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op. 120,

script of the conversation. The conversa- ing to their orientation. Yet we have always tion was very good, substantive, sharp in its tried to stress constructive aspects of those tone, as was appropriate. It has an aggres- declarations which were put forward by the sive character.

President, and by you and by other leading KOSYGIN. The conversation really American authorities who deal with foreign forced Vance to think over many issues, and policy. he will of course pass all the content on to But most recently our attention has Carter.

been more and more attracted to the fact that, USTINOV. Leonid Il’ich spoke very beginning with the President (and well about offensive strategic weapons. Brzezinski has already surpassed himself in They should know our position on that is- this), American officials are constantly maksue.

ing statements which are aimed, or so it SUSLOV. Leonid Il’ich did very well seems to us more and more, at nearly bringin conducting the conversation with Vance. ing us back to the period of “cold war.”

KOSYGIN. The main thing is that they In Washington, D.C. the other day, I now know perfectly our position on all the could not but come to the conclusion that issues.

the orientation of President Carter's stateSUSLOV. We have to take a decision ments is to a great extent determined by the to approve Leonid Il’ich's conversation with character of the false information which he Vance and the negotiations of Comrades receives. This can be illustrated by his decGromyko, Ogarkov, and others on issues larations on the situation in Africa, which related to the limitation strategic weap- are obviously based on wrong, distorted in

formation. ALL. Correct.

Now I see that the matter is even more

serious. Evidently somebody in the United (Source: Archive of the President of the States, some circles, consciously are creatRussian Federation (APRF), f. 3,

ing myths, and are then referring to those d. 39, II. 187-189; trans. by M. Doctoroff. ) same myths, and dumping all this on the laps

of the President, the Secretary of State, and Document 3: Memorandum of Conver- other American leaders. sation between Soviet Foreign Minister So what is the real policy of the USA, Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State and towards what is it directed: to the creVance, 31 May 1978 (excerpts) ation of relations based on mutual respect,

on non-interference in internal affairs, and Secret, Copy No. 1 on building relations; or towards aggravat

ing of tension in our relations[?] This is the RECORD OF MAIN CONTENT OF question, which I would like you to answer. CONVERSATION BETWEEN

On returning to Moscow I will report

to L.I. Brezhnev and to the Politburo of the U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE C. VANCE Central Committee of the Communist Party

about the general political situation in the 31 May 1978, New York

United States today and about the USA's

policy towards the USSR. I presume that Our final meeting with the USA Secretary you, in turn, will inform the President about of State C. Vance took place on May 31. this conversation. First I met with Vance "eye to eye” (only C. Vance. I will certainly inform the interpreters from both sides were present). President about our conversation. Actually

you have just asked me two questions. First, A.A. Gromyko. Taking advantage of you asked me to explain the reasons for that this opportunity to talk to you in private, I which you have called an explosion of hoswant to ask how the explosion of propa- tile propaganda toward the USSR in the ganda hostile to the USSR, which we have United States. Let me try to answer this observed in the USA for some time alreadyquestion with the utmost openness. can be explained? Until now we have ob- There are several facts which provoke served various declarations made by repre- concern in regard to the Soviet Union in the sentatives of the American administration, United States. These are reflected, naturally, and evaluated them in different ways accord- in newspaper articles, materials, TV pro

grams etc. I would like to point out three main areas, in which this concern reveals itself.

Very many people in the USA and in other countries, especially in the West, reveal serious concern in connection with the increase by the USSR of its military forces, especially in Europe, and the fact that the dimensions of this increase significantly exceed the dimensions needed for defense. Looking at the Soviet Union's spending for conventional arms, people picture a dramatically rising curve, at the same time keeping in mind the stable level (of spending) for arms by the USA and other western countries.

The intentions of the Soviet Union sincerely concern many people. A natural question arises: if the intentions of the USSR are to preserve the existing military balance, why does it increase its military forces and weapons on such a scale[?] Doesn't it mean that the Soviet Union, rather than trying to reduce military rivalry in Europe by cutting down the level of weapons and military forces in the region, has more aggressive intentions[?]

