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been Stalin's belief that the entire question of the Chinese entry into the war was so profound that: 1) he had to discuss it with Mao directly; and 2) he should not even raise it until it was clear that without Chinese help the North Koreans would not survive, and until the latter asked for it explicitly. Also, Stalin may have wanted to probe Mao's intentions and promises and put them to a real test, albeit on the minor issue of truck drivers. Perhaps Stalin even hoped to drag Mao into the war incrementally: according to this scenario, the drivers would be the first commitment of manpower by Mao to Korea, which would later lead to a chain of escalating commitments.

The Politburo made these decisions and wired some of them to Pyongyang close to noon on September 30, i.e., before Stalin received another ciphered telegram #1340 from Shtykov [Document #5], later that the same day (after 4:55 p.m.). Only then was Stalin officially informed by him that Seoul had fallen and Syngman Rhee was back in the capital, promising to complete his drive to the North and vanquish Stalin's North Korean comrades; that Kim Il Sung was afraid that the UN forces would not halt their advance northward at the 38th parallel; and that the North Koreans would not be able to resist the enemy's offensive on their

own.

Later in the evening of September 30, in line with the general disposition in Moscow toward limiting the Soviet presence and risks in Korea, Shtykov requested evacuation powers from Moscow [Stalin was informed of this in a note from Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko dated September 30-Document #9]. Shtykov asked for the right to send back to the USSR all Soviet specialists working at the North Korean enterprises, 27 as well as some redundant personnel of the Soviet organizations in the DPRK. As the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK responsible for the lives of his people and anticipating the inevitability of the U.S. occupation of North Korea, Shtykov not unnaturally sought emergence authority to order their evacuation. But Gromyko disagreed and advised a different procedure: In order to show the Soviets' continuous faith and backing for Kim Il Sung's government, he recommended to Stalin that Shtykov be allowed to repatriate the Soviet specialists only after a specific request of such a nature was made by the DPRK gov

ernment. Otherwise, all had to stay at their post, whatever it was. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry in Moscow insisted that it, Foreign Ministry in Moscow insisted that it, not Shtykov, should have the final say in each case of anticipatory repatriation. Surprisingly, Stalin opted to defer both Shtykov's request and Gromyko's recommendation for the time being.

Later that same night, on September 30, Stalin, who was vacationing at one of his dachas on the Black Sea, was informed about the content of Zhou Enlai's official speech in Beijing earlier that day, in which Zhou stated that "the Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists." Stalin may well have sensed that the Chinese might be ready for action.

On October 1, at 3:00 a.m., upon the receipt of Kim Il Sung's desperate plea for help, Stalin immediately dictated a telegram to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and had it wired to Beijing [Document #10]. In his telegram, first of all he placed all the blame for the KPA's collapse and disintegration on North Korean military commanders who, in his opinion, had failed to carry out Kim Il Sung's orders for a strategic retreat of the main forces from the South. He specifically mentioned to Mao that Moscow had forewarned the North Korean political leadership about possibly devastating consequences of the U.S. landing at Inch'on as early as September 16, but that the warning was disregarded. However, he was careful to avoid blaming Kim Il Sung personally, thereby indicating to Mao that Kim was still the man to deal with in Pyongyang. Second, Stalin informed Mao and Zhou that after their ruinous defeat in Seoul, the North Koreans no longer had any troops capable of resistance, and that the road toward the 38th parallel from the south was wide open. Finally, Stalin requested that Mao, if possible, "immediately dispatch at least five to six divisions toward the 38th parallel so that the Korean comrades would have an opportunity to regroup and form combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the protection of the Chinese troops." Stalin suggested, apparently for the first time, that the Chinese troops should be designated as "volunteer" forces. In order to entice Mao further, he indicated that he was ready to share overall command and control over the KPA and the Chinese volunteer forces with the Chinese

generals, implying that the role of the Soviet military advisers to Kim Il Sung and the KPA would be drastically curtailed, if not abolished altogether.

