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which would lead to a turn in the negotia- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
tions and to force the enemy to agree with
this.

Comrade Kim Il Sung suggests for the purpose of securing the neutral zone at Kaesong to ask representatives of neutral states to participate at the conference as monitors and witnesses for the period of negotiations, as a necessary condition for the resumption of the negotiations. Moreover, these representatives can be used in the future as a control organ for the implementation of the ceasefire.

How do you view this? Do you consider this necessary or do you have a better way? I ask your orders on the above. With greetings. Mao Zedong.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 86-88 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 51-53]

89.28 August 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from

THE SHTYKOV DIARIES: NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET POLICY IN KOREA

by Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng

From the time of his appointment as Member of the Military Council of the USSR's Maritime [Far Eastern] Military District in the summer of 1945, until early 1951, when he was summoned to Moscow, Gen. Terentii Fomich Shtykov played the key role in planning and executing Soviet foreign policy in Korea. According to Gen. Nikolai Georgievich Lebedev, the Director of the Soviet Civil Administration in North Korea from the autumn of 1947, "there was not an event in which Shtykov was not involved." Recently, it has emerged that Shtykov kept personal diaries and that these were in the possession of his son, Viktor Terentevich Shtykov, who lives in St. Petersburg. Although, unfortunately, the diaries for some years are missing, they constitute an important new primary source for scholars of Soviet-Korean relations in the period from the end of World War II to the onset of the Korean War, and of other issues with which Shtykov was involved.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations in

All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), Kaesong and with your line on the necessity

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P83/280

Malenkov,

28 August 1951 Copies:
Molotov, Vyshinsky, Vasilevsky
Excerpt from protocol No. 83 of meeting of
the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Commit-
tee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]
Decision of 28 August 1951
280. Telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong
of 27 August (No. 4279)

To adopt the attached draft answer of
Comrade Filippov to Comrade Mao Zedong.
SECRETARY CC
To p.280(op) pr.PB No. 83
TOP SECRET

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Soviet Union who participated in the found-
ing of the North Korean regime have pub-
lished accounts, among them Gen. Kirill
Meretskov, the Commander of the Maritime
Military District (1971); Gen. Ivan
Chistiakov, Commander of the Soviet 25th
Army in North Korea until April 1947 (1975);
Lebedev (1976); I. Kravtsov, Special Aide to
Shtykov (1951); and V. Petukhov, a Soviet
Foreign Ministry official (1987). Although
these accounts are important sources for un-
derstanding the period, they all try more or
less to reproduce the "myth" that the Soviet
Army "liberated" North Korea. What makes
Shtykov's diaries so significant is that they,
unlike the writings of the others who worked
with him, provide candid and vivid pictures
of the Soviet occupation period.

Shtykov started his political career in 1938 as the Second Secretary of the Leningrad Communist party committee. He was Zhdanov's faithful protege.2 After 1938, he served as Member of the Military Council of the 7th Army during the Winter War in Finland (1939-40); Member of the Military Council of the Maritime Military District (1945-47); Deputy Commander of Political Affairs of the Maritime Military District (1947-48); the first Soviet Plenipotentiary Ambassador to North Korea (1948-51)3; Since 1960, many individuals from the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary (1959-61);

of getting a satisfactory answer on the question of the incident provoked by the Americans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. As before, with regard to this we will proceed from the fact that the Americans have greater need to continue the negotiations.

We do not see the use in inviting, according to your initiative, representatives of neutral states to participate in the negotiations as monitors and witnesses during the present period of negotiations. The negative side of this proposal is that the Americans will view it as [an indication] that the Chinese-Korean side has more need quickly to reach an agreement about an armistice than do the Americans. If you are of such an opinion on this question, then you must communicate this to Comrade Kim Il Sung. FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,

full member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1956-61); and four times Representative to the Supreme Soviet.4 He also received numerous decorations, including the Lenin medal (three times) and the firstdegree Kutuzov medal (three times).5

Shtykov started writing his memoirs in his last years but a fatal heart attack in 1964 halted the writing.6 He was not only a vigorous political activist but an ardent recorder, almost an archivist. He kept numerous diaries from 1938, when he became the Second Secretary of the Leningrad party committee, until his death; 60 volumes survive, each containing roughly 100-200 pages. Such record keeping was quite unusual in the Soviet Union, as many people were reluctant to keep private records for fear of frequent political purges. Shtykov also kept other official documents and pictures: as a photo collector, he kept thousands of pictures; he also saved letters, reports, and telegrams which he wrote or were sent to him; he even kept some newspaper scraps. Thus his diaries open for us a new horizon in studying Soviet policy in Korea after 1945.

Unfortunately, however, only a portion of his diaries covering the period when he was in charge of Korean affairs exists. For the entire period 1945-1951 only four vol

continued on page 92

Listy 4-5 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 54-55] The telegram was sent to Beijing on August 29 [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 89]

90. 30 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23397 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951
SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV.

