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cant strengthening of North Korea. But subsequently Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, where some kind of agreement was reached, about which no one considered it necessary to consult with us beforehand. It should be noted, said Mao Zedong, that there was a serious miscalculation in the Korean war about the supposed impossibility of intervention of international forces on the side of South Korea...

P. YUDIN

Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for ci- People's Republic of China
phered telegrams

Gao Gang, Head of the Northeast Bureau of
the Chinese Communist Party

Shabshin, A.I., former Soviet Vice-Consul

in Seoul, 1940-46, became deputy to Political Adviser in North Korea

Gromyko, A.A., First Deputy Minister of Shtemenko, S.M., Chief of the General Staff
Foreign Affairs, USSR

Jiang Jieshi, (Chiang Kai-shek in Wade-
Giles spelling) leader of Chinese Nationalist
Party who established a rival government in
Taiwan in after being driven out of mainland
China by the PLA in 1949
Kaganovich, L.M., Deputy Premier of USSR

[Source: APRF, List 157, Fond, Opis and Kim Ch'aek, Deputy Commander of Korean Delo not given]

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRF Archive of the President, Russian Federation

AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation

CC Central Committee (of a communist party)

CCP Chinese Communist Party
CPV Chinese People's Volunteers (the
designation given PLA units sent to fight in
Korea)

People's Army

Kim Tu-bong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party Li Kenong, Director of Military Intelligence and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, PRC, head of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations

Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force, PRC

Malenkov, G.M., Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR

Malik, Ia., Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations

Mao Zedong, (Mao Tse-tung in Wade-Giles DPRK Democratic People's Republic of spelling), supreme leader of Chinese Com

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MID Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

munist Party

Matveev, pseudonym used by M.V.Zakharov Mikoyan, A.I., Minister of Foreign Trade, USSR

Molotov, V.M., replaced as Minister of For

PLA People's Liberation Army (Army eign Affairs 1949, remained deputy chairof the PRC)

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Beria, L.A., Minister of State Security, USSR Belov, General M. Chief of Staff for Soviet

man of Council of Ministers, USSR, until restored to Foreign Minister's post following Stalin's death in March 1953

Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff
of People's Liberation Army
Pak Hon-Yong, Foreign Minister of Korean
People's Democratic Republic

Pak II U, Minister of Internal Affairs, DPRK, named by Mao Zedong as deputy commander and deputy political commissar of Chinese People's Volunteers

of the Soviet Armed Forces

Shtykov, T.F., Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK until December 1950

Tsarapkin, S.K., Member of Soviet delegation to United Nations, had served as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Korea 1946-48

Vasiliev, Major General, Head of Soviet Military Advisory Group in DPRK Vasilevsky, A.M., Minister of War, USSR Vyshinsky, A.Ia., Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR

Wu, General Xiu-quan, Head of special delegation to the United Nations from the People's Republic of China in December 1950

Xiao, Jinguang, Commander of the Navy of the People's Republic of China

Xie, Fang, Chief of Staff, Chinese People's
Volunteers

Zakharov, General Matvei Vasilievich,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the
Soviet Armed Forces, Head of Special Mili-
tary Mission to North Korea (pseud. Matveev)
Zakharov, Semen Egorovich, Corps Com-
missar sent to Beijing during Korean War as
Stalin's personal military envoy
Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of People's
Republic of China

Kathryn Weathersby, Assistant Professor of History, Florida State University (Tallahassee), is working on a book on the Soviet Union and the Korean War. She contributed articles on new Russian archival evidence on the Korean War to CWIHP Bulletins 3 (Fall 1993) and 5 (Spring 1995) and authored CWIHP

First Air Army, Commander of 64th Fighter Peng Dehuai, Commander of Chinese Working Paper No. 8 on "Soviet Aims in

Air Corps

Bulganin, N.A., Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, USSR

Deng Hua, Commander of the 13th Army Corps of the People's Liberation Army, in June 1951 became Acting CPV Commander and Political Commissar

Fedorenko, N.T., diplomat and interpreter at the Soviet embassy in Beijing Filippov, pseudonym used by Stalin for ciphered telegrams

People's Volunteers in Korea

Qiao Guanhua, Director of the Press Bureau, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations Razuvaev, V.N., USSR Ambassador to DPRK following Shtykov's dismissal in December 1950

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, April 1951 appointed Commander of U.S. Eighth Army in Korea

Roshchin, N.V., Soviet Ambassador to the

Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives."

