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carry out good preparation so that it will be comrades think that it is not possible to this). In the main I agreed with the aforemenpossible to continue to fight. In the opposite pursue the retreating American and puppet tioned plan for the defense of the sea coast. case, we can repeat the mistakes allowed by (South Korea) troops with the forces of the I ask you to review. the Korean troops in the period from June to Korean People's Army alone. This would 3. The question of restaffing five corps. September 1950. also take on an adventuristic character.

It was decided that each corps must be But it is also possible that objective They stated that the Politburo regards as composed of three divisions. At present, all causes will force us to make a single opera- correct the proposal made from my side five corps, with the exception of 1st corps, tion in February, after which again to con- about the necessity of conducting rest and have 4-5 divisions. However, these divitinue the respite and reformation for the reformation for two months in order to make sions are not fully manned, there are 3,000purpose of completing the necessary prepa- a forward advance cautiously, without hur- 4,000-5,000 men. It is proposed that each ration for the next operation. This also must rying. Although Comrade PAK HON-YONG corps fill out three divisions using the fourth be taken into account. However, if this does had his own opinion, after the second eluci- division of the corps. In this way each not happen, then conducting the last decisive dation I made on 17 January, about the posi- division can be brought to an average of operation after finishing the necessary prepa- tive and negative sides of a risky forward 7,000 men. I introduced a proposal to apporration in two-three months, which was dis- advance without carrying out preparation tion 20,000 men per five armies from among cussed above, will be necessary and practi- and a cautious forward advance with ad- the South Korean prisoners, but they did not cable. vance preparation, he was satisfied.

agree with me. Chinese and Korean comrades must be The Soviet adviser also agreed that the With regard to my proposal to fill out the patient and carry out the necessary prepara- next operation is decisive, therefore with the existing corps with the newly organized three tion.

approval of the Politburo of the Korean Work- corps, they did not agree with this. Although I ask you to communicate your opinion. ers' party, it will be conducted better. such a proposal was advanced by me, I conMAO ZEDONG."

2. The question of the defense of the sea sidered it awkward to defend it further. They With Bolshevik greetings. coast.

are planning the participation in the next MAO ZEDONG

Premier KIM IL SUNG and Comrade operations of three of their corps.
No. 260
RAZUVAEV put forth the following opin-

4. A sufficient number of cadres were 15.1.51

ions: 26 brigade will be based in not prepared for carrying out work in the

TSINNAMPO, 23 brigade in KAISIU, 24 newly liberated regions. (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, brigade in GENZAN, 63 brigade in SEOUL earlier had a population of Listy 1-3]

BUGTKHENG,69 brigade in KORIO. These 1,500,000 persons, at the present time it

brigades will occupy by battalion, portions probably still has around 1,000,000 persons. 55. 27 January 1951, ciphered telegram, of the defense along the western and eastern There are great difficulties with food and Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey- sea coast, where they will serve as sentries. fuel. No assistance is being given to refugees ing 19 January 1951 telegram from Peng Each brigade to have an average of 3,000 and the unemployed. There is only just Dehuai to Mao re meetings with Kim Il men, and moreover their combat capability enough food for the Korean People's Army Sung is not high.

and the Chinese Volunteer troops. In the

In addition to this, three newly orga- regions to the west of KAIDZIO and to the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF nized corps (6th, 7th and 8th) will control the south of SIARIN there are large gangs, which THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET following regions: 6th corps - ANSIU, 7th have even seized some locations. We agreed ARMY

corps - KOKUZAN, 8th corps - KANKO. to send one regiment and four battalions CIPHERED TELEGRAM

No decision was made about which units to from the People's Army to destroy these Copies: Stalin (2)

leave in SEOUL and CHEMUL’PO. They gangs. In addition it was decided to send one From BEIJING Received 19 hours 35 min- also ask to leave one army of Chinese Volun- division from the 39th corps to the region to utes 27.1.1951

teers, as a skeleton. We gave agreement to the west of the RINSINKO river to assist. EXTREMELY URGENT T leave one army, which will be located in Thus, with the destruction of these gangs we To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin) TET-SUGEN.

will be able to receive several dozen tons of I send you a copy of the telegram from 1000 sea mines and 200,000 anti-tank food. Comrade Peng Dehuai to me of 19 January and other mines have been received from the Agreement in principle was obtained 1951.

