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the Embassy, in which are reviewed the ba- it was decided to attempt a review of the sic elements of contemporary Soviet-Ameri- entire concept of the policy of detente, subcan relations.

ordinating it to the needs of the Administra

tion, not stopping even before publicly putAttachment: the letter mentioned above, ting under threat the chances of concluding Secret, on 8 pages, to the addressee and to

a new agreement on the limitation of offenthe file.

sive strategic weapons (by artificially link

ing it with other issues). USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE USA

In the country, however, by the way /s/ A. DOBRYNIN

pretty unexpectedly for Carter, this “harsh”

course, which had been firmly and clearly [attachment]

rejected by the Soviet Union, caused a re

action in which was evident a clear appreUSSR EMBASSY in the USA

hension among broad strata of the AmeriWashington

can population regarding the long-term conSECRET, Copy No. 2 dition and fate of Soviet-American relations.

11 July 1978 There was expressed the depth of the AmeriAttachment to Issue No. 667 can mood in support of the policy of detente,

which had developed in the course of the SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS last few years and which in the minds of the IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA unsophisticated residents of this country is (Political Letter)

associated with a simple thesis: detente miti

gates the threat of confrontation with the Almost eighteen months ago—20 Soviet Union, and thus, of nuclear war with January 1977—the new, 39th President of it. Characteristically, there were such apthe USA, J. Carter, stepped across the prehensions even in the Congress, the repthreshhold of the White House. Since that resentatives of which began to demand extime, a definite policy has been conducted planations of the Administration, where anyby his administration, the basic elements of way the matter of relations with the Soviet which are the subject of the review in the Union is heading and wasn't the Adminispresent political letter.

tration trying to bring about some sort of I. As has already been noted by the big changes in these relations without the Embassy, Soviet-American relations during consent of the Congress. the Carter Administration have been char- And so, Carter became convinced that acterized by instability, major swings, which detente is not a “faucet" which he can turn to a great extent are due to its calculations on and off whenever he feels so disposed. of the state of affairs in both its internal and The Administration was obliged to quickly external dimensions. In the middle of April make some adjustments in its position (parof this year, Carter, as is well known, con- ticularly in light of the speech of L.I. ducted in his country residence, Camp Brezhnev, and also our answer in Pravda to David, a meeting of the members of his cabi- Carter's speech in Annapolis, which he had net and closest advisors, at which was teken found to be unexpectedly firm). The Presia decision to carry out a regular reevalua- dent, having let Vance go out front, decided tion of Soviet-American relations. The ini- to restrain Brzezinski a bit. Vance usually tiative for this affair came from Brzezinski stresses the positive accomplishments in and several Presidential advisors on domes- Soviet-American relations without leaving tic affairs, who convinced Carter that he out, however, the negative things which are would succeed in stopping the process of associated with Carter himself (for example, worsening of his position in the country if the notorious policy of defense of human he would openly initiate a harsher course rights” or “dissidents"). vis a vis the Soviet Union.

2. Consequently, insofar as it is posAfrica (events on the Horn of Africa, sible to judge on the basis of information and then in the Shaba Province of Zaire) was which the Embassy has at its disposal, the chosen as the pretext around which the Ad- Carter Administration has come to its own ministration would begin earnestly to cre- variety of a selective, half-hearted concepate tension in Soviet-American relations. In tion of detente (of which Brzezinski himfact, in connection to these African events self first accused us). Detente in its current

concrete application by the White House is, as if, being partitioned. It is seen as important and necessary-in support of the national interests of the United States itself and the corresponding formation of public opinion regarding problems associated with nuclear weapons, issues of war and peace (limitation of strategic weapons, a total ban on nuclear tests, certain other disarmamentrelated issues). As far as the majority of other questions is concerned, as in the past it is applied subject to the "behavior" of the Soviet Union in Africa, in the Middle East, in relation to “human rights,” and so on. The reaction of the Administration to the recently-begun Shcharansky process is in this regard sufficiently instructive.

The Carter Administration variously denies that it is supporting a return to the “Cold War.” It seems that it fears a decline of relations with the Soviet Union to a level when the threat of a serious, to say nothing of a military, conflict with us would be interpreted by the American people, and also in other countries of the world, as something real. Carter, evidently has come to realize that this would cause deep alarm among the population of the country and would for him be a political loss, and maybe would represent a catastrophe in the 1980 presidential elections. In this regard the choice—"cooperation or confrontation"—which he tried to pose for us in his speech in Annapolis, seemed in its essence directed in the USA itself to him personally; the heartland is expecting from Carter himself an answer to that choice, and he—thanks to the adherence to principle in our position—has turned out to have not quite as free a choice as he tried to present it.

