網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

derestimated the probability of American military intervention, ignoring Mao Zedong's warnings back in May 1949 and 1950. Zhou passed on Mao's advice to the North Koreans to create a strong defense line in the area of Inchon, because American troops could land there. The Chinese leadership feared landing operations by Americans in other parts of the Korean peninsula as well. In this conversation Zhou Enlai confirmed that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops, disguised as Korean, would engage the opponent. Three Chinese armies, 120,000 men in total, had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden. Zhou inquired if it would be possible to cover these troops with the Soviet air force.26

By July 8, Stalin was already showing a certain irritation with China. In a cable to Ambassador Roshchin he ordered: "Tell Mao Zedong that Koreans complain that there is no representative of China in Korea. They should quickly send a representative... if, of course, Mao Zedong feels it is necessary to have a communication link with Korea."27

On July 13, Stalin approved the Chinese decision to deploy troops in the vicinity of the Korean border and promised to train Chinese pilots and to provide China with military planes. In August-September 1950, on a number of occasions, Mao personally expressed concern over the escalation of American military intervention in Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing to send troops to the Korean Peninsula "to mince" American divisions. Simultaneously the Chinese leaders complained that the North Korean military command had committed many mistakes and ignored Beijing's recommendations. Moreover, Pyongyang did not even inform China of developments on the front.28

On September 20, Stalin in a cable to Mao agreed that it was not normal and correct that the North Korean leadership did not properly inform their Chinese comrades about the development of combat activities in Korea. Stalin, however, defended the Koreans, explaining the aforementioned fact by the lack of proper communications and noting that Moscow too had only received "sporadic and outdated" information from the front. Stalin reminded Mao that the (North) Korean People's Army was very young and inexperienced and it had to fight

against perfectly equipped foreign troops, not simply South Koreans.

In general, Moscow and Beijing held similar views at that time on the strategy and tactics of the war, though with the landing of Americans at Inchon, the mood in China started to change. In a conversation with Roshchin on September 21, Zhou Enlai admitted that there were persons in China who complained that the Korean war would drag on and would require sacrifices on the part of Chinese. It is also significant that China's authorities leaked to the Soviets intelligence information, showing the Kremlin's policy in Korea in a bad light. Thus, at one point Moscow was informed by Beijing that the British consul in the Chinese capital had reached the conclusion that the USSR and the USA had colluded in Korea, trying, with the help of the war there, to prevent China from capturing Taiwan, completing the civil war and becoming a strong power.29

8. Stalin pressures a reluctant China to enter the Korean war

On 1 October 1950, Stalin came to the conclusion that China had to come to the rescue of the collapsing Kim regime. On that day he sent an urgent message to Mao and Zhou asking them "to move to the 38th parallel at least 5-6 divisions in order to give our Korean comrades a chance to organize under the protection of your troops' military reserves to the North of the 38th parallel." Stalin added that Pyongyang was not informed of this request.30 It did not take Mao long to respond to Stalin's cable. Mao declined to fulfill his own promise under the pretext that Chinese troops were not strong enough and a clash between China and the USA would ruin Beijing's plans for peaceful USA would ruin Beijing's plans for peaceful reconstruction and could drag the USSR into a war with Washington. Instead, he suggested that the North Koreans accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics.31

The Soviets were stunned with this unexpected change in China's position. Stalin reminded the Chinese of their previous promises and urged them again to move into the conflict. The Soviet dictator tried to convince Beijing that the Americans would not dare to start a big war and would agree on a settlement on Korea favorable to the communist camp. Under such a scenario China would also solve the Taiwan issue. He added that even if the USA provoked a big war, "let

it take place now rather than a few years later, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an American ally, and when the United States and Japan will possess a military spring-board on the continent in the form of Rhee's Korea."32 Stalin informed Kim Il Sung about his attempts to persuade the Chinese and called upon the North Koreans "to hold firm to every piece of their land." However, on 12 October 1950, the Soviet leader told Kim that the Chinese had refused again and that Korea had to be evacuated. On the next day, however, Stalin had better news: the Chinese, after long deliberations and discussions, had agreed to extend military aid to North Korea. Moscow in exchange agreed to arm the Chinese troops and to provide them with air cover.33