USSR. So far a decision was made to use from our side in the discussion of such quesI ask you to familiarize yourself with it. 100,000 mines for defense of the sea coast tions as: fortifying the areas under control; “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. and to place the sea mines in the most impor- demoralization of the enemy-for example Copy: To Comrade GAO GANG. tant ports. The task of defending the sea preparation for the spring planting in North

I arrived at Premier Comrade KIM IL coast to the south of the SUIGEN- ern KOREA; assistance to refugees; partial SUNG's in the evening on 16 January 1951 SANSIOKU line was assigned to the for- restoration of production in several factoand returned on the evening of 18 January ward units. Defense of the port RIUGANPO, ries; developing a political offensive in the 1951.

which is located in the area of SINGISIU, areas temporarily occupied by the American I report about the results of our meeting: they asked to assign to troops VO of north- and puppet (South Korean) troops; creation 1. Comrade KIM IL SUNG and his east CHINA (one regiment is sufficient for of armed detachments which will include

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party and administrative workers and leaders 2. Our troops must immediately conduct 7. After the Chinese and Korean troops of mass organizations which will penetrate preparations for the fourth operation, with occupy the region to the north of the Taidenthe enemy's rear, where under the cover of the goal of the destruction of 20,000 to 30,000 Anto boundary, they must again make a two armed units of the detachment they will carry American and puppet (South Korean) troops to three months long preparation, after which out organizational work in the locality; the and the occupation of the area to the north of to accomplish the last, fifth, operation of combination of legal and illegal forms of the Taiden-Anto boundary.

decisive significance. This is advantageous struggle; striking a blow at the most reaction- 3. In the course of the preparation for

in all respects. ary elements; assistance to the progressive this operation it is necessary to hold 8. The ninth army group must in the near elements; attracting to their side the interme- Chemul’po, the fortification before the bridge future be redeployed to the region of diate elements; and also all methods of carry- on the south bank of the Kanko river and the Pyongyang, Seoul, Chemul'po, Suigen for ing out these measures. However, in the city of Seoul, and also to draw out the main rest and reformation. At the same time they future it will be clearer how to begin the enemy forces to the Suigen-Risen region. must fulfill the task of defending the given organization of the implementation of these After the beginning of the operation the main region so as not to give the possibility to measures resolutely and with the correct forces of the North Korean and Chinese enemy troops to land in Chemul’po an placement of cadres.

troops must break through the enemy's line Tsinnampo. At the time of the fifth operation PENG DEHUAI 12:00 19.1.51." of defense in the region of Gensiu and make the given army group must participate in With bolshevik greetings!

attacks in the direction toward Eisiu and military operations on the western portions MAO ZEDONG Anto.

of the front. No. 449

4. The withdrawal of Chinese and North 9. At the time of implementing the fourth 26.1.51

Korean troops for 15-30 km to the north and operation I ask you to think over the question

the publication of a communication about of whether it will be better for the main forces (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, support for the proposal about a temporary of the Chinese and North Korean troops to Listy 37-40)

ceasefire is disadvantageous for us, since the divide into two echelons. Troops of each

enemy precisely wishes to cease military echelon must have a five day dry ration. 56. 29 January 1951, ciphered telegram, operations only at the time when our troops Troops of the first echelon must make the Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey- withdraw some distance to the north and in breakthrough and carry out the pursuit of the ing 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao order that he (the enemy) can blockade the enemy to a determined border, and the troops Zedong to Peng Dehuai Kanko river.

