ePub 版

gans and considerable tribal feuds to elimihim.

USSR of 11 July 1978 (attached). nate progressive elements from the state and ANDROPOV. It is in the same way 2. Affirm the draft of instructions to party apparatus and to replace them with important to show Mengistu that we are on the Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa (atpeople faithful to him. This is facilitated by his side.

tached) the fact that the party is without a broad so- PONOMAREV. Yesterday the Secre- 3. Assign Gosplan USSR, Gossnab cial basis and in practice was organized by tary of the CC of the Communist Party of USSR, [Minzag] USSR, the Ministry of Barre from above. Barre is careful not to Cuba, Vivo Valdez visted me. He had been Foreign Trade, the KGB USSR, and the expound a pro-Western course. He has to in Ethiopia. In Cuba he received instruc- GKES to review the request of the Ethioacknowledge that the progressive develop- tions. He is returning there. Vivo said that pian side and within three weeks in the prement in the past cannot simply be crossed Cuba will not undertake to do anything in scribed manner to submit corresponding out. The country still has sufficiently pow- Ethiopia without the preliminary agreement proposals, including one about providing erful progressive forces which for now are with the Soviet Union.

assistance to Ethiopia in relation to the silent. He thus prefers to leave many things In relation to the fact that our Ambas- drought and one about a delay in payment outwardly as they have been. Officially, the sador in Ethiopia Com. Ratanov has taken for the general civilian goods which were program and the organization of the party ill, and has been in Moscow for three months delivered for the Ethiopian army. are retained. The party organization is even already, it is apparently necessary to think Assign the appropriate agencies and being activated.

about sending another comrade there. organizations to confirm the progress made (Signed] Grabowski.

ANDROPOV. Ambassador to Ethio- in fulfilling the obligations of the Soviet side

pia Com. Ratanov has already gotten bet- on agreements and contracts that were con(Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.0351 ter, he can go. But overall it evidently makes cluded. Accelerate the realization of 127; document obtained and translated by sense for the MFA to think about a new achieved agreements with the

government Christian F. Ostermann.) ambassador.

of Ethiopian regarding the creation of So

KIRILENKO. I think that, you, Com. viet-Ethiopian commission on economic coMinutes of Meeting of CPSU CC Mal'tsev, will take measures now to send operation. Politburo, 14 July 1978 (excerpt) there one of the comrades, say, an advisor, Assign the permanent Soviet represen

the most experienced, who could help Com. tative at the Council of Mutual Economic MEETING OF THE Ratanov.

Assistance to present ideas regarding the CC CPSU POLITBURO

The draft of the resolution is accepted. provision by the members of the CMEA of 14 July 1978

assistance to the economic development of (Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 40, II. 45, Ethiopia on a multilateral basis. Chaired by Com. KIRILENKO, A.P. 10-12; translated by Mark Doctoroff.)

Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., CPSU CC Politburo Decision,
Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Demichev,

14 July 1978

[attachment] P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev,

Re: Point IX Prot. No. 112
B.N.,Solomentsev, M.S., Chernenko, K.Y., Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P.,

Secret Rusakov, K.V


CC CPSU [...] 9. About Measures for the Future

According to the communication from Strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian Relations No. P112/X

the Soviet Ambassador in Addis-Ababa, and To Comrades: Brezhnev, Kosygin, also according to the information from the KIRILENKO. Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Mazurov, Cuban friends, facts are taking place which Andropov, and Ponomarev have presented Suslov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, bear witness to manifestations of nationalthis issue.

Katushev, Baibakov, Martynov, Zolotukhin, istic moods among certain parts of the EthioMAL'TSEV says that the Ethiopians Patolichev, Skachkov, Garbuzov, pian leadership following the victory over are behaving incorrectly in Eritrea. They Smirtiukov.

