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neutral states which would supervise the Comrade KIM IL SUNG insists on ad(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, fulfillment of points 1, 2 and 3. In this vancing this point. However, to bring this Listy 6-7]
committee there must be an equal number of about is very difficult. It is apparent that with
representatives of neutral states that have not regard to this question many differences of 84. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao taken part in the Korean war and that have opinion and many arguments will arise beZedong to Filippov (Stalin) been selected by both sides.”
tween the representatives of North and South
We think that the enemy also will ad- Korea, which can have an influence on the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF vance an analogous proposal, therefore we resolution of other important questions. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET intend to show initiative in this. However, Or is it possible to advance this proARMY
there will be numerous difficulties in the posal? CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21405 fulfillment of this point.
If it leads to arguments and is not reCopies: Stalin (2)
"Members” of the control committee solved, then transfer it for discussion at an From BEIJING Received 13:55
proposed by the enemy will monitor our international conference of a political char3.7.1951
military transport on the Chinese Korean acter. SERIES “G” T
border and at important communications I ask you to communicate your opinion To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin) points in Korea. Or should we not take the on the points indicated above. Furthermore, Comrade FILIPPOV!
initiative ourselves, but wait for the enemy to yesterday we sent Deputy Minister of ForDuring the meeting of military repre- advance his proposal, after which we will eign Affairs Comrade Li Kenong and his sentatives of both sides we intend to advance
assistant to Korea. He will arrive approxithe following 5 main points:
I ask you to communicate your opinion mately on 5.7.1951 and will discuss with 1. “Both sides must simultaneously is- about how to proceed expediently. To com- Comrade KIM IL SUNG and other comrades sue an order for a ceasefire. Land, sea and air pletely refuse to create a control committee various questions concerning the peace neforces of both sides, after the issuing of the seems also inadvisable.
gotiations. order on a ceasefire, must within all the 5. “Both sides must carry out repatria- After this he will go to the area of borders of Korea cease fire and halt all other tion of prisoners of war. In the course of four Kaesong, whence he will secretly lead the hostile actions."
months after the cessation of military opera- negotiations. This point will possibly be accepted by tions to conduct a full mutual exchange of I am also sending you the telegram which the enemy without qualifications. them, in separate batches."
lays out the opinion of Comrade KIM IL 2. “Land, sea and air forces of both sides The enemy will possibly propose to con- SUNG on this question. must withdraw from the 38th parallel for a duct a one for one exchange. We must
MAO ZEDONG distance of 10 English miles and create a demand repatriation of all prisoners of war. No. 3305 buffer zone in the region 10 English miles to However, the enemy has taken prisoner a 3.7.51 the south and to the north of the 38th parallel. relatively larger number of North Koreans, The civil administration of the buffer zone who have already been included in the ranks (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, must be as it was before 25.6.1950, in other of the South Korean troops, and therefore Listy 8-10) words to the north of the 38th parallel under this situation will possibly elicit an arguthe jurisdiction of the Korean People's gov- ment.
85.3.July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov ernment and to the south of the 38th parallel In our opinion the 5 basic points indi- (Stalin) to Mao Zedong under the jurisdiction of the South-Korean cated above must be accepted at the meeting government."
of military representatives of both sides. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3950 It is possible that there will be some In addition there are some other points: BEIJING, TO KRASOVSKY. divergences (from this proposal) among the 1. “All foreign troops including Chinese For Comrade MAO ZEDONG. enemy but we consider that our proposal is volunteer troops must completely leave North “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. extremely just and it will be difficult for the and South Korea within a specified period of We received your telegram of 3 July. enemy to refute it.
time (for example within three-four months), With regard to the first two points of your 3. “Both sides must cease the transport in separate batches.
proposal, we have no objections. It is posof arms, troops and reinforcements (includ- This is also a very important point. How- sible to delete the second part of the third ing land, sea and air transport) into Korea ever, the representatives of the enemy possi- point, but if the Americans advance such a from outside the country and also the afore- bly will think that this question belongs among proposal, it can be accepted. The fourth mentioned transports to the front line on the political questions and should not be re- point should not be advanced. But if the territory of Korea." solved at this meeting.