It is noteworthy that this is one of the first instances in the Stalin-Mao correspondence where Stalin indicated to Mao his willingness to share control over events in Korea. In exchange for shouldering so much of the burden of defending of North Korea, Stalin offered Mao a power-sharing arrangement. Thus, this telegram was a harbinger of the looming end of the unilateral Soviet control over North Korea which had lasted since 1945. It also meant that from then on Kim Il Sung would have two masters to serve, as well as to play off against each other-one in Moscow and one in Beijing. At the same time, Stalin felt compelled to show some respect for Chinese sensitivities, in particular, their yearning for national independence and independent decision-making; moreover, he was intent to avoid the possibly very awkward position of being the messenger of bad news, in case Mao turned down his request. Therefore, Stalin "magnanimously" designated Mao to deliver his own response directly to Kim Il Sung, stressing that he did not intend to pre-judge the Chinese comrades and tell Kim Il Sung about their likely decision, nor would he desire to do so in the future, because all the honors and gratitude should belong to Mao, not Stalin.

On the evening of October 1, Stalin approved the text of a Soviet draft resolution regarding the Korean Question that had been drafted at the Foreign Ministry's first Far Eastern Department, approved by Gromyko, and submitted for Stalin's consideration. For Stalin, it was a last pitch to the West to resolve the Korean crisis without major escalation.28 At 9:15 p.m. (Moscow time), in Beijing Soviet Ambassador Roshchin delivered the content of the draft resolution to Zhou Enlai. At 10:45 p.m. (Moscow time), Zhou Enlai met Roshchin again and informed him that Mao agreed with its provisions. An hour later, after learning Mao's view, Stalin immediately ordered it wired to the Soviet Representative to the United Nations at Lake Success.29

It is well known that on October 2, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky presented the Soviet draft resolution to the Political Committee of the General Assembly, which stipulated an immediate ceasefire, with

drawal of all foreign troops, and general elections in all Korea to be held under international supervision. However, at this stage of the war, after a miraculous landing at Inch'on and the recapture of Seoul when the KPA was in ruins, a ceasefire was out of question and totally unacceptable to the West. By now, the decision made in Washington, on mostly tactical grounds, to cross the 38th parallel, after Inch'on had become an official United Nations operation.

While waiting for Mao's reply, on October 2, Stalin received information that the North Korean frontier defenses had begun to crumble under incessant attacks from Rhee's revenge-hungry troops, and the ROK forces had pushed north beyond the parallel on the east coast road heading towards Kosong. He sent an angry ciphered telegram to Matveev in Pyongyang [Document #11], reiterating his earlier directive to his chief military representative in Korea to do his utmost to bring the remnants of the KPA mired in the south back into the north, and to hold the frontline along the 38th parallel.

In the meantime, in Beijing, the crisis was building on October 2: ignoring Zhou's warnings, ROK troops with U.S. backing had crossed the 38th parallel a day earlier; Kim Il Sung was begging for direct military assistance; and, finally, Stalin was personally urging Mao to intervene in Korea. Consequently, that day Mao convened the first of a series of enlarged meetings of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP CC) Politburo in Beijing to formulate the Chinese response. New documents from the Russian Presidential Archive suggest that at their first meeting the CCP CC Politburo members discussed general reasons why the PRC should or should not enter the war in Korea and decided that the risks outweighed the benefits of China's direct military intervention at that time. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao's negative position prevailed, and Mao felt obliged to inform Stalin of the Chinese hesitations and lack of decision.

On October 3, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Roshchin, relayed Mao Zedong's negative response. [See Document #12.] Replying to Stalin's October 1 entreaty to enter the war, Mao acknowledged that the Chinese leadership had "originally planned" to send "several volunteer divisions" to assist the "Korean comrades" once the enemy crossed the 38th parallel. However, he ex

plained, after "thoroughly" considering the matter, many of his comrades now advocated a more cautious course of action. Consequently, the PRC would refrain from sending troops to Korea, at least for the time being. Mao attributed this reversal to three principal considerations. First, the Chinese army was poorly armed, ill-prepared, and had "no confidence" it could defeat the modern American military, which could "force us into retreat." Second, Chinese intervention in the conflict would "most likely" lead to an open Sino-American war, which in turn could drag the USSR into the war due to its commitments under the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, "and the question would thus become extremely large." Finally, after decades of civil war, Chinese entry into the Korean conflict to confront a powerful American adversary would provoke widespread domestic resentment within the PRC toward the newly-established People's Government, and wreck the leadership's plan for peaceful reconstruction.

