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Risquet. 94

nied me.

said that he would inform the Political BuThis high morale, the large number of reau of this increase (of men and arms), and our troops and the large supply of material, appeared very satisfied with it, as an addithe nature of the terrain, and the material tional guarantee to counter whatever the and psychological condition of the enemy South Africans, the Zairians and the Impelead me to conclude that there are no big rialists might do. problems for our [defensive] line at In this meeting, Furry itemized some Amboim-Ebo-Quibala-Cariango; that we of the men and materiel that were coming have recovered the initiative in the south; aboard the Cuban ships. He spoke of a regithat in the next few days our “active de- ment. fense” will gain ground in the south. ...

3. Nevertheless, taking into account the concern you expressed in your cable of yes

terday, in the meeting that Oramas 96 and I (Source: Archives of the Cuban Communist had today with the president to discuss other Party Central Committee, Havana.) matters (SWAPO, Katangans, etc.), I re

turned as if in passing to this matter, and I DOCUMENT 7: Risquet to Fidel Castro, gave him a list of the weapons that will be Luanda, 29 January 1976

arriving on future Soviet ships and that are

for the Cuban troops. Commander-in-Chief,

I added that all the weapons that had Regarding the Cuban weapons deliv- arrived in Soviet ships (the 73 tanks, the 21 ered by the USSR in Luanda:

BM-21s, etc.) so far, as well as the ten MIG-
We have explained the situation clearly to 17s, belonged to the People's Republic of
President Neto, who understood it perfectly Angola.
without expressing any doubts.

[I stressed) that the MIG-21s that were
1. “Furry [Colomé]95 and I spoke with coming in the AN-22 planes as well as the
Neto alone the day after Furry's return (from weapons that were arriving in the Soviet
Moscow where he had gone to report to Fi- ships and that were enumerated in the list
del Castro, who was attending the Twenty- that I had given him were acquired by Cuba
fifth Congress of the Communist Party of in the USSR and delivered to Cuba by the
the Soviet Union), and we informed him of USSR in Luanda.
your decision to send more troops, fully We told him that the Cuban troops, with
armed, in order to amass the forces neces- all these weapons, would remain in Angola
sary both fully to accomplish the goal of for as long as it took and for as long as he
freeing the country from the South African considered necessary, and that we would
and Zairian invasions and also to be in a po- take care of the training of the Angolan per-
sition to counter any possible increases in sonnel, so that they would be able to oper-
their forces.

ate the tanks, the planes, Katyushas (rocketWe told him [Neto) that some of the propelled grenade launchers), mortars, cannew Cuban troops will arrive by boat with nons, etc. And that if the weapons delivtheir weapons and the rest will come to ered to the PRA (People's Republic of Luanda by plane, where they will pick up Angola) were to prove insufficient for the weapons that the Soviet Union is going to future Angolan army, the USSR would alsend for them.

ways be ready to provide what was required, We explained to him that this will al- etc., etc. low us to avoid the unnecessary time, ex- That is, our conversation was absopense and risk of having the Soviets send lutely brotherly and without the smallest these weapons to Cuba and then having to misunderstanding or reproach. However, transport them to Angola with the troops. we wanted to be absolutely clear—and we

Neto understood and approved with- left the list as written evidence—so that there out any qualm or hesitation.

could be no misunderstandings, now or in 2. Three days later, the Soviet general the future. [head of the Soviet military mission in We consider this matter to be totally Angola) told us he too would like to inform clear and settled. Let me know whether you [Neto), on behalf of the USSR, about the believe that this task has been accomplished delivery of the Soviet weapons to the Cu- or whether you think it is necessary to do bans in Angola. We agreed that the most something more about it. appropriate way would be that he, Furry, and Greetings, I meet again with Neto alone. And so we

Risquet did. The general explained in some detail what weapons were being sent.

(Source: Archives of the Cuban Communist Neto raised no objection whatsoever, Party Central Committee, Havana.) wrote down the most important weapons,


I would like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for helping to support this research. 2 Interview with Manuel Agramonte, Havana, 2 July 1994. The only two studies worth citing are William Durch “The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Spring/Summer 1978, 34-63 and Gisela García, La misión internacionalista de Cuba en Argelia (1963-1964) [The Internationalist Mission of Cuba in Algeria (1963-1964)] (Havana: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, 1990). A garbled account of Che Guevara's struggle in Zaire, based on his unpublished manuscript, is Paco Ignacio Taibo et al., El año que estuvimos en ninguna parte [The Year We Were Nowhere] (Mexico City: Planeta, 1994). 3