Somalia in the Ogaden, which already is beare campaigning against providing au

ginning to exert a negative influence on tonomy to Eritrea. They have begun mili- Extract from protocol No. 112 of the CC Ethiopia's relations with several countries tary actions there. There are not conduct- CPSU Politburo session of 14 July 1978 of the Socialist community (spec. No. 695 ing an entirely correct policy in the Ogaden

of 6130\78). From the Ethiopian side, in either. Military actions are taking place About measures for the future strengthen- particular, a certain dissatisfaction is being somewhere there against Somalia. ing of Soviet-Ethiopian relations

expressed regarding the progress of coopKIRILENKO. Mengistu is still not

eration with these countries above all in the sufficiently experienced, but at the same 1. Agree with the thoughts contained economic area, complaints connected with time he is a very sensitive person, therefore in the note of the MFA USSR, the Interna- the development of trade-economic relait is just necessary to educate him, to teach tional department, CC CPSU, and KGB tions, not always grounded in fact, are be

[ocr errors]

ing put forth. This type of mood in one way France). This determined the external poli- enterprises which were nationalized in Febor another shows up in the approach of the cies of the country, although formally Ethio- ruary 1975 (72 enterprises of the manufacEthiopian leadership to a resolution of the pia belonged to the nonaligned countries. turing industry), in which a foreign compoEritrean issue.

The connection of Ethiopia's economy nent was dominant, made up 41% of the The MFA USSR, the CC CPSU Inter- and trade as well as its defense to the capi- general sum of paid capital in this branch of national Department, and the KGB USSR talist governments was a key factor in the the national economy. In addition, the State consider it expedient to implement a range influence of the Western countries on Ethio- gained a controlling package of the stocks of steps from our side in order to neutralize pia. Until the revolution in 1974 developed of another 29 private companies. In questhese types of moods in the Ethiopian lead- capitalist countries occupied the predomi- tions of defense, Ethiopia practically cut off ership. It would make sense to assign the nant position in the external trade activity relations with the capitalist countries and set Soviet ambassador in Addis Ababa to have of Ethiopia. Thus, for example, in 1973, its course toward re-arming its army with a conversation with the chairman of the they represented approximately 70% of the

Soviet weapons. PMAC, during which in an open and volume of external trade (by comparison At the same time, it would be incorfriendly way opinions would be exchanged with 3% for the group of socialist countries). rect to consider that Ethiopia was fully libabout the future development of Soviet- Military supplies were completely de- erated from its dependence on Western Ethiopian relations, stressing the pendent on the United States.

countries, particularly in the economic immutablity of the policy of the Soviet Meanwhile, the West took into consid- sphere. The state of Ethiopian debts to the Union of multi-sided support and assistance eration first and foremost the significant West in May 1978 comprised 351 million to the Ethiopian revolution.

strategic position of Ethiopia in the region rubles. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, as a rule, pays Taking into account the conversation of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and Af- off its debts and credits in a timely fashion, with Mengistu it would be possible to re- rica as a whole in terms of a confrontation as well as the interest on them, and allots view the issue of conducting a comradely with the USSR, and likewise the visible situ- annually approximately 13 million rubles to exchange of opinions with the leadership of ation of the country on the continent in po- this end, which comprises approximately Cuba and the GDR about the current situa- litical terms.

5% of the annual export earnings and does tion in Ethiopia.

At the same time, even during the im- not represent a burden for the country's fiAssign the corresponding Soviet agen- perial regime, between various Western nances. Such a policy makes it easier for cies to carefully review the requests of the countries and, first and foremost, between Ethiopia to receive new means for the deEthiopian side vis-a-vis economic issues, the USA and the “Common market,” there velopment of the country's economy. Ethioand to submit proposals aimed at improv- was a contradiction with regard to Ethiopia pia has an acute need for economic assising Soviet-Ethiopian economic cooperation. in the area of the economy and, to a certain tance, particularly since the socialist counPlease review.

degree, in the area of policy. The countries tries have not taken the place of and do not

of the “Common market” were dissatisfied intend fully to take the place of the economic A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov B. Ponomarev with the dominant position of the USA in assistance and technical collaboration with

Ethiopia. From a certain point Japan also the Western countries. From the general 11 July 1978

entered the playing field as a competitor. volume of foreign economic assistance, the

