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Africa we could privately discuss these cise the required restraint in order to pre- tracts, however, in the future we intend to problems via our ambassadors in Moscow vent unnecessary aggravation in this region. exercise more restraint in this regard. We or Washington so that we could have a com

A few words about relations between hope that the Western European countries mon approach in the public arena. We do the USA and China. We are striving to nor- and the Soviet Union will take the same not have any specific interest in that a spe- malize our relations with China not for the position as well. cific government would come to power in purpose of creating a kind of alliance with We would like to conclude a treaty on this region. This question should be decided it against the Soviet Union but for strength- a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. We by the people themselves. And we do not ening peace, developing trade and other re- would like to achieve a termination of all want to sell weapons to the countries of this lations with that country. We hope that the nuclear tests on the basis of signing, first, region.

problem of mutual relations between the an agreement with the Soviet Union and Angola, with the presence of several PRC (People's Republic of China) and Tai- England in the hope that it will impel France thousand Cuban troops there, creates a prob- wan will be resolved by peaceful means. and China to join such an agreement. We lem for us. I think it would have been use- But we do not want to abrogate our obliga- think it is important to include in such a ban ful if you, or we together, had convinced tion to guarantee the peaceful life of Tai- also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, Cubans to withdraw their troops from

since it is difficult to make a distinction beAngola, although I understand that we have In the past few years we witnessed the tween an explosion for military purposes a difference of opinions on this question. improvement of the Soviet Union's relations and for peaceful ones. In any case, the abil

We also are interested in achieving a with some Western European countries ity to conduct peaceful explosions gives the settlement in the Middle East. Vance re- which are our allies. We too would like to countries who conduct them the ability to ported to me that judging from his conver- improve our relations with the Warsaw Pact use the nuclear energy also for military pursation with you, the Soviet position on this nations. Our alliance with our friends in

poses. question is close to ours. In the past the Western Europe is solid, like your alliance Now a few words of a general characSoviet Union was close to the Arab states with your friends. And we hope that this ter in regard to a conclusion of the new and the USA was close, mainly, to Israel. situation will last.

agreement on the limitation of strategic But even today we are interested in the pres- We conduct the negotiations with you arms. I think we are very close of reaching ervation of peace in the Middle East, in guar- on a number of questions of arms limita- an agreement. However, some new circumanteeing the independence of Israel by tion. We would like to reach an agreement stances emerged which differ from the situpeaceful methods. Over the last several on demilitarization of the Indian ocean in ation that existed during the meeting [beyears we won the respect and trust of a num- the future. We also are counting on an agree- tween Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald ber of Arab countries. We are trying to con- ment on a ban on chemical weapons. We R. Ford in December 1974) in Vladivostok. duct a just and evenhanded policy in this would like to reach an agreement on advance For us, the measures taken by the Soviet region and we hope that together with you notification of missile launch tests in order Union regarding the equipping of heavy we will be able to further a peaceful settle- to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. missiles with MIRV (Multiple, Indepenment. Sometimes the Soviet Union's ap- We hope that these and other negotiations dently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles--ed.] was proach to the problems of the Middle East, which we conduct with you will be success- unexpected and at the same time troubling. in our view, was not constructive enough. I ful.

We did not expect that the Soviet heavy misonly state the fact, however. I am not com- We hope to achieve an agreement on siles SS-18 would be equipped with MIRV plaining

banning hostile actions against artificial sat- at such a quick pace. But this strengthens We intend to keep you informed on the ellites. We know about the Soviet program the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a development of the situation in the Middle of the creation of the means intended for first strike and it threatens the survivability East, on the position of those countries with fighting the satellites of other countries. We of our missile silos. You, on the other hand, whom we have regular contact. And I hope also could develop such a program, but we express concern in regard to American that you too will keep us informed, in par- would like to ban such actions. Both of us cruise missiles which were not mentioned ticular about the PLO [Palestine Liberation take similar positions on the question of non- in Vladivostok. However, the cruise misOrganization) position.

proliferation of nuclear weapons and we siles are not capable of a first strike because Another region that worries us is Ko- together live through disappointments when of their small velocity and also because they rea. We hope that the South and North Ko- we witness attempts to violate this principle. can be easily identified during their flight. rea will live in peace with each other. The Both our countries speak in favor of stricter I talked with former President Ford and USA intends to withdraw its troops from the limitations in regard to proliferation of former Secretary of State (Henry A. South Korea in a 4-5 year period. How- nuclear weapons.