As for strategic weapons, we made definite

progress in the past: we concluded the ABM Treaty, signed the Temporary Agreement on limitation of strategic offensive weapons and have moved forward on working out a new agreement on SALT. All these can be considered positive elements in the relations between our two countries.

On the other hand, the constant growth by the Soviet Union of its armed forces and modern conventional weapons by the USSR provokes serious concern in many people.

Another major issue which alarms us is Africa, which President Carter and I have already discussed with you in detail. I think we all recognize that elements of rivalry will remain between us in the future. But at the same time there will be areas, in which we will be able to achieve mutual understanding and find a common language. If you look at the situation in Africa today, it seems that the areas of rivalry have developed beyond the limits of normal competition and led to military conflicts, fed by Soviet weapons and equipment and by armed combat detachments provided by Cuba.

I am acquainted with your explanation of the factors which stimulated certain military actions in Africa, and I will not repeat what was already said by both sides. How

prove them.

ever, in answering your question, I want to set forth the evaluation of the actions of the Soviet Union in Africa which is being formed in the USA and many other countries (not only European). Many people now presume that the Soviet Union sets fires in various regions of Africa instead of preventing those fires in a peaceful way.

The third issue which provokes serious concern is connected with the question of human rights, which has become particularly urgent recently because of actions like [Soviet dissident Yuri] Orlov's trial.

These are the three main issues, which provoke what you call the explosion of emotions directed against the Soviet Union.

The second part of your question referred to what the USA actually wants: to build good relations with the Soviet Union or to return to the "cold war” period, accompanied by permanent confrontation and arguments between us.

I can answer that question quite simply and clearly. The United States does not want to return to the period of tension and confrontation between our two countries. We want to return our relations to their correct path, we want to return to better, tighter, closer relations between the Soviet Union and the USA. We want to reduce tension in the military and other spheres, to find as many more grounds as we can for a common language between us.

There are several means by which it would be possible to move forward in this direction and, maybe, the main way lies in making progress in the negotiations on limitation of strategic weapons. Yet, besides this there is a lot more which we can do. Most importantly, we must come to a deep mutual understanding of the fact that detente is a two-way street; we have to develop broader links in commerce, cooperation, culture and other spheres. We made some progress in these areas in the past, but unfortunately we have lately backtracked significantly

I would like to mention some concrete steps, which in our opinion, could make it possible to achieve our aims. First, progress during the negotiations on limitation of strategic weapons. Second, progress in the Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe. Third, progress on a range of other arms control issues in the discussion of which we and you participate. Fourth, a better mu

tual understanding of the character of de- preserve the security of the Soviet Union in tente, and about how to turn this process into the face of the constant-I repeat, cona two-way street. Fifth, to come to agree- stant-growth of NATO's, and especially of ment on other steps which could be under- the USA's, armed forces and weapons. taken in order to provide broader exchanges If we had other intentions, why should between our peoples in the spheres of cul- we, in the U.N. and in other forums, insist tural, scientific, and other activity, as well every year, every month, every day, on the as in the area of commerce.

necessity of disarmament, up to general and In conclusion I must point out that, re- complete disarmament? Recall the proposlating to the fact that detente should be a als which were put forward by L.I. Brezhnev two-way street, and in the context of the situ- at the recent Komsomol Congress. They ation in Africa, we must determine how we were devoted to a total ban on the producshould act so that all these questions do not tion of nuclear arms, and the subsequent continue to be a constant source of confron- destruction of these weapons and the comtation between us.

plete switchover of nuclear energy to purely I tried as I could to set forth more sim- peaceful uses. Remember the program, ply some fundamental problems and to ex- adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress, of adpress my opinion about those steps which ditional actions in the sphere of the struggle could be undertaken in order to develop our for peace, which we try to bring to life literrelations in a correct direction and to im- ally every day, though you act in the oppo

site direction. A.A. Gromyko. I will try to react to We would not have conducted such a your statements as briefly as I can. Thus I policy if we had wanted to constantly inwill be able to avoid repeating what I al- crease our armaments. We carry out this ready said in Washington, D.C.