Americans advance a proposal about a conWe think that the enemy for his part will I ask you to study and communicate trol commission from the UN, then this proalso advance a proposal on this question, and whether our side should advance this point. posal should be rejected, with reference to we therefore intend to take the initiative in 2. “Within a specified period of time the fact that the UN occupies the position of this. But perhaps it is better to leave off the (for example in several months) refugees of a warring side, but you should then advance last part of our proposal?
North and South Korea must be returned to your proposal about a commission of repre4. "To create a control committee of the areas where they lived previously." sentatives of neutral states named with the
agreement of the sides. The fifth point either before or during the negotiations, which military situation. should be proposed and you should insist on the enemy may undertake in order to force us We consider that the goal of this is to it.
to sign a disadvantageous agreement. avoid defeat in the area of propaganda but As concerns your remaining two points If the enemy begins a large-scale attack, also secretly to show that he can alter his (about the withdrawal of all foreign troops our troops must go over to the counterattack proposal. Taking this into account, in our and about refugees), both of these proposals and defeat the enemy.
statement in today's meeting we pursued the should be advanced and should be insisted 3. It is necessary to issue an order to goal of striking a blow against his unfounded on.
second corps Yang Chengan and to the 50th theory of refusal to discuss the question of FILIPPOV (Stalin).
corps to depart quickly for the indicated re- the 38th parallel, and also tried to ascertain if No. 340/III
gions so that the enemy cannot make use of he intended to abandon his unfounded pro3 July."
the opportunity to make a landing in Genzan. posal. .
Our 38th, 39th and 42nd corps must be At today's meeting the enemy displayed (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, ready to repulse possible landings by the ,
some interest in the portion of our statement List 11] enemy on the western coast.
where we tried to ascertain his intention.
4. I ask you to think about what could However, in his statement in the second half 86. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao occur after the signing of an agreement on of the day the representative of the enemy Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 2 cessation of military operations and be pre- expressed a strong (sense of) injustice and July 1951 telegram from Mao to Peng pared for everything that needs to be done. tried to lay on us the responsibility for the Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Kim Il Sung
MAO ZEDONG 2.7.51." impasse that has been created in the negotiaMAO ZEDONG
tions. SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF No. 3308
Our statement for tomorrow will be conTHE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET 3.7.51
structed on the basis of your instructions. ARMY
The goal of the statement will be to smash CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21412 (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, this (claim of] injustice of the enemy, to Copies: Stalin (2) Listy 14-15]
unmask his capacity for deception and siFrom BEIJING Received 13:50
multaneously to advance such questions as 3.7.1951
87. 13 August 1951, ciphered telegram, to force the enemy more clearly to express
, SERIES “G” T
Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey- his position. To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin) ing 12 August 1951 telegram from Li The main goal of the statement is once Comrade Filippov! Kenong to Mao re armistice talks
again to underscore that if the enemy does I send you the text of my telegram to
not renounce his unfounded proposal, there Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF will be no progress in the work of the conferand KIM IL SUNG.
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ence. We consider that we can also express “Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO ARMY
our wish to change the proposal about the GANG and KIM IL SUNG!
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 22834 buffer zone in the area of the 38th parallel as The period of preparations for and con- Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, the military demarcation line only in such duct of negotiations with representatives of Bulganin
case as the enemy clearly gives us to underthe enemy will occupy approximately 10-14 From BEIJING Received 17:20
stand that he abandons his earlier proposal. days. I ask you with all seriousness to fulfill 13.8.1951
3. After the resumption of the work of the following points:
SERIES “G” T
the conference, the mistaken views of the 1. In the course of the 10 days that we
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin)
enemy have become even more intensified have, to make every effort to increase the Comrade FILIPPOV!
and the enemy has become even more conpersonnel of the front line units and espe- I send you for familiarization the tele- vinced that we yearn for peace, and therefore cially to replenish them with arms and am- gram received from Comrade Li Kenong on it is possible to get concessions from us. All munition. 12 August 4:00.
this was possible to foresee. I ask Comrade GAO GANG to transfer “To Comrade Mao Zedong.
