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Books, 1982), 479; Brzezinski, Power and Prin

CASTRO'S TRIP TO AFRICA ciple: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser

continued from page 8 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 56, 146, 187; and Turner, Secrecy and De

fuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes mocracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: (Honecker welcomes Castro, invites him to Houghton & Mifflin, 1985), 86, 92.

take the floor-ed.] 91 George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern:

Fidel Castro: (sections omitted—ed.) Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982), 374. Cuba's role in Shaba and the Horn go beyond the scope

We visited Tanzania because of an old of this essay. For Cuba and Shaba, see Piero commitment. We have built three schools Gleijeses, “Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter there, sent a medical brigade, and given help and the Invasions of Shaba, “International His.

in other ways. Nyerere had invited us to talk tory Review, February 1996, 70-103. 92 The 686 men of the Grupo Especial de

about economic matters above all. The rise Instrucción (GEI) arrived in Algeria aboard two in oil prices had affected Tanzania tremenspecial flights of Cubana de aviación that left

dously. Tanzania needs 800,000 tons of oil Havana on October 21, and on two ships, the

a year. The entire harvest of peanut, sisal and Aracelio Iglesias and the Andrés González Lines, which reached Oran on October 22 and 29 re

cotton crops has to be used for the purchase spectively. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the com- of oil. The Chinese are still present in Tanmander of the GEI.

zania. They have built a few things there, in 93 In this article the ellipsis is used to indicate

particular the railroad. The armed units of author's editing. Any sanitized words or sentences are clearly indicated as such.

the ZANU are trained by the Chinese. Tan94 On 3 December 1975, Risquet flew to Angola zania also carries some responsibility for the as head of the Cuban Mission in Luanda. As such,

split of the liberation movement of Zimbahe was above the ambassador (Oscar Oramas) and

bwe into ZANU and ZAPU. In South Afat the same level as the chief of the MMCA. 95 “Because of the growing scope of our help to

rica armed fighting has begun. the MPLA,” on 25 November 1975 the first vice- The ANC fighters are trained in Angola. minister of the armed forces, Abelardo Colomé The Chinese had also offered training here. Ibarra, had flown from Cuba to Angola to become

Tanzania considers the developments in the head of the MMCA. ("Síntesis," 23-24.) 96 Oscar Oramas, a senior foreign ministry offi

Zimbabwe in terms of prestige. [Its involvecial and former ambassador to Guinea Conakry ment) allows it to negotiate with Great Brit(1966-73), had arrived in December 1975 to serve ain and the United States over Zimbabwe as Cuba's first ambassador to Angola.

and to define a role for itself.

The ZANU has 5000 men in fighting Piero Gleijeses is Professor of U.S. For

units trained by the Chinese. The liberation eign Policy at the Johns Hopkins Uni- fighters in Namibia are also trained in versity School of Advanced Interna- Angola, however. Cuba and the Soviet tional Studies in Washington, D.C. He

Union have both set up training camps for is the author of, among other works,

this purpose. The ZAPU is supported by Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revo-Angola. lution and the United States (Princeton,

We flew directly from Tanzania to NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Mozambique. There used to be differences

between us and the FRELIMO, going back

to the times when FRELIMO was in TanzaINTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC

nia and Che Guevara had spoken to ARCHIVES ASSOCIATION

[Mozambique Liberation Front head

Eduardo] Mondlane there. At the time Scholars interested in conducting research

Mondlane did not agree with Che and said in Moscow at the Russian Foreign Minis

so publicly. Thereafter news articles against try Archives—the Archive of Foreign

Mondlane were published in Cuba. Later Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF)—may

Mondlane corrected himself, but only intercontact the International Diplomatic Ar

nally and things remained somewhat up in chives Association (IDAA). The Associa

the air. FRELIMO took good positions durtion assists scholars in locating relevant ma

ing the liberation struggle in Angola. But in terials, setting up research visits, obtaining

our opinion they were not sufficiently compasses for research, declassification proce

bative. For a time FRELIMO got close to dures, photocopying, etc. Inquiries: I.

