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Angola 33

eral Staff.36

that the rival movements, or at least Castro—who had close connections plan for a direct military intervention. UNITA, would return to the negotiat- with the Congolese leaders—to act as a Lucio Lara, the senior MPLA undering table and become part of an MPLA- facilitator for assistance to the MPLA. ground leader in Luanda, on August 17 led coalition government. The Soviet The Soviet leaders got more than they appealed to Ambassador Afanasenko experts did not believe that the United bargained for. The Cubans had since for the dispatch of Soviet staff officers States would stage a massive interven- early spring tried to get Moscow to sup- to the MPLA General Command, which tion, nor did they give much credence port an armed strategy on behalf of the had just moved from Brazzaville to to MPLA reports of direct South Afri- MPLA. Already in February, the Cu- Luanda. “The MPLA Command needs can or Zairean involvement. Their main ban ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam had qualified advice on military questions worry was the Chinese, who had told his Soviet colleague that “The at the strategic level,” Lara said. stepped up their FNLA assistance pro- choice of the socialist road in Angola Afanasenko, however, could only gram from bases in Zaire. Moscow must be made now. ... In October it promise technical experts, but agreed found particularly disturbing the fact will be too late.” In late summer, Castro to invite MPLA's defense minister desthat the Chinese were joined as instruc- used the new Soviet request as a stimu- ignate, Iko Carreira, to Moscow in late tors in these camps by military person- lus for launching his own plan for the August for talks with the CPSU CC Innel from Romania and North Korea. 30 intervention of Cuban forces in ternational Department, the Defense The Ford Administration was,

Ministry, and the Armed Forces Genhowever, not willing to let Neto's Cuba had sent military instructors MPLA force a solution to the nascent to work with the MPLA in its

camps in

In spite of their policy to support civil war in Angola. In mid-July 1975, Congo for several years before the col- Neto's MPLA, the Soviet leaders were the U.S. president authorized a large- lapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. not pleased with the content of the Cuscale covert operation in support of the By early summer 1975 these advisers ban plan. First of all, they objected to FNLA and the UNITA. Over three numbered about 250, and—in spite of the use of Soviet officers and even Somonths, the CIA was allocated almost not participating in combat—they viet transport planes in Angola prior to $50 million dollars to train, equip, and played an increasingly important role

played an increasingly important role independence. The Soviet leaders wortransport anti-MPLA troops. In early in planning MPLA operations. The ried that such a move would damage August, South African forces, at first in Cuban officers functioned as a kind of the policy of detente with regard to the limited numbers, crossed the border into general staff for Neto and the MPLA United States. They also knew that southern Angola, while regular Zairean leaders. Through their operational most African countries, including some troops joined FNLA forces fighting in training, Castro's instructors supplied close to the Soviet Union, would react the north. By mid-August the MPLA the necessary know-how which the against a direct Soviet involvement, as offensives in the north had been turned Angolan forces lacked, especially re- would some of their political friends in back, and Neto's forces were retreating garding communications, supply-lines, Portugal. Second, the Cubans were, in toward Luanda 31 and coordinated operations.34

the Soviet view, not sufficiently aware In addition to its flagging fortunes On August 15, Castro sent a mes- of how even a Cuban intervention could on the battlefield, the MPLA ran up sage to Leonid Brezhnev arguing the upset great power relations, since the against increasing problems in securing need for increased support for the Ford Administration would see Cuban their Soviet lifeline through the Congo. MPLA, including the introduction of forces as proxies for Soviet interests. The flamboyant and independent- Cuban special troops. The Cubans had Third, Moscow was still not sure that minded Congolese leader, Colonel already developed a fairly detailed plan the military situation in Angola warNguabi, had been angered by Neto's for transporting their troops to Luanda ranted a troop intervention in support persistent criticizm of Brazzaville for (or Congo), for supplies, and for how of the MPLA. 37 sheltering Cabindan separatist groups. the Cuban soldiers would be used on In spite of their displeasure, the In an irate message to the Soviet am- the ground in Angola. Castro wanted Soviet leaders found it difficult to make bassador, Nguabi informed Moscow Soviet transport assistance, as well as their objections known to Castro. Mosthat he would no longer accept that the use of Soviet staff officers, both in cow knew that the Cuban leader was Neto, “on the one hand, demands assis- Havana and Luanda, to help in planning wary of the Soviet policy of detente, and tance from Congo, [and] on the other the military operations. The Cubans their experience with Havana told them makes accusations against us." By early underlined to the Soviets the political to tread carefully so as to avoid episodes August the Congolese had informed strength of the MPLA, and the threat like the 1968 near-break between the Afanasenko that they would not accept which foreign assistance to the FNLA/ two allies. Still, Brezhnev flatly refused Soviet plans for large-scale support of UNITA alliance posed to socialism and to transport the Cuban troops or to send the MPLA through Congolese terri- independence in Angola.