Kissinger in detail and thoroughly studied ever, we have to do something so that South We worry about sales of arms to other the reports on the negotiations in Korea will be able to provide for its own countries. In the past the USA, unfortu- Vladivostok and I am convinced that the defence.

nately, have been selling too much arms, like representatives of the USA were talking The introduction by North Korea of the the Soviet Union, by the way.

there only about ballistic missiles, not the 50-mile zone of the sea borders concerns I hope that in the future we will not be cruise ones. us. We hope that the Soviet Union will be doing this. We still supply the arms to some I understand that L.I. Brezhnev does able to persuade the North Korea to exer- countries in accordance with our past con- not agree with such an interpretation of the Vladivostok negotiations. If so, one has to ness relations but precisely good friendly Brezhnev, that our policy is directed to mainrecognize the disagreements between us on ones. I think, you, yourself, made such a taining good and, even more than that, - as this question, the disagreements in interpre- conclusion from L.I. Brezhnev's speeches, we already mentioned - friendly relations tations.

in particular after your speech in Charles- with the USA. Secretary of State Vance told me about ton.

In your statement you touched upon your conversation with him on these mat- Incidentally, I would like to linger a bit some concrete problems. You pointed at the ters yesterday and I intend to give you an on some of your speeches, bearing in mind need to take into account the differences in account of our concrete proposals a little bit the importance of this question. You made social and economic systems of our counlater.

some statements where you touched upon tries. Actually, these differences exist, and So, I set forth my views on the ques- mutual relations with the Soviet Union. In they will exist. It is important, however, that tions of developing the relations with the some of these speeches you emphasized the despite the existing differences between us Soviet Union and I would like to empha- importance of mutual understanding and co- we should continue to develop our mutual size once again the great importance that I operation with the Soviet Union. In some relations. We again emphasize that it would attach to our mutual relations with the So- others you just mentioned the Soviet Union be in the interests of both our peoples and viet Union. I would like to assure you that without definite statements. And yet in some of the whole world. Precisely all that we personally as well as as President of the others you criticized the Soviet Union, in call the policy of peaceful co-existence, the USA that I will sincerely strive to overcome your own way, but I repeat, criticized it. policy of resolving controversial issues by all existing disagreements between us. I Sometimes you did it indirectly but it was peaceful means, regardless the differences hope that in the course of a few months we not difficult to guess to whom you addressed in economic and social systems and the difwill be able to achieve such progress in our these criticisms, whom you had in mind. ferences in ideology. mutual relations, which would justify a And so we ponder which of these state- You correctly pointed out the impormeeting between myself and L.I. Brezhnev. ments reflect your true policy as the Presi tance of trade-economic relations. It is also I would very much like him to visit the USA dent of the USA, the policy of the USA as a true that they are essential for the developwhere we would be able to discuss with him state. We would like to think that it is those ment of political relations. It would be very for two-three days here, in Washington, or, statements, in which the need of coopera- good if all the obstacles on the path of the even better, in Camp David, all the ques- tion was emphasized, the necessity of main- development trade-economic relations betions which interest both of us.

taining good relations with the Soviet Union tween our countries were removed. But it Before that, however, I would like us for the interests of both of our countries, for were not we who created these obstacles. together to have made such progress in solv- the interests of the whole world.

They have been created on this side of the ing the problems of particular importance But this is our desire too[:] however, Atlantic ocean. All this is well known. to us, that would demonstrate to the whole only you can interpret your own statements. We, certainly, have noted some optiworld our mutual aspiration consistently to And that is why we would like you to do it mistic signals that appeared in the statements improve our relations. I spoke about it pub- now. I would like to bring to Moscow a of some American politicians that the situalicly and I use this opportunity to express definite answer on the question of how you, tion can change for the better in the near my appreciation to L.I. Brezhnev for his yourself, imagine the prospects for devel- future. We would like for this to happen. public reaction to my speech in Charleston. opment of relations with the Soviet Union. We believe that it would be in the interests