[Tanzanian President Julius) Nyerere. (CuBoukharkin, President, International Dip

ban Vice President Carlos Rafael lomatic Archives Association, fax: (7-095)

[Rodriguez] had spoken to (Mozambican 230-2130 (new fax number).

President) Samora Machel in Colombos, Sri

Lanka, at the Nonaligned Summit Confer-
ence in August 1976). After that we sent a
Cuban delegation to Mozambique and I was
invited to visit. FRELIMO accepted all of
our suggestions for the visit. It was kept
discreet, which was convenient for me.
Samora Machel was really a surprise for me.
I learned to know him as an intelligent revo-
lutionary who took clear positions and had
a good relationship with the masses. He re-
ally impressed me. We spoke with each other
for one and a half days. We support
Mozambique. Machel asked us to send 300
technicians. He was interested in Cuba's
experiences, especially economic ones. Be-
fore this we did not know for sure what in-
fluence the Chinese had on him. Now he is
getting closer to the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries. He got a loan from the
Soviets for weapons of 100 million rubles.
In particular, the Soviets deliver aircraft and
anti-aircraft batteries. We were very pleased
with our visit to Mozambique. I want to say
that we consider this very important.

(Zambian President Kenneth] Kaunda
also wanted me to visit him. I had been in
Africa for a long time, however, and did not
want to extend my stay. Besides which the
imperialist penetration has advanced far in
Zambia. In the Angola matter, Zambia took
a very wrong position, in spite of the fact
that she was not forced to do so. We had
agreed with Angola not to visit Zambia. A
few days before my visit to southern Africa
the Katanga (Shaba) battles had begun and
[People's Republic of the Congo President
Marien] N'Gouabi was murdered. I had
been invited to Madagascar, but did not want
to stay in Africa any longer. During a press
conference in Dar Es Salaam I had categori-
cally denied that Cuba was in any way in-
volved in the Katanga battles. I explained
that the situation in Angola was different
from those in Zimbabwe and Namibia. I had
answered all questions in very general terms.

Things are going well in Angola. They achieved good progress in their first year of independence. There's been a lot of building and they are developing health facilities. In 1976 they produced 80,000 tons of coffee. Transportation means are also being developed. Currently between 200,000 and 400,000 tons of coffee are still in warehouses. In our talks with (Angolan President Agostinho] Neto we stressed the absolute necessity of achieving a level of economic development comparable to what had