Therefore, Mao reluctantly concluded, it was necessary to "show patience now," focus on building military strength for a possible later conflict, and in the meantime accept a temporary defeat in Korea while the North Koreans "change the form of the struggle to partisan war." Mao concluded his message by noting that this decision was provisional and awaited a final determination by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; in the meantime, he was ready to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to Stalin's vacation home for direct consultations. In conveying Mao's telegram, which was dated October 2, an obviously shocked Roshchin noted that this new position flatly contradicted repeated assurances from Chinese leaders that the People's Liberation Army was ready, indeed, in high "fighting spirit," to aid the Koreans and to defeat the Americans. The Soviet envoy could only speculate on the reasons for the turnabout in the Beijing leadership's stand: the international situation, the "worsening" predicament in Korea, and/or Anglo-American "intrigues" through the intercession of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (It is important to note that this account of Mao's October 2 communication to Stalin, informing him of Chinese refusal to enter the war, based on newly-declassified documents int he Russian archives, fundamentally contradicts the purported Mao to Stalin message of

October 2 which was published in 1987 in an official Chinese document compilation and has since been relied upon for numerous scholarly accounts; see the attached footnote for further information.)30

Stalin, while undoubtedly sorely disappointed, did not know whether Mao had given his final word or was simply for bargaining for better terms for China's participation in the war. During the day of October 5, Stalin conferred with the members of the (VKP(b) CC) Politburo. Although the official agenda was designated as "the Question of Comrade Shtykov," the real issue under consideration was the nature of the Soviet national security interest in Korea and how to protect it on the ground. All Politburo members agreed that a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation in Korea should be avoided at all costs, even if the USSR had to abandon North Korea. In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalls that "When the threat [after Inch'on] emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea that North Korea would be annihilated, and that the Americans would reach our border. I remember quite well that in connection with the exchange of opinions on the Korean question, Stalin said: 'So what? Let the United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. They will come there, but we shall not fight them now. We are not ready to fight."31 The upshot of the Politburo discussion was a decision to increase pressure on Mao to extract an unequivocal commitment from China to enter the war.

Thus, it appears that as a result of cumulative discussions and a series of incremental decisions dated September 27, September 30, and October 5, the Soviet Politburo adopted a major policy shift in the Soviet policy toward Korea. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided to begin to limit Soviet military and political exposure in Korea, and at the same time permit a greater Chinese role in the alliance decision-making on Korea.

In this light, given the continuous deterioration of the military situation in Korea, as well as the Soviet leaders' determination to see Chinese, not Soviet, troops fighting there, the Politburo overruled the Foreign Ministry's objections and decided, as one of the first steps aimed at curtailing the Soviet presence in Korea, to grant Ambassador Shtykov the evacuation powers that he requested with respect to some Soviet specialists employed by the DPRK government and

by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He was notified of this policy change by wire the same day. Ironically, the permission arrived just as Shtykov, sensing a policy shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim Il Sung's ability to defend his regime on his own, and unsure if any help was coming from Moscow or Beijing, requested even more extended evacuation powers, now including the families of the Soviet citizens of 32 Korean nationality, 52 the personnel of the Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea,33 and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Document #16]. It took less than a day for Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin's approval and immediately wire the affirma

tive response.