Overall, having moved to an obvious lowering of the level of relations with the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration has shown lately a desire to smooth them out a little. This however, should so far be understood like this, that although it is not generally averse to improving them, the White House at the same time does not want to sacrifice such irritants to our relations as efforts to interfere in our internal affairs or actions like Carter's planned visit to the “Berlin Wall.” In a word, the Administration itself has imposed a definite barrier to the possible improvement in our relations (which coincides with the tasks of strengthening NATO, the arms race, the game with China, and so forth).

A lot depends, of course, on how the President who caused a strategic arms agree- role in all of this. President himself will behave in the future. ment with the Soviet Union to fail, and who Our firm reaction to the recent blast of His views on Soviet-American relations, as led Soviet-American relations to the edge anti-Soviet rhetoric by the Carter Adminisin the past, are inconsistent, they contain of Cold War. Under conditions of an ero- tration forced it to noticeably soften its tone. plenty of dribs of this and drabs of that. sion of Carter's mass base in comparision We have to assert that this type of action Flirting with the conservative moods in the to his standing in 1976, the issue of rela- will be effective in the future too. Howcountry (the strength of which he at times tions with the Soviet Union really could be ever, it would not be in our interests to pass clearly overestimates), Carter frequently decisive for Carter in the next Presidential by specific positive aspects of Carter's apresorts to anti-Soviet rhetoric in order to, as elections.

proach to relations with the Soviet Unionthey say, win cheap applause. The danger - Under conditions of the serious eco- in the first place his great personal interest is found in the fact that such rhetoric is nomic difficulties facing the USA, the pos- in a meeting with L.I. Brezhnev, his suppicked up and amplified by the means of sibility of decreasing military spending by port in principle for a treaty on SALT, and mass communication, in Congress, and so limiting the arms race is proving more and others. Appropriate positive reactions from forth. Ultimately, as often happens in the more impressive to average American tax- our side, apart from anything else, would USA, the rhetoric is transformed, influences payers. For the population of the USA (and strengthen the positions of those individupolicy, and sometimes itself becomes policy. for Carter), inflation has become problem als and circles which are trying to to influIt would be incorrect, however, to number 1.

ence the President from the perspective of speak about some sort of hopelessness or Among Americans, as in the past, a the need for the development of Sovietirreconcilability in our relations with the strong mood “not to allow another Viet- American relations over the long term. USA and, in particular, with the current Ad- nam,” particularly in Africa, continues to A.A. Gromyko's meetings with Vance ministration, personally with Carter, al- hold. In the same way, the Administration's and Carter, and also L.I. Brezhnev’s recepthough this issue is exteremely complex. interference in African affairs is causing tion of Vance, have great significance in this

In the USA other things are also going growing suspiciousness among the Negro regard. on, which, together with the noted-above population of the country, which is feeling

X

X general attitudes in the country, require a sense of solidarity with the Africans in

X Carter and the Administration to maintain their conflict with the racist regimes. For relations with the Soviet Union at a certain Carter, who defeated Ford with the support We consider the following approach to level, regardless of all the vacillation of the of a majority of Negro voters, the views to- be expedient along the most important lines current President. The following are in- wards him of this category of Americans of our relations with the Carter Administracluded among these things:

subsequently may become critically impor- tion. - A general recognition in the USA of tant.

Continue to energetically pursue the the primacy of Soviet-American relations (in 3. On a practical level, the Carter Ad- working out of agreements on SALT and a its early days, the Administration—this was ministration, based on everything, intends total ban on nuclear tests, having in mind to Brzezinski's doing—tried to reduce their to continue the search for an agreement with create by these steps the political perquisites significance, but had to stop doing this when the Soviet Union on those issues which are for a Soviet-American summit meeting it collided with the realities of the interna- perceived by the public to touch directly on which could have decisive significance for tional situation.)

the problem of the prevention of nuclear normalization and then for improvement of - The firm and principled line of the war. It goes without saying that it is neces- our relations. Soviet leadership on relations with the USA, sary to use this in our interest. On other Taking into account the importance of which is finding here a growing response. issues, so far no Administration desire to the European path for the deepening of the