Jorge Risquet, note to author, Havana, 13 July 1996. 4 For full information on sources for Algeria, see Piero Gleijeses, “Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965,” Journal of Latin American Studies (February 1996), 159-95. 5 José Ramón Machado Ventura, note to author, Havana, 12 July 1995, 1. 6 Verde Olivo (Havana), 28 June 1964, 51-52. 7 See Piero Gleijeses, ***Flee! The White Giants Are Coming! The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-1965,Diplomatic History, Spring 1994, 207-37. 8 Che Guevara, “Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (Congo)” [Episodes of the Revolutionary War), Dar-es-Salaam, late 1965, 13 (private collection, Havana). 9 CIA Special Memorandum, “Implications of Growing Communist Influence in URTZ;" 29 September 1964, 11, Freedom of Information Act request (hereafter FOIA) 1977/91F. 10 Interviews with Godefroid Tschamlesso, an aide to Kabila (Havana, 30 June 1994) and Marcelino dos Santos, a Mozambican rebel leader (Havana, 27 June 1994). 11 Guevara, “Pasajes,” 12-13, 120, 14. 12 Quotations from CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, “Brazzaville's Move to the Left,” 30 October 1964, 5, National Security File Country File: Congo, box 83, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL), Austin, Texas; and “Discurso pronunciado por Raúl Castro Ruz en acto por el XX aniversario de la construcción de las columnas de combatientes internacionalistas cubanos que cumplieron misiones en el Congo Brazzaville y el Congo Leopoldville" (Speech by Raúl Castro Ruz on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the columns of internationalist Cuban fighters who went to Congo Brazzaville and Congo Leopoldville), 11 November 1965, 7, Archives of the Central Committee, Havana. 13 Guevara, “Pasajes," 10. 14 See Jorge Risquet, “Brizna de paja en la oreja" (Straw in the ear), Brazzaville, 12 July 1966, Archives of the Central Committee, Havana. 15 Interview with Rolando Kindelán, Havana, 11 March 1996. 16 Rodolfo Puente Ferro, head of the medical brigade attached to the column, in Luis Hernández and Félix López, “Africa mía,” Juventud Rebelde (Havana), 3 December 1995, 8-9. 17 Helenio Ferrer and Rodolfo Puente Ferro to Machado Ventura, 19 May 1966, Archives of the

Ministry of Public Health, Havana; Ferrer, “Informe sobre campaña de vacunación (Continuación)” [Report on the vaccination campaign (Continued)], 27 May 1966, ibid.; interviews with Jorge Risquet (Havana, 20 June 1994); with the Cuban doctors Rodolfo Puente Ferro (Havana, 21 June 1994) and Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra (Havana, 12 March 1996); and with Tirso Arcide Reyna (Havana, 5 March 1996), a Cuban soldier who helped in the campaign. 18 See Empresa Cubana de Navegación, (record of the Luis Arcos Bergnes), Manifiesto de pasajeros congoleses, Centro de Información de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Havana (hereafter CID-FAR); J' Transporte U/M 1546 to J' Servicios U/M 1546, 15 February 1966, CID-FAR; Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, “Relación de personal especial que se encuentra en El Cano,” 24 February 1966, CID-FAR. Interviews with the Cubans doctors Alvarez Cambra, Puente Ferro and Julian Alvarez (Havana, 5 April 1994) and with two other Cubans who participated in the operation: Ulises Estrada (Havana, 30 March 1994) and Rafael Orlando Duany (Havana, 12 March 1996); Granma (Havana), 5 July 1966, 1. See also René Gauze, The Politics of Congo-Brazzaville (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1973), 205. and “Brazzaville — Cuba's new base?" African Review, August 1966, 10. 19 “Policy Planning Memorandum No. 1,” 9, enclosed in Department of State to all African Diplomatic Posts, Lisbon, London, Paris, Rome, 2 December 1971, FOIA 1982/0426. See also Bennett (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 3 April 1968, FOIA 1982/0392; Bennett (Lisbon) to SecState, 16 July 1969, FOIA 1983/0449; Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Portuguese Guinea: Talks About Talks,” 3 March 1970, FOIA 1982/1049; “Portuguese Guinea: Guidelines for Policy," enclosed in Irwin to U.S. Embassy Lisbon, 2 October 1970, FOIA 1982/1879. 20 President Luís Cabral, No Pintcha (Bissau), 22 January 1977, 4-6. On the Guinea-Bissau story, see Piero Gleijeses, “The First Ambassadors: Cuba's Contribution to Guinea-Bissau's War of Independence,Journal of Latin American Studies (forthcoming, February 1997), 21 Interview with João Bernardo Vieira (Nino), Bissau, 1 May 1996. The conclusions in this paragraph are based on: a) a great number of Cuban documents in my possession, the most important of which are “Ayuda brindada por la República de Cuba al Partido Africano por la Independencia de Guinea y las Islas de Cabo Verde (PAIGC)" [Help given by the Republic of Cuba to the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde), CID-FAR, and Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (hereafter MINFAR), “Realización de la Operación ‘Amílcar Cabral,”” (1974), CID-FAR; b) interviews in Havana with over 20 Cuban protagonists; c) interviews in Bissau (25 April-1 May 1996) with the following senior PAIGC officials: Nino, Leopoldo Alfama, António Borges, Fidelis Cabral, Arafam Mané, Joseph Turpin, Vasco Cabral. 22 Interview with Francisca Pereira, Bissau, 25 April 1996. The exception was the Panamanian doctor Hugo Spadafora from July 1966 to May 1967. In addition to the sources listed in the previous footnote, I rely on three major groups of