However, from the entire course of the from the rear to North Korea in no more than 1. I received your telegram of 11 August conference and the general situation outside 10 days the personnel, arms and ammunition
the conference it is apparent that it is not marked for transfer. It is necessary to be 2. At the evening meeting the mistaken possible to force the enemy to accept the prepared for the fact that after the signing of views of the enemy became even more inten- proposal about the 38th parallel. In the an agreement on cessation of military opera- sified. The enemy considers that it is possible course of several days the enemy on the one tions it will be impossible to transfer the through pressure to force us to abandon dis- hand will put pressure on us and try to force aforementioned personnel and armaments. cussion of the question of the 38th parallel. us to be the first to make a concession, and on
2. To heighten vigilance up to the limit. He has already four times expressed his wish the other hand will prepare for a possible Units of the first line must be prepared to to discuss a proposal about a military demar- breakdown in the conference. repulse a possible large scale attack by the cation line and a buffer zone on the basis of Therefore we consider it necessary to enemy and intensive bombing of our rear the present line of the front and the present work out a definite resolution with regard to
the 38th parallel. 13.8.51
region of the building where the negotiations If our final goal consists of conducting a
are being conducted on his own initiative, struggle for the principle of the determina- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, (
without agreement from the Americans. tion of the 38th parallel as the military de- Listy 56-58]
Therefore, the provocational acts of the enmarcation line and if in this regard we can
emy have caused us to make a decisive admit only certain alterations, then we should 88. 27 August 1951, ciphered telegram, counterstroke. have in mind a breakdown in the negotiations Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
We have declared a temporary cessation and we must prepare for this.
of the negotiations until the enemy accepts In the opposite case we should have SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF responsibility for what has happened. The some kind of compromise position deter- THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET negotiations will not be resumed until we mined. Our past proposal, it is true, could not ARMY
receive a satisfactory answer—we'll let them foresee the possible development of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23256 cool their heels. However, we do not want to present situation, but it is also not possible to Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, take the initiative in declaring a breakdown win much time through action in accordance Bulganin
in the negotiations. with your orders contained in the telegram of From BEIJING 01:3027.8.1951
We suppose that the enemy will not 17.7.51 about a concession to the enemy
openly acknowledge his provocational acts. the purpose of gaining time,
To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin] The dragging out of the negotiations can 4. We (Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang Comrade Filippov!
end in two ways. and Qiao Guan-hua) suggest that the final In view of the fact that the enemy was First, the delay may bring the negotiagoal of the enemy is to cease military opera- not in a position to withdraw from the im- tions to a breakdown. tions at the present front line. In relation to passe created in the course of the negotia- We are forcefully preparing ourselves this the enemy may allow small alterations. tions on the question of a military demarca- to resist a possible attack by enemy troops
It is thus necessary for us to decide: to tion line, he has undertaken a whole series of directly at the front. We are simultaneously struggle for the 38th parallel and prepare for provocational actions.
strictly defending the ports on the western an end to the negotiations or, avoiding a On August 19 enemy troops, dressed in and eastern coast of North Korea from landbreakdown in the negotiations, to carry on civilian clothes, made a raid on our security ings by the enemy. For the last several days the struggle for the cessation of military forces in the neutral zone in Kaesong, as a enemy planes have passed through the area operations and to study the question of the result of which one man was killed and one of the following cities on the China coast: cessation of military operations at the present was wounded. After an investigation by Tsingtao, Shanghai, Hangchow. This was front line.