- In the ruling circles of the USA there review its position or to cease the anti-So- policy of detente and from the point of view is not by any means a united negative ap- viet rhetoric to which it resorts from time to of counteracting the opponents of that policy proach to relations with the Soviet Union. time is visible. This applies particularly to in the USA, it is very important to work even Influential political and business circles con- the “defense of human rights” in the Soviet more actively toward making progress on tinue to support a search for agreement with Union, NATO military preparations, oppo- the Vienna negotiations on the limitation on us in various areas, understanding from ex- sition to the Soviet Union in Africa, in the conventional forces and armaments in Cenperience that the paths of confrontation with Middle East, and in other regions of the tral Europe on the basis of our last proposus are hopeless.

world. In this regard, special attention has als. It is necessary to maximally activate - The Administration cannot but take lately been assigned to the Administration's this line, which was noted in the L.I. into account the fact that the main Western policy towards China, which according to Brezhnev’s recent speeches, particularly in partners of the USA—to say nothing of the all signs bears witness—if not formally, then Minsk. It would be extremely important to majority of developing countries-speak in essence—to its yearning for a plot with achieve via the Vienna negotiations such a more or less consistently in support of a China agains the interests of the Soviet psychological situation, when in the minds policy of detente.

Union. The danger of this course to our in- of broad masses of American they would - Carter has to realize the vulnerability terests is self-evident. Brzezinski, whom become as real and as necessary to reach a of his position in the 1980 Presidential elec- Gus Hall named "the Carter regime's decision as the current Soviet-American tions, if he goes into those elections as a Rasputin," continues to play a significant SALT negotiations. Here is a significant area REPORT ON THE MEETING

BETWEEN SED GENERAL SECRETARY E. HONECKER AND L. I. BREZHNEV IN THE CRIMEA,

25 JULY 1978

for our propaganda in the USA.

can relations, and it will be difficult to count - Regarding a Middle East settlement: on any sort of noticeable positive shifts. As the Americans try, with the assistance of More possibly, we can expect regular anti“artificial respiration,” to extend the life of Soviet outbursts about Shcharansky, the Sadat “initiative,” it is expedient, along (Aleksandr] Ginsburg, and others. with the indisputable continuation of our Later, however, with the achievement principled course, which has demonstrated of a SALT agreement, which in itself will its correctness, to once again, at the proper be a significant event, and when the Adminmoment, publicly raise the issue of a re- istration will have to more actively try to sumption of preparations for the Geneva justify that agreement in Congress and beConference, and in the presence of the fore the public, it is possible to expect an Americans as co-chairmen, of fulfilling the improvement in the political climate in our joint Soviet-American communique of 1 relations. About that time an election camOctober 1977. By doing this we will paign will be going on here, with its usual soundly throw a wrench into the outburst of chauvinistic demagoguery and Administration's current game. We should anti-Soviet propaganda. continue to reveal the hypocrisy of the USA On this issue it is indicative that our in trying to show that it is equally close to expression of firmness in relation to the the interests of the Arabs and Israel. At the prosecution of renegades like Shcharansky same time we must more actively use the played its own role. The Carter Adminiscontradiction between the American impe- tration, despite all its rhetoric, was forced rialistic interests in the Middle East (oil, in- to retreat and to announce its intention to vestment in Saudi Arabia, etc.) and Israeli- continue the Soviet-American negotiations Zionist interests (open territorial expansion on SALT aimed at the achievement of conat the Arabs' expense).

crete results, and to declare that that agree- On the Chinese issue, we should con- ment meets the interests not only of the Sotinue to actively, publicly advance to the viet Union, but also the national interests of USA our thesis, that the Carter the USA. “The Russians won this mini-conAdministration's formation of a bloc with frontation;" such is the conclusion of the Beijing on an anti-Soviet basis would pre- local political observers. clude to it opportunities for cooperation with Finally, a Soviet-American summit the Soviet Union in the matter of a decrease may become the most important landmark in the threat of nuclear war and of arms limi- from the point of view of a turn in our relatation, particularly as regards SALT. We tions with the USA, taking into account the should support the growing feeling among great political charge which such meetings Americans of anxiety regarding the possible carry. consequences of the current course of the Administration vis a vis China. This became, according to our observations, espe- Overall, it is important, as always, to cially noticeable here after Com. L.I. consistently adhere to our principled line on Brezhnev's warning in Minsk, since it has the development of relations with the USA, begun to occur to many Americans that the to the achievement of concrete decisions and Administration's playing of the "Chinese agreements wherever it concides with our card” carries with it potentially dangerous interests, and at the same time to give a deelements of confrontation with the Soviet cisive rebuff to unacceptable manifestations Union which, which are detrimental to the in the policy of the Carter Administration. USA, but in China's interests. Without the constant support and nurturing among