After the conference with his Politburo associates sometime during the day of October 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao and Zhou [Document #13]. Without mentioning the latest policy shift in Moscow, he outlined his reasoning why it was in China's national interest to dispatch the Chinese "Volunteers" to save the collapsing North Korean regime and why this had to be done immediately. First, he reiterated his conviction that the United States was not ready to fight a major war at present, while Japan, whose militaristic potential had not yet been restored, was not currently capable of militarily assisting the Americans. Therefore, he argued, the U.S. would be compelled to concede in the Korean question to China, which was backed by its ally, the USSR, and to agree to terms of settlement favorable to (North) Korea thus preventing the Americans from transforming the peninsula into their springboard. Following the same hardnosed realpolitik reasoning, Stalin stated that, consequently, not only would Washington have to abandon Taiwan, but also they would have to reject the idea of separate peace with the Japanese "revanchists," and to jettison their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their bridgehead in the Far East.

Having depicted his vision of an emerging new geopolitical order in the Far East, Stalin blandly told Mao that he proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if she were to

adopt a passive wait-and-see policy. Without some serious struggle and an imposing display of force, he argued, not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions,

but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan, which at that time the United States was clinging to; not for the benefit of Nationalist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), in Stalin's view, but to use the island as its own strategic base or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

In conclusion, Stalin displayed a singularly unusual propensity for high-stakes gambling which was fraught with the potential for global disaster. He reassured Mao that he had taken into account the possibility that the United States, albeit unready to fight a major war then, could still be drawn into a big war (i.e., with China) on a question of prestige, which, in turn, would drag the USSR, which was bound with China by a Mutual Assistance Pact, into the war. Stalin asked Mao: "Should we be afraid of this possibility? In my opinion, we should not, because, together, we will be stronger than the United States and Great Britain, whereas none of the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany, which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) possess any military power at all. If war is inevitable, let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese imperialism will be restored as a U.S. ally and when the U.S. and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in the form of all Korea run by Syngman Rhee." This telegram was a call for action. Stalin forcefully indicated to Mao that all the chips were down, and Mao had to show what hand he was playing after all.

The embattled Mao must have received this telegram amidst a series of tense emergency sessions of the CCP CC Politburo in Beijing sometime on October 6. It was at one of these meetings that Mao reportedly announced his decision to appoint Peng Dehuai as the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). Later that evening, Mao dined together with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, and Gao Gang. Reportedly, they agreed that "now it seems that we have to fight a war," and that Zhou Enlai would fly to Moscow to solicit Soviet military aid. The next morning, a supreme military conference presided over by Zhou is said formally to have approved of Mao's decision to send Zhou and Lin Biao to the USSR to discuss the details of military cooperation.34

On October 7, Stalin received Mao's reply; in Stalin's own words, "Mao expressed solidarity with the main ideas of my [October

5] letter and stated that he would send nine, not six, divisions to Korea, but that he would not do it right away; instead, he intended to do it some time soon. In the meantime, he asked me to receive his representatives and discuss with them a plan of military assistance to Korea in detail" [see Document #13]. Evidently, Mao's October 7 telegram contained only his conditional consent to send troops to Korea. He had taken a step toward Stalin's position but hinted that, once again, the decision was not yet final, and could be rendered final only after Stalin received in person and succeeded in persuading the chief CCP CC Politburo opponents of China's entry into the Korean War: Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Stalin accepted Mao's request with understanding, realizing that he had to bolster Mao if he wanted the latter to deliver.

While Moscow and Beijing bickered about why, when, on what terms, and whether troops should be sent to defend Kim Il Sung's crumbling regime—and whose troops they should be the Western allies intensified their diplomatic offensive at the United Nations and stepped up their military offensive on the battleground, anticipating a quick mop-up of the entire Korean campaign. On October 4, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly rejected the Soviet draft resolution of October 2, and, on October 7, the UN General Assembly passed by a 47-5-7 vote a "Go after the DPRK" resolution, proposed by the United Kingdom, which recommended that: "1. a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; b) all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the U.N., for the establishing of a united, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea." In a nutshell, this resolution gave Gen. MacArthur and the Western powers carte blanche to occupy all of North Korea and rearrange its political and economic systems to their liking. On the day this crucial vote was taken, in Korea the advanced units of the 1st Cavalry of Gen. Walton Walker's Army crossed the 38th Parallel in the Kaesong area.

