzinsori, Mokudo. lowing:
I ask you to familiarize yourself with it: After rest and regrouping, in three days 1. The Chinese Central People's Gov- “To Premier Comrade Kim Il Sung. We they must prepare to make a forced crossing ernment along with you, gentlemen del- are simultaneously sending a copy to the of the Kanko river and at the appropriate egates of England, Sweden, India would commanders of the corps and army Com- moment occupy the Kimpo airport, welcome the soonest possible conclusion of rades Hun Xianchu, Wu Ruilin, Chzhou Biao, , Chemul’po port and consolidate themselves the military actions in Korea. China is Pan Khe-som and to the commander of the 1st there. applying all its strength in order to conclude Corps NRVS and to the staff of the Northeast. b) Troops of the left column as before quickly the military activity forced on Korea 1. Today (4 January) the 116th infantry are under the unified command of Khan' and China.
division and a unit of troops from the 117th Sian'-chu. 2. Therefore, we would like to know the infantry division occupied the city of Seoul. The 50th army will continue to advance opinion of the UN and the USA with regard Enemy troops defending Seoul withdrew to in the direction of Kosainairi, Kando, Kiriudo to conditions for an armistice. As far as we the south bank of the Kanko river. The city of and the area to the northwest of these points. know, you have not been commissioned by Siumsen was also taken on 3 January by units It will send out immediately a strong detachthe UN or the USA to discuss with anyone of our 66th army.
ment to control the bridge across the Kanko the conditions for an armistice. Moreover, The enemy withdrew to the area of Kosen river (by a counterattack attempt to occupy the delegation from England together with and to areas further south.
the fortification before the bridge on the the delegation from the USA, France, Nor- It is supposed that the next attempt by south bank of the Kanko river). This detachway, Ecuador and Cuba already introduced enemy troops will be the defense of the river, ment will find out what the situation is, make into the First Committee (of the General which is beginning in the area of Chemul' po active preparations for a forced crossing of Assembly) of the UN a resolution condemn- [Inchon), Kimpo, lokhei, and is going on the Kanko river, attack the enemy on the ing China, thereby hindering the matter of a along the south bank of the Kanko river, south bank and continue to carry out the settlement of the Korean question.
through Gensiu, Seikheisio to Korio. battle in cooperation with the main forces. 3. In view of this we will eagerly await It is possible that the enemy, regrouping If the enemy continues to withdraw to the opinion of the UN and USA about the behind the natural barriers, like the Kanko the south, then it is necessary, while pursuing conditions for a cessation of military actions river and the mountainous areas, will gather
river and the mountainous areas, will gather him, to occupy Suigen and to wait for further in Korea.
the remnants of its forces, gain time and make orders.
The line of delimitation between the
Another possibility is that, in case of 50th army and the 1st corps of the People's GROMYKO.
further more powerful strikes by our troops, Army runs through Kokusekiri, Riuzan, 7/XII-50
the enemy will withdraw to the south. Kasaivairi. The line itself and the areas to the Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, 2. If we give the enemy the possibility to west of it belong to the 50th army, the areas Bulganin, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, continue to occupy defensive positions along to the east of this line belong to the 1st corps. Copy
the south bank of the river Kanko, to control The 38th, 39th and 40th armies will put
the airport at Kimpo and to use the port at themselves in order, rest for three days (until (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Chemul'po for supply, then although Seoul 7.1 inclusive) and prepare for a forced crossListy 20-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis will be in our hands, it will be under constant ing of the Khokukan-ko river above and 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 196-197] threat from enemy air force and artillery, below Seisen. They will first strike the
which will be extremely disadvantageous for enemy in the area of luokhei, after which 50. 8 January 1951, ciphered telegram, preparing our troops for a spring offensive. they will develop an offensive along a line Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) trans- If, in the presence of success, our troops from the southeast to the northwest on the mitting 4 January 1951 message from make one more effort and destroy another enemy positions in the area of Risen, Kosiu, Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak II U to unit of enemy troops and force the enemy to Suien, Eitokho. Kim Il Sung
retreat from the south bank of the Kanko A detailed plan is being worked out by river, then we not only will be able to take the Comrade Hun Xianchu.
c) The 42nd and 66th armies under the Zakharov to Filippov (Stalin) unified command of Wu Ruilin and Chzhou Biao, and also the 2nd and 5th corps of the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF People's Army under the unified command THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET of Pan Kho-Son, in accordance with the joint ARMY forces plan established earlier, must destroy CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15451 the enemy troops in the region of Kosen, Copies: Stalin (2) Odzio, and afterwards await further orders. From BEIJING Received 00 hours 50 min
All the aforementioned troops must send utes 13.1.51 spies and outposts toward the enemy troops
EXTREMELY URGENT located in front of the frontline.