35

Soviet officers to serve with the Cubans

The Cuban initiative was coordi- in Angola. The Soviet General Staff It was the threat to the Congo con- nated with the MPLA leaders, who now opposed any participation in the Cuban nection” which, in early August, in turn tried to put pressure on the So

in turn tried to put pressure on the So- operation, and even the KGB, with prompted Moscow to ask Fidel viets to get involved with the Cuban whom the policy of paying increased

tory. 32

relations. 38

party and state. 41

attention to Africa originated, in August ers into Angola by mid-December to MPLA was fighting for its very exist1975 warned against the effects of a defeat the South Africans and assist the ence only a few miles north of Luanda. direct Soviet intervention on US-Soviet MPLA leaders in building a socialist In the battle of Quifangondo valley the

Cuban artillerymen proved to give Havana would not be deterred by The Soviet perception of the wid- FAPLA the crucial advantage over its Soviet hesitation. The first Cuban com- ening role of the CIA in assisting FNLA FNLA-Zairean opponents. Soviet-supbat troops arrived in Luanda in late Sep- forces from bases in Zaire also played plied BM-21 122 millimeter rocket tember and early October onboard sev- a role in Moscow's reevaluation of its launchers devastated the attacking eral Soviet aircraft and rebuilt pre-revo- Angolan policy. The KGB station in forces and sent them on a disorderly lutionary Cuban cruise-ships. They Brazzaville supplied vital information retreat toward the northern border, givimmediately fanned out into FAPLA on the dramatic increase in U.S. assis- ing the MPLA and the Cubans a free units in the Angolan countryside, and tance, and Andropov believed that the hand to turn on the South African and took charge of much of the fighting Americans had a long-term strategy of UNITA forces approaching from the

45 against the MPLA's enemies. But the equipping large groups of Angolan, south. infusion of Cuban troops was not

Zairean, and Western mercenary troops During the week before indepenenough to sustain the MPLA conquests to be sent into Angola. It was also dence, large groups of Cuban soldiers from early summer against the new on- likely, the KGB said, that U.S. "experts” had started arriving in Luanda onboard slaught of its combined enemies. 39 would increase their own cross-border Soviet aircraft. The Soviets had orgaIn September the MPLA continued activities. 42

nized and equipped these transports, its retreat, hard pressed by Zairean and The reaction of most African coun- although the operation was technically mercenary-led FNLA troops in the tries to the South African invasion led directed by the Cubans themselves. north and UNITA forces, supported by the Soviets to believe that it would be Moscow had made it clear that the priadvisors and material from South Af- less dangerous than before to intervene mary objective of these forces was to rica, in the south. Savimbi’s incongru- in the Angolan conflict. Julius Nyerere, contain the South Africans along the ous alliance with Pretoria had given his an African leader who Moscow re- southern border and that they should not military units the equipment they badly spected in spite of his often blunt criti- be used for general purposes in the civil needed, and they could now exploit cism of its Africa policies, told the So- war. For the same reason the Soviet their substantial ethnically-based sup- viet ambassador on November 3 that in General Staff ordered about 60 of their port in central and eastern Angola. The spite of deploring the war in Angola, own officers to join the Cuban forces MPLA, meanwhile, was by mid-Octo- Pretoria's intervention had made out- rom Congo. These men started arrivber entirely dependent on its support in side support for the MPLA necessary. ing in Luanda in the evening of Novemthe western Luanda-Mbundu regions He hoped that many African countries ber 12.46 and in the cities. It controlled less than now would aid Neto's movement. Still, The ensuing two weeks saw the one-fourth of the country, and was los- he warned against a too open Soviet rapid advance toward Luanda of the ing ground, in spite of Cuban reinforce- support for the MPLA, and hoped that UNITA army led by about 6.000 reguments. 40

Moscow would channel the bulk of its lar South African troops. By late NoThe foreign alliance policies of the aid through African governments. The vember, these forces had reconquered MPLA, and thereby its possibilities for Soviet ambassador, untruthfully, re- all the territory which Savimbi had lost winning the struggle for power in sponded that such would be the case.