At 10:15 p.m. on the night of October 7 Stalin asked Bulganin to forward to Kim Il Sung via Shtykov his long-delayed response to Kim's October 1 plea for help. It had taken almost a week for Stalin to respond, although he was well aware that Kim was

desperate and hanging over a precipice. Stalin had tarried simply because he did not yet have any good news to deliver. Only after receiving Mao's conditional commitment did he decide to write to Kim. In his telegram, which Shtykov gave Kim on the afternoon of October 8, Stalin for the first time told Kim Il Sung about his ongoing negotiations with Mao, noting that the Chinese comrades still had doubts and hesitated to make a final commitment to fight, but, at the same time, emphasizing that negotiations continued, and therefore Kim Il Sung had to battle tenaciously for each inch of his land because help was on its way [Document #13].

Reportedly, Mao also sent a telegram to Kim Il Sung via his Ambassador in Pyongyang, who went to Kim's underground headquarters and handed it to him on the night of October 8. It said: "In view of the current situation, we have decided to send volunteers to Korea to help you fight against the aggressor." Chinese sources report Kim Il Sung to have reacted gleefully.35

The next morning, on October 9, at 7:05 a.m., Shtykov wired Kim's reply to Stalin [Document #16], adding that he concurred with its content. Clearly, this letter reflected Kim's new, more positive mood and his newly found self-confidence. Although Shtykov did not mention any contacts between Kim and the Chinese representatives the night before, surely Mao's cable had lifted Kim's spirit. In his letter, Kim expressed his belief that the U.S. aggressor would not stop until it had occupied Korea entirely and converted it into its militarystrategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East; therefore, the struggle of the Korean people for their independence, freedom, and state sovereignty would be protracted and very hard.

In contrast to his previous letter of September 29, in which he had requested "direct military assistance" from the Soviet Union, Kim now asked Stalin only to aid the KPA by training 2,000 pilots, 1,000 tank drivers, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers in the territory of the USSR. Of course, if one looks at the numbers, the inescapable impression is that Kim basically asked Stalin to help train an entirely new professional officers corps for the KPA, with the exception of the infantry officers. In other words, Kim Il Sung's fortunes were still very much dependent on professional

military advice and arms supplies from the USSR. Nonetheless, once informed of Mao's commitment to send ground troops to fight in Korea, he apparently began to distance himself from Stalin. No longer did he request Soviet ground troops or even air cover, because he knew Mao would probably take care of it by himself, 36

In the meantime, the Western allies continued to advance. On October 9 in Washington, President Truman and the JCS directed MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel, even if Chinese intervention occurred, so long as "in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success." At once, MacArthur issued his final unconditional surrender demand, stating that unless North Korea capitulated, he would proceed to "take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations." The same day, advanced ROK I Corps units moving up the east coast from the perimeter reached Wonsan, over 110 miles north of the parallel. The 1st Cavalry and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade pushed north towards Kumchon, Sariwon, and Pyongyang itself.37 On October 9, two F-80 jets raided "by mistake" a Soviet airfield sixty miles inside the USSR border near Vladivostok. The days of Kim Il Sung's state appeared to be numbered. It is plausible to assume that Stalin was aware of these developments in Korea when he first received Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao at a dacha near the Black Sea late that night.

The Stalin-Zhou talks of 9-10 October 1950 are crucial in understanding the evolution of the Soviet-Chinese alliance and the terms of the Chinese entry into the Korean War. They reveal how domestic political considerations influenced the foreign policy priorities of these two communist giants, as well as the pivotal role of misperceptions and miscommunications in the mismanagement of the alliance relationship.