sources: a) Luís Cabral, Crónica da Libertação (History of the War of Liberation) (Lisbon: Edições O Jornal, 1984), 253-54 and passim and Hugo Spadafora, Experiencias y pensamiento de un médico guerrillero [Experiences and Thoughts of a Guerrilla Doctor] (Panama City: Centro de Impresió Educativa, 1980), 15-79; b) interviews in Bissau (29 April-2 May 1996) with the following Guinean doctors and physician's assistants who served in the war: Paulo Medina, Venancio Furtado, Gaudêncio de Sousa Carvahlo, Ernesto Lopes Moreira and Paulo Alves; c) interviews in Havana with the Cuban doctors Luis Peraza (5 July 1994), Milton Hechavarría (20 July 1995), Raúl Candebat (12 July 1995), Pablo Pérez Capdet and Rubén Pérez de León (both on 28 February 1996). 23 Interviews with Estrada (Havana, 7 December 1994) and Oscar Cárdenas (Havana, 5 December 1993). 24 Interview with Víctor Dreke (Havana, 26 June 1994). 25 Interview with Robinson McIlvaine, Washington, D.C., 5 February 1996. See also Gleijeses, “Flee!!” 220-21; CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Cuban Meddling in Africa," 24 March 1967, 4, FOIA 1996/605; U.S. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Some Aspects of Subversion in Africa,” 19 October 1967, 9, National Security File Country File: Union of South Africa, box 78, LBJL; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, “The Liberation Movements of Southern Africa," 24 November 1967, National Security File, NIE, box 8, LBJL; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 19 October 1971, 2, FOIA 1982/1889; “Policy Planning Memorandum No. 1,” enclosed in Dept. of State to all African Diplomatic Posts, Lisbon, London, Paris, Rome, 2 December 1971, FOIA 1982/0426; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 7 January 1972, FOIA 1982/2672. 26 Interview with Paul O'Neil, Washington, D.C., 20 February 1992. 27 “Discurso pronunciado,” 2. 28 Lucio Lara, “A história do MPLA” [A History of the MPLA), n.d., 100. I would like to thank Dr. Christine Messiant of the Centre d'Etudes Africaines of Paris for sharing this important, unpublished document with me. 29 Rafael Moracén, who fought in Cabinda, allowed me to photocopy his diary, “Diario de campaña de Humberto Vazquez Mancevo." In addition to Moracén (Havana, 21 June 1994), I also interviewed several other Cubans who fought in Cabinda: Osvaldo Fuente Veitia (Havana, 25 June 1994); Rafael Orlando Duany (Havana, 12 March 1996); Fernando Galindo (Havana, 12 March 1996); Tirso Arcide Reyna (Havana, 5 March 1996). See also: César Augusto Kiluanji, Trajectória da vida de um guerrilheiro [The Life of a Guerrilla) (Lisbon: Editorial Vanguardia, 1990), 29-34. 30 Moracén, “Diario de campaña," entry of September 1965. 31 Interview with Moracén. 32 Interviews with Carlos Cadelo, the Communist party official whose portfolio included Angola (Havana, 7 July 1995), and with Félix Véliz Hernández (Havana, 3 July 1995) and Luis Mario Burgos (Havana, 24 June 1994), who were preparing to leave for eastern Angola; MINFAR, “Síntesis histórica de la ayuda internacionalista