Until the revolution, the sum total of for- assistance of the Western countries and in(Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 91, d. 272, II. 140- eign investments in the country's economy ternational organizations which are under 143; translated by Mark Doctoroff.] comprised 504 million rubles.

their control in the form of loans and cred

After 1974 the situation in the region its comprised 75% (status as of May 1978). Soviet Embassy in Ethiopia, back- concerning political and, particularly, ideo- It is precisely the economic factor that ground report on “Ethiopia's Relations logical relations with the Western countries the Western countries are bearing in mind with Western Countries," August 1978 changed in a fundamental way in connec- as they pursue a long-term struggle for

tion with the fact that Ethiopia set its course Ethiopia. They will push Ethiopia toward USSR EMBASSY TO

toward a socialist orientation and took on economic collaboration with the West, SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

as a ruling ideology Marxism-Leninism, and which would enable them to use this factor Re: no 275 likewise declared its intent to create a Marx- in pursuit also of political goals, to encour14 August 1978 ist-Leninist party.

age the Ethiopian leadership, if not to sup

The external political course of the plant, then to cut back on the influence of ETHIOPIA'S RELATIONS WITH country also changed. Ethiopia began to the USSR. WESTERN COUNTRIES

conduct an anti-imperialist policy, with the The other factor which the Western (Information)

support of the countries of the socialist camp powers are counting on, is the inescapable,

and, first and foremost, of the USSR. The in their minds, growth of bourgeois nationBefore the revolution, Ethiopia was position of foreign capital in Ethiopia was alism, or at the very least, of revolutionary primarily oriented toward the Western coun- seriously undermined in connection with the nationalism, which would be accompanied tries, first and foremost toward the USA and nationalization of the property of Western by a break with the socialist countries, an the countries of the "Common market” (Fed- firms in the country and its transfer to the erosion of Marxism-Leninism, and the coneral Republic of Germany, Italy, England, State sector. The capital of the industrial duct of a policy of equal distance from the

East and the West.

ceremony in honor of the graduates of the In order to preserve whatever remained The Westernizers are making use of the capital's university, spoke about the impe- of their former position in Ethiopia, the USA fact that certain of the socialist countries are rialist plot headed by the USA in the pres- is trying to use all of the factors enumerated conducting themselves with restraint with ence of the new American ambassador. The above (economic pressure, Ethiopian naregard to the development of economic col- People's Republic of China acts as an ob- tionalism, ties which remain to the state aplaboration with Ethiopia. These countries jective and actual ally of imperialism in the paratus). To a large extent the condition of include Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and also struggle against the countries of socialist Ethiopian finance depends, in particular, Romania, although this is for different rea- collaboration with Ethiopia. The Western- upon whether or not the United States buys sons.

izers attempt as much as possible to use this coffee, the income from which made up in The leadership of the PMAC regards factor, and do not disdain even to use anti- 1977 approximately 75% of the general exresentfully and with a lack of understand- Soviet propagandistic slogans, which are port earnings of the country. The USA pering the fact that the Council for Mutual Eco- invented by the Chinese.

sists in offering economic assistance to nomic Aid (Comecon), to which Ethiopia From the other side, in spite of the pres- Ethiopia, in particular in answer to the cirappealed with a proposal for the develop- ervation of the anti-imperialist course, which culated appeal from the Ethiopian commisment of collaboration not only on a bilat- was manifest in the speeches of the Ethio- sion on assistance to the population of the eral, but on a multilateral basis in March pian delegation at the Session of the Coun- Ogaden and Wollo. At the same time, they 1977, has since that time not made any con- cil of Ministers and the Assembly of the underscore that America offers mainly hucrete resolutions, but has rather confined it- heads of government of the Organization of manitarian aid, while the USSR is generous self to a declaration of the desire for such African States in Khartoum, and likewise only as regards military supplies. Meancollaboration.