representatives of both sides, the enemy in also done for provocational purposes. Having studied, on the basis of the lim- justifying himself stated that this was (com- Simultaneously with this, the enemy ited materials we have, the general world mitted by] partisans from the South Korean wanted to reconnoiter the air defense of our situation, the needs of our state and the fact partisan detachment active in our region, and coastal regions. With regard to this, we want that at present Korea cannot continue the therefore he does not take any responsibility to strengthen our command in Korea and the war, we think that it is better to think over the for this.
air defense of the cities located in the coastal question of cessation of military operations After this, on the night of August 22, one region. In a subsequent telegram I will comat the present front line than to carry on the enemy plane dropped nine bombs on the municate to you a draft (plan) for sending struggle for the 38th parallel and bring the territory of the neutral zone in Kaesong and Soviet military advisers to work with the conference to a breakdown.
fired on the house where our delegation is Chinese volunteer troops in Korea. In connection with this it is necessary to quartered. Although American officers came Simultaneously with this I will ask you take into consideration that it is possible to to investigate that same night, the enemy about an additional delivery of artillery argain some concessions from the enemy in the impudently refused to acknowledge their maments. discussion of the proposal about cessation of actions and contended that the fragments and Second, it is possible that as a result of military operations at the present front line. craters found there are not from air force the delay in the negotiations the enemy will
Thus it will be possible to secure 3-5 bombs. After this, the enemy, contradicting find the means to extricate [himself] from the years time for preparation of forces.
the former, said that the raid was made by an impasse and an agreement will be reached on Of course, if the enemy does not in any unidentified plane.
the question of a military demarcation line. way abandon his unfounded proposal, which The enemy dared to make these impu- At the present time we want to use the he is at present insisting on, then we also dent provocations because he considered that period of the break in negotiations for conintend to choose only the path of a schism. our side would not make a breakdown in the ducting a cold war in order to expose the
Having limited materials at our disposal, negotiations over this. He therefore wanted impudent provocational acts of the enemy. the situation has been studied superficially. to use this measure to put pressure on us. However, we suppose that the enemy will We urgently ask your instructions for future Of course, it is possible (that it was a not openly acknowledge his provocations. actions.
South Korean secret service plan to break up If after some period of time the situation LI KENONG12.8.51 4:00." the negotiations, but the possibility is ex- will develop so that the enemy wishes to MAO ZEDONG
cluded that Syngmann Rhee could send a renew the negotiations, then we think that at No. 4061
plane to make an attack on Kaesong in the our own initiative we can propose a way
which would lead to a turn in the negotia- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
We agree with your evaluation of the tions and to force the enemy to agree with
present condition of the negotiations in this.
All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), Kaesong and with your line on the necessity Comrade Kim Il Sung suggests for the CENTRAL COMMITTEE
of getting a satisfactory answer on the quespurpose of securing the neutral zone at No. P83/280
tion of the incident provoked by the AmeriKaesong to ask representatives of neutral 28 August 1951 Copies: Malenkov, cans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. states to participate at the conference as Molotov, Vyshinsky, Vasilevsky
As before, with regard to this we will proceed monitors and witnesses for the period of Excerpt from protocol No. 83 of meeting of from the fact that the Americans have greater negotiations, as a necessary condition for the Politburo CC VKP(b) (Central Commit- need to continue the negotiations. the resumption of the negotiations. More- tee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)] We do not see the use in inviting, acover, these representatives can be used in the
Decision of 28 August 1951 cording to your initiative, representatives of future as a control organ for the implemen- 280. Telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong neutral states to participate in the negotiatation of the ceasefire. of 27 August (No. 4279)
tions as monitors and witnesses during the How do you view this? Do you con- To adopt the attached draft answer of present period of negotiations. The negative sider this necessary or do you have a better
Comrade Filippov to Comrade Mao Zedong. side of this proposal is that the Americans way? I ask your orders on the above.
will view it as an indication) that the ChiWith greetings. Mao Zedong.
