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mire"" [Rethinking Policy in the Third World),
Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' 4 (April 1990).
3

A classic summary is Hans J. Morgenthau, “To
Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs
45 (April 1967). George W. Breslauer has an ex-
cellent survey of recent literature on Soviet inter-
ventions in “Ideology and Learning in Soviet
Third World Policy,” World Politics 44: 3 (July
1987), 429-448.
4

Karen N. Brutents, former first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter “Brutents interview"). For a discussion, see Steven R. David, “Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups,International Security 11 (Summer 1986), 3-36. 5 Celeste A. Wallander, “Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought,” World Politics 42:1 (October 1989), 31-37; Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36-59. See also Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention: Americans and Soviets in the Third World," The National Interest (Spring 1987), 39-47. 6

Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention,” 43; on Soviet interest groups, see Jan S. Adams, “Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee," Slavic Review 48: 4 (Winter 1989), 614-30 and, for an insider's view of one of the institutions, former head of the KGB First Chief Directorate Leonid V. Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy: Zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi razvedki (Moscow: Tsentr-100, 1992). This article is in part based on the archives of the International Department, now kept in TsKhSD. The International Department archives contain a large collection of materials important to understanding Soviet foreign policy history—among them embassy reports, documents created for the Politburo or the party Secretariat, intelligence summaries, and records of conversations with foreign leaders. A small portion of this material-documents which the Politburo or the heads of the MO wanted to have available for reference purposesis held in so-called osobye papki or “special files,” most of which are still unavailable to scholars. 7 See the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. 8 KGB to MO (International Department of the CPSU CC), 13 April 1970, TsKhSD, fond (f.) 5, opis' (op.) 62 delo (d.) 535, listy (11.) 7-9. This report, primarily an analysis of the preparations for the third summit conference of non-aligned nations in Lusaka, also notes that this conference will mean a step forward for Soviet diplomacy, that China's influence within the group is receding, and that the United States is increasingly isolated in the Third World. See also KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKHSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 32-35. On the KGB's influence on Brezhnev’s thinking: author's interview with Oleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassador, Moscow, 14 September 1992. 9 KGB to MO, 4 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 11. 73-76; KGB (Chebrikov) to MO, 26 November 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 115-118. The latter report is based on an evaluation of European policies toward Portugal, originating with an analysis of materials from the Brit

ish Conservative Party. The GRU, in a major re- (ambassador, Brazzaville) to MO, 30 March 1974,
port on U.S. strategies in Africa, noted that the political letter: "O polozhenii v ‘Narodnom
continent had become more important for the dvizhenii za osvobozhdenie Angoli' (MPLA) (On
Americans both strategically and in terms of its the situation in 'The People's Movement for the
natural resources. “Capitalist states,” said the Liberaton of Angola' (MPLA)],” TsKhSD, f. 5,
GRU, “are putting pressure on African countries op. 67, d. 758, 11. 37-45, 40.
to enter into base agreements and military assis- lu.A. Iukalov (chargé d'affaires, Dar-es-Sa-
tance plans.” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 71- laam) to MO, 22 May 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op.
90, 80.

67, d. 758, 11. 70-71; E.I. Afanasenko to MO, 8 10 General'nyi shtab voorushennykh sil SSSR June 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 78(General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR] 81.

19 (Glavnoe razvedivatelnoe upravlenie [Main in- Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 245telligence directorate); hereafter GRU) to MO, 48. 15 September 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 20 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 24911. 63-68; GRU to MO, “Po meropriiatiiam, 50; George Wright, U.S. Policy Towards Angola: napravlennym na oslablenie pozitsii KNR v The Kissinger Years, 1974-1976 (Leeds: UniverAfrike (On Measures (and) Directions to Weaken sity of Leeds, 1990), 18-23. the Positions of the PRC in Africa)," TsKhSD, f.

21

Afanasenko to MO, 10 October 1974, 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 96-101.

TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 121-122; see also 11 KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 251-253.

22 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 32-35, 35.

Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 253; 12

V.N. Bezukladnikov (counsellor, Lusaka) to Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in MO and attached letter from Neto to CPSU CC the Frontline (London: Zed, 1983), 109-122, preconcerning request for receiving MPLA members sents the MPLA view of events.