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existed under [Portuguese] colonialism. tically not organized. The Soviet advisers complicated. Over 300 Cubans are working in the health are primarily concerned with planning. Neto The number of our civilian advisers system. Fishing is recovering and the sugar wanted us to take the entire army in hand. and experts will rise to 4,000 this year. Unplantations are almost all back in produc- In practical terms that might have been the til now this aid has been provided free of tion. The reconstruction of the transport sys- best solution, but not politically. The Soviet charge. Starting in 1977, however, Angola tem is to be completed within 6 months. In Union is the chief weapons supplier and the is committed to paying for the living exeducation a lot is being done as well. The Angolans must speak directly to the Sovi- penses of our specialists, with an additional MPLA (Movement for the Popular Libera- ets. Neto himself must solve these problems. increase in financial responsibilities schedtion of Angola) is doing a good job with We also cannot commit our troops to the uled for 1978. Our military aid will remain mass organizing. Women are politically very fight against bandits because women and free of charge. The Soviet Union has comactive. There are no grounds for dissatisfac- children are being killed in these battles and mitted itself to supplying the entire matetion there. Angola has good hard currency we cannot take on such a responsibility. rial needs of the Angolan and our units. earnings. Oil revenues are about 500 mil- Neto made a very good impression. He While in Angola I also dealt with the lion dollars a year, without them havi to is an outstanding personality, very clever question of the liberation mo ements in do anything. They also generate about 300 and decisive. He is increasingly the leading Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. million from coffee. Now they are setting figure in the Angolan leadership. There are Namibia's liberation fighters are good, they up a Party in Angola. The fundamental de- also opportunists in Angola, however. are also helping Angola with the anti-bancisions in domestic and foreign policy are Sometimes they try to approach us or the dit battles. The South African ANC is a secorrect. We are still concerned about one Soviets and to spread certain opinions. We rious organization. Its president, Oliver area: the development of the Army. The De- are very clearly taking a line in favor of Tambo, is a serious politician. Three quarfense Ministry is doing hardly anything to Agostinho Neto. There is also evidence of ters of the ANC Central Committee memfight bandits in the north and south of the black racism in Angola. Some are using the bership is communist. They have a very country. The bands are particularly active hatred against the colonial masters for nega- clear political position with regards to in the center of the country. With our help tive purposes. There are many mulattos and Angola, the Soviet Union, and other socialthey could deliver heavy blows against whites in Angola. Unfortunately, racist feel- ist countries. The people have taken up the them. The Soviet military advisors are ac- ings are spreading very quickly. Neto has struggle in South Africa, in time the ANC tive at the highest levels. Our advisers are taken a balanced position here, naming both will be a serious power. active at the Brigade level and we are help- whites and mulattos as ministers. Neto is of The situation is most complicated in ing them with the training of military cad- course ready to contribute to this question Zimbabwe. The ZANU have 1,000 armed res and the fight against the bandits. The decisively. He is open to suggestions and fighters. The Chinese and Nyerere are inAngolan Defense Ministry underestimates arguments. The Defense Minister is not as fluential with the ZANU. The ZAPU, howthe fight against the bandits [and] they are strong. He does not have high standards. ever, haven't had any military forces of their not deploying regular troops against the ban- Because of this a lot of cadres do not have own. The best man in the ZAPU, General dits. We understand that the Soviet military the right attitudes. There are cases in which Secretary (Jason) Moyo, was murdered (in advisers are primarily requested to help them the military commanders have not visited Zambia in January 1977). During the to organize the regular army and are not in- their military district for five months. Many Angolan war of liberation, the Angolan leadterested in helping in the fight against ban- ministers were appointed because they were ership could not give its support to the libdits. It is difficult for us to fight against the old war comrades of Neto's. A fact remains: eration movement in Zimbabwe. At the time bandits on our own. Our comrades have had the army and general staff are not working Mozambique was leaning against Tanzania a lot of difficulties and have spent many bit- properly. Cadres overall are being developed and supported the ZANU. Today things are ter hours fighting them. The Cubans cannot well throughout Angola, but the Army is the different. Angola's influence is increasing do it alone. The state of the army unsettles most important. Things are going well, with and Mozambique is growing closer and us. In one region a brigade has been with- the exception of the army.

closer to Angola. The Patriotic Front in Zimout a commander or chief of staff for a long We are giving Angola a great deal of babwe is made up of both the ZANU and time. Until now the Cuban units have been military support. At the end of the libera- the ZAPU, but this is only a formality. the only ones fighting the bandits. The ma- tion war, 36,000 Cuban troops and 300 tanks [ZAPU leader Joshua) Nkomo is supported jor share must however be carried out by were deployed. The South African merce- by Angola, the Soviet Union and the other the Angolans themselves. The Cuban troops naries were quickly demoralized. The USA socialist countries. (ZANU leader Robert] are above all concentrated in Cabinda and talks about 12,000 Cuban soldiers. We are Mugabe is supported by Tanzania and the in the defense of the capital, Luanda. I spoke reducing our troop strength continuously. Chinese. Now there are possibilities for dewith Neto about the situation of the army This year we plan to leave 15,000 men sta- priving the Chinese and the Tanzanians of and told him that things had to change. The tioned there. By the end of 1978 there should their influence in Zimbabwe. Zambia is supDefense Minister (Cdr. Iko Teles Carreira- be only 7,000, although it's probable that porting the Zimbabwean liberation moveed.) is a good old fighter with the MPLA, the reductions won't proceed quite as rap- ment for the prestige factor that's involved but that hasn't helped. An army general staff idly. The main force is stationed in the south. and because it wants to counteract Angola's does not really exist. The country may have If the Cuban military were not deployed in influence with Nkomo. With the positive 70,000 men under arms but the army is prac- Angola the situation would be a lot more