The newly declassified Russian documents from the APRF by and large confirm the account of Mao's interpreter, Shi Zhe,38 (except dates) of what transpired between Stalin and Zhou at the former's dacha during these two days. In brief, Zhou told Stalin that the CCP CC Politburo had decided not to send troops to Korea because: 1) China lacked adequate money, arms, or transport; 2) the CCP's domestic political opposition had not been pacified yet, and reactionary had not been pacified yet, and reactionary

forces could use this opportunity to raise their heads again; and, finally, 3) the U.S. could declare war on China, should the latter intervene in Korea.

Aware of these arguments from his previous correspondence with Mao and bearing in mind that Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao were the chief opponents within the CCP CC Politburo of China's entry into the war, Stalin went on the offensive. First, he noted that the Great Patriotic War (World War II) had just ended, and therefore it would be very difficult for the USSR to fight another large-scale war right away. Besides, the Soviet-North Korean border was too narrow to allow massive troop transfers. Notwithstanding this, if U.S. actions were to jeopardize the fate of world socialism on a global scale, the Soviet Union would be ready to take up the American challenge. However, he stressed that, at that time, U.S. imperialism was in a weak strategic position because it could not rely for assistance on traditional military powers such as Germany and Japan, as well as Britain, all of which were profoundly weakened by the Second World War. Hence, Washington would not dare to launch a world war. Since any kind of U.S. attack against China would trigger the mutual military assistance provision of the Soviet-Chinese Alliance Treaty and draw the U.S. into a global conflict with the USSR, for which it was not ready, America was unlikely to risk a war with China on the latter's own territory. Hence, in Stalin's opinion, at that moment, Beijing could help the North Koreans without fear of U.S. retaliation against Mainland China. Moreover, Stalin emphasized that it was in China's national interest to ensure the survival of a friendly government in North Korea. For, if the U.S. occupied the North and deployed its forces along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, this would pose an enormous threat to Chinese security, because the Americans could harass China from the air, land, and sea at their discretion and could also endanger the economic development of northeast China.

But, despite these arguments, Zhou did not yield to Stalin's pressure. Stalin appears to have almost yelled in exasperation, “That you do not want to send troops to Korea is your decision, but socialism in Korea would collapse within a very short period of time." After regaining his composure, Stalin changed his tactics and laid out a stark alternative for Zhou. He suggested that both the

Soviet Union and PRC provide sanctuary for Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA if they could no longer fight on their own; the main forces, arms, equipment, and some cadres of the KPA would be redeployed to northeast China, while the disabled and wounded men, as well as Koreans of Soviet origin, could be moved to the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East. In their new bases in northeast China they would train new troops, master new weaponry, and prepare themselves for the day of their reentry into Korea. Stalin reiterated that since the Chinese did not intend to send troops, the Soviet Union and China should work out concrete plans to provide shelter for their Korean comrades and their forces, and make sure that one day they would be able to return to Korea.

Reportedly, Zhou was stunned at what he heard. He backed away from his initial tough stance, and asked Stalin whether China could count on Soviet air cover should it decide to fight in Korea. Without a pause, Stalin responded positively: "We can send a certain number of aircraft to offer cover [for the CPV in Korea-AM].” Stalin also reassured Zhou that the Soviet Union would take care of weapons and equipment supplies for the CPV, including their replacements, immediately after the Chinese side. ascertained its needs in actual combat.

The Stalin-Zhou talks lasted for two days, and yet no mutually agreed upon decisions were reached at the end. Zhou simply said that he needed to communicate with Beijing in order to ask for new instructions. Stalin replied that he could wait but that time was fast running out. They parted, reportedly, both confused about each other's true intentions.39

Contrary to Goncharov, Xue, and Lewis' account in Uncertain Partners40_ citing the recollections of Zhou aide Kang Yimin-Stalin and Zhou Enlai did not agree to send a joint telegram to Mao Zedong the next day. Nor did Molotov call Zhou after the latter's arrival in Moscow with "startling news that the Soviet Union would not offer any military equipment to China." These are stories, perhaps elaborated by Zhou's entourage in order to persuade Mao that Stalin, not Zhou's obduracy, was to blame for the "breakdown of talks;" that Stalin was an unreliable ally; and that, after all, China should not fight a war in Korea alone, which was Zhou's belief from the

very beginning.41 Not only did these fictional events never occur, they could not even have happened the way they were described. Stalin never co-signed his telegrams with anybody, regardless of the status of the other party or the addressee, including Mao and Zhou. In the Stalinist era, Soviet Politburo members never used the telephone to communicate important decisions, no matter how urgent those might be, let alone to talk to foreign leaders. These fictional events contradict the then-prevailing Soviet party bureaucratic practices.42 The present author has never encountered evidence of such unorthodox procedures anywhere in the Russian Archives.

