ePub 版

Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rusakov
we shall proceed.

necessary in order to whip up military fears

We would like to communicate to you and further propagate the myth about a “SoExtract from protocol No. 182 of the our viewpoint on several concrete issues. viet threat," to complicate the process for session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU

The “Carter Doctrine.” The general as- ratification of SALT II and to justify new of 1 February 1980

sessment of it by the Soviet side is set forth military measures aimed at the reinforce

in the leading article of the newspaper ment of the hegemonic and imperialistic asRe: Information for the Chairman of the “Pravda” dated January 29 of this year. In pirations of the USA. This was a distincSotzintern (Socialist International] W. our view, the platform articulated in the tive rehearsal for that which is presently Brandt and the Chairman of the Social- American President's speech, with which being perpetrated in connection with the Democratic Party of Finland, K. Sorsa. you are familiar, expresses in a concentrated events in Afghanistan.

1.Confirm the text of a telegram to the form the course of the present American Fact No. Four. In October and NovemSoviet Ambassador to the FRG (Attachment administration, which was not just adopted ber of last year, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put 1).

today, in connection with the events in Af- forward a comprehensive program to ad2.Confirm the text of information for ghanistan. This course had already emerged vance the cause of military detente in Eutransmittal to K. Sorsa (Attachment 2). a long time ago.

rope, called for immediate negotiations, and

Fact No. One. At the May 1978 spe- the Soviet Union also undertook unilateral SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL cial session of the General Assembly of the steps, with which you are familiar, aimed at COMMITTEE

United Nations in New York, the urgent is- the lessening of military confrontation in Attachments to No. 300s

sues relating to disarmament were dis- Europe.

cussed, in connection with which the com- The USSR has adamantly called for the [attachment 1]

prehensive program of actions proposed by institution of negotiations for the reduction

the Soviet Union occupied the center of at- of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Re: Item 2, Protocol No.182 tention.

Europe prior to the adoption of a decision
However, during the very same period on new American missiles.
SECRET of days, in Washington, a session of the And what was the response of the

Attachment 1 NATO Council at the highest level adopted USA? The American administration literBONN

a "long term program” of acceleration in ar- ally untied the hands of its confederates and TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR maments, calculated over a period of ten to set about in such a way that the December

fifteen years. At the same time, President session of the NATO Council adopted a deMeet personally with W. Brandt, tell Carter proclaimed a doctrine of global ac- cision to produce and deploy in Western Euhim that you are authorized to communi- tions by NATO, expanding the "sphere of rope new nuclear missile armaments, repcate certain views on the international situ- responsibility" of that military bloc into resenting a substantial increase in the alation that has developed, and expound on widening regions, significantly exceeding ready existing American arms deployed at the following text.

the framework stipulated in the agreement the frontline and aimed at the Soviet Union. Recently, especially in connection with that created the North Atlantic Bloc. In the Fact No. Five. Immediately following decisions of the December session of the application of this plan, NATO has appro- the NATO session and despite the voices NATO Council, events have transpired that priated to itself theright to interfere militar- resonating there about intentions to strive have sharply complicated the international ily, particularly in Africa (recalling the for a reduction in the level of military consituation.

events of Zaire). Finally, at the same time, frontation in Europe, President Carter is It is possible that we do not share the American official powers for the first time pushing through Congress a five year prosame views on everything. One way or an- openly proclaimed a tie between their inter- gram of automatic (that is, irrespective of other, under present circumstances, precise ests, the interests of NATO, and the inter- any changes in the international situation) and first hand information about assess- ests of the Chinese Government, which, as build-up in the arms race. ments and intentions becomes especially is known, blatantly undermines the policy Fact No. Six. Already this year, citing necessary. The important thing is to find a of detente.

the events in Afghanistan, President Carter common language on the issue that has al- Fact No. Two. A little more than half a is embarking upon full blown measures to ready been the topic of our mutual preoccu- year ago, Carter signed the SALT II Agree- curtail Soviet-American relations and even pation for many years - how to support the ment and spoke of its great significance for to apply so-called economic sanctions aim of strengthening international security. the cause of peace and security. However, against the Soviet Union. The SALT II