of the second echelon must continue the

5. After the conclusion of the fourth pursuit of the enemy, so that the operation SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF Operation, it is possible that the enemy will will continue for 10-12 days and that in this THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET conduct peace negotiations with us regard- time it will be possible to destroy as many ARMY

ing a resolution of the Korean question. Con- enemy troops as possible. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16052 ducting negotiations will then be advanta- I ask you to communicate your opinion. Copies: Stalin (2) geous for China and Korea. However, the

MAO ZEDONG, 28.1.51 From BEIJING Received 18 hours 40 min- enemy at present is calculating to return the 19:00.” utes 29.1.1951

fortification before the bridge on the south No. 478.
EXTREMELY URGENT T bank of the Kanko river, to the south of the 28.1.51. MAO ZEDONG

To FILIPPOV (Stalin) line Seoul-Chemul'po and to blockade the At the present time the American troops Kanko river, so that Seoul would be under (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, are trying to attack the regions of the south- threat of shelling from enemy artillery, so as Listy 41-43] ern bank of the Kanko river adjacent to Seoul thereby to force us to cease military operaand Chemul'po (Inchon). Such a situation tions and begin peace negotiations. In this 57. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, has developed that our troops are deprived of way the enemy wants to place China and Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong the possibility of continuing rest and refor- Korea in a disadvantageous position, which mation and are forced immediately to begin we can in no case allow.

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 633 preparation for the fourth operation. I send 6. Our troops have not been able to BEIJING TO ZAKHAROV you my telegram of 28.1.51, addressed to receive reinforcements. Transporting troops FOR COMRADE MAO ZEDONG Comrade PENG DEHUAI.

is also inadequate. We have a very great Comrade MAO ZEDONG! I ask you to familiarize yourself with it difficulty in this regard. However, we are in I received your telegram to PENG and communicate your opinion about whether a position to concentrate the main forces and DEHUAI of 28 January. I agree with you. this is advisable from the point of view of the with a strike in the direction of Gensiu-Eisiu From the international point of view it is international situation:

destroy a unit of American troops and four to undoubtedly advisable that CHEMUL'PO “Comrade PENG DEHUAI!

five divisions of South Korean troops. and SEOUL not be seized by the enemy, so 1. I received your telegram of 27.1.51, I ask you explain this to a meeting of the that the Chinese-Korean troops can make a 24:00, and your order about preparation for high command. This meeting must be com- serious rebuff to attacking enemy troops. conducting military operations sent to all pletely directed to the preparation of the

FILIPPOV (Stalin) armies. fourth operation.

No. 60/sh

group of

30 January 1951.

leading the corps, but there are already army 60. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram,

apparatuses. It would be better to organize Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung via Razuvaev (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, the 5 army administrations with 4 divisions List 44]

in each army, so that the army apparatus 8th Administration of the General Staff of

itself directly commands its divisions. In this the Armed Forces of the USSR 58. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, case the Korean armed forces would have in CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100320 Fyn Si (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador to its composition 5 armies (in all 20 divisions), To RAZUVAEV for KIM IL SUNG the DPRK A.M. Razuvaev with message and 3 divisions could be in the reserve of the To Comrade KIM IL SUNG. for Kim Il Sung

main command for assisting the most needy We have insufficient lead not only for

armies according to the course of the opera- satisfying the needs of China and Korea, but 8th Administration of the General Staff of tion. With time, when the commanders ma- also for our own needs. In view of this we the Armed Forces of the USSR

ture, when there will be enough of them and have decided to send to Korea CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100269 when they learn to command joint divisions, Soviet specialists to assist the Korean orga

To Comrade RAZUVAEV. then it will be possible to transfer to a corps nizations in working out measures for the Discuss the following telegram with system.

restoration of mines, concentrating mills and Comrade Kim Il Sung and his closest friends Of course, this reform should not be lead factories for the purpose of increasing and communicate their opinion.

carried out now, but during a time of rest after the production of lead. We would like also to 1. It is possible to consider it incontest- conducting the operation.