at the conference of nonaligned countries while, in spite of the fact of the worsening The Western countries place serious in Belgrade, we cannot consider that the governmental relations, economic assistance hopes on the fact that the make-up of the struggle is over in the ruling circles of the from the USA to Ethiopia is growing. Thus, State apparatus, as well as a significant part country about questions of the external po- according to information of an American of the officer staff of the military forces of litical orientation and the essence of a policy Congressional commission, which visited Ethiopia, remains as before. Many of the of nonalignment. In this struggle a signifi- the countries of the Horn of Africa with the bureaucrats and officers received their edu- cant role is played by the petit-bourgeois in- aim of collecting information about the situcation in the West, and are subject to the fluence, which is still quite strong in the ation in the region, if in 1977 this assistance influence of bourgeois ideology, and as a officers' circles.

reached 11 million dollars, then in 1978 it consequence of this they regard unfavorably Before turning to the nature of Ethio- reached 15 million dollars. the course of the country toward a socialist pian relations with individual Western coun- In July of this year the USA announced orientation and the primary development of tries, it is worth noting that in the frame- the delivery in September and October of relations with socialist countries. The Ethio- work of the general anti-imperialist course, this year of assistance at a level of 12.5 thoupian leadership, which understands this well, Ethiopia continues to distinguish between sand tons of food products, valued in sum is unable to replace the State apparatus due the USA and the countries of the Common at 7 million Ethiopian birr. In accordance to the lack of cadres which have received Market.

with information from the American Emthe appropriate preparation. The regime The central flame of anti-imperialist bassy, philanthropic assistance from the remains transitional in the country, new or- propaganda is directed against the USA, USA to Ethiopia for the period from 1975 gans of authority have not yet been put into England, the Federal Republic of Germany, reached 75 million Ethiopian birr. place. The country's leadership has only and, to a lesser degree, against France, Italy, The relations of Ethiopia with the begun the work of creating a basis for this. and the Scandinavian countries.

countries of the Common Market is deterDrawing a general conclusion, one can The relations of Ethiopia with the USA mined by their mutual interest in maintainsay with certainty that a long-term course have undergone the greatest changes. (The ing economic and commercial ties. Trying for the USA and the Western countries for Americans) have eliminated their military to keep Ethiopia in the sphere of their interthe struggle for Ethiopia is being plotted. objects from the territory of the country, ests, the Western European countries have This is evident if only from the fact that, in their propaganda apparatus, their military regarded the revolution with patience. As spite of the Somali adventure, they do not mission; they have cut by one half the staff does the USA, they make declarations reintend to exchange Ethiopia for Somalia. of the American embassy. The Ethiopian garding their support for the territorial inWhile creating their position in Somalia, government delayed the agreement for the tegrity of Ethiopia, both in the event of Sothey are setting their strategic sights on new American ambassador by three months mali aggression and with regard to Eritrea. Ethiopia. This can be seen both from the and gave it only after a serious discussion, The new French ambassador, upon conveydegree of patience with which the USA, in the course of which the Ethiopians warned ing his letters of credentials to the Head of England, and the Federal Republic of Ger- that if the anti-Ethiopian campaign in the the PMAC, Mengistu Haile Mariam, even many are regarding the sharp anti-imperial- USA, connected, in part, with human rights declared that France respects the path of deist attacks in the speeches of the Ethiopian issues, was not brought to an end, that they velopment chosen by Ethiopia in the frameleaders and in the press.

would seek to break off diplomatic relations. work of a policy of socialist orientation. The The head of the government, Mengistu After this the United States was forced to Federal Republic of Germany did not un Haile Mariam, in a speech he delivered at a reach a certain compromise.

continued on page 422

U.S.-Soviet Relations and the
Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980–
New Russian & East German Documents

S-Soviet r Editor's Note: U.S.-Soviet relations following the inauguration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter in January 1977 misfired by March, when Secretary of State Vance carried the new president's arms control initiative to Moscow, only to receive a harsh public lashing from the Soviet leadership. (For translations of Russian archival documents on this early period, including correspondence between Carter and Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 140-154, 160.) But ties seemed to be mending by the late summer of that yearas reflected by progress on talks toward signing a SALT II arms treaty, quiet cooperation in heading off a South African nuclear test, and (on 1 October 1977) the issuance of an unprecedented joint statement calling on Israel and its Arab enemies to return to the Geneva Conference co-chaired by Washington and Moscow to seek a comprehensive peace" in the Middle East.