de Cuba a la R.P.A. (Summary of the history of the internationalist assistance given by Cuba to the P.R.A.)," n.d., 3, Archives of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Havana. (Hereafter “Síntesis") 33 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto, día 31 de diciembre de 1974 (Conversation with Agostinho Neto, 31st of December 1974),” Appendix no. 6, enclosed in “Informe sobre la visita realizada a Angola” (Report on the Visit to Angola), 21 March 1975, 31, CID-FAR. (Hereafter “Informe sobre la visita") 34 “Informe sobre la visita,” 1. 35 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizar la visita a Angola” (Conversation with Agostinho Neto at the conclusion of his visit to Angola), enclosed in “Informe sobre la visita," 32-33. 36 Cadelo, note to author, Havana 15 July 1995, 7. 37 Conversación con Agustinho Neto, día 31 de diciembre de 1974," enclosed in “Informe sobre la visita," quotation on p. 31; interviews with Cadelo and Alfonso Pérez Morales (Pina) (Havana, 28 February 1996). 38 "Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizar la visita a Angola," enclosed in “Informe sobre la visita,” 33. 39 Interview with Cadelo. 40 Andrés González Ballester, “Estudio de la colaboración militar cubano-angolana, 19751976," Havana, Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales, 1989, quotation on p. 10; Cadelo, note to author, 10. 41 See The Observer, 20 April 1975, 11, and 18 May 1975, 5; Le Monde, 3 May 1975, 6. 42 Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 21 April 1975, 1. 43 “Informe sobre las actividades ejecutadas por el Partido Comunista de Cuba y Gobierno Revolucionario para dar cumplimiento a la ayuda solicitada por el Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola (Report on the actions taken by the Communist party of Cuba and the Revolutionary Government to deliver the aid requested by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola),” (hereafter “Informe sobre las actividades”), CID-FAR, 1 (quoted); “Síntesis," 5; interviews with Cadelo and Víctor Schueg Colás (Havana, 27 February 1996), who were members of the delegation. 44 “Síntesis,” 6. 45 See "Síntesis,” 6-7 and “Informe sobre las actividades," 1-2. 46 Interview with Risquet, Havana, 15 February 1996. 47 See the trailblazing article by Peter Kornbluh and James Blight, “Dialogue with Castro: A Hidden History,The New York Review of Books, 6 October 1994, 45-49. 48 Interview with Risquet. In his capacity as a member of the Secretariat of the PCC, Risquet attended the sessions of the Political Bureau. 49 The preparatory meeting for the conference was held in Havana in late March 1975. The Conferencia Internacional de Solidaridad con la Independencia de Puerto Rico was held in Havana on September 5-8. (See Granma, 1, 5, 15 April 1975, all 1; 5 September 1975, 1; 6 September 1975, 8; 9 September 1975, 2.) 50 The mission to Syria (October 1973-January 1975) is briefly described in MINFAR, "Las misiones internacionalistas desarrolladas por


FAR en defensa de la independencia y la soberanía de los pueblos” (Internationalist missions of the FAR in defense of the independence and the sovereignty of other peoples), n.d., 26-34, Archives of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Havana. 51 Le Monde, 14 January 1976, 8; Kissinger's testimony of 29 January 1976 in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommitteee on African Affairs, Angola, 94th Cong., 2d sess.(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 17; New York Times, 5 February 1976, 12; Sunday Telegraph (London), 30 January 1977, 8; Fred Bridgland, “The Future of Angola,” South Africa International, July 1988, 32; Christian Science Monitor, 22 January 1976, 9. 52 See Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late August 1975), 4; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 2 September 1975, 14; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 3 September 1975, 9 (signed by Díaz Argüelles but the handwriting is Cadelo's); Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late September 1975), 5; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975, 15; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 26; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 16 October 1975, 2; “Situación militar en Angola. Octubre/75” [Military Situation in Angola, October 1975), November (1?), 1975, 13. Díaz Argüelles also cabled specific requests. See MINFAR “Solicitud de Argüelles," 25 August 1975 through 26 September 1975, CID-FAR. After Cuba decided to send troops to Angola on November 4, a more senior officer, Leopoldo Cintra Frías, replaced Díaz Arguelles as head of the MMCA. He arrived in Angola on November 11. 53 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late August 1975), 1, 4, CID-FAR. 54 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 2, CID-FAR. 55 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 5, 9-11, 12, CID-FAR. See also MINFAR, "Composición de fuerzas y medios de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4,” n.d. [late October 1975). On the 1965 agreement: interview with Estrada, who was a senior intelligence officer at the time, Havana, 18 December 1994. 56 MINFAR, “Composición de fuerzas y medios de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4,"n.d. [late October 1975); MINFAR “Solicitud de Argüelles,” 25 August 1975 through 26 September 1975, CID-FAR; “Informe sobre las actividades," 3; “Síntesis," 11-12. 57 Quotations from Le Monde, 20 August 1975, 4 and 19 August 1975, 3. The best analysis of the US role in the Angolan civil war is Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: AmericanSoviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (rev. ed., Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 556-93. 58 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton, 1978), 163. 59 Quotations from Elima (Kinshasa), 21 October 1975, 1, and 23 October 1975, 1. 60 See F.J. du Toit Spies, Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976 (Pretoria: S.A. Weermag, 1989), 132 and Sophia du Preez, Aventuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976 (Adventure in Angola: The Story of South Africa's Soldiers in Angola 19751976] (Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik 1989), 113. 61 Díaz Argüelles, “Situación militar en Angola. Octubre ( 75," November (1?) 1975, 3-5, CIDFAR; "Síntesis," 14-17.