a

development of Angola and Mozambique the prospects of the liberation movement in They know very well that there are no Cu- the Libyans we have not yet come to a deciZimbabwe can only improve. It is possible ban units involved. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez sion. that Angola, Mozambique and Zambia will is charged with speaking to the French and I had consultations with (Houari] move forward together. The ZAPU must es- Belgian ambassadors to protest against their Boumedienne in Algeria and asked for his tablish its own armed forces as soon as pos

ers.

countries' involvement and to pressure them opinion. He assured me that Algeria would sible. There are today 6,000 ZAPU men in to stop. We want them to be worried, so never abandon Libya. Algeria is very conAngola, and one could make an Army out when they are organizing their mercenar- cerned with the situation in the Mediterraof them. That would facilitate uniting the ies, and to think that our troops are very near. nean because of its security interests. It is ZAPU and the ZANU. I told Neto about this Angola has a certain moral duty, and a in favor of supporting Libya, as long as miliand he agreed. Above all that would be a desire, to support the Katanga liberation tary aid is confined to the socialist camp. way to roll back China's influence. Nkomo movement. They also desire it because the That is not only a question between Cuba also understands this. He is very intelligent Angolan leadership is angered by (Zairian and Algeria. If we are to succeed in strengthand talks to Samora Machel a great deal. leader) Mobutu Sese Seko)'s behavior. ening the revolution in Libya, Ethiopia, Unfortunately he is very fat, and so his Angola has asked us and the Soviets to give Mozambique, the PDRY (People's Demohealth is not good.

them weapons for delivery to the Katangans. cratic Republic of Yemen) and Angola we I told him and others that the personal We should wait for developments, however. must have an integrated strategy for the safety of all the liberation leaders was in Mobutu is an incompetent and weak politi- whole African continent. danger. The imperialists would be moved cian. It's possible that he will not survive Angola is becoming closer to the soto try and murder them all. They've already this crisis. The frontline states are now in cialist camp. It bought 1.5 billion rubles of murdered N'Gouabi and Moyo. Because of favor of supporting Katanga, while Angola weapons from the Soviets. Boumedienne this it is absolutely necessary to take steps favors direct aid. We don't want to be in- thinks that [Egyptian President Anwar] to increase security measures for the lead- volved in order not to give the USA an ex- Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syria there is