According to available sources, it was not easy for Beijing to adopt that military decision. Two members of the Chinese leadership considered sympathetic to Moscow, Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, finally managed to convince Mao to take their side. Their main argument was: if all of Korea was occupied by the Americans, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution. Those who opposed participation, on the other hand, complained about Soviet refusal to participate in the conflict. Some even suggested that China should accept the American advance, even occupation by the USA of Manchuria-because in this case a war between Moscow and Washington would break out and China could stay away from trouble.

9. Chinese "volunteers" enter the Korean War, the communist camp is euphoric

After the entrance of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean war in late November 1950, the mood of Stalin and Kim Il Sung (as well as that of Mao Zedong, of course) dramatically changed for the better. With every new success of the Chinese on the battlefield the desires and arrogance of Stalin and his allies grew (though they did feel their weak points and exchanged occasional complaints).

On December 1, Stalin cabled Mao: "Your successes make happy not only myself and my comrades in the leadership, but the entire Soviet people. Let me welcome from all my heart you and your friends in the leadership, your army and the entire Chinese people in connection with tremendous suc

cesses in the struggle against American troops."34 On December 4, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, talking to the Chinese Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, advised Beijing to continue its successful offensive by crossing the 38th parallel. He stressed that the Chinese had to exploit the emerging opportunities to the full extent. Both sides agreed that Americans were confused and had fallen into a very unfavorable situation, that disagreements had developed between Washington and London. The Chinese ambassador quoted reports from the front that Americans were poor fighters, much worse than the Japanese."35

On December 7, Stalin and Mao agreed to go on with the fighting and present at the United Nations tough conditions for a ceasefire. On 8 January 1951, in a cable announcing the further advance of Chinese troops, Stalin wrote: "From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades on the capture of Seoul. This is a great victory of popular patriotic forces over forces of reaction."36 On January 16, Mao suggested to Kim Il Sung to reinforce and to restructure joint forces in Korea (in order "not to repeat mistakes committed by the Korean troops from June to September 1950"). After a certain rest, Mao proposed that a spring (April/May) offensive could start "with the purpose of achieving the final solution of the South Korean issue." Mao did not exclude that the Americans, having learned about serious preparations on the Chinese-North Korean side, would cease resisting and leave the Korean peninsula. But even if Washington continued to resist, it would soon realize that resistance was futile and evacuate its troops from Korea,37

On January 19, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao that Pyongyang accepted Mao's plan of a rest and thorough preparation for the final assault (though Pak Hon-Yong tried to hurry things up). It was also agreed that the North Koreans could not advance alone; Chinese participation was needed.38

10. Euphoria disappears

By the end of January 1951, as documents testify, the communists' euphoria started to decline; soon it disappeared, replaced by worries, fear, confusion, and at times panic. Reading the documents, one also senses growing irritation among the ranks of the communist allies. It is also

noticeable that Stalin tried to keep the USSR as much as possible out of direct participation in the war-if he agreed to send Soviet advisers, pilots and other military personnel to Korea once in a while, every time he did so only after repeated pleas by Mao and Kim. Stalin did not always satisfy the requests of his allies about supplies of armaments, but for objective reasons: they wanted more than the USSR, still weak after WWII and engaged in a global Cold War, could provide.

On January 28, Mao informed Stalin that the adversary had begun an unexpected offensive and due to this the communist troops lost the opportunity to rest and to undergo a restructuring. Instead they had to launch a counterattack. After achieving an operational success the Chinese side hoped to resume preparation for the final assault on the South.39 Stalin promptly agreed with the strategy, stressing that "from the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that Inchon and Seoul are not captured by the adversary, that Chinese-Korean troops give a serious rebuff to the advancing troops of the adversary."40