Our general assessment of, and our po- in the last year, the American administra- Agreement has been withdrawn from consition on, the current international situation, tion has essentially ruined the chances for sideration and its ratification has been postare known to you from the responses of ratification of the agreement.

poned for an indefinite period. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to questions put for- Fact No. Three. In the autumn of this On the heels of this the “Carter Docward by the newspaper “Pravda,” published year, the American government has under- trine" is proclaimed. on January 13 of this year. That document taken active measures to organize a provoca- In it is a summary of the measures unreflects the principled position of the Cen- tive outcry concerning “Soviet forces in dertaken by the American administration in tral Committee of the CPSU, from which Cuba." This Cuban “mini-crisis” has been recent time to escalate the arms race and inflame international tensions. We are talk- territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, they do other government. We have never had and ing about efforts to resurrect the doctrines not conceal their aim - to liquidate the April do not have any expansionist plans in relafrom the days of the Cold War - "contain- revolution, to reinstate the previous anti- tion to Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan. We ment” and “rolling back" of Socialism, and popular order, to convert Afghanistan into a reject as a malicious lie any talk that our "brinkmanship."

staging ground for aggression against the goal is to expand into the "third world” or During meetings with the working USSR, with which that country has a 2,000 toward sources of oil. As soon as the reagroup of the Sotzintern (Socialist Interna- kilometer border.

sons have dissipated which caused the Aftional) in Moscow, the issue was discussed These plans were carried out by the ghan government to address us with a reas to where the policy of President Carter is previous leader of Afghanistan, H. Amin, quest for the dispatch of Soviet forces, they leading. Now, that is fully apparent. We sustained, as the facts attest, in large part by will be withdrawn from Afghanistan. are literally talking about the destruction of the CIA. Having entered into a contract with At the present time, the military interthat which was achieved in the last ten years, emigre leaders, he prepared a counter-revo- vention by Washington and Beijing in the accomplished by men of good will, includ- lutionary coup and carried out acts of re- affairs of Afghanistan has by no means come ing the Social Democrats.

pression against genuine patriots on an un- to a halt. Washington is openly acceleratUnder these circumstances it is man- precedented scale. After seizing power, ing the delivery of arms to the so-called indatory to reaffirm the policy of detente in Amin physically destroyed H. M. Taraki, surgents. As illustrated by the visit of the international tensions. Great significance president of the Democratic Republic of minister of foreign affairs for the PRC, adheres in pronouncements to the effect that Afghanistan, a veteran soldier against Af- Huang Hua, Beijing does not lag behind it is now important to “preserve cool heads ghan despotism. The government of Af- Washington. Huang Hua assured the ringand continue the process of negotiations," ghanistan, led by B. Karmal, turned once leader of the mercenaries that China will that “hysteria must not substitute for ratio- again to the Soviet Union for help, as Taraki also henceforth render them assistance and nal policy," and that it is necessary to be- had done.

support “without any limitations." ware of ill-conceived and hypertrophied Responding to the request of the Af- Washington and Beijing are also at(sic) reactions which do not conform to the ghan government for help in the struggle tempting to enlist several Arab states in their reality of events and which, in their entirety, against interventionist activity directed by aggressive actions against Afghanistan could lead to an even worse situation.” Washington and Beijing, we acted in accor- (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others). In this

Our position is to seriously, responsi- dance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan fashion, Washington and Beijing are specifibly, and adamantly adhere to the principles Treaty on Friendship, Neighborly Relations cally following a course designed to create of peaceful co-existence, and to everything and Cooperation, concluded in 1978. Our a hotbed of international tension in the positive in the development of normalized, assistance is also fully in accord with Ar- Middle East. mutually advantageous relations between ticle 51 of the United Nations Charter, pro- At the same time a profusion of ungovernments that was achieved in the pro- viding for the right of any government to mitigated nonsense is being voiced about cess of detente.

collective self-defense, that is, the right to some kind of occupation by us in AfghaniEvents in Afghanistan. We would re- appeal to any other country for help in de- stan or about a usurpation of that country's quest you to examine them without the

fending against aggression. And in the case sovereign rights by the Soviet Union. Evprejudice and hysteria characteristic of the of Afghanistan - and we want to emphasize ery one who is in Afghanistan these days, Carter Administration.