23 for military training, 24 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. Afanasenko to MO, 4 December 1974, 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 99-102; D.Z. Belokolos to TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 11-12. Raymond MO, 14 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, Garthoff correctly concludes that the Soviet de11. 195-200.

cision “preceded the American funding in Janu13 Belokolos to MO, 25 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. ary 1975, although it probably followed the mili5, op. 62, d. 536, 11. 215-218; Embassy, Lusaka tary efforts of the FNLA in November.Détente to MO, political letter: “Perspektivy razvitiia and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations borby naroda Angoly protiv portugalskikh from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: kolonizatorov [Perspectives on the Development Brookings Institution, 1985), 507. of the Angolan People's Struggle Against the Por- 24 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 25 December tuguese Colonizers," n.d. (October 1970), 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, II. 10-21, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 11. 219-228, 224. 21, 17. The Soviet intelligence services still suspected 25 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 257that Neto kept the China option in reserve. See 58; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 533-34. KGB to MO, 8 October 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op.

26

S.A. Slipchenko (Soviet ambassador, Dar-es62, d. 536, 1. 212.

Salaam) to MO, 30 December 1974 (Conversa14

Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January tion with Oscar Oramas, Cuban Foreign Minis1973, “K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i try; later ambassador to Luanda), TsKhSD, f. 5, MPLA (On the question of reconciliation between op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 3-7; Afanasenko to MO, 10 the FNLA and the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. January 1975 (Conversation with Cuban ambas66, d. 843, 11. 4-9; Belokolos to MO, 10 October sador A. Columbio Alvarez), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 11. 121-123. 68, d. 1962, 11. 17-18, 18. See also Jorge I. The CPSU CC archives hold large amounts of Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revoludocuments on Soviet relations with all liberation tion: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: movements in Southern Africa, especially the Harvard University Press, 1989), 130-137; WillANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union iam M. LeoGrande, “Cuban-Soviet Relations and in addition to the MPLA (see footnote 6). Cuban Policy in Africa,” Cuban Studies 10:1 15

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution. Vol- (January 1980), 1-48. ume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962

27

B. Putilin (first secretary, embassy 1976 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 199. Brazzaville) to MO, n.d. (late January, 1975), 16 MPLA (Pedro Van Dunem) to CC CPSU, 11 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, II. 10-21; December 1972, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 1. Afanasenko to MO, 30 January 1975, TsKhSD, 22; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 26. U.S. support for 1973, “K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i Holden Roberto-with whom the CIA for sevMPLA (On the question of reconciliation between eral years had had “an intelligence gathering rethe FNLA and the MPLA)," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. lationship"—was limited to "non-lethal equip66, d. 843, 11. 4-9; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to ment” up to July 1975; see “Talking points for MO, 12 April 1973, “K voprosu ob otnosheniiakh secretary Kissinger. NSC meeting on Angola, Frimezhdu MPLA i FNLA (On the question of rela- day, June 27, 1975.” National Security Archive tions between the MPLA and the FNLA]," (NSArchive Angola collection of documents obTsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, 11. 54-57; Neto to tained through the Freedom of Information Act CC CPSU, 23 June 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, (hereafter “National Security Archive Angola d. 844, 11. 91; Belokolos to MO, 7 February 1974 FOIA collection”). The Archive, a non-govern(Conversation with Daniel Chipenda), TsKhSD, mental research institute and declassified docuf. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 5-8.

ments repository, is located on the 7th floor of 17

Belokolos to MO, 25 October 1973, TsKhSD, the Gelman Library at George Washington Unif. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 11. 118-120; E.I. Afanasenko versity in Washington, D.C.); Robert E. Gates,

From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 6569, has a useful account of CIA initiatives on Angola. 28

Slipchenko to MO, 6 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 48-54, 51; Slipchenko to MO, 24 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 238-246. 29

Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 50-53, 53. For the relationship among the Angolan groups, see Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola, 1974-76: An Essay in Political Sociology (Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautes etudes internationales, 1979). 30 V.V. Aldoshin (chargé d'affaires, embassy, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 20 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 153-156; Institut Afriki Akademija Nauk SSSR (Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) to MO, 19 June 1975, “Protsess dekolonizatsii v Angole i politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav [The Decolonization Process in Angola and the Policies of the Imperialist Powers),” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 87-110; Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 50-53. 31 Nina D. Howland, "The United States and Angola, 1974-88: A Chronology,” in Department of State Bulletin 89:2143 (February 1989), 1619; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), 40-57; Paul L. Moorcraft, African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010 (London: Brassey's, 1990), 76-81. See also Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis to Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, 12 July 1975, and Sisco to Deputy to the National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 15 July 1975, both in National Security Archive Angola FOIA collection. The American covert military aid was in addition to U.S. civilian assistance and military and financial aid procured by the United States from U.S. allies in the region, notably Zaire. (See Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, 25 May 1978; also Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev.ed.; (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 560-70).

Afanasenko to MO, 14 June 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 1. 137; Afanasenko to MO, ibid., 11. 180-82. 33

Afanasenko to MO, 4 July 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 8, d. 1962, 11. 136-38; Slipchenko to MO, 10 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, II. 44-47, 46. (For an alternate view based on Cuban sources, see the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) 34

lu. K. Naumov, (councellor, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 2 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 226-27; record of conversation, Afanasenko-Congolese Prime Minister Henri Lopez, 17 June 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962 , II. 113-14. On the Cuban role, see also Putilin to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 50-53. See also Klinghoffer and Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa,” in David E. Albright, ed. Communism in Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Press, 1980), and the aforementioned Gleijeses article. 35 M.A. Manasov (chargé d'affaires, embassy, Havana) to MO, 15 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 1. 122. This document is a record of the conversation between Manasov and Oscar Cienfuegos, an assistant to Fidel Castro, who brought the Cuban leader's message to the Soviet embassy. No copy of the message itself has been found in the MO records. Georgi M. Kornienko, former first vice-foreign minister, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter “Kornienko interview"); Brutents interview; Brutents in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Workshop on US-Soviet Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s, Oral history transcript, Lysebu, 1-3 October 1994 (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1994, hereafter “Lysebu transcript"), 68-69. 36

Afanasenko to MO, 17 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 196-203, 196. 37 Kornienko interview; Brutents interview. 38 Ibid. On the 1968 tensions in Soviet-Cuban relations, see Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, “Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 1, 81-85. 39

Georgi Kornienko, the deputy foreign minister, later recalled that the Soviet leadership tried to stop the Cubans: “I read a cable from our ambassador in Conakry (Guinea] which said, among many other things, that the Cuban ambassador had told him that the next day some planes with Cuban troops will land in Conakry for refueling on the way to Angola. I asked (Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, do you know anything? He called Andropov, he called Grechko. Nobody knew anything. All of them were against it and reported it immediately to the Politburo and suggested that we stop Castro. It took some hours to write the report, to get the decision, and to send the message to Castro. By this time the planes were in the air. You could rightly ask: How could it be—Soviet planes, stationed on Cuba, but it was Soviet planes and we had quite a few military people there. I checked. Well, technically, our people were involved, our planes were there for Cuban use, our advisers were involved, but they were completely convinced that a political decision had been taken (in Moscow)" (Kornienko interview). See also Gabriel García Márquez, “Operation Carlota: Cuba's Role in Angolan Victory,” Venceremos 4:5 (February 1977), 1-8; Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 109-20. 40

Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 118-121; see Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 83-84. The military situation in Angola at the time of the Cuban intervention is still under dispute. Piero Gleijeses, who has studied the Angolan war based on Cuban documents, believes that through the first half of October the MPLA was winning the war (Gleijeses, personal communication to author). The MPLA reports to Moscow (and presumably also to Havana) are much less optimistic (see Naumov to MO, 3 and 20 October 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 268-270, 280-81). 41

Kornienko interview; Brutents interview; Slipchenko to MO, 30 October 1975 TsKhSD, f.