Yet, the fall of 1977 and the first half of 1978 witnessed another downturn in relations, caused by, among other disputes, the negation of the October 1 joint communique on the Middle East as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat startled the world by visiting Jerusalem in November 1977 and pursuing a separate peace with Israel; a massive Soviet-Cuban military airlift to Ethiopia that fall turned the tide of the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and irked Washington, which the following spring retaliated by accelerating ties with Beijing; talks on SALT II slowed to a crawl; Soviet human rights abuses (including the highly-publicized arrests and trials of well-known dissidents such as Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov) fanned public anger in the United States, and within the Carter Administration, the faction (led by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) favoring a tougher line toward Moscow (including linkage" of arms talks with other issues, such as Soviet behavior in Third World) began to get the upper hand in its incessant competition with those (such as Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance) adhering to a more conciliatory approach.

By mid-1978, it seemed evident that U.S.-USSR relations had reached a new crisis point, dimming the hopes that had existed at the outset of the Carter Administration. Over the next year, the two sides managed to patch things up somewhat, agree on final terms for a SALT II treaty, and hold the long-delayed Carter-Brezhnev Summit in Vienna to sign it in June 1979. But valuable time had been lost, and a store of mutual mistrust had accumulated. Even that interlude of relative concord in Vienna turned out to be short-lived, for in the fall of 1979, at a time when Carter had hoped to be triumphantly signing a SALT II treaty after winning Senate ratification, U.S.-Soviet relations again went sourand in December 1979 came an event that shelved the treaty indefinitely (and permanently, it turned out) and also officially rang the death knell of detente: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see next section).

To illuminate the evolution in ties between Washington and Moscow during this stretch, the Bulletin presents a selection of ten documents (or excerpts) from the Russian and East German archives, including:

* the transcript of a contentious yet cautiously optimistic 30 September 1977 Oval Office meeting between Carter and visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, returning Vance's ill-starred trip to Moscow (translated records of Gromyko's discussions with Vance during this trip are also available, but not printed due to space limitations);

an extract from the minutes of a 27 April 1978 session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC) Politburo in which Brezhnev recounts his handling of a meeting with Vance, specifically his upbraiding of Carter's inconsistent foreign policy line" and his strong rebuffof U.S. criticism of Soviet actions in Africa;

a testy encounter between Vance and Gromyko in New York on 31 May 1978, in which the Soviet Foreign Minister accused the Carter Administration of an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign that was on the verge of destroying detente and bringing us back to the period of 'cold war,'and the two exchanged espionage accusations;

* three excerpts from June 1978 CPSU CC Politburo sessions, including a general foreign policy survey by Brezhnev concluding that a serious deterioration and exacerbationof the international scene had taken place due to the Carter Administration's "growing aggression,and discussions of controversial dissidents (Andrei Sakharov and Anatoly Shcharansky);

a lengthy July 1978 political letter" from Soviet Ambassador to the Washington Anatoly F. Dobrynin assessing the evolution of US-USSR relations in the first year-and-a-half of the Carter Administration, and recommending expedientpolicies for the future;

two excerpts from East German archival records of conversations between Brezhnev and German Democratic Republic leader Erich Honecker, one in July 1978 and another a year later, in which they analyzed the international situation and U.S.-Soviet relations;

* and finally, little more than a month after the invasion of Afghanistan, a February 1980 Politburo-approved telegram to the USSR Ambassador to West Germany (in preparation for a meeting with former Chancellor and head of the Socialist International Willy Brandt) defending Moscow's action and reviewing the downward spiral in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Most of these translated documents were obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project" undertaken by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University in cooperation with the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and other scholarly and archival partners. To explore the reasons behind the collapse of superpower detente in the mid-1970s, the Project assembled veterans of the Carter and Brezhnev leaderships for a series of oral history conferences and promoted the declassification,