cuse to intervene. As I mentioned we will also no leftist movement any more, espeThe liberation struggle in Africa has a try to put pressure on Belgium and France. cially after the Syrians defeated the progresgreat future. From a historical perspective It will be a great event if Mobutu falls. sive powers and the PLO (Palestine Liberathe facts are that the imperialists cannot turn In the People's Republic of the Congo tion Organization) in Lebanon. things back. The liberation struggle is the there is a confusing situation following [Indian President] Indira Gandhi most moral thing in existence. If the social- N'Gouabi's murder. The interior and de- gambled away the elections. ist states take the right positions, they could fense ministers are competing for the lead- In Africa we can inflict a severe defeat gain a lot of influence. Here is where we ership. There are also pro-Westerners in the on the entire reactionary imperialist policy. can strike heavy blows against the imperi- military council. It is practically certain that We can free Africa from the influence of the alists. The liberation army in Katanga the rightists murdered N'Gouabi. But the USA and of the Chinese. The developments [Shaba) is led by a general. These people left wing was also dissatisfied with him as in Zaire are also very important. Libya and used to favor Katanga's secession from well. In other words there was a relatively Algeria have large territories, Ethiopia has Zaire. Later they went to Angola, were uncertain situation there. We sent Comrade a great revolutionary potential. So there is a trained by the Portuguese and fought against Almeyda to the funeral, and hope that the great counterweight to Sadat's betrayal in the MPLA, until they went over to Neto's situation will stabilize. We were also asked Egypt. It is even possible that Sadat will be side; now they could not fall out with Neto. to send a military unit to Brazzaville. The turned around and that the imperialist inThey are good soldiers. Its military leader internal problems of the country must be fluence in the Middle East can be turned is a general in the gendarmerie who now solved by the Congolese themselves how- back. wants to make a revolution in Zaire. These ever. We have stationed a small military unit This must all be discussed with the Sopeople are now saying that they are good in Pointe Noire, and another one in Cabinda. viet Union. We follow its policies and its Marxist-Leninists and that they no longer There were several requests for mili- example. advocate the secession of Katanga. They tary aid from various sides: (Libyan leader We estimate that Libya's request is an went off in four different directions with four Moammar) Qadaffi, Mengistu, and the Con- expression of trust. One should not reject battalions. We didn't know about this, and golese leaders. During our stay in Africa we their request. Cuba cannot help it alone. we think that the Angolans didn't either. The sent Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to Moscow to [subsequent sections omitted-ed.] frontline states were split 50/50 in favor of confer with our Soviet comrades and to supporting the Katanga liberation move- Havana for consultations with our leader- (Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und ment. We gave them a categorical explana- ship. In order to find the best solution we Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen tion that Cuba was in no way involved in must think through this question quietly and DDR im Bundesarchiv" (Berlin), DY30 JIV this. The armed groups are marching for- thoroughly and consider it in terms of the 2/201/1292; document obtained by Chrisward. Their commander sends an open (pub- overall situation of the socialist camp. tian F. Ostermann (National Security lic) daily telegram to the Angolan leader- Above all we must do something for Archive); translated for Carter-Brezhnev ship and to the Soviet and Cuban embassies Mengistu... [section on Ethiopia printed in Project by David Welch with revisions by in Luanda describing his advances and ask- “Horn of Africa Crisis" section-ed.) ... With Ostermann; copy on file at National Secuing for support. The Yankees are wavering. regard to military aid for the PR Congo and rity Archive.]

Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976:

A New Pattern of Intervention

by Odd Arne Westad?
Was it the possibilities for expan-

There are, in particular, two aspects sion within the world system of states of the Soviet materials on the Angolan For a period of roughly twenty which prompted Moscow's involve- civil war which point away from explayears—from the formation of the Cu- ment in Africa and Asia? Some ana- nations generally offered by realist ban-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s lysts, such as Francis Fukuyama, have scholars. First, there is the issue of the until the Red Army got bogged down argued that it was the U.S. foreign nature and importance of ideology in in the valleys of Afghanistan in the early policy of detente and the defeat in Viet- Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet offi1980s—the Soviet Union was an inter- nam which more than anything else cials who designed the intervention in ventionist power with global aspira- paved the way for Soviet expansionism. Southern Africa were driven by ideas tions. The peak of Soviet intervention- Recent memoirs and Moscow's own de- of promoting their model of developism outside Eastern Europe was in the classified documents lend support to ment abroad. Their early contacts with mid- and late 1970s, and coincided this view by showing that the mid-70s the Angolan left-wing rebels had shown roughly with the rise of detente and the was the high-point of a wave of opti- them that the Movimento Popular de effects of the American defeat in Viet- mism in Soviet foreign policy-"the Libertação de Angola (People's Movenam. This period witnessed significant world,” according to one former senior ment for the Liberation of Angola or efforts by Moscow to expand its power official, "was turning in our direction. 4

"