5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 313-320; Iu.K. Naumov to MO, 20 October 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 280-281. See also comments by Kornienko, Brutents and others in Lysebu transcript; and Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola,” in Albright, ed., Communism in Africa. Several of the MO documents dealing with this issue are not yet declassified. 42

Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, I. 118 (the Brazzaville station also underlined that the FNLA as late as August 1975 was still receiving assistance from Romania and North Korea); Kornienko interview. 43

Slipchenko to MO, 3 November 1975 (conversation with J. Nyerere), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 305-307. 44 Secretariat card index, 192 meeting, 5 November 1975, TsKhSD; Afanasenko to MO, 4 November 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 230-231. 45

Klinghoffer, Angolan War, 26-27; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 512. 46

G.A. Zverev (chargé d'affaires, Luanda) to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole” (On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513 (hereafter “Zverev report"), appendix. In looking at Cuban documents, Piero Gleijeses finds no trace of Soviet support for the airlift before January 1976. 47

Ibid.; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 87-91. 48 Zverev report, appendix; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 90. 49 Zverev report, pp. 13-23; V.N. Rykov (ambassador, Algiers) to MO, 20 December 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 1-4; CPSU CC Secretariat card index, 197 meeting, 23 December 1975, TsKhSD. See also Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 90. The archive of the Soviet General Staff is still not open for scholarly research. 50 Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, “The Case of Angola: Four Power Intervention and Disengagement," in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman, eds., Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 163-208. 51

B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 March 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA (On the Situation in the MPLA)," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 29-34; Klinghoffer, Angolan War, 61-71. 52 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 227-248; Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (London: Coronet Books, 1988), 174-181. 53 Brutents in Lysebu transcript, pp. 76-77. 54

Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 May 1976, report on discussions during meeting between Raul Castro and Jorge Risquet (Cuba) and I.F. Ponomarenko and A.I. Dubenko (USSR Ministry of Defense), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513 (hereafter “Castro discussions”), II. 42-48; on Vietnam, Mikhail Kapitsa, former vice-foreign minister, author's interview, Moscow, 7 September 1992. See also Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Mark

32

77.

68

59 Ibid.

Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought Brutents in Lysebu transcript, p.

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 67 Morton Kaplan, “Intervention in Internal

ANGOLA AND SOUTHERN 1982); Neil Matheson, The "Rules of the Game" War,” in James N. Rosenau, ed. International

AFRICA, 1975-79 of Superpower Military Intervention in the Third Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton UniWorld, 1975-1980 (Washington, DC: University versity Press, 1967), 110-11; Odd Arne Westad, Press of America, 1982). “Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the

Ed. note: Following are illustrations 55 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political Third World,” Journal of Peace Research 29:4

of Russian archival documents on Soviet report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi (1992), 455-64. See also Edward Kick and David i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" (On Kiefer, “The Influence of the World System on

policy toward Angola and Southern Africa Some Questions Concerning the Military-Politi- War in the Third World,” International Journal in the 1970s. Most were culled from the files cal and Economic Situation in Angola), TsKhSD, of Sociology and Social Policy 7 (1987), 34-48; of the Center for the Storage of Contempof. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, 11. 13-23, 15-16.

and Kick, “World System Properties and Mili56 Ibid., 23; Castro discussions, 11. 42-48. For

rary Documentation in Moscow (TsKHSD; tary Intervention-Internal War Linkages,Jourthe history of the Cuban-Soviet relationship, see nal of Political and Military Sociology 11 (1983),

the repository for records of the Central Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu- 185-208; Oran R. Young, “Intervention and In- Committee of the Communist Party of the tion, 78-84.

ternational Systems,Journal of International Af- Soviet Union (CC CPSU) from 1952 thru 57 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political fairs 22:2 (1968).