organize the export of lead ore to the USSR, able that the present [North) Korean divi- Discuss these proposals and communi- since it is not being processed now in Korea sions are less battle capable than the old cate your opinion.

for (industrial) processing. divisions in the summer of last year. This is 30 Jan 1951

We hope that you will not be opposed to explained by the fact that the Koreans had 10

FYN SI (Stalin)

this. divisions, well fitted out with officer corps No. 4/854

We await your answer. and more or less satisfactorily trained. And Copies: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko

FYN-SI (Stalin). now the Koreans have 28 divisions, of which

No. 83/sh. 19 divisions are at the front and 9 are in (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, 3 February 1951. Manchuria. It is clear that the Koreans are Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis not in a position to supply such a large 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 15-16)

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, number of divisions with officer corps. Ac

List 20] cording to our norms, each division, having, 59. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, let's say, 8,000 men must have at least 800 Fyn Si (Stalin) to Razuvaev

61. 4 February 1951, ciphered telegram, officers, not counting sergeants. I have in

Razuvaev to Fyn-Si (Stalin) reporting mind the genuine officers, capable of ce- 8th Administration of the General Staff of message from Kim Il Sung menting a division, and not hastily commis- the Armed Forces of the USSR sioned officers. It is clear that the Koreans CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100319 CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 500361/sh still don't have such a number of officers.

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

From Correspondent 20 Sent 4.2.51 14:35 Therefore the present Korean officers are You did not understand my telegram of Received 4.2. 15:10 understrength, unstable and little capable of January 30 about the Korean divisions. This Sent to the 8th Administration of the General battle. The Koreans increased the number of telegram is not a directive, but my proposal Staff of the Soviet Army 4.2 15:25 divisions and forgot about quality, but qual- for discussion together with Korean com

To Comrade FYN-SI (Stalin). ity plays the decisive role here. rades. I asked you to communicate to me the

To No. 4/854 and No. 81/sh. 2. It would be advisable in the given opinion of the Korean comrades and your I report: situation to have not more than 23 divisions own opinion. You answer me that my order KIM IL SUNG and the Korean comin the Korean army, so that the officer corps will be fulfilled by you. You did not under- rades discussed your telegram about the comof the reduced 5 divisions can be used to fill stand my telegram. Once again I ask you to position of forces of the Korean People's out the officer corps of the remaining weak familiarize KIM IL SUNG and his friends Army and arrived at the following concludivisions, and the rank and file to use as with my telegram and after my proposal is sion: reinforcement. This will strengthen the divi- discussed, communicate to me the opinion of 1. To raise the battle readiness of the sions, lessen the expenses and make for a the Koreans.

troops and to improve their quality, it is gain in arms. The same needs to be said

FYN SI (Stalin]

necessary to lower the number of army adregarding the four Korean infantry brigades 3 February 1951.

ministrations and the number of divisions. which are in poorly combat readiness and No. 81/sh

2. To produce the decrease in army which also can be used to fill out the divi

administrations and divisions by increasing sions with officers and rank and file. (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, the three army administrations from Man

3. At this stage the organization of corps List 20 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, churia. administration is inadvisable, since there are Delo 3, Papka 11, List 198]

To reduce: two army administrations; no, or almost no, commanders capable of

—four pd [infantry divisions): 2nd army - 27th and 31st pd, 5th army - 43rd pd, one


No. 4/2761 FILIPPOV (Stalin) pd by increasing 8th army

To ZAKHAROV for MAO 29.V.51 3. To temporarily keep naval brigades ZEDONG

Copies: Stalin (2) for the defense of bases and coastline.

or ZHOU ENLAI To strengthen the naval brigades to sig- As is obvious, in the nearest future there (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, nificantly reduce VMU (“battle friction" will be major military operations in Korea by List 29 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, that results from being understrength]; the the Chinese and Korean liberation troops. It Delo 5, Papka 11, List 28] sailor school and apparatus of naval com- is apparent that you will need a large number mand.