In late January/early February 1951, Stalin criticized the structure, organization, and quality of the Korean armed forces, suggesting substantial changes. His proposals were immediately accepted by the Koreans and supported by Beijing. By that time the first reports of the falling spirit of the the first reports of the falling spirit of the Korean troops reached Beijing and Moscow.41 That the situation for the communist side continued to deteriorate is quite clear from a cable sent by Mao to Stalin on 1 March 1951, in which the Chinese leader admitted that a general offensive was no longer possible, that the adversary had superiority in weapons and dominated the air, and that Sino-Korean troops were sustaining heavy losses and urgently needed air cover by Soviet air force units. Mao stressed that the communist side must prepare for a long war and admitted that American troops will not be driven out of Korea for at least a number of years.42

Stalin satisfied Mao's requests, immediately noting that large-scale military operations were in the offing for Sino-Korean troops.43 In the following months Moscow promptly and favorably responded to all other requests of the Chinese, concerning first of all airplanes and air defense.

Meanwhile, further correspondence be

tween the USSR and the PRC reveals that the fighting spirit of the communist side. continued to deteriorate as that of the Americans improved.44 The situation got so bad. that Stalin felt it necessary to criticize Mao for wrong tactics employed in the war.45

11. Communists seek an armistice

By June 1951 the situation at the front became so hopeless for the communists that they started to seek a way out. The question of an armistice was raised by the North Koreans and Chinese. Stalin had no choice but to agree. Maneuvers around the armistice talks did not, however, prevent the communists from looking for every opportunity to reinforce the army, to gain territory and to strike at the opposite side. At the same time the communists constantly worried about attacks by the opposite side. The conditions presented by the communists for an armistice were inflexible. It is also worth noting that Stalin flatly refused to direct the armistice negotiations and quite rudely told Mao to do the job. Another prominent feature of this period was constant bargaining between Stalin and Mao about Soviet military supplies and military advisers. Mao kept bombarding Stalin with new requests, and the Kremlin chief continued to rebuff Mao, sometimes with visible irritation.

In June 1951, Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang went to Moscow, where they convinced Stalin to agree to the necessity of an armistice-seeking policy. However, at the same time the communists discussed measures to beef up their military capabilities and to prepare for an offensive in August.46 In ensuing communications, tactics were worked out on who would raise the issue of the armistice first and how it would be done. It was also decided to insist on restoration of the border line along the 38th parallel and on a small neutral zone on both sides. Mao suggested to raise, for the sake of bargaining, the issue of Taiwan and then to drop it. Simultaneously China requested from the USSR armaments for 60 divisions. Stalin gave the OK, though he rebuked the Chinese for trying to get all the weapons during one year, explaining that it was "physically impossible and totally unthinkable."47

Preparing for the negotiations, Mao cabled Stalin: "It is extremely important that you personally take charge of the negotiations in order to prevent us from getting into

an awkward position."48 Stalin rejected the idea, saying: "In your cable you proposed that we, from Moscow, should direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, unthinkable and not necessary. It's you, comrade Mao Zedong, who'll have to direct negotiations. We can at best give advice on some questions. We are not able to be in direct communication with Kim Il Sung. You must have direct communication with him."49

To raise the stakes at the forthcoming negotiations the communists decided to be more active on the front, to put additional pressure on the adversary as well as to improve their own defenses in case the other side would try to gain a military advantage.

Measures were also taken to upgrade the overall military potential of North Korea, making it ready for a prolonged war. Stalin satisfied the requests of his allies as much as he was able, except for the advisers. Periodically Stalin lashed at the Chinese for extravagant requests for weapons and unwillingness to share them with the North Koreans.

My analysis concludes here, leaving for other contributions a reexamination of the strategy and tactics of the communist side at the armistice talks and in the final stage of the war. In conclusion, I would stress that further archival research is needed to get definite answers to the following aspects of communist politics in the Korean

war:

1. The exact reasons for the reversal of Stalin's position on "the liberation" of South Korea.

2. The real motives behind China's initial refusal to enter the Korea War, and the total picture of Soviet-Chinese interactions on Korea in 1949-1950. 3. The detailed process of communist preparations for the war.

4. The events of the first days of the war and reaction to these events in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang.