1991) and declassified in early 1995 in conreport: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi For other examples, see Alexei Vassiliev, Rusi ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" (On sian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism

nection with the Carter-Brezhnev Project." Some Questions Concerning the Military-Politi- to Pragmatism (Reading: Ithaca, 1993), and This international project, led by the cal and Economic Situation in Angola), TsKhSD, Margot Light, ed., Troubled Friendships: the Thomas J. Watson Institute for Internaf. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, 11. 13-14; G.A. Zverev to MO, Moscow's Third World Ventures (London: Brit

tional Studies at Brown University, orgareport on conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó (Head, ish Academic Press, 1993). General Department for International Relations, 69 Charles Kupchan, "Getting In: The Initial

nized a series of conferences bringing toCuban Communist Party) - Zverev, 28 May 1976, Stage of Military Intervention," in Levite et al., gether former U.S. and Soviet officials, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 53-54; Castro eds., Foreign Military Intervention, 259. For Af- scholars, and newly-declassified documents discussion, 1. 45. ghanistan, see Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to In

to explore the reasons behind the collapse 58 B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 vasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan ComMarch 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA (On munists, 1978-1979,"International History Re

of superpower detente in the 1970s and its the Situation in the MPLA];” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. view 1:1 (February 1994), 49-69.

possible lessons for current and future Rus69, d. 2513, 11. 29-34.

70

The possible exception is of course Vietnam, sian-American relations. (These documents

but even there it is unlikely that Soviet aid was 60

were among a much larger collection speSoviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 21 June 1976, decisive for the outcome (see Marilyn Young, The Report: “Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoi Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York:

cifically declassified by Russian authorities rabote za II kvartal 1976 g." [On Information and HarperCollins, 1991), 232-253). On perceptions, in preparation for a conference on superPropaganda Work in the Second Quarter of 1976), see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception power rivalry in the Third World held in Ft. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 60-62. The em- in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

Lauderdale, Florida, in March 1995.) bassy did, however, find it difficult to dispose of University Press, 1976). "several" sets of Lenin's collected works in

71
On Soviet foreign policy ideology, see Stephen

The Cold War International History French—not surprisingly, since more than 90 per- Shenfield in Ideology and Soviet Politics, edited Project and the National Security Archivecent of all Angolans were illiterate and those who by Stephen White and Alex Pravda (London:

a non-governmental research institute and were able to read mostly did so in Portuguese. Macmillan, 1988), 203-24. 61

declassified documents repository located Castro discussions; F.D. Kudashkin (councellor, Luanda) to MO, 30 July 1976,

CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS

at George Washington University-cooperTsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 82-83. By the

ated with the Carter-Brezhnev Project and end of 1976 Soviet authorities were hard-pressed to find the Marxist-Leninist avant-garde in

The Cold War International History played a major role in obtaining the release Angola. See N.P. Tolubeev (Soviet ambassador,

Project awards a limited number of fellow- of these Russian documents and supporting Havana) to MO, 10 December 1976, memoran

ship for scholars from countries on "the the translation of some of them into English. dum of conversation Jorge Risquet - Tolubeev,

other side” of the Cold War to conduct up to The full set of photocopies of Russian, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 121-123. one year of archival research in the United

American, and East German documents 62 On Fidel Castro: Marquez, “Operation States. Recipients are based at the Institute

obtained by the Project may be examined Carlota," 1-2; Castro discussions, I. 46; G.A.

for European, Russian, and Eurasian StudZverev to MO, 28 May 1976, memorandum of

by interested researchers at the National ies, George Washington University, Washconversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó - Zverev,

Security Archive, which is located on the 7th TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 49-54.

ington, D.C. Applications should include: 63 Castro discussions, 11. 43, 47.

CV; letter of nomination and three letters of floor of the Gelman Library, George Wash64 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 August

recommendation; research proposal, indi-ington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washing1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513.

cating topic to be investigated and sources to ton, DC 20037; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax: 65 Philip Windsor, “Superpower Intervention," be utilized; writing samples in English wel- (202) 994-7005. in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Poli- comed, though not required. Applicans tics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54. Michael

should have a working ability in English. Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front

Preference will be given to scholars who Line (London: Zed, 1983), 85-99, is a generally

have not previously had an opportunity to do reliable account of the Alves coup.

Soviet Ambassador to the People's 66 George W. Breslauer, “Ideology and Learnresearch in the United States. Applications

Republic of Angola E.I. Afanasenko, ing in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics

may be sent or faxed to: David Wolff, Direc39 (April 1987), 429-48; Richard F. Herrmann, tor; Cold War International History Project;

Memorandum of Conversation with "Soviet Behavior In Regional Conflicts: Old Woodrow Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson

President of the Movement for the Questions, New Strategies, and Important Les- Dr. SW; Washington, D.C. 20560 USA; Popular Liberation of Angola sons,” World Politics 44: 3 (April 1992), 432-65; fax: (202) 357-4439.