MPLA) was a likely adherent to Soviet abroad, especially in the Middle East, Other scholars have concentrated ideas of state and society. As the around the Indian Ocean, and in South- on the immense expansion of Soviet Angolan group came under pressure ern Africa. But it was also a period in military and infrastructural capabilities from its enemies, many Soviet officials which the traditional cautiousness of during the late 1960s as a cause for So- used opportunity, capability, and straSoviet Third World diplomacy was cast viet involvement in the Third World. tegic interest as rationalizations of a away at a peril: By the mid-1980s, many This instrumental explanation empha- desire to uphold a regime willing to link Russians had started to question the sizes in particular the growth of the up to the Soviet experience. costs of the Kremlin's imperial ambi- Soviet navy, the development of a large Second, there is the ability of Sotions 2

fleet of long-distance transport planes, viet allies in this case the Angolans What was behind the new Soviet enlarged training facilities, and im- and the Cubans—to influence interventionism of the 1970s? Which provements in global communica- Moscow's actions. Luanda and espeperceptions and motives led Soviet tions 5

cially Havana pushed successfully for leaders to involve themselves deeply Analysts have also pointed to Moscow's involvement in the civil war, into the affairs of countries outside Eu- changes in leadership and political or both demonstrating leverage far in exrope or their immediate border areas? institutional conflicts within the Soviet cess of their putative "power." In 1975, As the doors to the archives of the Com- elite. Samuel Huntington suggests that Fidel Castro initiated Cuban armed supmunist Party of the Soviet Union each of the Soviet advances into new port for the MPLA without Moscow's (CPSU) open, albeit slowly, we are get- foreign policy arenas antedated the

foreign policy arenas antedated the agreement or knowledge, and thereby ting new insights into the old problems emergence of a new leader and became reduced the Soviet leaders' role for sev

a of Moscow's foreign policy behavior part of the new leader's claim to power. eral crucial months to that of spectators through CPSU documents on a multi- Brezhnev is the prototype for such a to a war in which the Cubans and their tude of international crises. This article leader, and the Soviet policy changes Angolan allies gambled on prospective attempts to address some of the issues in the 1970s must then be seen as part Soviet support to win. Although it cerrelating to Soviet interventions by re- of Brezhnev's international agenda. tainly was the direction of Soviet forvisiting one of the main African con- Parallel with Brezhnev’s rise to power, eign policy itself which poised Moscow flicts of the 1970s: the 1975-76 Angolan the International Department for its Angolan adventure, it was Castro civil war.

(Mezhdunarodnvi otdel or MO) of the and MPLA President Agostinho Neto In the dominant realist interpreta- CPSU Central Committee (CC) who conditioned and shaped the intertion of international relations, the So- strengthened its position as a maker of vention. viet elite is seen primarily as pursuing Soviet foreign policy at the expense of The main foreign policy aim for a set of interests on the international the Foreign Ministry, and, while the Soviet involvement in Africa was to arena. The primary interest of the elite Ministry was preoccupied with the tra- score a series of inexpensive victories is the preservation of the Soviet state- ditional arenas for Soviet foreign in what was perceived as a global conan interest which in foreign policy leads policy-Europe and the United test with Washington for influence and to caution at most times, and expansion States-the MO increasingly empha- positions in the Third World. Political when possible. 3 sized the Third World 6

theory-Marxism-Leninism-did play a role in selecting who should be the plans in Angola in late 1975 that the especially Angola and Guinea-Bissau Soviet allies in the area, and the large Soviet Union finally made a major in- had great potential strategic importance deposits of mineral resources in South- vestment in one of its Southern African for the Soviet Union, and that both the ern Africa also played a role (prima- alliances, and thereby made the MPLA United States and China were trying to rily in terms of denying these resources a regional ally second in importance increase their influence with the liberato the US and its allies), but these were only to the African National Congress tion movements in these countries. 9 subsidiary parts of the equation. (ANC) of South Africa.