5. What further strategy Stalin had in mind when he ordered North Korean communists to evacuate the country in the autumn of 1950.

1. See, e.g., coded message N 121973, 2 May 1947, The 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 4-6, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF); cable from Ambassador Shtykov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1949, APRF.

2. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46.

3. Shtykov report to Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF). See also Marshal Vasilevsky and Ambassador Shtykov's cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, APRF. 4. See, e.g., Stalin cable to Shtykov, 30 October 1949, APRF.

5. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46. 6. See, e.g., memorandums of conversations of ambassador Shtykov with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong, 12 and 14 August 1949, and Charge'd'Affaires Tunkin's cable to Moscow on 3 September 1949, AVP RF. 7. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 776, pp. 30-32. 8. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 19 January 1950, AVP RF.

9. Stalin's cable to Shtykov, 30 January 1950, AVP RF. 10. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 23 March 1950, AVP RF.

11. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 15 May 1949, AVP RF; cable to Stalin by General Kovalev about a conversation with Mao Zedong, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61.

12. Shtykov cable to Moscow, 12 May 1950, AVP RF. 13. Coded message N 2220, 3 May 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61.

14. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950.

15. Coded message N 5500, 14 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55.

16. See Ambassador Roshchin's cable to Moscow, 14 May 1950, AVP RF.

17. APRF, Fund 6, list 9, file 14, p 57.

18. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 1 January 1950, AVP RF. 19. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950, AVP RF. 20. Coded message N 34691 /sh, 1 July 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, p. 104.

21. Coded message N 405809, 2 July 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 105-107.

22. Coded message N 75021, 28 August 1950, ibid., pp. 5-6, 10-11.

23. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 12-15. 24. Coded message N 600262/sh, 27 September 1950, APRF, Fund 3, list 65, file 827, pp. 94-96. 25. Coded message N 600508/sh, 30 September 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp.41-45. 26. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 2 July 1950. 27. Stalin cable to Roshchin, 8 July 1950. 28. See, e.g., Mao's conversations with Soviet academician on 19 and 28 August 1950, and Zhou's comments on 14 September 1950 to Roshchin.

29. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 13 July 1950, AVP RF. 30. Coded message N 4581, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 334, pp. 97-98.

31. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 3 October 1950, coded message N 25199, ibid., pp. 105-106.

32. See Stalin's cable to Kim Il Sung (quoting Stalin's earlier message to Mao), 8 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 65-67.

33. Coded message N 4829, 14 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 343, p.77.

34. Coded message N 9768. APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, p. 5.

35. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 371, pp. 35-37. 36. Ibid., list 1, file 336, pp. 88-90.

37. See coded message N 15603, 16 January 1951,
APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, pp. 81-82.
38. Coded message 15994, 21 January 1951, APRF,
Fond 45, list 1, file 335, pp. 37-40.

39. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, p. 44.
40. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 47-48.
41. Ibid., Fond 3, list 65, file 828, p. 123.

42. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 78-82.
43. Ibid., p. 118.

44. See, e.g., the coded message N 20412, June 1951, ibid., file 339, pp. 4-6.

45. Ibid., file 338, pp. 98-99.

46. Coded message N 3557, 13 June 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 31-32; see also file 339, pp. 6163.

47. Coded message N 635177, 24 June 1951, ibid., file 339, p. 78.

48. Coded message N 21334, 30 June 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 339, p. 92.

49. Coded message N 3917, 30 June 1951, ibid., pp. 9596.

Dr. Evgueni Bajanov is Director of the Institute for Contemporary International Problems, Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, Russia. This article was originally presented to the conference on "The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record," held on 24-25 July 1995 at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, and sponsored by the Korea Society, the Korea-America Society and Georgetown University.

CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS

The Cold War International History Project awards a limited number of fellowship for scholars from countries on "the other side" of the Cold War to conduct up to one year of archival research in the United States. Recipients are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Applications should include: CV; letter of nomination and three letters of recommendation; research proposal, indicating topic to be investigated and sources to be utilized; writing samples in English welcomed, though not required. Applicans should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States. Applications may be sent or faxed to:

Jim Hershberg

Cold War International History Project Woodrow Wilson Center

1000 Jefferson Dr. SW Washington, D.C. 20560 USA Fax: (202) 357-4439

E-mail: wwcem 123@sivm.si.edu

Recent recipients of CWIHP fellowships include: Vytas Berenis (Insitute of Culture and Arts, Vilnius); Wanda Jazarbek (Insitute of Political Studies, Warsaw); Michael Latysh (Institute of Slavonic & Balkan Studies, Moscow); Michael Lesniewski (Warsaw University); Bartek Pawlak (Warsaw University); Michael Skapa (Charles University, Prague); and Wenqian Gao (Research Center on Party Literature, Beijing).

SHTYKOV

continued from page 69

umes remain: Vol. 1, 149 pages (from Sept. 5-Nov. 16, 1946); Vol. 2, 141 pages (from Dec. 1, 1946-Feb. 5, 1947); Vol. 3, 193 pages (from July 7-Aug. 29, 1947); Vol. 4, 72 pages (from July 26-Sept. 6, 1948). The periods of Aug. 1945-Sept. 1946, Feb.-July 1947, Sept. 1947-July 1948, and Sept. 1948 to 1951 have been lost.

In the diaries, of course, Shtykov wrote much about strictly military affairs. However, the majority of the diaries were devoted to the political and economic situation in Korea after the liberation from Japanese occupation in August 1945. The first volume deals with the September 1946 General Strike, the October 1946 Uprising, and the merger of the three leftist parties in the south; volume two covers the election for the People's committees of provinces, cities, and counties, and the Assemblies of the Committees in North Korea; the third volume includes the Second Soviet-American Joint Commission, when Shtykov himself was the head of the Soviet Delegation; and finally volume four covers the cabinet formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

Most important, the diaries vividly show that the Soviet Stationary/Occupation Army intervened deeply in and exerted an enormous influence on not only North Korean but also South Korean politics.8

The merger of the three leftist parties and the September General Strike/October Uprising in the south are the two most conspicuous examples of the Soviet intervention. In the case of the merger of the parties, the Soviet Army played the role of moderator and leader in the process. Interestingly, despite the efforts by Shtykov and the Soviet Army to make Kim Il Sung the representative of the will of the Soviets, the South Korean leftist leaders preferred to deal with the Soviets directly rather than with Kim Il Sung. This demonstrates that the leftist leaders in the south did not yet approve Kim's leadership. In the process of the merger, the Soviet Army consistently supported Pak Hon-yong, head of the Korean Communist Party (KCP). The reasons were, first of all, that Pak controlled the biggest leftist party in the south; and second, that Pak's transition of policy from cooperation to confrontation with the U.S. Occupation Government was consistent with that of

the Soviet Army in the north. The Soviet leaders in the north, through Kim Il Sung, tried to persuade or even threaten leftist leaders in the south, who were against the merger, into accepting Pak Hon-yong's line and the merger. For instance, when Kang Jin, a leftist leader in the south who was against the merger, visited North Korea, Kim Il Sung, apparently under the direction of Shtykov, met with Kang and reported the details of the meeting to Shtykov on 22 October 1946.10

I met with Kang Jin. I told him that he had to take full responsibility for the failure of the merger. I also told him, "Although I don't know whether you are a running-dog of American Imperialism, you are helping Americans enormously.... Comrade Pak Hon-yong's decision is not only his but also 400,000 North Korean Party members'.... You have to admit that you made a mistake if you truly want to be a real revolutionary which you have not been."