(A. DOBRYNIN) Americans of these feelings of anxiety and preoccupation, as is now taking place in the (Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 76, dok. 28, II. USA in relation to SALT, the 1-9; document obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Administration's current covert move to- Project; translated by Mark Doctoroff.] ward a deal with China may assume an even more open and dangerous character.

Document 8: Transcript, Meeting of The immediate future, in any case the East German leader Erich Honecker next month or month and a half, will be an and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, extremely complex period in Soviet-Ameri- Crimea, USSR, 25 July 1978 (excerpt)

BREZHNEV: (Welcoming remarks; report on domestic issues)

The defense of the country is important. The strengthening of the country's defensive capabilities still requires our continual attention. Unfortunately, it is not possible to reduce military expenses significantly for now. NATO, especially the USA, is heating up the arms race. We must take care of our security and the security of our allies. The production of modern weapons is a heavy burden on the economy. But we view the strengthening of our defenses as a national as well as an international duty.

Allow me, L.I. Brezhnev said, two words on the trials against Shcharansky and Ginzburg. As you know, in the West a true witch dance has been staged over these two traitors whose hostile activities were inspired by subversive imperialist centers. The matter went far beyond the importance of the miserable roles which these people actually played. Actually this was an attempt of reactionary circles to test our strength, and we have vigorously demonstrated that any attempts to intervene in our affairs, to blackmail us, and to drive the matter, under the pretext of protecting human rights, to the point of creating a legal opposition against the Socialist order, are doomed to fail. I think, he [Brezhnev] said, that this should teach them once and for all.

As always, we have many concerns with regard to international affairs. The situation in the world has not developed badly in the last one to two years. On the one hand important results have been achieved under the conditions of detente, on the other hand we are experiencing an open activation of imperialist forces in their attempts to roll back the position of socialism in the various regions.

Soviet-American relations illustrate this. Speaking frankly, Leonid Ilyich said, the state (of U.S.-Soviet relations) leaves a lot to be desired. Although Carter has moderated his tone after the decisive rebuff we gave him, for now there is no reason to assume that he is willing to eliminate the principal matter which has caused the turn for the worse in our relations. I am speaking anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis. This coin- on the problem of treason. In one word: we, above all of the arms race heightened by cides with the efforts of the Chinese to use Erich, draw the conclusion that we have to Washington which is at the same time de- the “American card” in the fight against the stick together even more and coordinate laying the negotiations on arms control, and USSR and the other countries of the Social- even further in proceeding in the internathe continuing campaign for the so-called ist community.

tional arena. Our leadership is convinced, "human rights.”

The other day we carefully analyzed Erich, that the new course of the CC of the At the center of attention at the meet- the policy of the Chinese leadership in the SED in international affairs, your actions in ing which recently took place between A. C[entral) C[ommittee) and arrived at the an effort to accomplish a common line of A. Gromyko and C. Vance were questions conclusion that it is increasingly reaction- the Socialist community, are being implerelating to a new agreement on the limita- ary and aggressive in all directions. I am mented with continued vigor. tion of strategic arms, especially the ques- talking above all about the frank statements [Brezhnev then discussed questions tion of new types of ballistic missiles. by Beijing in support of the plans of the related to bilateral USSR-GDR relations] Should there be any [agreement on limita- revanchist circles in the FRG on the unity Honecker:(expressed agreement with tions] or not, and if so, to which (weapons] of Germany which de facto means the in- Brezhnev on state of international affairs, should they apply? The Americans tried this corporation of the GDR.

bilateral relations] time again to handle the matter in a way that No less telling are the public contacts Initialed: E (rich]H[onecker] would assure them the possibility of devel- by both sides with [Franz Joseph] Strauss, oping missiles in which they have an inter- [Helmut] Kohl, and other rightist West Ger- (Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und est without regard for our interests. We, by man politicians.

Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen contrast, were willing to renounce on a mu- Since it became an impediment to the DDRim Bundesrachiv (SAPMO-BArch) tual basis the creation of new intercontinen- implementation of their great power ambi- Berlin, DY30 JIV 2/201/1495; document obtal ballistic missiles for the entire term of tions in Southeast Asia, Vietnam is now tained and translated by C.F. Ostermann the agreement. Since the Americans, how- under massive pressure by the Chinese lead- (CWIHP/National Security Archive), copy ever, still did not agree to this, they were ership. We are taking measures in order to on file at Natinal Security Archive.) asked directly whether they would agree to support energetically our Vietnamese mutually acceptable solutions on all other friends. These include various measures, Document 9: Transcript, Meeting of questions on the basis of our proposals if among them military ones. It is good, Erich, East German leader Erich Honecker we met them with regard to the question of he said, that during your visit to Hanoi the and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, new ballistic missiles.

treaty of friendship and cooperation between Crimea, USSR, 27 July 1979 (excerpt) Vance could not respond immediately the GDR and the Socialist Republic of Vietand promised to do this later. But he said nam (SRV] was signed. I can tell you confi- Minutes of the Meeting between SED our position with regard to the solution of dentially that [deleted] was recently with us, General Secretary E. Honecker and L. I. the remaining questions was indeed “very and besides other questions we also dealt Brezhnev in the Crimea, 27 July 1979 interesting." Carter in his press conference with the possibility of a Soviet-Vietnamese

(dated 28 July 1979) with (West German Chancellor Helmut) Treaty. Schmidt later characterized the meeting be- In one word: we cannot desert Vietnam. BREZHNEV: tween A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance as “con- It is our internationalist duty to strengthen structive and useful.” For now it is, of and express our solidarity with this Social- [Welcoming remarks; comments on course, difficult to say what the final Ameri- ist brother country and grant it comprehen- domestic situation, FRG-GDR relations] can response will be. But it is clear that in sive help, among other things via the any case we still are facing a battle.

COMECON (Council on Mutual Economic And now on international questions. On the whole one can say that a settle- Assistance), an equal member of which the We have comprehensively informed ment in the relations between the USSR and SRV has just become.

you on the results of the recent meeting with the USA is not to be expected anytime soon. One of the main methods developed by President Carter. I would like to emphasize Carter is wavering and apparently is listen- Washington as well as Beijing is the differ- that our politburo appreciates the support ing to the forces for which detente goes entiated approach to the Socialist countries which the GDR and the other brother counagainst the grain, although he seems to be as well as the attempts to drive a wedge be- tries have given to the results of Vienna. I aware that it is necessary to search for agree- tween them and to bring them into confron- would put it this way - at the meeting in ments with us on the cardinal question of tation with the Soviet Union. For this pur- Vienna we accomplished the reestablishwar and peace.

pose they are actively taking advantage of ment of the direct dialogue between the Another tendency within the policy of the nationalistic deviations of such politi- USSR and the USA at the highest level. And the American administration has recently cians as (Romanian leader Nicolae] even more - we managed to give a positive beome more powerful. I am talking about Ceaucescu and make various promises. It is impulse to the entire complex of Soviettheir efforts to play the “Chinese card.” The difficult to say something about his behav- American relations. All this is, of course, question now is not simply a normalization ior. Basically he is a traitor. The devil knows very important. of relations between the USA and China, but what else he might possibly do. In this con- We did not have any illusions: there actually attempts at a rapprochement on an nection L. I. mentioned a saying by Stalin are quite a few dark moments in our relations with the USA. The negotiations were, treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weap- for the presence of UN special forces on the frankly speaking, very difficult and this not ons as well as other kinds of arms is ac- Sinai Peninsula does not appear any more only because of their intensity. The largest cepted, it would, I must say, constitute a tre- on the agenda of the Security Council undifficulties were connected with the nature mendous advantage for the cause of detente. doubtedly constitutes a success for our comof the questions with which we dealt, with By the way, I have also talked about this mon line. Hence the attempts to bless Israel's the differences, yes, even with direct con- with Carter. We have proposed to him a dec- separate agreement with Egypt directly with trasts between our views.