To p.280(op) pr.PB No. 83 nese Korean side has more need quickly to
reach an agreement about an armistice than (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, BEIJING
do the Americans. If you are of such an Listy 86-88 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis TO KRASOVSKY
opinion on this question, then you must com5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 51-53] For transmission to MAO ZEDONG
municate this to Comrade Kim Il Sung. “Comrade Mao Zedong!
FILIPPOV (Stalin)." 89.28 August 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo We received your telegram of August decision with approved message from 27.
(Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,
THE SHTYKOV DIARIES: Soviet Union who participated in the found- full member of the Central Committee of the NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET ing of the North Korean regime have pub- CPSU (1956-61); and four times RepresenPOLICY IN KOREA
lished accounts, among them Gen. Kirill tative to the Supreme Soviet. He also
Meretskov, the Commander of the Maritime received numerous decorations, including by Hyun-su Jeon
Military District (1971); Gen. Ivan the Lenin medal (three times) and the firstwith Gyoo Kahng
Chistiakov, Commander of the Soviet 25th degree Kutuzov medal (three times).5
Army in North Korea until April 1947 (1975); Shtykov started writing his memoirs in From the time of his appointment as Lebedev (1976); I. Kravtsov, Special Aide to his last years but a fatal heart attack in 1964 Member of the Military Council of the Shtykov (1951); and V. Petukhov, a Soviet halted the writing. He was not only a USSR's Maritime (Far Eastern] Military Foreign Ministry official (1987). Although vigorous political activist but an ardent reDistrict in the summer of 1945, until early these accounts are important sources for un- corder, almost an archivist. He kept numer1951, when he was summoned to Moscow, derstanding the period, they all try more or ous diaries from 1938, when he became the Gen. Terentii Fomich Shtykov played the less to reproduce the “myth" that the Soviet Second Secretary of the Leningrad party key role in planning and executing Soviet Army “liberated" North Korea. What makes committee, until his death; 60 volumes surforeign policy in Korea. According to Gen. Shtykov's diaries so significant is that they, vive, each containing roughly 100-200 pages. Nikolai Georgievich Lebedev, the Director unlike the writings of the others who worked Such record keeping was quite unusual in of the Soviet Civil Administration in North with him, provide candid and vivid pictures the Soviet Union, as many people were reKorea from the autumn of 1947, “there was of the Soviet occupation period.
luctant to keep private records for fear of not an event in which Shtykov was not Shtykov started his political career in frequent political purges.7 Shtykov also involved."! Recently, it has emerged that 1938 as the Second Secretary of the Leningrad kept other official documents and pictures: Shtykov kept personal diaries and that these Communist party committee. He was as a photo collector, he kept thousands of were in the possession of his son, Viktor Zhdanov's faithful protege 2 After 1938, he pictures; he also saved letters, reports, and Terentevich Shtykov, who lives in St. Pe- served as Member of the Military Council of telegrams which he wrote or were sent to tersburg. Although, unfortunately, the dia- the 7th Army during the Winter War in him; he even kept some newspaper scraps. ries for some years are missing, they consti- Finland (1939-40); Member of the Military Thus his diaries open for us a new horizon in tute an important new primary source for Council of the Maritime Military District studying Soviet policy in Korea after 1945. scholars of Soviet-Korean relations in the (1945-47); Deputy Commander of Political Unfortunately, however, only a portion period from the end of World War II to the Affairs of the Maritime Military District of his diaries covering the period when he onset of the Korean War, and of other issues (1947-48); the first Soviet Plenipotentiary was in charge of Korean affairs exists. For with which Shtykov was involved.