43

to the MPLA over the preceding Angola, were saved by Pretoria's Oc- The Soviet military preparations months. They had occupied every matober decision to launch an invasion. for the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola jor port south of the capital except Porto Moscow knew of the South African intensified in early November. The Amboim, taken control of the Benguela plans in advance of their implementa- CPSU secretariat met on November 5 railway, and were attempting to set up tion in mid-October, and the Kremlin and decided to send Soviet naval units their own civilian administration in leadership discussed how to respond. to areas off the Angolan coast. In Huambo. Both the Soviets and the CuThe CPSU CC International Depart- Brazzaville, in a striking reversal of bans concluded that if the MPLA rement considered the new stage of the roles within less than two months, the gime was to survive, the Cuban forces anti-MPLA operations in Angola a joint Soviet ambassador now exhorted his would have to attack in the south as U.S.-South African effort, and believed Cuban colleague to "intensify” soon as possible.47 the Soviet Union had to come to the aid Havana's preparations for combat in After the creation of the MPLA of its ally. In the third week of Octo- Angola. “But a Cuban artillery regi- regime the Politburo authorized the ber, Moscow decided to start assisting ment is already fighting in Luanda," the Soviet General Staff to take direct conthe Cuban operation in Angola imme- Cuban ambassador responded, some- trol of the trans-Atlantic deployment of diately after the MPLA had made its what incredulously.44

additional Cuban troops, as well as the declaration of independence on Novem- Agostinho Neto declared the inde- supplying of these troops with advanced ber 11. The Soviet aim was to infuse pendence of the People's Republic of military hardware. The massive operaenough Cuban troops and Soviet advis- Angola on November 11, just as the

Angola on November 11, just as the tion—the first Soviet effort of its kind

transported more than 12,000 soldiers instance in the case of Zambia, where that disaster had struck again and again by sea and air from Cuba to Africa be- President Kenneth Kaunda switched because of the Vietnamese leaders' intween late October 1975 and mid-Janu- over to the MPLA's side after substan- ability to follow Moscow's advice).

54 ary 1976. In the same period it also tial Soviet pressure.51

The Soviet cadres in Angola were, provided FAPLA and the Cubans with In terms of control of the central by 1976, very satisfied with the way hundreds of tons of heavy arms, as well regions, the Angolan war was over by both Angolans and Cubans had reas T-34 and T-54 tanks, SAM-7s, anti- early March 1976. The capital of the spected Moscow's political primacy tank missiles, and a number of MiG-21 anti-MPLA forces, Huambo, fell to during the war. According to the emfighter planes. 48

FAPLA forces on February 11. Holden bassy, Neto realized his dependence on It is still not possible to chart in any Roberto had already in January returned Soviet assistance and, equally impordetail the logistics of the Soviet opera- to exile in Zaire and the FNLA had tant, that it was Moscow, not Havana, tion. What we do know is that the gov- given up its military activities. Jonas who made the final decisions. Even ernments of several African countries Savimbi had returned to the bush areas though the embassy still did not trust agreed to assist with the enterprise. of southeastern Angola with about Neto fully, they admitted that he had Congo was the main staging ground for 2.000 guerillas and their U.S. and South performed to their liking during these personnel and arms arriving from Cuba African advisers, and although he was battles. In the spring of 1976 he conand the Soviet Union (although in some to fight his way back to international tinued to press for more Soviet military cases An-22 transport planes flew di- prominence by the early 1980s, in 1976 instructors, an attitude which the charge rectly from the southern USSR or from Savimbi himself realized that he could d'affaires in Luanda, G.A. Zverev, held Cuba). Algeria, Guinea, Mali, and Tan- not effectively challenge FAPLA and up as a sign of the Angolan president's zania cooperated with the efforts in dif- the Cubans.52

dedication to the new alliance, even if ferent ways,

even if the Soviets on some In the spring of 1976 the Soviet Neto had not yet consented to request occasions had to push hard to get their leaders felt—with a high degree of cer- permanent Soviet military bases.5