this once more - there was and continues to including correspondents from the Western We think it would be useful to bring be external aggression, the form of which, information services, acknowledges that cirthe following information to your attention. as defined by the 29th Session of the U.N. cumstances are normalizing there. The new

The facts establish that only a short General Assembly, consists of the sending Afghan leadership, headed by Babrak time after the April revolution of 1978, an of armed bands, groups or regular forces or Karmal, is pursuing a rational and sober intense "undeclared war” was instigated mercenaries by a government or in the name policy, attempting to eliminate the remnants against Afghanistan. Bands of mercenar- of a government, which carry out acts in the of the policies of H. Amin, and to reinstate ies, financed with money from the CIA and application of military force against another democratic freedoms. All political detainBeijing, have literally terrorized the civil- government."

ees, representatives of the intelligentsia and ian population of that country. Pakistan has In fulfillment of our treaty commit- the clergy have been released from prison. become the principal staging ground for this ments, we were obligated to defend the na- Relations are improving with the nomadic war. Here, more than twenty bases and fifty tional sovereignty of Afghanistan against ex- population, the Muslim clergy, although, support points have been created, at which ternal aggression. Moreover, we were un- speaking candidly, the situation in the southterrorist and military detachments are able to stand by idly, in view of the fact that east and eastern provinces, where terrorists trained under the direction of American, the USA is attempting (with the assistance are operating, remains tense. Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian instructors. of China) to create a new and dangerous The Afghan government has declared In just the period between July 1978 until military-strategic staging ground on our - and has confirmed by means of practical November 1979, the training of not less than southern border.

measures - its firm intention to pursue a 15,000 individuals was carried out there. We would like to emphasize that our policy of international peace and friendship They are equipped with American and Chi- actions in no way affect the legitimate na- and a policy of non-alignment. It is undernese weapons and then dispatched into the tional interests of the United States or any taking all measures toward the establishment of normalized relations with neighboring ever possible. This policy is doomed to fail

EUROPE IN THE states based on principles of peaceful coex- ure, because it is impossible to intimidate

COLD WAR istence and non-interference in the internal the USSR or to shake its determination. affairs of one another. Such is the truth about In this complicated situation, the leadAfghanistan. ership of the CPSU does not intend to adopt

Call for Contacts: from the European Our position on the decisions of the De- a policy of “fighting fire with fire.” We shall Project Group “Europe in the Cold War” cember session of the NATO Council. You henceforth exhibit a maximum degree of are already aware of our principal assess- cool-headedness and reasonable judgment.

A group of European historians has re

cently taken an initiative in setting up a ment of its results. Here are several addi- We shall do everything possible to prevent project to reappraise the Cold War in Eutional observations. the Carter administration from drawing us

rope from 1943-1989. As you are aware, the Soviet Union has into confrontation and undermining detente. We believe that, now that the archives in warned more than once, that if NATO in We shall not engage, as the American ad- Moscow and in several Eastern European December implements its decision, then it ministration is doing, in impulsive acts countries are increasingly being opened to will knock the ground out from underneath which can only intensify the situation and

scholars, this is a timely and important opnegotiations and destroy their basis. Our play into the hands of the proponents of the

portunity to examine the realities of the Cold agreement to negotiations in the face of the "Cold War.

War and its impact on the countries of WestNATO decision would mean conducting The American side, forgetting the el

ern and Eastern Europe.

We have set up a long-term research them as to the reduction only of Soviet de- ementary principals of restraint and pru

project on the subject, which will involve at fensive capacity at the same time as the dence, is conducting a policy leading to the least seven Euro-international conferences. United States is carrying out, in full stride, destruction of all the inter-governmental ties It is hoped that the proceedings of each conpreparations for new nuclear missile sys- which were constructed with such difficulty ference will be edited and published as a tems.

during the past years. Moreover, and this series of books. The first conference, on In the communique from the session can no longer be doubted, the Carter admin- “The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943of the NATO Council, the condition was laid istration is striving to spoil the relations of

1948,” took place in Florence in June 1996. down in the harshest of terms that negotia- the West European countries with the So

The second conference, on the period from

the Berlin Crisis to the death of Stalin, is to tions shall be conducted only in regard to viet Union, and is demanding support from

be held in Paris in the autumn of 1998. American and Soviet tactical nuclear inter- them for its dangerous line, i.e., that they