I received your telegram of 29.8.1951. I agree that it is not advisable to take the initiative in inviting representatives of neutral states as monitors and witnesses at the present stage of the negotiations.

1. Advisers for the staff of the volunteer troops: in all nine persons, including: Main adviser - 1, adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on operational questions - 1, adviser on intelligence - 1, adviser on communications - 1, adviser on the rear - 1, adviser on VOSO [voennye soobshcheniie, military communications] -1, adviser on artillery - 1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns [samokhodnym ustanovkam] -1, adviser on engineering matters - 1.

2. Advisers for the five armies: in all 10 persons. Two advisers to each army, specifically: adviser of the command of the army and jointly adviser of the chief of staff of the army -1, adviser on operational questions -1.

3. Advisers for twenty one corps: in all 83 persons. Three persons in each corps, specifically: adviser of the command of the corps and jointly adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on artillery -1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns -1. It is hoped that the aforementioned advisers be sent to Korea

I have already communicated about this through Beijing in September and October to Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 4358

30.8.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 56]

91. 8 September 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23703 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 16:20 8.9.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] Comrade FILIPPOV!

In my telegram to you of 27.8 of this year I communicated to you that we intend to ask the Soviet Government to send its military advisers for work among the troops of the Chinese volunteers in Korea.

After studying this question and consulting with the Main Military Adviser Comrade Krasovsky, we consider that it is necessary to invite 83 advisers:

1951.

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To Comrade KRASOVSKY
for Comrade Mao Zedong
"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We have received your telegram of 8 September.

We agree to send a main military adviser and a group of military specialists as military advisers attached to the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea.

We consider it advisable to resolve the question of sending military advisers to the armies and corps after the main military adviser familiarizes himself with the situation on location and presents his considerations on this question.

As main military adviser for the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea we could send General of the Army Zakharov.

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To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] Comrade FILIPPOV!

After the resumption of negotiations for cessation of military operations in Korea, in view of the large losses at the front over the last two months and the increase in demands within America and outside its borders for cessation of military operations, the possibility of the American side accepting the conditions for an armistice has increased. However, at the same time, taking into account internal and external politics, the American government is still trying to keep the international situation tense, and therefore the Americans, while actively engaged in spying and carrying out a policy of an advance in the course of the negotiations, are trying to drag out the negotiations.

The main question in the negotiations is the determination of the demarcation line. In place of the demand for designation of the demarcation line deep in the rear of our troops, the enemy has proposed to designate it on the basis of the present line of the front, with some alterations and with the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone.

At present the enemy is already demanding the designation of the line in fact contiguous with the line of the troops at the time of the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations as the demarcation line without the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone. We are insisting on the cessation of military opera

1

tions at the present front line and the designation of the present line contiguous to the troops of both sides as the demarcation line with the introduction of alterations in the line contiguous to troops of both sides in case of alterations of it in the period of the achievement of an agreement on all points of the agenda. At the present time the enemy is fighting with us precisely on this question, but we assume that this fight will not continue for long.

Our proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line and our agreement to set aside the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before the convening of a political conference, was made not only because the present negotiations are negotiations about cessation of military operations and [because] the enemy will not in any case want to exchange eastern mountainous regions to the north of the 38th parallel for low-lying regions to the south of the 38th parallel, but also because in case the enemy refuses to leave the eastern mountainous regions we also have mountainous regions there [that are] advantageous for defense; as regards the western coastal plain to the south of the 38th parallel, it is advantageous for us because it has a much greater population than the eastern regions, and furthermore it is rich in agricultural products, plus the region of Kaesong is an advanced post for taking Seoul.

Comrade Kim Il Sung during the discussion of armistice conditions in Beijing in June of this year had the same opinion on this question. This time it also was done with his agreement.

As regards the discussion of the question of monitoring at the negotiations, we earlier suggested to propose to create an organ for cessation of military operations, in which would be included representatives of both sides, and to assign to it the task of monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions of the cessation of military operations and monitoring in the buffer zone.

However, the enemy is sure to demand the establishment of monitoring in the rear of both sides, in order to limit the transport by both sides of reinforcements and military goods.

We intend to agree to the establishment of monitoring at 1 or 2 border points of both sides and in accordance with your instruc

tions to propose to transfer the monitoring functions to neutral states, in other words to states that are not participating in the war. We want to invite three states to fulfill these tasks: the Soviet Union, Poland and India.

It is possible that the Americans will oppose this at the beginning. Then we will oppose this at the beginning. Then we will propose to introduce [as monitors] representatives from Sweden and one state of Latin America.

As regards the exchange of prisoners of war, we will oppose exchange according to the principle of 1 for 1 and will propose exchange according to the principle of return of all prisoners of war by both sides.