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CHINA'S ROAD continued from page 41

The reexamination of the Korean case led me into a broader question concerning the proper understanding not only of Communist China's foreign policy but also, probably, that of any sovereign country: is it appropriate to comprehend the foreign policy behavior of a country, especially one that had historically viewed itself as the "Middle Kingdom," as totally reactive and without its own consistent inner logic? The assumptions underlying most of the existing scholR arship on China's entrance into the Korean War, though seemingly critical of Washington's management of the Korean crisis, emerge ironically as American-centered in a methodological sense. Lacking a real understanding of the logic, dynamics, goals, and means of Communist China's foreign policy, they treat Beijing's management of the Korean crisis simply as a passive reaction to the policy of the United States. They thus imply that American policy is the source of all virtues as well as evils in the world-if something went wrong somewhere, it must have been the result of a mistake committed by the United States. It was time to rethink Beijing's entrance into the Korean War.

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My study, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), retraces China's path to involvement in the Korean War with insight gained from recently released Chinese materials. It argues that China's entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border. To comprehend China's decision to enter the war, one must first examine the CCP leaders' perception of China's security interests and their judgment of to what extent and in which ways such interests had been challenged during the Korean crisis. This examination requires an extended analysis of a variety of basic factors shaping the CCP leadership's understanding of China's external relations. Among these factors, the most important ones include CCP leaders' perception of the outside world and China's position in it, the nature and goals of the Chinese Communist revolution and their impact on the CCP's security strategy and foreign policy, the influence of the CCP's domestic policies on

the party's foreign behavior, and the leverage of historical-cultural factors (such as the Chinese emphasis of the moral aspect of China's external relations, Chinese ethnocentrism, and Chinese universalism) upon Mao and the CCP leadership. Only with a better understanding of the logic and dynamics of the CCP's outlook is it possible to reconstruct the interactions that led China and the United States into a major confrontation in Korea.6

My three-part study begins with an analysis of Communist China as an emerging revolutionary power. Focusing on the pre-1949 period, I first discuss the domestic sources of the CCP's foreign policy, the party leadership's perception of the outside world and China's position in it, and Mao's central role in the CCP's policy-making structure. The second part explains how the conflict between the CCP and the United States escalated and the strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow developed in 1949 and the first half of 1950: On the eve of the Korean War, Beijing and Washington had perceived each other as a dangerous enemy, and the stage for SinoAmerican confrontation had been set. The third part examines Beijing's management of the Korean crisis from late June to midOctober 1950, focusing on how the decision to enter the war was made and how it withstood both internal and external tests. Emphasizing that Beijing's decision to enter the war was based on the belief that the outcome

of the Korean crisis was closely related to

the new China's vital domestic and international interests, I argue that there was little possibility that China's entrance into the Korean War could have been averted.

A note on the Chinese sources used in this study is appropriate here. Since the mid1980s, thanks to China's reform and opening policies, many fresh and meaningful materials concerning China's entry into the Korean War have been released, which offer the basis for this study. These new sources include personal memoirs by those who were involved in Beijing's intervention in Korea, scholarly articles and monographs by Chinese researchers with archival accesses,8 official academic publications using classified documents, openly or internally published collections of CCP Central Committee's and regional bureaus' documents, 10 and the internally and openly published collections of Mao Zedong's papers.11

While it is apparent that these sources have created new opportunities for fresh studies, it is also clear that they were released on a selective basis and, sometimes, for purposes other than a desire to have the truth known. Indeed, unless scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese, are offered free and equal access to the original historical documentation, there is always the possibility that a study might be misled by its incomplete databases. Fully aware of this danger, I have made every effort to doublecheck my citations as much as possible (such as checking documents with information from interviews, and vice versa, and comparing Chinese materials with non-Chinese ones). Wherever necessary, I pointed out what I consider to be dubious sources in the notes.