62 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975, 11, CID-FAR. 63 Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Angola: The MPLA Prepares for Independence,” 22 September 1975, 4-5, FOIA Collection, National Security Archive, Washing

ton, D.C.

64 Quotations from: Daily Telegraph (London), 10 October 1975, 16; Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 23 October 1975, 1; Spies, Operasie Savannah, 82. 65 Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 9 October 1975, 4. 66 Quotations from Helmoed-Römer Heitman, South African War Machine (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), 170 and Dirk and Johanna de Villiers, P.W. - A Biography of South Africa's President P.W. Botha (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1984), 251. On the controversial issue of Washington's role, a good starting point is Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: Norton, 1992), 49. 67 See Spies, Operasie Savannah, 87-95 and du Preez, Aventuur, 65-72. For the South African campaign, see Cdr. Jan Breytenbach, Forged in Battle (Cape Town: Saayaman & Weber, 1986); idem, They Live By the Sword (Alberton, S.A.: Lemur, 1990), 18-66; Spies, Operasie Savannah; du Preez, Aventuur. 68 Díaz Argüelles, “Situación militar en Angola. Octubre/75," November (1?) 1975, 10, CID-FAR. 69 Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, 72. 70 Elima, 3 November 1975, 1. 71 Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, 108-09. 72 For the Western press, see Rand Daily Mail, 8 November 1975, 8; Cape Times, 13 November 1975, 1; London Times, 6 November 1975, 5; Washington Post, 7 November 1975, 7; Guardian (Manchester), 4 November 1975, 3; New York Times, 9 November 1975, 18. For the MPLA's denunciations, see FBIS, VIII, 23 October 1975, E2 and Granma, 25 October 1975, 8. 73 Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1983), 30. 74 Paulo Jorge, “Resposta célere dos cubanos ao apelo de Agostinho Neto," Jornal de Notícias (Lisbon), 14 November 1995, 14. 75 “Informe sobre las actividades,” 5. 76 MINFAR, “Batallón de Tropas Especiales," nd, CID-FAR; Lucas Molina to Colomé ("Informe del cumplimiento de la misión en Luanda entre los días 4-18.11.75") (Report on the mission in Luanda on 4-18 November 1975), n.d., 7, CIDFAR; “Resumen de los cables recibidos. Noviembre 75" [Summary of the cables received), entry of 9 November 1975, CID-FAR. The Cuban planes, two aging Britannias, refuelled twice en route to Luanda. 77 Du Preez, Aventuur, 142. 78 Quotations from Cape Times, 21 November 1975, 1, and Spies, Operasie Savannah, 108. 79 See Westad article in this Bulletin. 80 See "Informe sobre la visita realizada por el mayor Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga a Angola en los días del 16.11.75 al 26.11.75 (Frente sur)” (Report on the visit to Angola by Major Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga on 16-26 November 1975 (Southern front)], n.d., CID-FAR; Lucas Molina to Colomé (“Informe del cumplimiento de la misión en Luanda entre los días 4-18.11.75 [Report on

the mission to Angola on November 4-18]"), n.d., CID-FAR; Raúl Pérez Millares and Eliseo Matos Andreu (representatives of Cubana de Aviación in Barbados) to Olivio, 17 December 1975, CIDFAR; González Bellester, “Estudio de la colaboración,” 12-13. On the U.S. campaign to close airports for the Cuban airlift, see the following documents, all in FOIA collection, National Security Archive: U.S. Embassy Port of Spain to SecState, 19 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Georgetown, 20 December 1975; SecState to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, 20 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Georgetown, 24 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Lisbon, 22 December 1975; and U.S. Embassy Lisbon to SecState, 8 January 1976, FOIA, MF 8904623 S.1. The fact that the Cubans were in charge was well reported in the Western press: see, e.g., Economist, 27 December 1975, 26; Daily Telegraph, 19 December 1975, 4; Le Monde, 18 January 1976, 1; Christian Science Monitor, 22 January 1976, 9; Washington Post, 10 March 1976, 15. 81 MINFAR “Conversación con el embajador soviético," 6 January 1976, CID-FAR; Gustavo Chui (deputy chief of the Puesto de Mando de Angola in the EMG) to Comandante de Brigada Rogelio Acevedo, 9 January 1976, CID-FAR; Raúl Castro to Severo Aguirre, 31 January 1976, CID-FAR. 82 Interview with Risquet. 83 See Chui (Subjefe del Puesto de Mando de Angola en el EMG) to Cdte Juan Escalona (Jefe del Puesto de Mando), 30 January 1976, CIDFAR. 84 See Gleijeses, “Cuba's First Venture,” 174. 85 See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, weekly reports, “The Situation in the Congo," 10 March 1965, 5-6, 31 March 1965, 4, and 14 April 1965, 4, all in National Security File Country File: Congo, box 87, LBJL; CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, “Tanzanian Support for the Congo Rebels," 7 April 1965, 4, ibid. 86