We are interested in building our contacts mediate land based missile systems. Ex- subject themselves to that policy which with historians of the Cold War in Europe cluded from these proposed “negotiations," Washington considers necessary.

and especially those from Russia and Eastand to be preserved inviolable, are all of the A great deal that is positive and con- ern Europe. Those with inquiries, suggesother means of front line deployment be- structive could be achieved in connection tions, or contributions may contact any of longing to the USA, and the nuclear arse- with the meetings that have taken place in

the following members of the Steering Comnals of other Western European countries, Madrid by the conference on issues of Eu

mittee: that is to say, everything in respect to which ropean security and cooperation, as well as

ITALY (Co-ordinating Centre): the Soviet intermediate range forces serve on the path to implementation of the pro

Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo/Prof. Antonio as a counterbalance. They are demanding posal of the Warsaw Pact countries concern

Varsori, Dipartmento Di Studi Sullo of the Soviet Union a sharp reduction in its ing the conduct of a conference on military Stato, Universita Degli Studio Di Firenze, existing defensive forces with a simulta- detente and disarmament.

fax: 0039-55-2345486 neous preservation of the entire existing In a word, despite all the gravity of the BRITAIN: powerful NATO nuclear potential, aimed developing international situation, we be- Dr. Saki Dockrill/Dr. D.B.G. Heuser, Deagainst the USSR and its allies. lieve that there is a possibility of bringing

partment of War Studies, King's College, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his recent to a halt the dangerous development toward

London, fax: 0044-171-873-2026. interview with the newspaper Pravda, stated which the present administration in Wash


Prof. Georges-Henri Soutou, Ecole that “the present position of the NATO coun- ington is pushing.

Doctorale Mondes contemporaines, tries renders negotiations on this question The entirety of these circumstances de

Universite de Paris, IV-Sorbonne, fax: 0033impossible.” At the same time, Comrade mands joint efforts from all who value the

1-404-62588. Brezhnev emphasized that “we are for ne- cause of peace and detente.

GERMANY: gotiations, but honest and co-equal ones In Moscow, the meetings with you in Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth, Kulturwissenwhich conform to the principal of parity in the Soviet Union are fondly recalled, and it schaftliches Institut, Essen, fax: 0049-201security.” is believed that they were useful.

460674 If Mr. Brandt should request a text,

Prof. Dr. Klaus Schwabe, Historisches Our long term intentions

Institut, RWTH, Aachen, fax: 0049-241deliver it to him, translated into German.

8888357. (a similar telegram was approved to be sent

USA: It is apparent that Carter and Brzezinski to Sorsa (not printed)—ed.]

Prof. Vojtech Mastny, Woodrow Wilson Inare gambling on the prospect of intimidat

ternational Center for Scholars, Washington, ing the USSR, on the isolation of our coun- (Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 4; ob- D.C., fax: 001-49-357-4439 try, and on the creation of difficulties wher- tained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff. ]

Concerning the situation in A”:

New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

by Odd Arne Westad cies, the men at the second level spend both interventions consisted of two

most of their time trying to second- separate plans—one political and one In the winter of 1994-95, as Rus- guess what their bosses really want in military-which, at the last moment, sian tanks and planes were pounding the

terms of alternatives and conclusions. were merged to form one operation, Chechen capital of Groznyi into rubble,

Add to this the paranoia and fear bred more substantial and therefore more I felt a painful, almost menacing, sense

by an authoritarian political system, and difficult to manage. Since nobody in of déjà vu. I had just returned from the result is a distorted, dysfunctional Moscow could define exactly who the Moscow where I had been conducting decision-making process, in which es- enemy was, massive force became a interviews and collecting documents for

sential commodities like time, informa- useful drug against the painful search a book on Soviet-era interventions, and tion, and trust are even scarcer than in for political and military precision. I was struck by how rhetorically and the West.