policy of peace and detente firmly and conI listened with positive feelings to your sistently, despite the ring of American miliwords to the effect that USA is trying to tary bases around the Soviet Union. We are conduct its affairs so as to allow us to find ready to disarm, even radically, but at the solutions to the problems that confront us, same time, it goes without saying that we avoiding tension in Soviet-American rela- will never agree to unilateral disarmament. tions and not returning to the period of the Do not expect this. An equal degree of se“cold war." I am sure that all my colleagues curity must be observed, there must be no in the Soviet leadership, including L.I. loss of security for any of the sides. This is Brezhnev personally, will also react to your an immutable law which must be observed. words positively. This is my response to

C. Vance. Neither of us is speaking the constructive part of your statements. It about unilateral disarmament. We believe would have been good if the actions of the that both sides are pragmatic enough to unAmerican government had corresponded derstand that unilateral disarmament is imwith your words, but that is not the case now. possible. It can take place only within the

You went on to say that one of the rea- mutual interests of the sides. The question, sons for the explosion in the United States however, is whether we will manage to creof propaganda hostile to the USSR was that ate a situation in which mutually advantathe Soviet Union lately had, apparently, geous arms control agreements, which will greatly increased its military potential, and clearly show everyone that we are striving that this fact worries the United States and for disarmament rather than for an increase other Western countries.

in arms, can be achieved. I must categorically deny this state- A.A. Gromyko. I will respond to what ment. Moreover, it has already been repeat- you have just said later. Now I will conedly denied at the highest level by L.I. tinue to express ideas, which I started beBrezhnev. It is not true. It is a myth, thought fore. I will touch on the issue of military up in the West with a definite goal in mind budgets.

to camouflage the Western program of Several times we have introduced proarms increases. And the facts completely posals to reduce military budgets, naming

in this regard concrete percentages, corOur military forces are certainly at their rected our proposal in accordance with required level. But we do not want to spend counterproposals of other states. Yet, the on defense any more than is necessary to USA and its allies never expressed any posi


support this.




tive attitude to our proposals. They met them with raised bayonets, every time rejecting them at once. We proposed to freeze military budgets at their present level, from which it might later have been possible to begin their reduction. But these proposals, too, were declined without consideration.

At the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to questions of disarmament, we decided to propose a new approach to the issue. Earlier, when we had named a definite percent by which to reduce military budgets, Western states had referred to various difficulties related to the allegedly different structures of the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the countries of the West. We always acted from a belief that these complexities had an artificial character and must not serve as a barrier on in the way ofreducing military spending. Now we decided to take another approach: to speak not about percents, but about absolute figures. These figures may not entirely coincide, although, it goes without saying that they must be, as they say, in the same ballpark. There must not be a situation when one great power would reduce its military budget by 1 bln. dollars a year, and the other - by 1 mln. Think over our new proposals. It seems to us that they could make it easier to achieve an agreement.

Both previously and now, American representatives have tried and are trying now to suggestthat their military budget is not growing, although in fact USA military spending grows enormously every year. This truth is known to everyone.

C. Vance, Spending is growing, but not in real terms.

A.A. Gromyko. We are speaking about the real budget.

C. Vance. From the point of view of dollars our military budget is growing, but only because of inflation.

A.A. Gromyko. I am afraid that now you will start to throw blame at us for not having inflation in our country. In fact the USA military budget is growing both in real and in material terms. You can not cover this with inflation.

You spoke further on about the situation in Africa. I must say that in this case a total and crude distortion of the real situation is taking place. If I, discussing this topic, behaved like some of your high ranking officials, who let loose with simply in

sulting declarations directed toward the So- are not responsible for somebody else's sins
viet Union, I would have been forced to use and do not intend to be. Those who sin are
not those, but sharper expressions. By the responsible.
way, those American officials who make Touching on the question of so-called
such declarations should study how to com- human rights, you raised a question of So-
municate with people, especially with rep- viet citizens, giving the concrete name
resentatives of foreign states.