of aviation both at the front and in the rear. In 65. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, 4. To carry out further reductions after a previous telegram we accepted your pro- Filippov to Mao Zedong the next operation, which will begin Febru- posal about shifting the base of Belov's air ary 7-13, 1951.

force to Korea, in the rear of your troops, but CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3410 5. To have the total number of army with the condition that two Chinese fighter BEIJING units and divisions be within the numerical divisions be placed in the Andong region to TO KRASOVSKY limits that you recommended.

cover this area. However, we see now that in FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG RAZUVAEV.

view of the forthcoming major operations, I received your telegram of June 4, and No. 375/sh

you will need the largest possible aviation also the two directives of Comrade Peng 4.2.51

force at the front. We have therefore decided Dehuai. Copies: Stalin (2), Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, to send to Andong from the USSR an addi- I also think, as do you, that the war in File of 8th Administration

tional large fighter division so that the two Korea should not be speeded up, since a

Chinese fighter divisions which were desig- drawn out war, in the first place, gives the (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, nated for covering Andong would be sent to possibility to the Chinese troops to study Listy 25-26 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis the front for use in operations at the front. contemporary warfare on the field of battle 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 199-200)

We hope that you will not object. and in the second place shakes up the Truman

regime in America and harms the military 62. 16 February 1951, ciphered telegram, No. 139/sh

prestige of the Anglo-American troops. Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via 15 March 1951

In my telegram I wrote mainly about the Zakharov

fact that it is risky to conduct maneuvers if (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, there are no strong defensive fortifications in CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1078 List 118 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, the rear, to which the main forces could be Sent 22:03 16.2.51 Delo 3, Papka 11, List 202]

quickly withdrawn. Comrade Peng Dehuai Transmitted 22:55 16.2.51

writes that he is creating three defensive lines BEIJING - To Comrade ZAKHAROV 64. 29 May 1951, ciphered telegram, in the rear. If this is done and the defensive for Comrade ZHOU ENLAI

Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev with mes- lines are truly serious, then the affair will Your request about advisers for the Chi- sage for Kim Il Sung

proceed in a better way and the troops will nese Air Army will be satisfied. I consider

not fall into encirclement. it more advisable to give you advisers who 8th Administration of the General Staff of the You complain that you have little artilknow China and are familiar with the air war Armed Forces of the USSR

lery, antitank guns and other arms. I commuin Korea. As adviser to the command of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101255 nicated to you two months ago that the Poles Air Army we suggest Major General PYONGYANG

have retracted their orders and we therefore GOLUNOV, who is attached to General of

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

could make for you additional deliveries of the Army ZAKHAROV. The list of remain- Visit KIM IL SUNG and communicate arms in this year, thus increasing the volume ing advisers will be communicated sepa- to him that we have received their application of military credit for 1951. Comrade Zhou rately.

for additional delivery of rifle-mortar arms Enlai welcomed this report of mine and told FILIPPOV (Stalin]

that was sent through you. Communicate to us that you will soon send new applications. No. 635037

Comrade KIM IL SUNG that we unfortu- However, there are no new applications from 16 February 1951.

nately cannot now fully satisfy this applica- you. Why is this? How is this explained?

tion, since he sent it almost in the middle of Again I communicate to you that we could (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, 1951, while arms were already allocated for make new deliveries of artillery for you if List 60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, the Peoples Democracies in February.

you want this. Delo 5, Papka 11, List 26)

At this time we can send to KOREA Comrade Peng Dehuai is right that it is

during the month of June: 25,000 carbines, necessary to strengthen the operations of 63. 15 March 1951, ciphered telegram, 5,000 sub-machine guns, 1,200 light ma- partisan detachments in the enemy's rear. Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong or Zhou chine guns, 550 medium machine guns, 275 This is absolutely necessary. Enlai (via Zakharov)

TSK machine guns, 500 antitank rifles, 700 Comrade Peng Dehaui writes about the

82 mm mortars, and 125 120 mm mortars. presence of a relatively high fighting spirit CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1749