My study was also based on my four research trips to China respectively in 1987, 1991, 1992, and 1993. During these trips I established and updated my research databases, and interviewed those who were involved in Beijing's policy-making during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and those who have access to classified CCP documents (because of the political sensitivity involved in the issues under discussion, unless authorized by the interviewees, I do not identify their names, but I restrict myself to using unidentified interviews only when absolutely necessary). I have not been able to get close to Beijing's CCP Central Archives (which, by the way, is located in the city's remote western suburb). But by a combination of effort and good luck, I gained access to some important classified documents (including correspondences and telegrams of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other CCP leaders, and a few minutes of CCP leaders' decision-making conferences) for the 1948-1950 period. To balance the need to protect my sources with the general practice of Western scholarship, I cite them in my book by pointing out their forms (telegram, correspondence, or minute), dates, and where their originals are maintained (the Chinese Central Archives or Chinese Military Archives). I believe that this is the best one can do in the current circumstances. It is my hope that China, my motherland, will follow the internationally accepted practice of declassifying historical documents on a legal basis, so that all researchers, including myself, will soon be able to get free access to them.

1. Except for a few books written by journalists, such as Isidor F. Stone's The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), this approach dominated the study of the origins of the Korean War in the 1950s and part of the 1960s. See, e.g., Robert T. Oliver, Why War Came in Korea (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950); Philip E. Mosley, "Soviet Policy and the War," Journal of International Affairs 6 (Spring 1952), 107-114; Alexander L. George, “American Policy Making and the North Korean Aggression," World Politics 7:2 (January 1955), 209-232; and Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 555-556. In his classic study of the Korean War, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 18-20, David Rees continued to draw a picture reflecting a well-coordinated Communist plot to start the war. For summaries of various scholarly interpretations of the origins of the Korean War based on the assumption that the North Korean invasion obeyed Moscow's grand strategic design, see Denna F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), 2:605; and Kim Hak-joon, "Approaches and Perspectives to the Origins of War," in War Memorial Service-Korea, comp., The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: Korean War Research Conference Committee, 1990), 1-9. For general historiographical discussions of the origins of the Korean War, see John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsula Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), chap. 1; Philip West, "Interpreting the Korean War," American Historical Review 94:1 (February 1989), 80-96; Rosemary Foot, "Make the Unknown War Known: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15:3 (Summer 1991), 411-431.

2. Truman's statement, 27 June 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), pp. 202-203. 3. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

4. These interpretations are evident in Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 25-62; Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London and New York: Longman, 1986), ix, 189-201; Ronald Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), 45-47; Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 236-238.

5. This approach can be found in a wide range of Chinese publications, such as Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi (History of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), chap. 1; Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1987), 37-38; Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, in "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," The China Quarterly 121 (March 1990) 94-115, attempt to offer an alternative to Whiting's thesis but generally follow Whiting's stress on Beijing's concerns for the safety of the ChineseKorean Border.

6. In a series of recent studies, scholars in the U.S. have begun to use the new Chinese sources. Russell Spurr's Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War against the U.S. in Korea (New York: Newmarket, 1988) was the first one in this regard. Allegedly supported by “information from extensive interviews," this book appears largely based on hearsay and fiction-style imagination. Harrison Salisbury devotes a whole chapter to China's decision to enter the Korean War in his new book, The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), which is based on a few interviews and a haphazard reading of secondary Chinese sources. Lacking corroborating documentary sources, this book contains many errors. The studies by Michael Hunt and Thomas Christensen represent the best efforts to reinterpret China's entrance into the Korean War with the support of new Chinese sources. Hunt, in “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," Political Science Quarterly 107:3 (Fall 1992), 453-478, offers enlightening analyses of Beijing's management of the Korean Crisis and Mao's direction of the CPV's first-year operations in Korea. Christensen, in "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-154, uses Beijing's response to the Korean crisis to challenge the traditional view based on deterrence theory. Also of note is Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), which offers interesting, though sometimes highly speculative, interpretations of the Sino-Soviet alliance and its relation to the origins of the Korean War.

7. The most important ones include Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongjun, Banmendian tanpan (The Panmunjom Negotiations, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1989; second edition, 1992); Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu: Du Ping huiyilu (My Days at the Headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteers: Du Ping's Memoirs, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1988); Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi (Recollections of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Literature Press, 1990); Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu (Nie Rongzhen's Memoirs, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1986); and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu (Together with Historical Giants: Shi Zhe's Memoirs, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1991).