In the fall of 1995, a group of scholstructurally similar the Chechen opera

The most immediate parallel to the ars and former Soviet and American tion was to the invasions of Hungary Chechen crisis was of course the inter- officials with special knowledge of the (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Af- vention in Afghanistan. In both cases, Afghanistan intervention and its effect ghanistan (1979). At the heart of all of

the final decision to commit troops was on Soviet-American relations gathered these interventions was an inability

made by an ailing and isolated leader; for a three-day meeting in the Norwewithin the Soviet (or Russian) leader

reports on conversations with Boris gian village of Lysebu, outside Oslo. I ship to communicate effectively and to

Yeltsin from late 1994 through late 1996 Among the participants on the Amerireach settlements once a conflict had

sounded remarkably similar to conver- can side were Carter Administration reached a certain level. In terms of per

sations with Leonid Brezhnev during veterans Stansfield Turner, then Direcsonalities, all of them were directed

the period surrounding the decision to tor of Central Intelligence; William against former “allies": Imre Nagy, invade Afghanistan fifteen years earlier. Odom and Gary Sick, assistants to NaAlexander Dubcek, Hafizullah Amin, Their political attention span and field tional Security Adviser Zbigniew and Dzhokar Dudaiev had little in com

of vision much reduced, both tended to Brzezinski on Soviet and Near Eastern mon beyond having spent most of their view decisions in strongly personalized affairs, respectively; and Marshall lives serving a Communist party. In all

terms. To Brezhnev, Amin was the Shulman, then Secretary of State Cyrus four cases it seems like it was the bro- “dirty fellow” who usurped power by R. Vance's main adviser on the Soviet ken trust, the sense of betrayal and in- killing President Nur Mohammed Union. On the Russian side sat several gratitude, which propelled the men in Taraki just days after the president had key survivors of the Brezhnev era, led the Kremlin past initial doubts and hesi- been embraced by Brezhnev in Mos- by former ambassador to the United tations up to the moment when some

cow. To Yeltsin, Dudaiev was a "scoun- States Anatolii F. Dobrynin and Gen. one said, “Go!”

drel” who tried to blackmail him and Valentin Varennikov, then Commander From what we know, the Kremlin challenged his manly courage. Neither of Soviet ground forces. There were processes of decision-making on for- could be permitted to remain if the self- also some lesser known faces: Gen. eign policy crises have stayed remark- image of the ailing Kremlin leader was Leonid Shebarshin, former head of ably intact since the Bolshevik revoluto stay intact.

KGB foreign intelligence (and in the tion. Although the degree of absolute

Around the sickly heads of state, late 1970s head of the KGB station in centralization on such issues has dif- factional politics flourished, with insti- Teheran), and Karen Brutents, former fered from the one-man rule of Stalin, tutional rivalries particularly strong. Deputy Head of the International DeGorbachev, and (when healthy, at least) During both crises the heads of the mili- partment of the Central Committee of Yeltsin to the small collectives of the tary and security institutions drove the Communist Party of the Soviet Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras—the events—in 1979 and 1994 it was the Union (CC CPSU). number of people actually involved in

defense ministers, Dmitri Ustinov and The conference was the latest in a preparing and making essential foreign Pavel Grachev, who made the final push series of such gatherings of former Sopolicy decisions has remained ex- for intervention. Because of depart- viet and American officials to explore tremely limited. As in most bureaucra- mental jealousies, in operational terms the reasons behind the collapse of superpower detente in the mid-1970s, and sity)—were commissioned by CWIHP. coup in April 1978 (the "Saur (April) whether those events suggested any les- (CWIHP also expresses thanks to Revolution"). In spite of their misgivsons for current and future Russian- Raymond L. Garthoff and Selig ings about the lapses and limitations of American relations. They were orga- Harrison for providing copies of Rus- the Afghan Communist leaders, the nized as part of the “Carter-Brezhnev sian documents on Afghanistan.) Other members of the Soviet Politburo could Project,” spearheaded by Dr. James G. materials were gathered and translated not bring themselves to give up on the Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Insti- as a result of research by the present au- building of socialism in a neighboring tute for International Studies at Brown thor and for the Lysebu conference. In country. As the political and military University. Among the scholarly orga- addition to the documents published in predicament of the Kabul regime deepnizations supporting the Project's ef- this issue of the Bulletin, my summary ened, Soviet advisers came to substiforts to obtain fresh evidence from of Soviet decision-making on Afghani- tute for the “revolutionary masses” and American, Russian, and other archives stan from early October to mid-Decem- the “Afghan Communists,” keeping the were the National Security Archive, a ber 1979 is based on the transcript of regime going while the progressive non-governmental research institute the Nobel Symposium of Afghanistan strata" had time to develop. In the proand declassified documents repository and conversations with former senior cess, institutional and personal links based at George Washington Univer- Soviet officials at that meeting. were forged between Soviets and Afsity; the Cold War International History The Lysebu meeting's aim was to ghans, increasing the Kremlin's sense Project, at the Woodrow Wilson Inter- retrace the final steps of Soviet deci- of commitment as well as the Kabul national Center for Scholars in Wash- sion-making on the Afghanistan inter- leadership's ability to avail themselves ington; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; vention and to investigate the U.S. re- of Moscow's resources.