55 cooperation. Moscow also had to push tainty and self-congratulation—that As to the Cubans, the Soviet repsome of its East European allies to rush they had won the Angolan war. The resentatives often expressed a certain to the defense of “African liberation and Kremlin was impressed that the logis- degree of surprise to Moscow at how global anti-imperialism” by supporting tics of the operation had worked so well: harmonious were relations with the the MPLA.49

over 7,000 kilometers from Moscow the small Caribbean ally. The Soviet-CuBy the end of November the Cu- Soviet Union had conducted a cam- ban “close coordination in Angola durbans had stopped the South African-led paign in support of its allies against the ing the war has had very positive readvance on Luanda, and in two battles power of the United States and its strong sults,” Zverev told his superiors in south of the Cuanza river in December regional supporters, and come out on March 1976. Soviet diplomats and ofthe southern invaders suffered major top. For Brezhnev himself Angola be- ficers lauded the Cubans for their bravsetbacks. Pretoria then decided to with- came a benchmark for “active solidar- ery and for their ability to function as a draw towards the border, partly because ity with the peoples of Africa and Asia” link between Moscow and Luanda of its military problems and partly be- and evidence that the Soviet Union while at the same time “respecting" the cause the U.S. Senate voted on Decem- could advance socialism in the Third paramount role of the CPSU leadership. ber 19 to block all funding for covert World during a period of detente with The overall Cuban-Soviet relationship operations in Angola. Pretoria would the United States. 53

improved significantly in the wake of not accept being left in the lurch by What did the Soviets believe they the Angolan operation, up to a point Washington, with its own men held hos- learned from the Angolan conflict? which had not been reached since the tage to a conflict they no longer believed From the reports coming in to the CPSU 1962 missile crisis 56 they could win 50

CC International Department, the most Moscow and Havana also agreed Just as it had opened the gates for important lesson at the time seems to on strategy in Angola after the main African acceptance of Soviet-Cuban aid have been that the United States could battles had ended in the spring of 1976. to the MPLA, the by now defunct South be defeated in local conflicts under cer- Both countries wanted to wind down African intervention also paved the way tain circumstances. First, the Soviet their military involvement as soon as for African diplomatic recognition of armed forces must be capable of and possible, "avoid broad military clashes the new Angolan regime. By mid-Feb- ready to provide, at short notice, the with South Africa, and attain their goal ruary 1976, most African states had of- logistics for the operation needed. by means of political and diplomatic ficially recognized Neto's government, These tasks were primarily assigned to struggle.” In May, Raul Castro told the as had the Organization of African the navy and the air-force, both of which Soviet General Staff that he wanted to Unity (OAU), in spite of attempts by were commended for their efforts in start withdrawing Cuban troops right its chairman, Ugandan President Idi Angola. Second, the Soviet Union must away, and that he expected almost Amin, to have the decision postponed. be able to organize and control the anti- 15,000 Cubans to have left by late OcSoviet diplomatic efforts contributed imperialist forces involved (unlike in tober. The Cuban leaders asked Mossignificantly to this development, for Vietnam, where the Soviet leaders felt cow to inform Pretoria of their inten

tions, well knowing that such a demili- Propaganda Department. 60

Angolan foreign policy in the future," tarization of the conflict-albeit with a The transformation of the MPLA Raúl Castro told his Soviet colleagues. MPLA government in place—was what turned out to be an infinitely more dif- He instructed Risquet to "on all questhe Soviets had wanted all along. Ha- ficult task for the Soviets than the dis- tions inform the USSR embassy in vana knew how to placate the great semination of Lenin busts. Neto's in- Angola and maintain close contact with power, although, as we will see below, dependence of mind and his claim to the Soviet comrades.” Castro also casthey exacted their price for doing so.57 be a Marxist theoretician in his own tigated some of the Angolan leaders

The second lesson the Soviets be- right rankled the Russians and made it whom the Soviet distrusted; Lucio Lara lieved they had learnt from the Angolan increasingly difficult for them to con- "displays a certain restraint on questions adventure was that the Soviet Union can trol the MPLA as soon as the military [of] broadening the collaboration with and must rebuild and reform local anti- situation stabilized. Some of the the socialist countries. He is reserved capitalist groups in crisis areas. The Angolan leaders whom Moscow dis- and not frank . . . . [and] has avoided MPLA, local Soviet observers postu- liked, for instance FAPLA veteran com- us,” Castro told Ponomarenko.63 lated in 1976, was saved from its own mander and defense minister Iko But even such measures could not follies by advice and assistance from Carreira and MPLA general secretary