Agostinho Neto, 4 July 1975

that group.

From the diary of

SECRET propaganda efforts prior to the establishment tionaries. Neto also included the FNLA in E.I. Afanasenko

Copy No. 2

of radio broadcasting facilities in the counSer. No. 181 try, broadcast of the radio program "Struggle The president of the MPLA said that 21 July 1975 of Angola” will be resumed in Brazzaville. the military conflict which took place last

The president of the MPLA stated that June demonstrated the strength of the Record of Conference with

one of the main points in the negotiations MPLA's military detachments. NotwithPresident of MPLA Agostinho NETO with the KPT was the issue of Cabinda. The standing the numerical superiority of the 4 July 1975

PRC made the decision not to support the FNLA's forces, the MPLA is no weaker than

demand of autonomy for Cabinda at the the FNLA in military terms. Neto declared We received a visit from President of OAU assembly which had been advanced that the MPLA commands great political inthe MPLA Agostinho Neto. I informed him by the Congo and Zaire last February. As fluence in the country which is continuing that the Central Committee of the CPSU was to the change of their position on the to grow. At the same time, he acknowledged closely following the development of cir- Cabinda question, the Congolese assured the that two northwest provinces of Angola have cumstances in Angola. The Soviet people MPLA delegation that they would terminate been controlled by the FNLA since last June. are interested in the victory of democratic assistance to the nationalist Cabindi orga- In addition, UNITA commands major influforces in Angola. In 1975, significant aid nization FLEC. Inasmuch as the parties had ence in Bie and the surrounding regions, has been provided to the MPLA. Pursuant reached an agreement on the Cabinda issue, where a large portion of the country's poputo instructions from the Central Committee the PRC allowed the MPLA to use its terri- lation lives. of the CPSU, we had a conference with the tory for the transport of arms, military equip- Neto characterized UNITA as an orgaPresident of the PRC [People's Republic of ment and other cargo supplied to the Move- nization representing the interests of white the Congo] M. Nguabi, in which the issue ment by the Soviet Union and other friendly farmers with reactionary leanings. Howof rendering aid to the MPLA was discussed. countries. In addition, the Congolese con- ever, UNITA does not command significant

Neto thanked the Central Committee firmed their decision to close their land bor- military forces and is attempting to play a of the CPSU for the rendering of assistance. der with Cabinda for the MPLA. In order role as an intermediary between the MPLA He stated that the leadership of the MPLA to export supplies to Angola, they allotted and the FNLA. The president of the MPLA had recently expanded its contacts with gov- the port and airfield at Pointe-Noire. Trans- spoke in favor of a tactical alliance with ernments of the African countries. In the portation of cargo is to be carried out by the UNITA. The desirability of such an allicourse of these discussions, the MPLA is land and sea forces of the MPLA. Neto was ance was advocated to the leadership of the attempting to increase the number of its sup- outspoken in his appraisal of the results of MPLA by numerous heads of African govporters in Africa. One of the immediate the negotiations with the Congolese. He ernments, first and foremost, by the PRC. objectives of the MPLA is to prevent the emphasized that the refusal of the Congo to The president of the MPLA expressed discussion of the issue of Cabinda at the up- support the Cabindi demand for autonomy doubts about fulfillment of all the agreecoming assembly concerned about the fact represented an important step forward in the ments signed in Nakuru (Kenya). One of the that this year (Ugandan leader] Idi Amin, normalization of relations between the reasons for the likely breakdown of those who collaborates closely with (Zairian MPLA and the KPT.