The American people sincerely strives There is hardly a need for a lengthy of both countries to establish normal tradefor cooperation and friendship with the So- discussion about the significance of these economic links, to remove all the obstacles viet Union. I hope that I, as the political relations for the peoples of our countries as on this path, especially because from the leader of our country, and L.I. Brezhnev, as well as for the whole world. It is self-evi- very beginning they were artificial. But in the political leader of the Soviet Union, will dent that these relations have a great sig- general, such relations are for our mutual not create obstacles on the path which our nificance. If there are good relations and benefits. We are convinced that it is both peoples so sincerely strive to follow. And I mutual understanding between us or, even countries that will benefit from trade and hope that our meeting today will be useful better, friendly relations, then there will be the development of economic links between and constructive in this respect.

peace in the world, there won't be another them. A.A. GROMYKO. I attentively lis- world war. If, however, these relations will You touched upon the issue of “human tened to your statement in which a whole go awry, if somebody will ruin these rela- rights." We must say that when you or other specter of questions between our countries tions, then a world tragedy will occur. American politicians begin to talk about has been touched upon. On my part I would The basic thing in this matter is the “human rights," we, in the Soviet Union, in like to express my opinion on the questions question of what will be the policy of the the Soviet leadership, have a kind of autoyou have touched upon and maybe on some USA government toward the Soviet Union matic conditional reflex: we expect that others.

and, consequently, what will be the policy some shots will be made towards the Soviet First of all, I would like to emphasize of the Soviet Union toward the USA. For Union, of course without any grounds. Why that the entire Soviet leadership, L.I. ourselves, for the Soviet Union we have is it being done? We do not believe that one Brezhnev personally, and all our people sin- been giving and can give a clear answer right person in the world or even a group of cerely aspire to maintain good friendly re- now. I am authorized to declare on behalf people can claim the unique right to make lations with the USA, not just normal busi- of all our leadership, on behalf of L.I. judgments about “human rights." Each state has to decide these questions independently. And so it is being done.

If we would like to make a list of all violations of human rights in the USA or, say in England, Italy, the FRG, and in many other countries, it would be a long and impressive list. We are not doing it, however, because we do not want to interfere in other people's affairs. But we will never allow others to interfere in our affairs.

You mentioned someone called Shcharansky. Nobody knows him at all except, maybe, doctors and some representatives of authorities who oversee the order in our country. Such questions have an infinitesimal significance. Certainly, you, Mr. President, have a right to act as you believe is needed, but speaking impartially such position of yours on this question can only harm the climate of our relations. Besides, we think that the gain you get, acting in a such a way, is enormously disproportionate to your political loss.

You touched upon the so-called Jewish question. The Soviet Union during the war saved millions of Jews. These are known facts. This is an open book. Right after the war we together, or to be more precise, at the same time as the USA we introduced in the UN the proposal on the creation of an independent Jewish state. Since then we have always supported the right of Israel to independent state existence. We are trying to convince the Arabs, including the most extremist groups, to recognize Israel as an independent state, i.e. to recognize the reality. But at the same time we are blamed that we act wrongly in regard to Jewish question. In general, the question of emigration from the Soviet Union of any nationality, whether the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Armenians, the Georgians, the Jews or others, is our domestic problem, which is to be resolved in accordance with the laws of our country. If you use the facts then you probably know that dozens of thousands of Jews have left the Soviet Union over the past several years.

With satisfaction I have heard your words that you expect positive results from the Belgrade Conference, the results in the spirit of the Helsinki agreement. It would be good if Belgrade would become a constructive forum instead of a place of mutual accusations, some kind of a box of complaints. The Soviet Union is ready to play in Belgrade its own constructive role and

hopes that other participants will do the course I am saying this not on behalf of Palsame.

estinians. They did not authorize us to make Now, about the situation in the South any statements. But we are saying this on of Africa. Our policy for this region is the basis of knowing their position, and on simple. We do not have any military bases, the basis of our recent conversations with and no military personnel in this region. If [PLO chairman Yasser] Arafat in Moscow. one feels the influence of our ideology there So, is it really not possible to find a then who in the world can build the barriers solution of the issue who must be the first against the dissemination of any ideology? to take a step forward, Israel or the PalesThe only thing we want there is that all the tinians? This is exactly what the diplomacy problems should be solved by the majority is for: to solve such problems. It is posof population, by the peoples themselves. sible, for example, to find a solution under The majority of population there are Blacks, which such a recognition of the Palestinian so the power belongs to them, not to the state by Israel and Israel by the Palestinians White racists. We are against any delays in would be declared by both sides simultathe transition of power. Such is, in short, our neously. position in regard to Namibia, Zimbabwe, We share the opinion of Secretary South Africa. Incidentally, to the question Vance that peace in the Middle East should of the SAR I will come back in connection mean not only an armistice but also the eswith the problem of non-proliferation of tablishment of normal relations between two nuclear weapons.