5 and the Institute for General History, sponse. The method is known as criti- As seen from Moscow, the develRussian Academy of Sciences.

cal oral history: groups of former opments in Iran in the winter of 1978Prior to the Afghanistan session, policymakers query each other on mo- 79 suddenly increased the importance which took place in Lysebu on 17-20 tives, issues, and actions, prodded by of the Afghan revolution. The rise of September 1995, the Carter-Brezhnev groups of scholars using newly declas- the Islamic radicals in Teheran took the Project had organized two other major sified documents. As in previous meet- Soviets by surprise and created politioral history conferences on the events ings of this kind—for instance the se- cal instability in the region, forcing the of the late 1970s: on SALT II and the ries of conferences held in 1987-1992 Kremlin to devote more attention to the growth of U.S.-Soviet distrust, held at on the Cuban Missile Crisis3_

more situation along the USSR's southern the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons than history was up for discussion. borders. The overthrow of the Shah Island, Georgia, on 6-9 May 1994; and “Lessons” and relevance for today's presented both opportunities and danon U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third leaders were on everybody's mind and gers to the Soviet leadership: Many of World, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, the conversations were filled with those reporting to the Kremlin on Iraon 23-26 March 1995. For each con- "presentisms.” In this conference, if nian and Afghan affairs expected the ference, a briefing book was prepared someone had suddenly replaced “Af- Iranian Communists to gradually by the National Security Archive with ghanistan” with “Chechnya” or some strengthen their position. But at the support from CWIHP and other Project possible site for future Russian inter- same time, Washington's "loss" of Iran affiliates, containing declassified U.S. ventions, I do not think that the core alerted the Politburo for the first time documents and English translations of issues of the conversation would have to the possibility-however remotedocuments obtained from Russian (and changed much.

that the Americans would attempt to East German) archives, including those In retrospect, the Afghanistan in- replace their lost positions there with of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the tervention stands as an avoidable trag- fresh outposts in Afghanistan. 6 former CC CPSU.2 Many of these edy, a tragedy in which the final script When the introduction of Soviet translations appear in this Bulletin. was ordained by perceptions, person- troops was first discussed in March

In the case of the Afghanistan-re- alities, and ideology far more than “in- 1979, after a rebellion had broken out lated documents printed below, the terests” and “strategies.” Although sub- against the Communist regime in Westtranslations include, for the most part, stantial resistance to the invasion plans ern Afghanistan (and particularly in the materials declassified by Russian au- emerged within the Soviet hierarchy, the major city of Herat), the Kremlin leadthorities as part of Fond 89, a collec- real story is how easily this opposition

real story is how easily this oppositioners hesitantly concluded that “in no case tion prepared for the Russian Constitu- could be overcome by a tiny group of will we go forward with a deployment tional Court trial of the CPSU in 1992 people at the pinnacle of power. of troops in Afghanistan.” Politburo and now stored at the Center for the The documents published in this members Prime Minister Aleksei Storage of Contemporary Documenta- Bulletin show how the Soviet leaders Kosygin and CC Secretary Andrei tion (TsKhSD) in Moscow; translations gradually increased their commitment Kirilenko, who until the end opposed a of these documents—most of which to the Afghan Communist party (the Soviet invasion, argued that the Afghan were obtained and provided to CWIHP People's Democratic Party of Afghani- Communists themselves were to blame by Mark Kramer (Harvard Univer- stan, or PDPA) after the Communist for the rebellion. “We gave (them) ev

« 上一頁繼續 »