8. For example, Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu (The Inside Story of the Decision-making during the Korean War, Liaoning: Liaoning University Press, 1991); Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang: kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng de lishi huigu yu fansi (The First Test of Strength: A Historical Review and Evaluation of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea, Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Press, 1990); Yao Xu, Cong yalujiang dao banmendian (From the Yalu River to Panmunjom, Beijing: People's Press, 1985); and Zhang Xi, "Before and After Peng Dehuai's Appointment to Command Troops in Korea," Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (Materials of the CCP History) 31 (1989), 111159.

9. Good examples in this category include Tan Jingqiao et al., Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng (The War to Resist America and Assist Korea, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1990); and Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingqiao et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo (The Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 2 vols. Both volumes are part of the "Contemporary China”

series.

10. The most useful ones include Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Reference Materials for Teaching CCP History, Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1986), vols. 18-19 (1945-1953); Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee, first edition, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1983-1987), 14 vols. Both collections were published for "internal circulation" only. An open and generally enlarged version of the second collection has been published in 1989-1992, but a few important documents are not included. 11. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong, Beijing: Soldiers' Press, 1981); and Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987, 1989), vol. 1, September 1949-December 1950, and vol. 2, January 1951-December 1951. Both collections are "for internal circulation" only. Also useful are the openly published Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers, 6 vols., Beijing: Military Science Press and the Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993), and Pang Xianzhi et al., Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893-1949 (A Chronology of Mao Zedong, 1893-1949, 3 vols., Beijing: People's Press and the Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993).

Chen Jian is Associate Professor of History at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. This article is adapted from the introduction to his China's Road to the Korean War; The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

WILSON CENTER ASIA PROGRAM BOOK ON CCP FOREIGN RELATIONS The Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars has published a compilation of articles on CCP foreign relations, revised versions of papers originally prepared for a 7-9 July 1992 international academic conference at the Wilson Center. Toward a History of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches, edited by Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, contains: Niu Jun, "The Origins of Mao Zedong's Thinking on International Affairs (19161949); He Di, "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States"; Zhang Baija, "Zhou Enlai-The Shaper and Founder of China's Diplomacy"; Chen Xiaolu, "Chen Yi and China's Diplomacy"; Odd Arne Westad, “The Foreign Policies of Revolutionary Parties: The CCP in a Comparative Perspective"; Jurgen Osterhammel, "CCP Foreign Policy as International History: Mapping the Field”; Michael H. Hunt, "CCP Foreign Policy: 'Normalizing' the Field".

For information on obtaining copies, contact the Asia Program, Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560 USA; tel.: (202) 357-1937; fax: (202) 357-4439; e-mail: lizhao@sivm.si.edu

BAJANOV

continued from page 54

the withdrawal of American troops from Korea, the 38th parallel lost its meaning; e) a counterattack was no longer possible since Seoul postponed its plans for an overall offensive against the North.6

Finally Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending, on 11 September 1949, instructions to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, political, and international aspects of a possible attack on the South. The embassy gave a negative view on the matter (14 September 1949), and on 24 September 1949, the CPSU CC Politburo rejected the appeal of the North Koreans to start the war, concluding that the North Korean army was not prepared for such an attack militarily, that "little has been done to raise the South Korean masses to an active struggle," and that an unprovoked attack by the North "would give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs.”7

As can be seen from this Politburo docu

ment, Moscow no longer flatly rejected the idea of military reunification of Korea. Instead it called upon Pyongyang to get better prepared for the operation. Evidently couraged by this shift in the Kremlin's mood, the North Korean leadership increased pressure to win Soviet support for the war. On 17 January 1950, Kim Il Sung complained to Soviet ambassador Shtykov: "I can't sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the cause... is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people." Kim Il Sung requested permission to make a new visit to the USSR to receive "orders and permission" from Stalin for the offensive.8

3. Stalin blesses the invasion

After ambassador Shtykov informed Moscow of this wave of demands by Pyongyang, Stalin (on 30 January 1950) replied (through diplomatic channels): "I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea... requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him.... I am prepared to help him in this matter."9

So, Stalin finally took the decision to initiate preparations for the war. At exactly the same time that the above mentioned

exchange of cables between Moscow and Pyongyang took place, Mao Zedong was present in the Soviet capital. Stalin discussed with Mao the Korean situation, but according to all available data the Soviet dictator never mentioned to the Chinese guest his decision to launch an attack on the South as well as his invitation to Kim Il Sung to come to Moscow.