Hughes to SecState, “Che Guevara's African Venture," 19 April 1965, 1-2, National Security File Country File: Cuba, box 20, LBJL. 87 Interview with Turpin. 88 Ford, quoted in New York Times, 11 February 1976, 1. According to press reports, Kissinger believed that the Cubans had intervened on their own initiative, but he chose the politically more rewarding course of claiming that Cuba “was acting merely as the 'client state' of the Soviet Union.” (New York Times, 5 February 1976, 12.) See also Kissinger's 29 January 1976 testimony in US Senate, Angola, 6-55, quotation on 8. 89 In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Sir Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 362. See also Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), 271-72; Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance: 1959-1991 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994). 90 Pastor to Brzezinski, 21 September 1979, White House Central File, box CO-21, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia. Carter called Castro “a Soviet puppet”; Brzezinski dismissed the Cubans as “proxy military forces" and CIA director Stansfield Turner blithely spoke of “Cuban mercenaries.” See Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam

Books, 1982), 479; Brzezinski, Power and Prin- CASTRO'S TRIP TO AFRICA Lanka, at the Nonaligned Summit Conferciple: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser

continued from page 8

ence in August 1976). After that we sent a 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 56, 146, 187; and Turner, Secrecy and De

fuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes Cuban delegation to Mozambique and I was mocracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: (Honecker welcomes Castro, invites him to invited to visit. FRELIMO accepted all of Houghton & Mifflin, 1985), 86, 92. take the floor-ed.]

our suggestions for the visit. It was kept 91 George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern:

Fidel Castro: (sections omitted—ed.] discreet, which was convenient for me. Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982), 374. Cuba's role in Shaba and the Horn go beyond the scope

We visited Tanzania because of an old Samora Machel was really a surprise for me. of this essay. For Cuba and Shaba, see Piero commitment. We have built three schools I learned to know him as an intelligent revoGleijeses, “Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter there, sent a medical brigade, and given help lutionary who took clear positions and had and the Invasions of Shaba, International His

in other ways. Nyerere had invited us to talk a good relationship with the masses. He retory Review, February 1996, 70-103. 92 The 686 men of the Grupo Especial de

about economic matters above all. The rise ally impressed me. We spoke with each other Instrucción (GEI) arrived in Algeria aboard two in oil prices had affected Tanzania tremen- for one and a half days. We support special flights of Cubana de aviación that left dously. Tanzania needs 800,000 tons of oil Mozambique. Machel asked us to send 300 Havana on October 21, and on two ships, the

a year. The entire harvest of peanut, sisal and technicians. He was interested in Cuba's Aracelio Iglesias and the Andrés González Lines, which reached Oran on October 22 and 29 re

cotton crops has to be used for the purchase experiences, especially economic ones. Bespectively. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the com- of oil. The Chinese are still present in Tan- fore this we did not know for sure what inmander of the GEI.

zania. They have built a few things there, in fluence the Chinese had on him. Now he is 93 In this article the ellipsis is used to indicate

particular the railroad. The armed units of getting closer to the Soviet Union and other author's editing. Any sanitized words or sentences are clearly indicated as such.

the ZANU are trained by the Chinese. Tan- socialist countries. He got a loan from the 94 On 3 December 1975, Risquet flew to Angola zania also carries some responsibility for the Soviets for weapons of 100 million rubles. as head of the Cuban Mission in Luanda. As such, split of the liberation movement of Zimba- In particular, the Soviets deliver aircraft and he was above the ambassador (Oscar Oramas) and

bwe into ZANU and ZAPU. In South Af- anti-aircraft batteries. We were very pleased at the same level as the chief of the MMCA. 95 “Because of the growing scope of our help to rica armed fighting has begun.