sides. Now about Angola. We hailed the birth So let us together strive for the convoof this new independent African state. Not cation of the Geneva Conference on the so long ago we met A[gostinho). Neto in Middle East already this year. An all Arab Moscow, on the highest level, with the par- delegation could take part in this Conferticipation of L.I. Brezhnev. We did not find ence, if the Arabs themselves would agree that Angola took a hostile position in regard with that. But in any case the Palestinians, to the USA. As for the Cuban troops in the PLO must be represented in Geneva. Let Angola, it is the business of Angola and us try to do it. We are ready to make every Cuba and I am not authorized to discuss this effort possible in this direction. question. It would be right, however, to ask Whether you want it or not, the lack of in this regard: whose personnel supports the a settlement in the Middle East throws a anti-Angolan movement, the troops that are shadow on our mutual relations. We think based in Zaire and invade Angola? Whose that removing this shadow would serve the foreign troops acted in Angola even before interests of both of us. the arrival there of the Cuban troops. The Maybe you supply arms to the Middle answers to these questions are clear. East with happiness, we know to whom

Now about the Middle East. This is a these arms go, and to many other countries. large topic. I do not think we should spend We do it without any particular joy. If a a lot of time at your place discussing it. really stable peace would be established in More so since we already had an exchange the Middle East we would not supply the of opinions on this question with the Secre- arms there, if, of course, the others would tary Vance. And we have found out that not do it. It would be the ideal situation for there are some identical elements in our po- which one should strive. sitions. We also handed over some infor- A few words about Korea. You said mation to the American side which was not that you would be ready to cut the Ameriknown to you.

can troops deployed in the South Korea. But We are strongly convinced that if Is- as it is known the USA intends to keep its rael had taken a more sober position and had bases there at the same time. I think you, accepted the idea of a small state for the Pal- yourself, do not believe that we are going estinian Arabs, the PLO would have be to applaud such a decision, although, cerready to officially declare its recognition of tainly, such a step has some significance. Israel as an independent sovereign state in All the same, this seat of tension would conthe Middle East. In other words, it would tinue to exist among many others. have recognized the reality. But this is ex- Now about China. From the point of actly what Israel is striving for. Now it has view of the international situation and also more chances than ever to achieve it. Of of the broad interests of the USA and, of

course, the Soviet Union, we believe it is sentially identical. We both should expect a
correct to emphasize that it would have been great danger if this problem will not be ef-
a great mistake if a dirty game had been fectively resolved. This is a fact that the SAR
played here, the open or secret collusion (South African Republic) step by step is
against the Soviet Union, against its inter- moving forward to the creation of its own
ests. Because sooner or later it would have nuclear weapon. There are also other states
become known and the appropriate conse- who are close to the creation of nuclear
quences would follow, including those in the weapons. It would be good if the USA and
area ofthe US-Soviet relations. We would the Soviet Union would work more vigor-
like to hope that the USA does not intend to ously in the direction of reliable prevention
play the Chinese card against the Soviet of nuclear weapons proliferation. We are
Union. In the past under other American ready for it
administrations we have been assured many

You touched in general upon the questimes that the USA does not have such in- tion of arms sales to other countries. This tentions. We will see what the reality turn question is certainly connected to the genout to be.

eral climate that exists in the world, to the Presently relations between China and existence of hotbeds of tension. If the conthe USA are normal and, possibly, even ditions for stopping the arms sales had been friendly, whereas our relations with China created, we would have been ready to make are tense. We do not object to the existence an appropriate agreement. We stated it many of normal relations between China and the times. But first the hotbeds should be reUSA. But be on guard so that they do not moved. One of these hotbeds is the Middle pull you into games dirty and dangerous for East. our both countries. We too once had good I think that it was not accidental that relations with China. If the Chinese would you lingered on the question of stopping be able to embroil the USA with the Soviet nuclear tests. We would like to hope that the Union they would gladly use it for their own Soviet-American agreement on some paradvantage. Would this be good for the USA? tial steps in this sphere, which have been We do not have a crystal ball so that we concluded between us and which are being could see the future, however, the history considered by the USA Congress, will be teaches historians a lot. It have taught us, ratified as soon as possible. And we hope in any case, and the USA, too, should have that the negotiations, that are being conalready learned