Document 1: Record of Conversation tably be competition between our countries. between Soviet Foreign Minister

I do not think, however, that this is an Gromyko and President Carter, 23 unhealthy situation and I believe that we can September 1977

conduct this competition to our mutual ben

efit in the spirit of respect for each other. RECORD OF THE MAIN CONTENT

Like the Soviet Union, our country will

support its own defenses on the high level

necessary to guarantee the preservation of WITH USA PRESIDENT J. CARTER peace. I am sure that this will not prevent

us from developing our mutual relations. 23 September 1977, Washington

The USA has a highly developed tech

nology. We have powerful economic potenJ. CARTER. I am very happy to greet tial, produce many food items, conduct large you here in the White House. It is an honor scale trade with other countries. to meet you.

The Soviet Union has its own strong A.A. GROMYKO, I am very happy to qualities and it too has an ability to offer meet you, Mr. President, and to discuss the many benefits to the international commuquestions which are of interest to both sides. nity. I want to use this opportunity to tell you that Both of our countries still do not use L.I. Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership send in full the potential for the development of their greetings and best wishes to you. mutual trade, although we have some trade

J. CARTER. Thank you and upon your links. We successfully cooperate in a numreturn home please give my warmest and ber of science-technical areas such as enmost sincere regards and best wishes to L.I. ergy industry. These links and cooperation Brezhnev.

should be developed further. At this meeting I would like to set forth We have different approaches to the in a general form my personal views on the question of human rights. And I know that questions of mutual relations between the some of our statements on this question proUSA and the Soviet Union. Then, you, if voked L.I. Brezhnev’s displeasure. Howyou like, could respond to my general state- ever, adhering to our position on this quesments, and after that we could discuss some tion, we do not want to interfere in the doconcrete questions in more detail.

mestic affairs of any state or to put you in A.A. GROMYKO. I agree with such a an awkward position. It is necessary, approcedure of our conversation.

parently, to recognize that we see differently J. CARTER. I would like to say right these problems and that the human rights away that as President I attach special sig- problem deeply troubles our people. Above nificance to good relations with the Soviet all, the human rights problem in our hemiUnion. I believe that friendly relations and sphere concerns us. But some facts in the close cooperation between the USA and the Soviet Union also give rise to our concern, Soviet Union are of utmost importance and such as the imprisonment of some Soviet I will do everything necessary in order to Jews, for instance (dissident Anatoly] guarantee the steady development of good Shcharansky. mutual relations between our two countries. You know, that our Congress, even

Certainly, because of the differences before my coming to the White House, between our social systems there will inevi- linked the development of trade with the

Soviet Union with the problem of the Jewish emigration from the USSR. I would like with your assistance to achieve some progress in overcoming of limitations established by the Congress in order to ameliorate this source of tension and misunderstanding

Next month the question of human rights among others will be discussed at the Conference (on Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Belgrade. We approach this Conference in a constructive way and we will maintain constant consultations in Belgrade with the Soviet representative. We already consulted on the questions related to the Conference with our allies and we do not want this Conference to be an obstacle in our relations with the Soviet Union. But it is also true that it will be necessary to discuss all aspects of the Helsinki Agreement in Belgrade in order to verify how they are being observed. In other words, my approach to the Belgrade Conference is constructive and I do not want it to be conducted in the spirit of controversy.

The USA is actively involved in various international problems which we would like to solve in the conditions of cooperation with the Soviet Union. We, in particular, are trying to resolve the South African problems. We, like you, are very concerned about the situation that has developed there. We are worrying not only about the manifestation of racism in this part of the globe, but, like you, about the intention of the South African Republic to create its own nuclear weapon.

We would like to resolve the problems of Namibia and Zimbabwe. Together with Great Britain we put forth a concrete plan of solving the problem of Rhodesia. I am glad that in the UN the Soviet Union takes a constructive position on this question. I hope that in case of disagreement with our approach to the problems of the South of

« 上一頁繼續 »