Orlov, and noting that you could give some
Who should know better than the USA, other names. I will say only that we will
with its a far-reaching espionage network, not discuss questions like this, neither with
that the Soviet Union had absolutely noth- you, nor with anybody else, because these
ing to do with events in Zaire, Rhodesia, are questions in our internal competence,
Namibia[?] As for the conflict between and only in our competence.
Ethiopia and Somalia, when Somalia And now I respond to your statement
launched an attack against Ethiopia we, re- that there are other questions on which we
sponding to a request from the latter, helped do not agree, but which we should discuss
out by sending to Ethiopia a certain amount in order to find mutually acceptable deci-
of weapons and a group of specialists to train sions. You are right: there are such ques-
them how to use the weapons. At the same tions. I want, however, to draw your atten-
time, as I already told you, we would at that tion to the fact that the USA and some of its
time have welcomed any help of this kind allies do not, as a rule, want to discuss the
from other countries, including the USA, if proposals which we put forward. It often
any such assistance had been requested of happens that you decline our proposals on

the basis only of some fragmentary reports But instead of this we face the fiction in the press, even before you have received that Ethiopian troops acted under Soviet the official text. This was the case, for excommand, etc. Why is this done? Being re- ample, when the Warsaw Treaty states proalists, we started to look for reasons for such posed that all countries which signed the absurd assertions. We came to the conclu- Helsinki Final Act should agree not to be sion that it is necessary to search for those the first to use nuclear weapons against each reasons in the attempts of some definite other. forces, particularly in the United States, to You turned this proposal down, but life create a screen through which it would be itself did not reject it because of that. We more difficult for people to understand the suggested having a preparatory meeting, at true situation, in order to justify (their) own which it would have been possible to conactions in Africa, which appear as interfer- sider this proposal, if necessary to sharpen ence in the domestic affairs of the countries it, to ask each other different questions, etc. on that continent.

You did not want to do this either. We also An illustration of this statement is the could follow this same approach, turning slaughter which took place in [the Shaba down at once any proposal of the Western Province of] Zaire not long ago. In fact nei- states at once. But is this how serious people ther the USSR nor Cuba had anything to do conduct their affairs[?] We would not like with it. As you remember, I told President to conduct our affairs this way. Carter about this. We were indignant at this C. Vance. First of all I want to say that slaughter and at the insinuations to our ad- I fully agree that it is necessary to work out dress. I have already said that there is not a some sort of a mechanism for the discussingle Soviet person in Namibia or in Rho- sion of those or other proposals put forward desia, and in Zaire we have only official dip- by the sides, which would allow us to hear lomatic representatives.

each other out and to seriously consider Pass my words on to the President. Tell those or any other questions. The thing is him that the assertions, which we confront that sometimes we are faced with divergent in connection with events in Africa, in par- interpretations of these or other problems, ticular in Zaire, we can treat only as a pure the consideration of which could have and deliberate fiction.

helped to eliminate differences of opinion. As it happened, some individuals and That is why it is very important to undergovernments themselves threw an explosive stand how each side pictures the existing ball of lightening into the arena and now situation. Let us think of the best way to are saying: look, how terrible that looks. We conduct affairs which touch on relations between the Soviet Union and the USA. You do not know his reasons, who he works Maybe it makes sense for the sides to meet for, do you? Many questions arise here. more often both on our level and on the level C. Vance. Evidently it does not make of those who negotiate concrete questions, much sense to continue this argument. I in order to clarify the positions of both sides? mentioned these facts only to illustrate difMaybe it follows that we should think of ficulties in receiving trustworthy informaother methods? One thing is clear: some- tion. Probably it is one more argument in thing must be done to change the tendency, support of the necessity of having more frewhich has lately appeared in the relations quent meetings and exchange of opinions between our two countries.

between us. A.A. Gromyko. This is a very impor- A.A.Gromyko. Perhaps. But if on the tant question.

basis of this type of information, known to C. Vance. Let me now respond to your be false, a broad campaign, hostile to us, is remarks regarding our information about the developed in the USA, then it is another participation of Cubans in the events in kettle of fish. And if, on top of everything, Zaire. According to our intelligence data, the government takes part in this process and Cubans took part in planning and prepara- heats up this campaign, then what conclution of the intrusion there. As for the sources sion should we draw? Really, this is not of our information, it was the Commander happening within the four walls of a workof Katang armed forces, General Mbumba, ing study. It is taking place on a national and Cuban sources in East Germany. We scale. considered these sources reliable.