After the success of the merger, Shtykov ordered General Romanenko, the Director of the Soviet Military Administration in the north, to telegraph Pak Hon-yong as follows: "Congratulations on the hard-earned but successful merger."11 Even after the merger, Shtykov and the Soviet leaders closely worked with Pak and even supported him financially from time to time.12

It has been a widely accepted view that the September General Strike and the October Taegu Riot (or Uprising) in the south had nothing to do with the Soviets. However, the Shtykov Diaries shed new light on this issue. The strike and the riot broke out to a certain

extent spontaneously under KCP leadership. But the incidents themselves provoked the intervention of Soviet leaders in the north. On the other hand, Communist leaders in the south had to consult with the Soviets when the General Strike transformed into an armed riot. In their wholehearted support for the strike and riot, Shtykov and the Soviet leaders did not refrain from giving advice: Shtykov gave specific instructions to Communist leaders in the south, and these leaders often asked for the instructions of the Soviet

leaders in the north. 13 For example, Shtykov wrote in his diary on 28 September 1946:

As regard to the strike, I instructed as follows:

Continue the struggle until the demands of various economic claims, wage increase for workers, the release of the leftist leaders from prison, the cancellation of the warrant of arrests of Communist leaders, and revived publication of banned leftist newspapers are met.

Stop the strike when the demands are met.

Declare that [the strikers] will continue to talk with the American Occupation Government on the issue of transition of power to People's Committee [in the south].

Demand that the American Occupation Government not oppress the organizers and supporters of the strike.

Probably the most striking evidence of intervention was that Shtykov funneled 2 million yen to support the General Strike and later 3 million yen for the October Riot. 14

There are some problems in analyzing the diaries. First, the information in the diaries is so fragmentary that it is nearly impossible for us to understand completely how certain situations evolved. They also contain many abbreviations which can be understood only by the author himself and grammatical errors which are open to a variety of interpretations. Above all, Shtykov wrote as if he were giving orders to Korean leftist leaders: according to the diaries, the Korean leaders were simply automatons. Therefore we must interpret historical events very carefully, comparing information from the diaries and that from other sources.

Still, the Shtykov diaries are undoubtedly among the most important documents to emerge on Soviet policy toward Korea from 1945 to 1951 and the emergence of the Cold War in East Asia. From the diaries, it is evident that Shtykov and the Soviet Army in North Korea played a major role in the decision-making: Soviet policies in Korea were planned at Shtykov's desk and approved by the higher ranking Soviet army leaders and later by Moscow. After he received approval from Moscow, the diaries suggest, Shtykov and his lieutenants carefully choreographed and directed the political drama of North Korean (and sometimes South Korean) politics. Although not all of

them were puppets of the Soviet Army, it is evident that North Korean Communist leaders like Kim Il Sung were under the tutelage of the Soviet Army. Even though the Soviet Army leaders tried to make their rule look like an indirect one, their intervention was always direct and full-scale. In other words, the Shtykov diaries show that the Soviet Army in North Korea was a de facto Occupation Army, not merely a "Stationary Army." In addition, we now know from the diaries that the Soviets were more deeply involved in politics and social unrest in the south than we had known previously; leftist parties in the north and south were strongly dependent upon the Soviets in the north and, ultimately, Moscow.

1. Lebedev, "S soznaniem ispolnennogo dolga," in Osvobodzhdenie KOREI (Moscow, 1976), 79. 2. Zhdanov was the First Secretary of the party committee of Leningrad. Shtykov had absolute loyalty to Zhdanov. When Zhdanov died on 31 August 1948, Shtykov expressed his deep grief over his death in his diary. Diaries, 31 August, 1, 3 September 1948.

3. When the Communist regime was established in North Korea, Stalin immediately appointed Shtykov to this important post. Interestingly enough, Shtykov refused the offer at first because of his heart problem. However, he could not refuse Molotov's urgent request along with promise to send Shtykov to a center for medical treatment and provide him with competent aides. See Diaries, 2 December 1948.

4. Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow, 1980), 544

5. Ibid.

6. His memoirs stopped at the years of his childhood. Interview in 1995 with Viktor Terentevich Shtykov, General Shtykov's son, in St.Petersburg.

7. For example, Kravtsov, a special aide to Shtykov, recollected that he had burned in the 1950s all of his documents, including reports he had written.

8. For convenience's sake, I use North Korea and South Korea although there were only the de jure U.S. Occupation Government in the south and de facto Soviet Occupation Government in the north from 1945-1948. 9. The 3 November 1946 election in North Korea was another example.