Kim Il Sung and his delegation spent almost the whole of April 1950 in the Soviet Union. The first issue on the agenda was: ways and methods of unification of Korea through military means. 10 Stalin gave his approval to an invasion of the South and

outlined his view on how the war had to be prepared. Unfortunately, memorandums of conversations between Stalin and Kim in April 1950 have not been found as yet in the Russian archives. However, from some secondary sources (testimonies of people involved in the negotiations, reports of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR) and from earlier and later statements and positions of Moscow and Pyongyang, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Stalin changed his mind on the Korean war because of: a) the victory of the communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb (first tested by Moscow in August 1949); c) the establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West; and d) a perceived weakening of Washington's positions and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia.

Stalin was now more confident of the Communist bloc's strength, less respectful of American capabilities and less interested in the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves.

2. Stalin did not consult Mao in advance because he wanted to work out the plans for the Korean war himself without Chinese interference and objections and then present Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it. While in Moscow Mao insisted on the liberation of Taiwan. Stalin was negative to the idea. It would be hard for Stalin to convince Mao in Moscow to help the Koreans before the Chinese had completed the reunification of their own country.

4. China's position on "liberating" the

South

China was involved in the process of working out communist strategy in Korea in the late 1940s. Basically Mao supported Kim's desire "to liberate" the South and even promised to help with troops if necessary. Mao, however, recommended not to hurry things up, to wait until the Chinese completed their revolutionary war.

In the beginning of May 1949, North Korean Politburo member Kim Il had meetings with Chinese leaders. Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that a war in Korea could start at any moment. If the war dragged on, the Japanese could interfere, but this was not a reason for worry. Mao pointed out: "If necessary, we can throw in for you Chinese soldiers, all of us are black, Americans will not see the difference." Mao at the same time warned Kim not to advance to the South in the near future. He cited the unfavorable situation in the world and the preoccupation of Chinese communists with the civil war. Mao Zedong recommended to postpone the war until China was united under the leadership of the Communist party.11

In the end of March 1950, Mao Zedong, talking to the North Korean ambassador, stressed that peaceful unification in Korea was impossible, it was necessary to employ military means. Mao said one should not be afraid of Americans because "they would not start a third world war over such a small territory."12

After completion of Kim Il Sung's April 1950 visit to the USSR, of which Mao seemed to know nothing, Stalin authorized the Soviet ambassador in China to tell the Chinese leadership the following: "Korean comrades visited us recently. I'll inform you shortly about the results of our conversations."13 Simultaneously Kim Il Sung requested a visit to Beijing to execute Stalin's instructions: to continue with the war plans only if Chinese supported the idea. On the eve of the visit Kim II Sung said to the Soviet ambassador that he did not intend to ask anything from the Chinese since "all his requests had been met in Moscow."14

Upon hearing from Kim Il Sung about the decision to attack South Korea, Mao requested additional information from Stalin. On 14 May 1950 Stalin sent the following cable to Mao Zedong: "In the conversations with Korean comrades Filippov [Stalin's alias] and his friends expressed the opinion

that due to the changed international situation they agreed with the proposals by the Koreans to set upon unification. The final decision of the issue must be made jointly by Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chinese comrades disagree, the decision must be postponed till a new discussion."15

In talks with North Korean leaders Mao approved their analysis of the situation and stressed that he supported a speedy military solution of the Korean problem. He was sure of its success. Mao did not exclude the possibility of American interference. In such an event, China would help.16

5. Preparations for the war

Even before Kim Il Sung received, in January 1950, the first hints from the Kremlin that Stalin had become more favorably disposed to a war in Korea, Pyongyang had embarked upon a concerted effort to upgrade its military potential. Stalin responded positively. After Kim's talks in Moscow in April 1950 the war was energetically prepared by the two sides jointly.

On June 1949 a special protocol was signed between the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) on military-technical assistance. Moscow agreed to supply its ally with large numbers of air force planes, tanks, cannons, landing ships, machine-guns, engineering equipment, etc. 17

At the end of 1949 Kim Il Sung again addressed himself to Moscow a reguest for large quantities of armaments and ammunitions necessary for the creation of new 5 round units and enlargement of the fleet. 18 In March 1950, Kim Il Sung asked to use the Soviet credit allocated for 1951 in 1950 and to acquire additional quantities of military hardware; these requests were met.