C. Vance. President Carter asked me A.A. Gromyko. Oh, then you are sim- to find out your opinion of the expediency ply victims of disinformation. If we were of carrying out exchange visits of some senot sure that our information was authentic, nior military officers from the Soviet Union we would not have told you about it. We and the USA. I mean, for example, a meettake great responsibility for what we are ing between the Chairman of the Joint saying

Chiefs of Staff and the Head of the General C. Vance. But how could we know that Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. As for information provided to us by Mbumba and selecting questions for discussion, they can Cubans themselves does not correspond agree on them in advance. with reality? When this information came A.A. Gromyko. We will discuss this to us we assumed that it was based on solid question and inform you about our decision. evidence.

C. Vance. We start from a belief that A.A.Gromyko. But who on Earth such exchanges could demonstrate to the knows what kind of General this is? Who public our readiness to have contacts on all does he serve? Is he really the only one to levels. This could even prove, in a way, that tell the truth, like Jesus Christ of the Bible we do not aim at confrontation. legend?

[sections omitted dealing with SALT II neYou have information from us

gotiations and Cyprus situation-ed.] cept it. Your sources of information are bad During the final meeting with the USA if they present lies as truth. You yourself Secretary of State Vance the issue of two know from experience that you must not Soviet citizens, staff members of the United believe every report. Man was given his Nations Secretariat (Valdik] Enger and brain in order to analyze information, think, [Rudolf] Cherniaev, who are being held in and make realistic conclusions.

a prison in New York City, was discussed. Unfortunately, there are officials in the The record of the main contents of this conUSA who easily, to put it mildly, present lies versation, which took place in the presence for truth. But a serious policy cannot be of two interpreters only, is given below. built on this.

A.A. Gromyko. During this meeting C. Vance. I take into consideration you promised to answer the question we what you have said. Yet I want to say that raised about freeing the two Soviet citizens we have to take as serious the information, kept in prison by American authorities. which we receive from people like the Com- C. Vance. I can do that. At the present mander of the Katang forces.

time we can not undertake any definite acA.A. Gromyko. But maybe the Gen- tions as far as these two people are coneral you mentioned is only saving his skin? cerned. I specially got acquainted with the

case and am afraid that this matter will have to take its normal course.

As for reducing the amount of bail, (State Department official] M[arshall D). Shulman has already told a representative of the USSR Embassy in the USA that the lawyers of the two mentioned people know how to solve this problem in accordance with American legislation.

A.A. Gromyko. I listened your answer with the feeling of regret. What prospects do you see for solving this problem?

C. Vance. I think that a legal proceeding will take place, and when it's over we will see what we can do.

A.A. Gromyko. I will not repeat what I have already said on this account, not to waste time. You are familiar with everything I said about our attitude to such a development of events and about possible consequences.

I want to inform you that we found and confiscated more than 50 bugging devices which were functioning in different Soviet institutions in the USA — in Washington, D.C., in New York, in San Francisco. I will give you the materials connected with this issue now. We, naturally, have at our disposal many more photographs and, if we wanted, we could have released them long ago. But we have not done it yet, because we have a broader approach to SovietAmerican relations. We also took into account the requests of the American side not to publish these materials.

I can tell you, by the way, that many of these devices were established under President Carter's Administration. I do not want to claim that this was sanctioned by him personally, but the fact is that they were put into practice after he came to power.

C. Vance. I do not know anything about these devices and have absolutely no information whether they were installed somewhere or not. I will consider materials given by you but I do not want you to treat my silence as agreement with the fact that we did install such devices somewhere.

A.A. Gromyko. It is necessary to say that here, in New York, there took place many approaches to our workers by staffers of American intelligence services who work for the United Nations Secretariat. According to our estimate, at least 200 agents of American intelligence work in this international Secretariat.

So we have at our disposal very many



[blocks in formation]

quite interesting, and I would say, piquant photomaterials on this subject. They will make a very interesting exhibition, though a pretty big hall would be needed to accommodate it.

Our decision regarding these materials will to a great extend depend on the development of this matter on the whole. You have just said that after the trial you will see what you can do. We also will take a look at what you do.

C. Vance. We do not start a war of intelligence services with the Soviet Union. Yet we are very much concerned by the case of the two mentioned Soviet citizens, especially by the fact that they work for the United Nations Secretariat.