I think it will not be difficult to reach agreement on this question.

On the question of the governments of the interested states convening a conference of high level officials, three variants are possible:

1. Convening a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting negotiations. (It is possible that America will propose this variant.)

2. Convening a conference with the participation of four states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England and representatives of North and South Korea.

3. Convening a conference with participation of seven states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England, France, India, Egypt and representatives of North and South Korea.

I ask you, proceeding from the international situation, to give instructions regarding which of the three variants is best or propose a new variant.

At the present time, on the basis of the aforementioned we will achieve cessation of military operations this year. At the same time, we will carry out the necessary preparation in case of a dragging out of the negotiations by the enemy and their breakdown. Expecting that the negotiations will be drawn out for another half year or year, we have moved toward economizing on our human and material forces in the Korean theater of military operations and we are pursuing the tactics of a long, active defense, with the goal of holding the position we presently occupy and inflicting great manpower losses on the enemy, in order to gain victory in the war.

Within the country we are preparing for the reorganization of the army, reduction of the bureaucracy, introduction of a regime of economizing, increasing production and fureconomizing, increasing production and fur

ther strengthening of the campaign to aid Korea and struggle against American imperialism, for the purpose of ensuring the further conduct of the war in Korea, securing also by financial means the stabilization of the scene within the country, and also strengthening state construction and mainly construction of defense.

In the present year, in light of rendering aid to Korea and the struggle against American imperialism, the budget of the Chinese state in comparison with 1950 has increased by 60%. 32% of the total budget is directly being used in the Korean theater of military operations. (Military credit extended to us by the Soviet Government is not included in this calculation.)

Thus, if a regime of economizing is not introduced now, in the next year the budget will increase even more, which inevitably will have an influence on finances and lead to a great rise in the prices of goods, which in turn will create difficulties at the front, and also in the area of construction in the rear. It is true that achieving peace as a result of the negotiations is advantageous for us, but we also are not afraid of dragging out the negotiations. Acting thus, we will surely be able to achieve victory. At the same time we will be able successfully to carry out various measures within the country and secure stabilization and further development in the area of politics and the economy.

I ask your instructions on the above.
MAO ZEDONG

No. 5631 14.11.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 16-19]

94. 19 November 1951, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

Ciphered Telegram

Copies: Stalin (2), Copy
From BEIJING 17:1019/XI.1951
Special No. 1821

TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL

19 November at 18 hours Beijing time I was invited to visit Zhou Enlai, who asked me to transmit to Comrade Filippov the request of Mao Zedong to give an answer to the telegram of Mao Zedong to Comrade Filippov [Stalin] on the question of negotiations in

Korea, which was transmitted to the Center on 14 November through Krasovsky.

Zhou Enlai acquainted me with the telegram and added that while awaiting the reply of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had already twice declined to meet with American representatives in Korea.

19.XI.51 ROSHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62]

95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/421

19 November 1951 Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko, Vasilevsky Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]

Decision of 19 November 1951

421. Telegram of Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

To adopt the attached draft answer of Comrade Filippov to the telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea. SECRETARY CC

BEIJING

To p.421 (op) pr.PB No.84 Top Secret

TO KRASOVSKY

not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.

We consider your position on the definition of the line of demarcation and the establishment of monitoring in one or two border points to be correct. We also agree with you about the composition of the commission for the fulfillment of monitoring functions.

Your position on the question of an exchange of prisoners of war is completely correct and it will be difficult for the opponent to dispute it.

As regards the possible variants of convening a conference for the further resolution of the Korean question after the conclusion of an armistice, it seems to us that it would be more expedient to convene a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting the negotiations, with the obligatory participation of representatives of North and South Korea.

19 November 1951

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828 [9], Listy 42-43 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 64] A copy of the telegram sent to Beijing in found in [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 23]

96. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/422 Copies: Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko 19 November 1951

For transmission to Comrade MAO Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting ZEDONG. of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]

"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram on the questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations.

The entire course of the negotiations for some time past shows that although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations, they nonetheless are more in need of rapidly concluding them. This is based on the overall international situation.

We consider it correct that the Chinese/ Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line,

Decision of 19 November 1951 422. Telegram of Comrade Razuvaev No. 1352.

To adopt the attached draft instruction to Comrade Razuvaev.

SECRETARY CC

To p.422(op) pr.PB No. 84
Top Secret
Top Priority

NORTH KOREA TO RAZUVAEV

1352. From your telegram it is not clear in connection with what and on whose initiative the question arose about an appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and the Security Council with a demand concerning a speeding up of the resolution of the Korean question. It is also not clear how the Chinese friends regard this, since you do not communicate anything about this in your telegram.

An appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as it is set forth in your telegram: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops along the front line and the creation of a two kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could be evaluated in the present situation, in conditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean side, which is politically disadvantageous. Therefore, not having the text of the appeal, not knowing the opinion of the Chinese comrades and not knowing the motives which are guiding the Korean friends, we consider it necessary that you advise the Korean friends to set aside resolution of the question of an appeal until the elucidation of the aforementioned questions.

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appeal of the Korean friends to the UN on the question of speeding up a peace settlement in Korea.

You communicated only on 18 November (your No. [number is illegible]) about the intention of the Korean friends to put forth an appeal to the General Assembly and the Security Council with demands: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops from the front line and creation of a 2kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea-asking if such an appeal would contradict the statement of Comrade Vyshinsky.

Since we knew nothing about the proposed appeal of the Korean friends with a statement of the indicated demands, or at whose initiative arose the question of putting these demands before the UN, we asked you to elucidate (our No. 1059).

Without waiting for an answer to your telegram, in which were laid out the demands of the Korean friends mentioned above, you informed us (Your No. 1353 of 19 November), that on that same day, i.e. 19 November, the text of the statement by Pak Hon-Yong will be transmitted over the radio. Moreover, after receipt of our inquiry (our No. 1059), on the question of the indicated demands of the Korean friends you limited yourself only to a report that you had raised the question at your own initiative and to a repetition of the question of whether there is a discrepancy between the proposals of Comrade Vyshinsky about withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel and agreement in Kaesong to the point of the agenda about the establishment of a demarcation line. Concerning the appeal, you also only reported that it would be announced 19 November.

Thus, both in telegram No. 1353 of 19 November and in telegram No. 1355 of 19 November, you informed us that the Korean friends will announce their appeal, even though at that time you did not have instructions from us and could not yet have received an answer to your inquiry. As a result the Korean friends made the appeal without agreement with us.

In that way you acted inadmissably thoughtlessly. Your guilt is aggravated also by the fact that you did not even take the trouble to find out from the Korean friends whether they had reached agreement with

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Sent 20:50 21.XI.1951
CIPHERED TELEGRAM

To NORTH KOREA

TO RAZUVAEV TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL

On 20 November the following directive from Comrade Filippov [Stalin] was sent to Roshchin:

"Explain to Mao Zedong and also to Kim Il Sung through Razuvaev, that there is indeed a difference between Vyshinsky's demand about the immediate withdrawal of USA troops across the 38th parallel and the present position of the Chinese-Korean comrades about the delineation of the demarcation line at the present front line. Vyshinsky could not speak otherwise in order to demonstrate the injustice of the USA position of refusing to withdraw their troops beyond the 38th parallel. Vyshinsky's position is advantageous to the Chinese-Korean comrades, since it demonstrates from one side the greediness of the Americans and from the other side the tractability and peaceableness of the Chinese-Korean comrades, who are making serious concessions for the sake of achieving peace."

In view of the fact that Comrade Roshchin does not have communications with you and therefore cannot fulfill through you the order about transmitting to Kim Il Sung the elucidation given in the directive of Comrade Filippov, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is sending the directive to you. Confirm receipt.

Immediately telegraph the fulfillment.
21.XI.51 GROMYKO

21.XI.51
Copies: Stalin, Copy

the Chinese friends about the appeal to the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348,

Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, opis 5a, Delo 5, papka 11, Listy 67-68]

99. 25 December 1951, memorandum, Gromyko to Razuvaev

To Comrade STALIN I.V. According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, reports have been published lately in French and American newspapers in Paris which underscore the inevitability of a breakdown in the peace negotiations in Korea and the possibility of broadening the Korean conflict and which lay the responsibility for this on the Korean-Chinese side (telegram No. 812).

In connection with this, Comrade Vyshinsky is introducing a proposal that by the time the period for agreement about a demarcation line [expires], i.e. by 27 December, the Korean-Chinese command publish a communiqué about the course of the negotiations with an exposure of the position of the Americans, which is aimed at drawing out and breaking down the negotiations for an armistice in Korea. In the opinion of Vyshinsky, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] DPRK should send such a communiqué to the chairman of the General Assembly of the UN with a request to publish it as a document of the UN and to send it to all the delegations in the Assembly session.

MID USSR considers the above indicated reports of the French and American newspapers as blackmail, done for the purpose of putting pressure on the Korean-Chinese side.

As regards the communiqué proposed by Vyshinsky, in the opinion of MID, it is scarcely necessary to give advice to the Koreans and Chinese on this account, since they systematically publish reports which disclose the line taken by the Americans in the negotiations about an armistice in Korea. From the other side, the distribution of a Korean-Chinese communiqué as a document of the UN will not give any practical results, and a request from the Koreans and Chinese about this can be evaluated as a sign of their weakness.

In view of this, MID considers that to give any kind of advice to the Korean and Chinese governments regarding the communiqué is inadvisable.

A draft resolution is attached.

I ask you to review.

A. Gromyko

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