Carreira and MPLA general secretary always convince the Soviets of Cuban Moscow, which not only helped it win Lucio Lara, who was strongly influ- loyalty. Reporting on Neto's visit to the war, but also laid the foundation for enced by the European left, strength- Havana in July 1976, the Soviet emthe building of a "vanguard party." The ened their positions after the war was bassy noted with disapproval that Fidel Angolan movement had earlier been over. According to the embassy, the Castro had told the Angolans that Cuplagued by "careerists and fellow-trav- influence of such people delayed both ban troops would remain in Africa “as ellers," but, due to Soviet guidance, the the necessary changes in the MPLA and long as they are needed,” and that Neto "internationalists" were in ascendance. the finalization of the development had asked for Cuba's assistance in These new leaders—men like Lopo do plans on which the Soviets and Cubans building a Marxist-Leninist party. Even Nascimento and Nito Alves-underwere advising. 61

worse, Castro had spoken of Angola, stood that the MPLA was part of an in- Differences between the Soviet and Cuba, and Vietnam as “the main antiternational revolutionary movement led Cuban perceptions of the political situ- imperialist core” of the world. That the by Moscow and that they therefore both ation in the MPLA did not make things Cuban president had also mentioned the then and in the future depended on So- easier for Moscow. Part of the price "central role” of the Soviet Union was viet support.58

which Castro exacted for his general not sufficient to please the Soviet obIt was these “internationalists” who deference to the Soviets on the Angolan servers, particularly since Castro Moscow wanted to assist in building a issue was the right to argue for Angolan coupled his statement with an endorsenew MPLA, patterned on the experi- political solutions which were to his lik- ment of Neto's own “paramount role” ence of the CPSU. Noting the poor state ing. Preeminent in Castro's political in the MPLA.64 of the MPLA organization in many ar- equation was the leadership of As Philip Windsor has observed eas, the Soviet party-building experts Agostinho Neto: whom he considered about the Brezhnev Doctrine, the relasuggested that this was the field in a brilliant man and a great African tionship between the Soviet Union and which do Nascimento, Alves, and oth- leader, as well as a personal friend. The its allies approximated the roles of a ers should concentrate their activities. Cubans therefore missed no opportunity king and his vassals in medieval natuBy taking the lead in constructing the to impress the Soviets with their view ral law. The Cubans and the Angolans party organization they would also be that the MPLA president was the only could set their own agenda, so long as the future leaders of the Marxist- solution to Angola's leadership prob- they subordinated themselves to the Leninist party in Angola. 59

lems, well knowing of Moscow's sus- general purpose of Soviet foreign policy The Soviets supplied very large picions of him. “We have the highest and used the proper code of address amounts of political propaganda to be regard for President Neto," Raúl Castro when reporting to Moscow's represendisseminated among MPLA supporters told Soviet Vice-Minister of Defense tatives. For Soviet cadre at the local and used in the training of cadre. The I.F. Ponomarenko. “Cuba wants to level the real character of the Moscowordinary embassy staff sometimes strengthen Neto's authority," the head Havana-Luanda relationship complifound the amounts a bit difficult to of the Cuban party's International De- cated their efforts at reforming the handle—a plane-load of brochures with partment, Raúl Valdés Vivó, told the MPLA, as shown in excess by the specBrezhnev's speech at the 25th CPSU Soviet chargé in May.62

tacle of the May 1977 coup attempt congress, two plane-loads of anti- The Cubans were, however, always against Neto, when Nito Alves—a SoMaoist literature—but in general the clever at sweetening their tough posi- viet favorite—found his bid to oust the embassy could put the materials to good tion in support of Neto by underlining president blocked by Cuban tanks. use (or so they claimed in reports to that the Soviet Union of course was The belief of many Soviet leaders Moscow). By summer 1976 they had Angola's primary international ally. that they could control domestic politirun out of Lenin portraits, and had to “Relations with the Soviet Union will cal developments in Third World counrequest a new supply from the CPSU become a more important aspect of tries was a misperception with fateful

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consequences for Soviet foreign policy Angola if they had been convinced that come, in spite of much contrary inforin the late Brezhnev era. The Angolan Washington would respond in force. mation. In the case of Angola, this beintervention played an important part in the conventional realist approach to lief contributed significantly to the inupholding this misperception, as the interventions provides adequate expla- tervention and sustained the decision to reporting from Luanda shows. In hind- nation for this side of Soviet interven- commit additional men, money, and sight, one of the main managers of tionism: the Brezhnev leadership saw material to the country in subsequent Moscow's African and Asian policies an opportunity for unchecked expansion years. It even led Moscow's local repin the late 1970s, Karen Brutents, has and made use of it.68