Besides, we are greatly concerned with the case, connected with our Embassy in Moscow. The investigation on this matter is still going on. But the fact that there is a tunnel under the building of the USA Embassy, more than 7 meters of which occupy the territory of the building, which belongs to the United States, disturbs us. We consider this as a rude intrusion into the building of our Embassy.

As far as the issue of two Soviet citizens arrested in the USA is concerned, I will contact you again after the trial is over, and tell you which measures we could undertake.

A.A. Gromyko. We will be waiting for such a report.

As for the incident with the USA Embassy in Moscow, according to the information, which I received, the case is totally different. What your representatives describe as an intrusion into the territory of the US Embassy, belongs, in fact, to the area of our normal economic activity. The goals of these measures actually had a purely protective character. In particular, there also were fire-prevention measures.

And in general it would have been primitive to rely on some sort of tunnels in our age of perfect technology. You and I do not live during the post-war period, when in the middle of the 50s we discovered a tunnel, several hundred meters long, which led from West to East Berlin. It was dug by Americans.

I will be expecting your reports about our two citizens who are de ed in the USA, and we will plan our activity according to your decision.

C. Vance. Good.

Correct: (signature) llegible]

Comrades, it is apparent from what Andrei 2 June 1978.

Andreevich (Gromyko) has now told us, that Original # 1351/GS

Com. Gromyko has performed considerable

and useful work during his time in America (Source: AVPRF; trans. by M. Doctoroff. ] both in terms of participation in the special

session of the General Assembly of the UN, Document 4: Speech by L.I. Brezhnev as well as in the course of his negotiations to CPSU CC Politburo, 8 June 1978 with Carter and Vance, and also at the time

of bilateral meetings and discussions with
Proletariats of all countries, unite! representatives of many countries. I think
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. that it is fitting to approve this work and to
CENTRALCOMMITTEE record this in our resolution.
TOP SECRET But it would be, probably, incorrect to

limit ourselves only to this. From the reNo. P107/111

port of com. Gromyko, and likewise from To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, the extensive information which has reached Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kulakov, us recently through various channels, it is Kunaev, Mazurov, Pel’she, Romanov, completely clearly apparent that we are exSluslov, Ustinov, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, periencing a very complicated period in the Demichev, Kuznetsov, Masherov, development of international relations. A Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, serious deterioration and exacerbation of the Chernenko, Dolgikh, Zimianin, Kapitonov, situation has occurred. And the primary Rusakov, Riabov, Zamiatin

source of this deterioration is the growing

aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter Extract from protocol No. 107 of the government, the continually more sharply sessionof the Politburo of the CC CPSU of anti-Soviet character of the statements of the 8 June 1978

President himself and of his closest col

leagues—in the first instance those of Several issues of the international situation Brzezinski.

Judging from appearances, Carter is 1. To approve the proposal concerning not simply falling under the usual influence this question, as stated in comrade of the most shameless anti-Soviet types and L.I.Brezhnev's speech at the Politburo ses- ringleaders of the military-industrial comsion of the CC (text of the speech affixed). plex of the USA, but is intent upon strug

2. To charge the MFA [Ministry of For- gling for his election to a new term as Presieign Affairs of the USSR, the KGB of the dent of the USA under the banner of antiUSSR, the International Department of the Soviet policy and a return to the “cold war." CC CPSU, the Department of Propaganda This line of the government of the USA for Foreign Affairs of the CC CPSU to pre- is putting its stamp on the policy of the pare the corresponding materials and Western powers both in the NATO bloc, and projects of documents, with regard for the in Africa, and in relation to China. exchange of opinions, which took place at The question arises, how are we to rethe Politburo session, and to submit them act to all of this? to the CC CPSU.

I think, that passivity here is inadmis

sible. We must fight actively and persisPolitburo CC CPSU

tently for peace and detente. We must do

all that is possible in order to hinder the [attachment]

policy, which is fraught with the threat of a

new world war. Here we need energetic Re: item III protocol No. 107 steps, noticeable for the whole world.

Concretely, if we are speaking of the SPEECH OF Com. L.I. BREZHNEV immediate period, it would be possible, it AT THE POLITBURO SESSION OF seems to me, to do the following.

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