Ambassador to North Korea (1948-51)3; the entire period 1945-1951 only four volSince 1960, many individuals from the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary (1959-61);
continued on page 92
Listy 4-5 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 1. Advisers for the staff of the volunteer If you agree with this decision of ours, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 54-55) The telegram troops: in all nine persons, including: Main then General of the Army Zakharov can was sent to Beijing on August 29 (APRF, adviser - 1, adviser of the chief of staff - 1, depart soon for Beijing for further movement Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 89) adviser on operational questions - 1, adviser to the location of the staff of the Volunteer on intelligence - 1, adviser on communica
troops in Korea. 90. 30 August 1951, ciphered telegram, tions - 1, adviser on the rear - 1, adviser on
FILIPPOV (Stalin)." Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
VOSO (voennye soobshcheniie, military 3-ae.
communications] -1, adviser on artillery - 1, 10.IX.51 SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET (samokhodnym ustanovkam] -1, adviser on (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, ARMY engineering matters - 1.
List 109) CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23397 2. Advisers for the five armies: in all 10 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, persons. Two advisers to each army, specifi- 93.14 November 1951, ciphered telegram, Bulganin
cally: adviser of the command of the army Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951 and jointly adviser of the chief of staff of the SERIES “G” T
army -1, adviser on operational questions - 1. SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin]
3. Advisers for twenty one corps: in all THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Comrade FILIPPOV.
83 persons. Three persons in each corps, ARMY I received your telegram of 29.8.1951. I specifically: adviser of the command of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25902 agree that it is not advisable to take the corps and jointly adviser of the chief of staff Copies: Stalin (2) initiative in inviting representatives of neu- - 1, adviser on artillery -1, adviser on tanks From BEIJING Received 13:40 tral states as monitors and witnesses at the and self-propelled guns -1. It is hoped that 14.11.1951 present stage of the negotiations. the aforementioned advisers be sent to Korea
SERIES “G” T. I have already communicated about this through Beijing in September and October
To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin] to Comrade KIM IL SUNG. 1951.
I ask you to study this question and After the resumption of negotiations for No. 4358 communicate your decision.
cessation of military operations in Korea, in 30.8.51
view of the large losses at the front over the MAO ZEDONG
last two months and the increase in demands (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, No. 4492
within America and outside its borders for List 97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 8.9.51
cessation of military operations, the possibilDelo 5, Papka 11, List 56)
ity of the American side accepting the condi(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, tions for an armistice has increased. HowListy 98-99]
ever, at the same time, taking into account 91. 8 September 1951, ciphered telegram,
internal and external politics, the American Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
92.10 September 1951, ciphered telegram, government is still trying to keep the internaFilippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
tional situation tense, and therefore the AmeriSECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
cans, while actively engaged in spying and THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET BEIJING
carrying out a policy of an advance in the ARMY
To Comrade KRASOVSKY course of the negotiations, are trying to drag CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23703
for Comrade Mao Zedong
out the negotiations. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, “Comrade Mao Zedong!
The main question in the negotiations is Bulganin
We have received your telegram of 8 the determination of the demarcation line. In From BEIJING Received 16:20 September.
place of the demand for designation of the 8.9.1951
We agree to send a main military adviser demarcation line deep in the rear of our SERIES “G” T
and a group of military specialists as military troops, the enemy has proposed to designate To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin) advisers attached to the staff of the Volunteer it on the basis of the present line of the front, Comrade FILIPPOV! troops in Korea.
with some alterations and with the inclusion In my telegram to you of 27.8 of this We consider it advisable to resolve the of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone. year I communicated to you that we intend to question of sending military advisers to the At present the enemy is already deask the Soviet Government to send its mili- armies and corps after the main military manding the designation of the line in fact tary advisers for work among the troops of adviser familiarizes himself with the situa- contiguous with the line of the troops at the the Chinese volunteers in Korea.
tion on location and presents his consider- time of the signing of an agreement on cessaAfter studying this question and con- ations on this question.
tion of military operations as the demarcasulting with the Main Military Adviser Com- As main military adviser for the staff of tion line without the inclusion of the region rade Krasovsky, we consider that it is neces- the Volunteer troops in Korea we could send of Kaesong in the buffer zone. sary to invite 83 advisers: General of the Army Zakharov.
insisting on the cessation of military opera