Telegraph the fulfillment.

among the Anglo-American troops, and about the fact that “serious rightist moods” have matter of the resolution of these important to six months, then why is it impossible to appeared among the Chinese troops. In my questions.

complete the training of Chinese pilots in opinion this is explained by the fact that your At the present time Comrade KIM IL seven to eight months? Isn't it time to throw local maneuvers with some forward advance SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with away this harmful overcautiousness? The but then a falling back, repeated several Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of Chinese troops will not fight without air times, create among your troops the impres- these questions with you.

cover. Therefore it is necessary to create sion of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, I ask you to communicate your opinion more quickly a group of eight Chinese air but create among the Anglo-American troops about the possibility of this trip.

fighter divisions and send them to the front. the impression of their might. I fear that this


This is now your main task. situation can undermine the spirit of the No. 2787

Belov can send one division closer to the Chinese Korean troops. I think that it will 5.6.51

Chinese border in Manchuria, and two divinot be possible to crush these unhealthy

sions can be held in the rear in North Korea, moods unless you prepare and carry out a (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, thus freeing up two airports for the Chinese serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of List 23]

fighter divisions closer to the front. This is three to four enemy divisions. This would

absolutely necessary. It is necessary to arlead to a serious turnaround in the moods of 67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, range matters so that the Chinese rely only on the Chinese Koreans as well as among the Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

their own aviation at the front. Anglo-American troops. This, of course,

Report the fulfillment. will not be broad and far from being an


FILIPPOV (Stalin) offensive, will be only a serious short blow BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY

No. 303/sh
against the enemy, but this will be the kind of for Comrade MAO ZEDONG.
blow that will sober up the

and raise To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean We received your telegram about the List 47 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, troops. Moreover this would give you the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and Delo 5, Papka 11, List 33] possibility of undertaking then wider and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive more successful local maneuvers needed to Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG 69. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, exhaust the enemy.

and to discuss with them the questions indi- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meetFILIPPOV (Stalin) cated in your telegram.

ing in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il No. 297/sh

On 8 June in the morning we will send a Sung 5 June 1951

plane from Moscow to Peking to transport

Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557 (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing BEIJING, TO ROSHCHIN Listy 17-18] on 9 June.

Deliver immediately to the addressee.

We ask you to give an order to your “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. 66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao authorities about the unimpeded flight of the Today there was a conversation with Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing. your representatives from Manchuria and FILIPPOV (Stalin)

Korea (Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung). Three SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF

questions were raised: THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, First-about an armistice. We recogARMY

List 26 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, nized that an armistice is now advantageous. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448 Delo 5, Papka 11, List 30)

Second—about military advisers. If they Copies: Stalin (2)

are very necessary to you, then we are ready From Beijing Received 18:30 5 June 1951 68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, to satisfy you. SERIES G T.

Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advi- Third-about the delivery of arms for TO FILIPPOV (Stalin) sor in Beijing Krasovsky

sixteen divisions. There will not be objecComrade FILIPPOV!

tions from our side. In the course of conducting the war in CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3559

I won't write about the details, since KOREA we have run into such serious ques- BEIJING

your representatives will report to you about tions as the financial question, the question


them. of the conduct of military operations directly According to our information, our pilots We consider it absolutely necessary now at the front, the question of the danger of a are training the Koreans very slowly and in a to start moving at least eight fighter aviation possible enemy landing on the sea coast in slipshod manner. You and General Belov divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions. our rear.

apparently intend to make professors rather We think that besides two or three aviation Weintend to send Comrade GAOGANG than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots. divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to We consider this to be overcautiousness on front from central and southern China five or inform you regarding the aforementioned the side of our aviation specialists. If Rus- six divisions of MIG-9's, which operate very questions and to ask your directions in the sian pilots were trained during the war in five

sian pilots were trained during the war in five effectively against bombers. Eight fighter

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