with our visit to Mozambique. I want to say the MPLA,” on 25 November 1975 the first vice- The ANC fighters are trained in Angola. that we consider this very important. minister of the armed forces, Abelardo Colomé The Chinese had also offered training here. (Zambian President Kenneth) Kaunda Ibarra, had flown from Cuba to Angola to become

Tanzania considers the developments in also wanted me to visit him. I had been in the head of the MMCA. (“Síntesis," 23-24.) 96 Oscar Oramas, a senior foreign ministry offi

Zimbabwe in terms of prestige. [Its involve- Africa for a long time, however, and did not cial and former ambassador to Guinea Conakry ment] allows it to negotiate with Great Brit- want to extend my stay. Besides which the (1966-73), had arrived in December 1975 to serve ain and the United States over Zimbabwe imperialist penetration has advanced far in as Cuba's first ambassador to Angola. and to define a role for itself.

Zambia. In the Angola matter, Zambia took

The ZANU has 5000 men in fighting a very wrong position, in spite of the fact Piero Gleijeses is Professor of U.S. For

units trained by the Chinese. The liberation that she was not forced to do so. We had eign Policy at the Johns Hopkins Uni-fighters in Namibia are also trained in agreed with Angola not to visit Zambia. A versity School of Advanced Interna- Angola, however. Cuba and the Soviet few days before my visit to southern Africa tional Studies in Washington, D.C. He

Union have both set up training camps for the Katanga (Shaba) battles had begun and is the author of, among other works, this purpose. The ZAPU is supported by [People's Republic of the Congo President Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revo- | Angola.

Marien] N'Gouabi was murdered. I had lution and the United States (Princeton,

We flew directly from Tanzania to been invited to Madagascar, but did not want NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Mozambique. There used to be differences to stay in Africa any longer. During a press

between us and the FRELIMO, going back conference in Dar Es Salaam I had categori

to the times when FRELIMO was in Tanza- cally denied that Cuba was in any way inINTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC

nia and Che Guevara had spoken to volved in the Katanga battles. I explained ARCHIVES ASSOCIATION

[Mozambique Liberation Front head that the situation in Angola was different

Eduardo] Mondlane there. At the time from those in Zimbabwe and Namibia. I had Scholars interested in conducting research

Mondlane did not agree with Che and said answered all questions in very general terms. in Moscow at the Russian Foreign Minis

so publicly. Thereafter news articles against Things are going well in Angola. They try Archives—the Archive of Foreign

Mondlane were published in Cuba. Later achieved good progress in their first year of Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF)-may

Mondlane corrected himself, but only inter- independence. There's been a lot of buildcontact the International Diplomatic Ar

nally and things remained somewhat up in ing and they are developing health facilichives Association (IDAA). The Associa

the air. FRELIMO took good positions dur- ties. In 1976 they produced 80,000 tons of tion assists scholars in locating relevant ma

ing the liberation struggle in Angola. But in terials, setting up research visits, obtaining

coffee. Transportation means are also being our opinion they were not sufficiently com- developed. Currently between 200,000 and passes for research, declassification proce

bative. For a time FRELIMO got close to 400,000 tons of coffee are still in waredures, photocopying, etc. Inquiries: I.

[Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. (Cu- houses. In our talks with (Angolan PresiBoukharkin, President, International Dip

ban Vice President] Carlos Rafael dent Agostinho] Neto stressed the absolomatic Archives Association, fax: (7-095)

[Rodriguez] had spoken to (Mozambican lute necessity of achieving a level of eco230-2130 (new fax number).

President) Samora Machel in Colombo[, Sri nomic development comparable to what had existed under [Portuguese] colonialism. tically not organized. The Soviet advisers complicated. Over 300 Cubans are working in the health are primarily concerned with planning. Neto The number of our civilian advisers system. Fishing is recovering and the sugar wanted us to take the entire army in hand. and experts will rise to 4,000 this year. Unplantations are almost all back in produc- In practical terms that might have been the til now this aid has been provided free of tion. The reconstruction of the transport sys- best solution, but not politically. The Soviet charge. Starting in 1977, however, Angola tem is to be completed within 6 months. In Union is the chief weapons supplier and the is committed to paying for the living exeducation a lot is being done as well. The Angolans must speak directly to the Sovi- penses