10. Kim Il Sung's Report to Shtykov on Kim's meeting with Kang Jin. Diaries, 22 October 1946. 11. Diaries, 2 December 1946.

12. Diaries, 6, 7, 11, 12, 25, 27 December 1946 13. Diaries, 28 September, 7, 8, 22 December 1946. 14. At that time one seom of rice (a big sack of rice) cost 15 yen in the north and 150 yen in the south).

Hyun-su Jeon is a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; this article was edited and translated by Gyoo-hyoung Kahng, a fellow of the Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University. A longer version of this article appeared in the Fall 1995 issue of the Korean-langauge publication Yoksa biyong [Critique of History].

DMITRII ANTONOVICH VOLKOGONOV (1928-1995)

General Dmitrii Volkogonov, a prominent Russian military historian, died of cancer on 6 December 1995 at age 67. Volkogonov spent much of his career as a high-ranking political officer in the Soviet Army, and for several years was director of the prestigious Institute of Military History. More recently, he served as a military adviser to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and as co-chair of the joint U.S.-Russian commission on prisoners of war. Even while he performed these functions, he continued to work on lengthy books about Soviet history. Beginning in 1989, Volkogonov published richly documented biographical studies of Josif Stalin (Triumf i tragediya: Politicheskii portret I.V. Stalina, 4 vols. [Moscow: Novosti, 1989], English ed., Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, trans. and ed. Harold Shukman [New York: Free Press, 1991]); Leon Trotsky (Trotskii: Politicheskii portret, 2 vols. [Moscow: Novosti, 1992]); and Vladimir Lenin (Lenin: Politicheskii portret, 2 vols. [Moscow: Novosti, 1994], English ed., Lenin: A New Biography, trans. and ed. Harold Shukman [New York: Free Press, 1994). Shortly before his death, he completed a survey of the whole Soviet period (Sem' Portretov (Seven Portraits) [Moscow: Novosti, 1995]), which only recently appeared in Russia.

Having been an orthodox Communist for most of his life, Volkogonov in the 1990s shifted toward a strongly anti-Communist position. As recently as when he wrote his books on Stalin and Trotsky, he had glorified Lenin. But by the time he completed his study of Lenin in 1994, Volkogonov had concluded that the founder of Bolshevism was in fact a “savage, cruel, uncompromising, remorseless, and vengeful" figure. Volkogonov said he had found it "painful" to "shed [his] illusions" about the Soviet regime, but shed them he did. His final books provide overwhelming support for his ideological change of heart.

In late 1991, Volkogonov was ap

pointed head of a special parliamentary commission to oversee the handling of archives from the Soviet period. In that capacity, he helped secure the release of many valuable documents, including items from the Presidential Archive, the collection of highly-sensitive materials kept under the personal control of Soviet and then Russian leaders. Even so, critics of Volkogonov frequently charged that he exploited his privileged access to the archives and held back from circulation the most significant or sensational documents for his own use. After a lengthy article along these lines appeared in the newspaper Izvestiya in July 1994, Volkogonov sent a letter to the editor asserting that he had enjoyed no special access for his Stalin and Trotsky biographies, and that virtually all the documents he used for his Lenin book were "accessible to everyone." Partly as a result of this controversy, the translator's preface to the English edition of the Lenin biography was modified to include a pledge that all documents cited in the book, including those from the Presidential Archive, would be made available to all researchers.

Unfortunately, the access envisaged in that pledge has not yet materialized. Russian and foreign scholars who worked in the Russian archives in 1995 (including myself) were summarily turned down when they requested access to documents adduced in the Lenin book. Whether because of bureaucratic inertia or some other motive, most of the senior archival officials in Moscow displayed no interest in gathering and making available the items that Volkogonov cited. One hopes that with Volkogonov's death, a renewed effort will be made to release for open research the many documents he employed to such good effect. That would be a fitting tribute to a courageous historian.

-Mark Kramer

Russian Research Center Harvard University

« 上一頁繼續 »