The intelligence organizations saw As the Moscow leadership devel- The "African strategy" was devel- Soviet rivalry with Beijing over influoped its links with the liberation move- oped by the KGB and received the sup- ence in Africa as a major element bements, it created African expectations port of the Soviet leadership—and hind their policy recommendations. of further support as well as a sense of Brezhnev-in the summer and fall of The main military intelligence bureaucommitment in its own ranks. This 1970. The KGB reports emphasized the GRU—reported that China was tarsense of commitment was particularly that the regimes and liberation move- geting countries and movements which strong among the cadre of the CPSU ments of Southern Africa were search- already received aid from the Soviet CC International Department ing for international allies, and under- Union. China, the GRU stressed, would handled most of the contacts with Af- lined the "simplistic" approach most Af- use its resources to the maximum to atrican organizations. In addition, the rican regimes had to world affairs, un- tract African supporters, and could, Cuban leadership—who had been in- derstanding neither the conflict between within a few years, build its position volved in African affairs since the mid- the two camps nor the nature of Ameri- sufficiently to control large parts of 1960s7_viewed the early Soviet in- can imperialism. The black political Africa in a loose coalition with the volvement as a harbinger of a much leaders of Southern Africa felt that their United States.

10 wider East-bloc engagement on the efforts to gain aid from Washington had KGB chairman Yuri Andropov also continent.

failed, and that the Soviet Union was had other reasons for recommending an Still, a larger Soviet operation in the only major power which could as- increase in Soviet involvement in black Africa was slow in coming. sist them in reaching their political and Southern Africa. Summarizing a report Moscow's ideologically inspired atsocial goals. 8

on Western estimates of Soviet policy tempts to influence the policies of the The Portuguese colonies—Angola, in Africa, Andropov stressed that Westlocal revolutionary movements com- Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape ern experts believe that although the plicated the building of stable alliances Verde-were particularly interesting Soviet Union will strive to strengthen with these groups, and often frustrated from a Soviet point of view both for its position in Africa, "in the coming Soviet foreign policy aims. The links political and strategic reasons. The years (it does not plan a 'broad offenwhich the Soviets-often wrongly- KGB noted the Nixon Administration's sive'," limiting itself to “securing posiassumed existed between many Afri- renewed alliance with Portugal, and the tions (already) achieved." These Westcan militants and the People's Repub- recent military setbacks for the colonial ern estimates, Andropov found, were by lic of China contributed to Moscow's forces in their war against the libera- themselves good reasons why the Socaution. It was not until the Soviet and tion movements. KGB Deputy Chair- viet Union should step up its African Cuban leaders agreed on their military man Viktor Chebrikov explained that operations. 11

The new emphasis on Africa in NOBEL INSTITUTE FELLOWSHIPS

Soviet foreign policy was immediately ON COLD WAR HISTORY 1998-99

put into practice in the case of Angola.

After a number of unsuccesful MPLA The Norwegian Nobel Institute will award ment, and the purchase of specific research appeals for increased support in the a limited number of fellowships in its guest materials for the Nobel Institute Library. spring of 1970, Agostinho Neto was researchers program for the spring and fall Fellows must be free to devote full time to

startled by the scale and scope of what terms of 1998 and the spring term of 1999. study and writing and will be expected to

the Soviets offered in mid-July. Soviet The fellowships are for scholars of any na- spend most of their time at the Institute.

ambassador to Zambia D. Z. Belokolos tionality in history, social sciences, and in- The general theme for the 1998-99 pro

proposed a series of plans for Moscow ternational law. Both senior fellowships (for gram is Reviewing the Cold War: Interpre

to assist the MPLA in terms of military distinguished scholars with a substantial tations, Approaches, Theory. Contact Dr.

hardware, logistical support, and politirecord of publication in her/his field) and Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, The

cal training. In addition, the Soviets general fellowships (for scholars in the ear- Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensvn.

were willing to send military advisers lier stages of their post-doctoral careers) are 19, N-0255 Oslo, Norway (fax: 47-22 43

and offer political support for Neto's available. 01 68; e-mail: oaw @nobel.no), or send a

movement in its conflicts with the Stipends will be given in accordance with brief project description, a c.v., and two let- neighboring African states: Zambia, the individual needs of approved applicants ters of recommendation to the above ad

Zaire, and Congo. 12 and availability of funds. The Institute will dress. Review of applicants' credentials will

The MPLA leadership responded also cover travel expenses, office equip- begin February 15, 1997.

avidly to this Soviet largesse. In his

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