ducted between us on the broad treaty, will You have mentioned the Indian Ocean. have also be successfully concluded. Certainly it would have been very good if You also touched upon the problem of an agreement would be reached between us problems, the signing of an agreement on on this question. Objectively, there are strategic arms limitation. I would like to grounds for this. But it is strikingly evi- state our position on two major questions dent, however, that you stubbornly cling to which are still unresolved. First, on the one rock in the Indian Ocean which is called cruise missiles of the class "air-land” (i.e. Diego Garcia. In our view the USA has no ALCM (air-launched cruise missiles]) on the real need for this, but at the same time this heavy bombers, and secondly, on the Sois being done with the intention of stepping viet heavy missiles by which some people on our toes. This is being done against the love to scare the American public. interests of our security. The American side I already stated our arguments to Secshould see this problem in a broader con- retary Vance which hardly need be repeated text. On our part we are ready to continue again. Apparently, you have been informed the exchange of opinions on this question about this. I shall emphasize only that in that has already begun.

regard to this questions “there is no land We conduct negotiations with the USA behind the Volga, there is no place to reon a range of other questions, including the treat,” as we used to say during the war. arms limitations at the expert level, work- Just remember how many concessions ing groups. We are ready to continue these we have already made to the Americans. negotiations and would like to believe that Specifically, in May of this year in Geneva they reach positive results.

we agreed to cut back - bearing in mind the About the non-proliferation of nuclear significance you personally give to this weapons. Our interests in this issue are es- question - by 150 units the total number of

carriers of strategic nuclear arms in comparison to the total amount of them in the agreement that was reached in Vladivostok.

Even earlier we agreed on the principle of calculation of missiles equipped with MIRV, under which if the missile had been tested even once with MIRV, then all the missiles of this type should be included in the total amount of missiles equipped with MIRV.

We accepted the USA proposal regarding the structure of the future agreement which would include an agreement or a treaty for the duration until 1985, the protocol to it, and the mutual declaration on basic directions of future negotiations. We also agreed that the protocol should be valid only for three years rather than until 1985.

All these were big concessions to the USA. But all of them, it goes without saying, were made dependent upon the achievement of the general agreement on the whole complex of questions. In other words, we considered all the questions as a complex. All these components are interrelated. One cannot seriously pocket any our concession as self-evident, leaving, however, the rest of questions unresolved.

If the contentious questions that I mentioned would be resolved, then we could conclude the agreement and sign it. I would like you to see the situation from a more realistic perspective.

We understand that you get advice on this question from many different people. I, on my part, was trying to picture the decision which would have been the most correct from our point of view. If we would be able to resolve these two main questions, then the road to a new agreement would be cleared up.

You said that there are two different interpretations of the Vladivostok agreement in regard to the cruise missiles. But, in fact, in Vladivostok there was not made any exception for any types of missiles. Some components of the proposed new agreement were absent in the acting temporary agreement. Precisely, the aviation. The temporary agreement speaks about two components: intercontinental ballistic land-based missiles and the submarine-based ballistic missiles. In the new agreement a third component was added, that is the aviation.

Now we again decided to meet the USA half-way in order to reach the agreement. Secretary Vance, probably, has already informed you. We are talking, in part, about USA, we think, should also be interested in Washington, I would like to meet him in the total number of land-based ICBM (in- this. In addition, a meeting would not be in order to discuss the practical steps which tercontinental ballistic misiles) equipped anyone's interests if it were a meeting just could facilitate the settlement of the issue with MIRV. Yesterday during my conversa- for the sake of meeting, or if such a meeting of the trade-economic relations between our tion with Vance I announced that we would would push our relationship backwards. countries. be ready to limit the number of such mis- This seems to coincide with what you We do not believe that the Shcharansky siles to 820 units under the condition that in said.

affair lacks significance. I did not blow it the agreement our proposed limitation J. CARTER: Let me briefly comment up. It concerns broad segments of the would be stipulated for the missiles (of] “air- on your statements. My attitude toward the American public. land” class. I would like to get a definite Soviet Union is consistent. On my part, I think that the concern that you exreaction of the American side to our pro- there were no words of criticism as such pressed about human rights in our country, posal before my departure from the USA. toward the Soviet Union or Brezhnev per- as well as our public concern over this ques