laration to the effect that both sides would the authority of the UN failed. And that was As you know, it is not our habit to avoid forego the first use of either nuclear or con- exactly what Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washingdifficult questions. The Middle East, South- ventional arms against the other side or its ton persistently tried to achieve. But now east Asia, the situation in Southern Africa, allies. Initially Carter declared that he would the UN special troops have to be withdrawn. the relationship between the USA and China agree and said that one could try to arrange With respect to international questions, - on all these questions I explained our ba- for an agreeable formula. But later the Erich, I would like to briefly touch upon the sic point of view. With great determination Americans put on the reverse gear. But one situation in Africa. I conveyed to Carter our opinion on the has to understand that after all we wrestled Recently we have had quite active conwrong theses of American propaganda with six years over the conclusion of SALT II. tacts with representatives of the progressive respect to the “Soviet threat” as well as with The Chinese problem still demands African states. To generalize these talks and respect to the “violation of human rights” greatest attention.

the observations made by our comrades, and in the Socialist countries. Carter's situation, The nature of Chinese foreign policy our CC comrades as well, the task of politias the recent rearrangement in Washington revealed itself in China's aggression against cally strengthening the independent African proved, is not easy. A bitter battle over the Vietnam. The Chinese are now negotiating countries is still in the forefront. But the coming into force [ratification) of the SALT with the Vietnamese comrades but they are problem of our economic relations with Il-Treaty is now being waged. If the treaty conducting the negotiations in a way that it these states is already posed in its fullest failed in the Senate, this would be, I think, a becomes obvious that they do not want a extent. It is important and valuable that we political catastrophe for Carter. But it would normalization of relations but Vietnam's vigorously oppose colonialism and racism. also be an extremely severe blow to the in- capitulation. Moreover, there is a real dan- But the task which we have to meet together ternational prestige of the USA.

ger of new Chinese provocations against has larger dimensions. It is necessary to inYou will of course understand that, by Vietnam. One has to take that seriously. This volve the African countries to a larger deand large, the prospect of the failure of the obliges all of us, of course, not to weaken gree in cooperation with us in the economic treaty is not desirable for us. But even in in the slightest manner our support and our field. This will be of advantage to us as well such a case, we will probably not lose po- help for the Vietnamese people as well as as the Africans. Your trip through a number litically because then the entire world will for the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. There of African countries, Erich, proved very userecognize who is consistently seeking dis- are more than enough problems and ex- ful. We highly appreciate your efforts in armament and who is working in the oppo- tremely difficult problems. Let's take the support of the progressive forces in Africa. site direction. But we all should try - in the “refugee" matter. The enemies of Vietnam [concluding remarks) framework of our means - to make sure this have undertaken everything in order to make important matter will have a different end. use of this problem to create a bad image of Honecker: (report on domestic Issues)

And now to the European matters. Here Vietnamese policy. To be sure, they did not obviously much depends on proceeding with manage to turn the Geneva conference into (Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 JIV 2/2011 our initiatives in the field of disarmament a trial of Vietnam. But obviously the matter 1313; document obtained and translated by which we have taken at the meeting of the cannot be put to rest. The Vietnamese friends C.F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security (Warsaw Pact] Political Consultative Com- are facing a great political and propagan- Archive); copy on file at the Archive.) mittee in Moscow and later at the meeting distic job. We all have to support them in of the Committee of Foreign Ministers in this task.

Document 10: CPSU CC Politburo Budapest.

Now briefly on our imminent negotia- Decision, 1 February 1980, with The reaction to our proposal has been tions with the Chinese about which you have telegrams to Soviet Ambassador to West a bit vague. The NATO countries seem to learned from the newspapers. One cannot Germany (for Willy Brandt) and have acknowledged the positive direction of expect quick progress in the Soviet-Chinese Finnish Social Democratic leader K. the efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries but dialogue. The negotiations with China will

Sorsa (not printed) an audible “yes” was not to be heard. It is require great patience, circumspection, and good that currently the necessary link is exact calculation of each of our steps.

Proletariats of all countries, unite! being established at the level of foreign min- That having been said, I think it is im- Communist Party of the Soviet Union. istries between the European conference on portant for all of us not to relent in our op

CENTRALCOMMITTEE military detente as proposed by us and the position against China's policy which runs

TOP SECRET European meeting (of the Conference on counter to the cause of peace and interna- No. P182/2 Security and Cooperation in Europe tional security. (CSCE)) in Madrid in 1980.

A few words on the Middle East. The To Comrades Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, If our proposal on the conclusion of a fact that the question of prolonging the terms Gromyko, Kirilenko,Pel'she, Ponomarev,

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