To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin]
(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336,
List 121] (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 88-90]
52. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram,
Roshchin to USSR Foreign Ministry 51. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram,
Special No. 62
of this year.
13.1.51 ROSHCHIN Spravka: no. 48 (from no. 837) of Jan 13, 1950. Vyshinsky proposed to visit Zhou
ASSESSING THE POLITICS OF growing number of violations of the 38th
forces. On 3 February 1949 Soviet Ambas-
sador to North Korea Shtykov bitterly com- While Stalin tried to prevent a war in
plained that the North Koreans did not have Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership This article is based on the recently enough trained personnel, adequate weap- increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, declassified Soviet archives and examines ons and sufficient numbers of bullets to demanding permission to liberate the South. the political line of Moscow as well as of its rebuff intensifying incursions from the South. On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in allies, Pyongyang and Beijing, on the Ko- Receiving Kim Il Sung in the Kremlin on 5 Moscow Kim Il Sung said: "We believe that rean Peninsula in 1949-1951, up to the armi- March 1949, Stalin showed an open concern the situation makes it necessary and possible stice negotiations, which began in the sum- about growing pressure from the opponent to liberate the whole country through milimer of 1951.
in the vicinity of the 38th parallel and em- tary means." The Soviet leader disagreed, The paper is divided into eleven sec- phatically told Kim: “The 38th parallel must citing the military weakness of the North, tions in order to show more clearly the be peaceful. It is very important."2
the USSR-USA agreement on the 38th parevolution of the policies of the three commu- After Kim's return to Korea, the situa- allel, and the possibility of American internist governments in Korea.
tion did not improve. On 17 April 1949, vention.
Stalin warned his ambassador of an immi- Stalin added that only if the adversary 1. Stalin fears an attack from the South nent attack from the South. The Soviet attacked Pyongyang could they try military
ambassador confirmed that a large-scale war reunification by launching a counterattack. Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan was begin prepared by Seoul with the help of “Then,” the Kremlin chief explained, “your any aggression against South Korea. In- Americans and raised alarm about the in- move will be understood and supported by stead he was worried about an attack from ability of North Korean troops to withstand everyone."5 the South, and did everything to avoid pro- the aggression.3 In May-August 1949 the In August and again in September 1949, voking Washington and Seoul. In 1947- Kremlin and Pyongyang continued to ex- North Korean leaders resumed pressure on 1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the change data about a possible attack from the Moscow, hoping to convince it that: a) peacepossibility of a unification of Korea, and South. The USSR was clearly afraid of such ful reunification was totally impossible; b) refused to sign a separate friendship and an attack, and was nervous not knowing how the Korean people wanted liberation and cooperation treaty with North Korean leader
to prevent the war. Stalin repeatedly casti- would not understand if the chance for reuniKim Il Sung.
gated Ambassador Shtykov for failing to do fication was missed; c)Northern armed forces In the beginning of 1949 the Soviet everything in his power to maintain peace on were superior to the Southern army; d) after embassy began to alert the Kremlin to the the 38th parallel.4
continued on page 87
Enlai and transmit to him Filippov's tele- goods ordered in the requests have been sent I send you a copy of my telegram of 14 gram regarding the memorandum of the only in part? Will this difference be covered January 1951 to Comrade Peng Dehuai for Chinese government.
in 1951? I ask you to communicate about transmission to Comrade Kim Il Sung. this.