Now, there is another thing. We would sonally. At the same time, in the Soviet press tion in the Soviet Union, could lead to broadlike you, here, in the USA, to stop scaring there had been critical statements toward me ening of human rights in both countries. But the people by the statements about an abil- personally. Recently such criticism signifi- I hope that both sides will exert necessary ity of making a first strike at America by cantly subsided, which I appreciate. The restraint and that you will not allow openly the Soviet Union. Why is it being done? As point is that such criticism gives concern to expressed concern over these issues in the we understand it, it is being done only to our people. And I hope that in the future USA to spoil our relations. And, as I already excite the atmosphere so that one could eas- there will be no more.

said, I hope that the Belgrade Conference ily build up the military budget of the USA. I would like to emphasize that I am will be conducted in an atmosphere of har

What first strike you are talking about? deeply devoted to maintaining constructive mony between our delegations. We are not going to make a first strike at friendly relations with the Soviet Union on About China. We will never allow that anybody. Moreover, together with the other the basis of solving all contentious questions our relations with China would become an states of the Warsaw Pact we proposed to in a peaceful atmosphere and without pub- obstacle for the development of USA relaall countries signatory of the Final Act on lic polemics. I hope that in the future So- tions with the Soviet Union. We did not have Security and Cooperation in Europe to sign viet-American relations will constantly im- and we will not have any secret or open colan agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear prove. I would suffer a complete political lusion with China directed against the Soweapon against each other. So stop scaring fiasco as a President if this does not hap- viet Union. I would rather stop my efforts the American people by this nonexistent pen. In other words, I would have betrayed to change for the better our relations with Soviet threat. The Soviet Union did not the confidence in me of my people. Now I China than to allow something like that to have, does not have, and will not have such enjoy the support of the majority of the happen. an intent.

American people for my foreign policy. The As for Diego Garcia we have built there And now I would like to read what L.I. goal of constant improvement of relations a small airstrip, but we do not want at all to Brezhnev, whom I met before my departure with the Soviet Union is a matter of first use this island to damage the security of the to the USA, asked me to tell you in person. priority for me. There is no other more im- Soviet Union. Besides the greetings I extended to you in portant problem for me.

About stopping all nuclear weapons the beginning of our conversation, he asked (It should be noted that in regard to this tests. A full cessation of all nuclear weapme to tell you the following: “I and the important statement made by Carter, the ons tests, at least for some time in the bewhole Soviet people are struggling for peace President made it, apparently, bearing in ginning, would be a significant achievement. and struggling for it conscientiously. But I mind the fact that recent public opinion polls We can achieve it together. In our opinion am firmly convinced as well as all our lead- in the USA show that the majority of popu- such a ban should include also so-called ership that this issue must be resolved not lation critically responded to the way the re- peaceful explosions. We are ready to give arithmetically but politically. We do not have lations with the Soviet Union are handled you some information about the results of any other alternative. No calculations will by Carter.)

our research on nuclear explosions for lead to anything good. I ask the President to I, continued J. Carter, am aware of the peaceful purposes. This research shows that think about it. Such an approach would only need to improve the Soviet-American trade. the application of nuclear explosions for elevate the authority of our states. And the I inherited the law, about which you know, building canals or changing the flows of rivpeoples of the world would take a sigh of which links the questions of trade with other ers is unadvisable. relief."

questions. I would like to see this problem Now on the problem of concluding a Now a few words about your meeting solved. I hope that together we will be able new agreement on strategic offensive weapwith L.I. Brezhnev, which you have men- to influence our common “friend,” Senator ons in more detail. We think - although we tioned. L.I. Brezhnev, personally, and the (Henry] Jackson, to annul the Soviet-Ameri- are aware that you do not accept this - the Soviet leadership are not at all against such can trade limitations that were adopted on Vladivostok agreement took place in a difa meeting, in general. We believe that such his initiative. I hope that you, as far as you ferent situation from the one that has devela meeting would be an important threshold can, will help me in this matter.

oped today. And at that time we thought if it had been thoroughly prepared and con- When in the near future the Minister about a different perspective. As we undercluded with a major political outcome. The of External Trade, Patolichev, will come to stand it the issue of cruise missiles was not

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