In April 1950, leaders of the guerilla movement in the South arrived in Pyongyang to work out a program of action for before and after the invasion. On 12 May 1950, Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassador that his General Staff had already started to plan the operation. Pyongyang wanted to attack in June but was not sure that preparations could be completed by that time.19 By the end of May, the armaments which had been promised by Stalin arrived and the plan of the invasion was ready. Kim Il Sung insisted on an attack in June, not in July as Soviet advisers preferred, arguing that infor

mation about the imminent attack could leak to the South; and that in July rain would slow the advancement of troops.

While making final preparations for the war, the North continued a propaganda campaign, proposing initiatives on the peaceful unification of Korea. Initially the communists wanted to strike at the Ongjin peninsula, but at the last moment the strategy was changed. It was believed that Seoul had learned about the attack and beefed up its defenses in the Ongjin direction. The North Koreans now asked Moscow for permission to attack along the whole front.

Unfortunately the final period (MayJune 1950) before the attack is not well documented, and additional research in the archives is required to get a clearer and more detailed picture of the final preparations by the communist side for the war.

6. The initial stage of the war

Throughout the initial stage of the Korean War Stalin was clearly in charge: his word was final on the date of the invasion, he told the Koreans how to fight and he kept instructing the Sino-Korean command on its every move. As for the mood of both Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was quickly changing for the worse as the adversary hit back harder and harder.

Already on 1 July 1950, Stalin seemed to be worried about a halt in the advancement of North Korean troops and the impact of American air raids on North Korean territory.20 Soviet Ambassador Shtykov admit

ted that American air raids had worsened the political mood in the North. Doubts regarding final victory surfaced and some officials began to hint that it was difficult for Pyongyang to rely purely on its own forces in the war with America.21 Meeting with the Soviet ambassador on July 3, Kim Il Sung confirmed the seriousness of the situation on the front due to American bombing. He wanted Soviet advice on how to reorganize the command of the military actions, and also hoped for new supplies of weapons.

On July 8, Kim Il Sung requested Soviet military advisers in order to strengthen his army. Stalin agreed to provide some of these advisers, but his main preoccupation was to give moral support to Pyongyang. In an August 28 cable to Kim, he emphasized the fact that "the great liberation struggle of the Korean people ... was conducted with bril

liant success," that Kim Il Sung "should not feel embarrassed... because of delays in advancement and because of some local defeats... The biggest success of Korea is that it has become the most popular country in the world and has turned into the banner of the liberation movement in Asia against the imperialist yoke."22 Kim Il Sung expressed deep gratitude to Stalin for this letter, and for "fatherly care and assistance.”23

But the outlook for the North Koreans soured following the successful U.S./UN landing at Inchon in mid-September. On September 27, the Soviet Politburo, frustrated by problems at the front, approved a letter to Ambassador Shtykov which contained devastating criticism of the North Korean military leadership and Soviet military advisers. The letter explained in detail what to do and how to do it in the course of the fighting. With the situation getting more and more complicated for the North Koreans, Stalin, after persistent requests from both Kim Il Sung and Moscow's representatives in Korea, consented to station air force units in the North. Meanwhile, the situation for the communists was becoming desperate.24

The North Korean leadership forwarded on September 30 a letter to Stalin literally begging for direct military assistance by the Soviet Union or "volunteer units of China and other countries of people's democracy."25 Realizing that the situation was desperate, Moscow responded in the following ways: 1) giving constant advice to North Koreans on tactical matters; 2) withdrawing Soviet representatives from Korea; 3) preparing plans for the evacuation of the Pyongyang regime and its troops out of the country; 4) training troops for a comeback to Korea in the future; 5) pressuring the Chinese to enter the conflict.

7. China's role in the war's initial stage

As was mentioned earlier in this paper, China supported an attack on the South. However, quite soon Beijing became distressed and offended by the fact that the North Koreans did not consult with them and did not pay heed to their advice. Moscow attempted to calm the emotions of the Chinese.

On 2 July 1950, Zhou Enlai in a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Roshchin complained that the North Koreans had un

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