resentatives to sum up Angola as a succlaimed that it was Angola which led On local factors, which were cru- cess, thereby over time encouraging to Ethiopia which led to Afghanistan, cial in the case of Angola, some schol- further Soviet “limited interventions” in not in terms of the circumstances and ars have argued that great power inter- Africa and Asia, culminating in the Afstructure of the interventions—which ventions are grounded not so much in ghanistan disaster. 71 certainly varied—but in terms of the misperceptions—the “slippery slope" We need much more evidence from inflated pretensions of control over for- theory of growing commitment—as in Russian and foreign sources in order to eign left-wing movements which were what Charles Kupchan calls the generalize about the nature of Soviet stimulated by the Angolan affair. “reputational and intrinsic interest,” of Cold War involvement in Africa, Asia, Brutents' point is a good one, although the intervening power.69 This is an at- and Latin America. From what we see we should still be careful in generaliz- tempt to rescue the case for an interest- so far, the two faces of Soviet associaing about the direction of Soviet foreign driven decision-making process in cases tion with Third World radicals—revopolicy during that period until we have where there is a significant discrepancy lutionary patronage and distrustful caumore documentation on the discussions between the prior expectations of an tion-correspond closely with two of the Politburo and General Staff.66

intervening power and the outcome of faces of Russian culture and history. On the other hand, as I have argued its action—an argument which of One is the elite tradition which has elsewhere, what Morton Kaplan terms course can only be tested through the sought to bring Russia into a Europethe “loose bipolar structure” of the Cold evidence.

anized society of states. The other is War international system often gave In the case presented here, would the tradition of defiance of the West, a Third World revolutionary parties a a clearer perception of the conditions radical and, in European terms, sectarchance to enter into alliances with one inside the MPLA—and of Soviet inabil- ian approach to Russia's international of the great powers, a chance which they ity to change these conditions—have role. Both are visible during the last may not have been offered in a more prevented an intervention? Possibly, not phase of the Soviet experiment: CPSU complex global constellation of states. least since much of Moscow's histori- officials seem to have felt as uncomAs the aspiring, anti-systemic power, cal experience pointed away from such fortable at meetings in the White House the Soviet Union was particularly likely an adventure. Soviet diplomacy was at as when visiting PLO training camps to be the candidate for such alliances most times very cautious outside its own in Syria. Both for historians and politifrom a Third World perspective. The core area, preferring mutually advanta- cal scientists, the opening of Russian leaders of some African movements, geous links with established regimes archives offers opportunities to revisit including the MPLA, knew of these rather than with revolutionary move- these motives of Soviet foreign policy possibilities and sometimes knew how ments. Up to the Angolan intervention, and to expand our understanding of their to exploit them. In addition to its so- the Soviet Union never gave decisive role in the international history of the cial and economic message, this poten- support to a revolutionary movement Cold War. tial for a powerful ally was one of the outside its neighboring countries. One assets of African communism during can indeed argue that the United States

I am grateful to Ilya Gaiduk and Maxim

Korobochkin for their assistance in locating mathe 1970s, an asset which increased in has supported more successful revolu

terials in Moscow. My thanks also to the former importance as their revolutions high- tionary movements, even since the mid- head of the State Archives Service of the Russian lighted the idea of a socialist victory in 1970s, for instance in Nicaragua and in Federation, Dr. Rudolf G. Pikhoia, and to the staff the Third World in Soviet foreign policy Afghanistan.70

of the Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi

dokumentatsii (Center for the Preservation of What prevented a “clear view" of

Contemporary Documentation; hereafter There is enough evidence in the the obstacles to long-term successful TsKhSD) in Moscow for their help during my materials on Angola, and elsewhere, to intervention was primarily Soviet for- archival research. Piero Gleijeses, Geir indicate that the Soviet leadership was eign policy ideology. Its mix of Rus

Lundestad, and Iver B. Neumann offered helpful

comments on a draft version. very much aware of the strategic op- sian exceptionalism, Marxist-Leninist 2

See Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs portunities which the post-Vietnam theory, and the Soviet experience of to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991); anti-interventionist mood in the United economic and political development,

Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: States afforded Moscow for activism in created a fertile ground for believing

Droemer Knaur, 1993); Francis Fukuyama,

Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the regional conflicts. It is likely that the that difficulties associated with the char

Third World. RAND report no. 3337-USDP Politburo would have been much less acter of the movements and societies

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986); Andrei inclined to interventions like the one in targeted for intervention could be over- Kolosov, “Pereosmysleniie politiki v 'tretiem

1

ideology. 67

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