of our specialists, with an additional MPLA (Movement for the Popular Libera- ets. Neto himself must solve these problems. increase in financial responsibilities schedtion of Angola) is doing a good job with We also cannot commit our troops to the uled for 1978. Our military aid will remain mass organizing. Women are politically very fight against bandits because women and free of charge. The Soviet Union has comactive. There are no grounds for dissatisfac- children are being killed in these battles and mitted itself to supplying the entire matetion there. Angola has good hard currency we cannot take on such a responsibility. rial needs of the Angolan and our units. earnings. Oil revenues are about 500 mil- Neto made a very good impression. He While in Angola I also dealt with the lion dollars a year, without them having to is an outstanding personality, very clever question of the liberation movements in do anything. They also generate about 300 and decisive. He is increasingly the leading Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. million from coffee. Now they are setting figure in the Angolan leadership. There are Namibia's liberation fighters are good, they up a Party in Angola. The fundamental de- also opportunists in Angola, however. are also helping Angola with the anti-bancisions in domestic and foreign policy are Sometimes they try to approach us or the dit battles. The South African ANC is a secorrect. We are still concerned about one Soviets and to spread certain opinions. We rious organization. Its president, Oliver area: the development of the Army. The De- are very clearly taking a line in favor of Tambo, is a serious politician. Three quarfense Ministry is doing hardly anything to Agostinho Neto. There is also evidence of ters of the ANC Central Committee memfight bandits in the north and south of the black racism in Angola. Some are using the bership is communist. They have a very country. The bands are particularly active hatred against the colonial masters for nega- clear political position with regards to in the center of the country. With our help tive purposes. There are many mulattos and Angola, the Soviet Union, and other socialthey could deliver heavy blows against whites in Angola. Unfortunately, racist feel- ist countries. The people have taken up the them. The Soviet military advisors are ac- ings are spreading very quickly. Neto has struggle in South Africa, in time the ANC tive at the highest levels. Our advisers are taken a balanced position here, naming both will be a serious power. active at the Brigade level and we are help- whites and mulattos as ministers. Neto is of The situation is most complicated in ing them with the training of military cad- course ready to contribute to this question Zimbabwe. The ZANU have 1,000 armed res and the fight against the bandits. The decisively. He is open to suggestions and fighters. The Chinese and Nyerere are inAngolan Defense Ministry underestimates arguments. The Defense Minister is not as fluential with the ZANU. The ZAPU, howthe fight against the bandits [and] they are strong. He does not have high standards. ever, haven't had any military forces of their not deploying regular troops against the ban- Because of this a lot of cadres do not have own. The best man in the ZAPU, General dits. We understand that the Soviet military the right attitudes. There are cases in which Secretary (Jason) Moyo, was murdered [in advisers are primarily requested to help them the military commanders have not visited Zambia in January 1977). During the to organize the regular army and are not in- their military district for five months. Many Angolan war of liberation, the Angolan leadterested in helping in the fight against ban- ministers were appointed because they were ership could not give its support to the libdits. It is difficult for us to fight against the old war comrades of Neto's. A fact remains: eration movement in Zimbabwe. At the time bandits on our own. Our comrades have had the army and general staff are not working Mozambique was leaning against Tanzania a lot of difficulties and have spent many bit- properly. Cadres overall are being developed and supported the ZANU. Today things are ter hours fighting them. The Cubans cannot well throughout Angola, but the Army is the different. Angola's influence is increasing do it alone. The state of the army unsettles most important. Things are going well, with and Mozambique is growing closer and us. In one region a brigade has been with- the exception of the army.

closer to Angola. The Patriotic Front in Zimout a commander or chief of staff for a long We are giving Angola a great deal of babwe is made up of both the ZANU and time. Until now the Cuban units have been military support. At the end of the libera- the ZAPU, but this is only a formality. the only ones fighting the bandits. The ma- tion war, 36,000 Cuban troops and 300 tanks (ZAPU leader Joshua) Nkomo is supported jor share must however be carried out by were deployed. The South African merce- by Angola, the Soviet Union and the other the Angolans themselves. The Cuban troops naries were quickly demoralized. The USA socialist countries. (ZANU leader Robert] are above all concentrated in Cabinda and talks about 12,000 Cuban soldiers. We are Mugabe is supported by Tanzania and the in the defense of the capital, Luanda. I spoke reducing our troop strength continuously. Chinese. Now there are possibilities for dewith Neto about the situation of the army This year we plan to leave 15,000 men sta- priving the Chinese and the Tanzanians of and told him that things had to change. The tioned there. By the end of 1978 there should their influence in Zimbabwe. Zambia is supDefense Minister (Cdr. Iko Teles Carreira- be only 7,000, although it's probable that porting the Zimbabwean liberation moveed.) is a good old fighter with the MPLA, the reductions won't proceed quite as rap- ment for the prestige factor that's involved but that hasn't helped. An army general staff idly. The main force is stationed in the south. and because it wants to counteract Angola's does not really exist. The country may have If the Cuban military were not deployed in influence with Nkomo. With the positive 70,000 men under arms but the army is prac- Angola the situation would be a lot more development of Angola and Mozambique

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