I ask you to familiarize yourself with it: (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, 4. That you have established the amounts “To Comrade Peng Dehuai. I ask that the List 122 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, of military credit for 1951 is very good. As contents of this telegram be transmitted to Delo 5, Papka 11, List 13]
soon as we sort out the first two requests we Comrade Kim Il Sung.
will make an application for military goods The approximately 100,000 Korean re53. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, for 1951, with a careful calculation of the cost cruits being trained in Northeast China must Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
of this military hardware, so that the total sum be incorporated into various corps of the
will not exceed the amount of 400,000,000 People's Army in the next 2-3 months, in the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF rubles established by you, so that the Soviet period of rest and reformation, so that the THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET government will not be burdened by the ful- companies in all divisions of the People's ARMY fillment of our military applications.
Army will be fully manned. There must be CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15607
5. I thank you for your decision about the more than 100 men in each company and Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Vasilevsky, delivery of railway equipment as a part of the 10,000 - 15,000 men in each division. Men'shikov
military credit in accordance with the agree- In the Korean army there are too many From BEIJING Received 14 hours 30 min- ment on military credit, with a reduction of units of the division and brigade type. It is utes 16.1.1951 25% of the cost of this equipment.
necessary that all personnel be consolidated EXTREMELY URGENT T 6. We agree that 5,000 automobiles de- into fifteen divisions (approximately) and To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin] livered to us in 1950 and 12,000 automobiles Soviet arms be apportioned to them so that 1. I received your telegram of 4.1.51. I which will be delivered in 1951 should be these Korean divisions, cooperating with the fully agree with all the arrangements con- paid through trade exchange. I hope that you Chinese volunteers, provide major support tained in your telegram. I thank you and the will review my request and communicate an to them during the spring offensive (April Soviet Government for the assistance you answer about the delivery ahead of time of the May), with the goal of finally resolving the are rendering to us.
remaining 12,000 automobiles for satisfying South Korean question. 2. We have studied the draft agreement the needs of the front.
In the next two to three months the on military credit.
7. I ask you to communicate to us whether Chinese volunteers and the Korean troops We fully agree with the draft of this gasoline and aviation fuel, for military pur- must carry out serious and major work, in agreement, with the exception of the 1st and poses, included in the application for military particular to replenish the troops with newly 2nd points of the third article, to which were equipment sent after 19.10.1950, will be in- trained soldiers, to make sure that the newly introduced changes on the basis of your cluded in the military equipment stipulated trained soldiers imitate the experience of the telegram of 4.1 of this year, about which we by the agreement on military credit. Is the old soldiers, to strengthen the troop armarequested Comrade Zakharov to inform you. agreement on military equipment applicable ments, to rebuild the railways, to lay in store With regard to the signing of this agree- to the aforementioned gasoline?
food and ammunition, to improve the work ment, Comrade Zhou Enlai will resolve this
With bolshevik greetings!
of transport and the rear service. Carrying question together with Comrade Zakharov.
out this work can secure the final victory. 3. You communicated in your telegram No. 262
It is possible that the enemy command that in the first nine and a half months of 14.1.51
will have two variants for conducting subse1950 the USSR has agreed, in accordance
quent military operations: with the agreement on credit of 14.2.1950, to (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, delo 337, 1. Under pressure from Chinese and deliver to China military goods in the amount Listy 4-5]
North Korean troops the enemy will make of 140 million rubles.
insignificant resistance and then withdraw Not long ago Comrade Wang Jia-xiang 54. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, from Korea. If this happens, it will be the brought the requests of February and May Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmit- result of our carrying out thorough preparafor military goods that he received from the ting 14 January 1951 message from Mao to
tions, because the enemy, having received military-engineering administration of MVT Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung information about the preparation work beto the general sum of 237,548,103.64 rubles,
ing carried out, will be convinced that our of which the request for February is SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF military forces have grown even greater, and 114,415,274.67 rubles and for May THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET therefore, fearing difficulty, he will with123,132,828.97 rubles. ARMY
draw from Korea. Thus, the total value of the military CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15603 2. The enemy will make stubborn resisgoods delivered, contained in our telegram, Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
tance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he is 97,500,000 rubles less than the value of From BEIJING Received 14 hours 45 min- becomes convinced of the uselessness of the military goods in the February and May utes 16.1.1951
resistance, and then he will withdraw from requests.
EXTREMELY URGENT T South Korea. Should it be considered that the military To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin).
If this happens, it is necessary for us to