In reality, all along Stalin reiterated his willingness to provide the CPV with air cover if Mao sent his troops to Korea.43 Nonetheless, on October 11, Zhou reportedly sent a telegram to Mao in Beijing, stating that "Comrade Filippov [a pseudonym for Stalin-AM] did not express his objections to the CCP CC Politburo's decision not to send troops to Korea." It was Gao Gang who told the Soviet Consul-General in Shenyang, A.M. Ledovsky, and General Vazhnov about Zhou's cable from Moscow during a conversation on October 25 in Shenyang. He added that it was this telegram from Zhou that reignited a fierce debate in the CCP CC Politburo regarding the merits of China's intervention in Korea.44 The result was that Mao put on hold all Chinese preparations in the northeast for the dispatch of troops to Korea. 45

I would interpret what happened during the Stalin-Zhou talks on October 9-10 as follows. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to see Stalin with a strong belief that China could not and should not intervene in Korea. During the talks, Stalin failed to convince them of the potentially dire consequences of the North's collapse for Chinese security and its international standing. Therefore, Zhou and Lin decided to stick to their original antiintervention stand in their debate with Mao, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang. At the same time, they invented a "respectable" excuse for their obduracy, i.e., an alleged refusal by Stalin to provide the CPV with air cover. At that moment, there was a brief rupture in bilateral communications, and both sides were left to make decisions for themselves.

As far as Zhou Enlai's role is concerned, if this scenario is correct, he rose up between Stalin and Mao, and almost had them at each

other's throat because they both disagreed with his own beliefs. Zhou seems to have viewed his visit to Stalin as a last opportunity to prevent China from entering the Korean war and to shift the entire burden of saving Kim's regime onto Stalin's broad shoulders. Once he realized that Stalin did not want to accept this responsibility and preferred to see the Chinese fighting, Zhou opted to bluff and may even have misrepresented the Soviet position in his correspondence with Mao. But, to his regret, he miscalculated Stalin's high risk-taking propensity in his gambling on the future of North Korea altogether, as well as Mao's own determination to fight in Korea, and failed to foresee that Mao would decide to fight even when his back was pushed against the wall and he was left ostensibly alone, allegedly without Soviet air support.

In the meantime, in Korea, on October 12, the Interim Committee of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, created by the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, advised the United Nations Command to take over the civil government of North Korea, which meant in practice that the U.S. military was authorized to rule the "liberated" provinces of North Korea. Kim Il Sung moved his headquarters to Kosangjin, near Kanggye, not far from the Chinese border. The newlyrebuilt KPA Front Line Command was moved to Tokch'on in South P'yongan Province. The KPA forces desperately tried to halt the advancing ROK and U.S. troops that had broken through the 38th parallel and reached as far as Chunghwa, a few miles from Pyongyang.

On the morning of October 13, Stalin received a report from Admirals Golovko and Fokin informing him of a large concentration of U.S. heavy battleships and amphibious assault vessels, manned with troops, apparently ready for an amphibious landing in the harbor of Wonsan [Document #17]. That day, Wonsan was the target of ferocious U.S. air raids and Navy fire. Stalin could easily foresee the strategic implications of the forthcoming U.S. landing in Wonsan: the KPA would be again split in half, this time along the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and, with its rear absolutely unprotected, the ROK I Corps and U.S. X Corps could march unimpeded toward the YaluTumen rivers on the North Korean-Chinese and North Korean-Soviet borders, while Gen.

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