agreements is the aggression of the FNLA, leader) Mobutu (Sese Seko), will become The president of the MPLA proceeded which is unlikely to give up its armed provothe Chairman of the OAU (Organization of to characterize the domestic situation in cations. All of this, Neto emphasized, reAfrican Unity). We anticipate, said Neto, Angola. He pointed out that the existence quires the MPLA to continue the developthat the president of Uganda will come for- of three national liberation movements in ment of its armed forces. In this connection ward at the OAU assembly with a proposal the country was creating a favorable oppor- it is counting on aid from the Soviet Union. to discuss the issue of Cabinda. Our meet- tunity for reactionary forces in the country, The MPLA has decided to address the Cenings in Nigeria and our ongoing negotiations which in turn was leading to a further inten- tral Committee of the CPSU with a request in the Congo with president M. Nguabi, sification of political, social, and economic to furnish additional military and financial Member of the Politburo of the Central conflicts. Neto pointed to two groups of aid. At the end of this July, an MPLA delCommittee of the KPT (the Russian acro- reactionary forces acting against Angola. egation will be dispatched to the USSR, nym for the Congolese Workers' Party] A. The first group he attributed to domestic headed by member of the Politburo of the Lopez, member of the Central Committee Portuguese reactionaries. This group is fo- Central Committee of the MPLA Iko Kareira of the KPT Obami-Itu, and Foreign Minis- menting tensions in the country and provok- (commander in chief of the MPLA). ter (Charles-David] Ganao, said Neto, are ing a mass emigration of the white popula- Neto reported that last June, a delegadirected to this very question.

tion from Angola. The departure of large tion of the MPLA visited the PRC [People's Negotiations between the MPLA and numbers of technical specialists has resulted Republic of China] at the invitation of the the KPT are proceeding successfully. An in serious damage to the country's economy. Chinese government. Zambia, Tanzania, agreement has been reached to maintain The white reactionaries are capitalizing on and the PRC (People's Republic of the ongoing consultations between the MPLA the support of the present Supreme Com- Congo) also took part in the organization of and KPT with the aim of developing a com- missar of Angola and a large portion of the that trip. In the course of negotiations in mon policy and the conduct of joint efforts Portuguese officers. The second group of the PRC, the Chinese assured their delegain Africa and Angola. In order to enhance reactionary forces consists of foreign reac- tion that they would terminate all forms of military aid to all three Angolan national lib- share his thoughts in connection with the The president further stated that the eration movements until the granting of in- upcoming meeting and requested his assess- Politburo of the MPLA, by special dispendependence to Angola.

ment of conditions in the national liberation sation, had empowered Politburo member I thanked the president of the MPLA movement and of the position of other Afri- and Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento, for the interesting information. I promised can countries. Neto reported that it had been with responsibility for all important issues to communicate to the Central Committee determined to hold the meeting of the five of foreign policy, to prepare additional proof the CPSU the request of the MPLA to presidents ahead of schedule (that is, not on posals on the issue over further development furnish additional military and financial aid. September 15 as referenced above), and that of contacts by the PRA with Sao-Tome and

The conference was attended by mem- in just two hours he was flying to Dar-es- Principe. He requested the Soviet Ambasbers of the Politburo of the Central Com- Salaam. The principal theme of the meet- sador to provide him with detailed positions mittee of the MPLA Lucio Lara and Jose ing would be the meeting between (U.S. of the Soviet side on the issue over the situEduardo, member of the governing council Secretary of State Henry A.] Kissinger and ation in the South Atlantic and relations of of the MPLA Pedro Van-Dunen, as well as (South African Prime Minister John] Vorster Lopo do Nascimento with the ROZM and the first Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in and its im ications for Africa. He, Neto, the DRSTP. the PRC Comrade B. G. Putilin.

still did not know exactly what position to Neto stated his desire for a continual

propose at the meeting, what policy to adopt. exchange of information between the PRA Ambassador of the USSR to the This being his first opportunity for partici- and the USSR on international questions, People's Republic of the Congo pation in this sort of a conference (Tanza- in particular those concerning the situation /s/ E. Afanasenko

nia, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana in Africa and the South Atlantic. He stated

have already met repeatedly on these issues), that he intended to address these questions (Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, II. it is apparent that Neto needs to hear the in his conferences in Moscow. 157-159.]

opinions of his colleagues at the meeting,

and only after that will he be in a position to USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE Soviet Ambassador to the People's formulate his position. For example, it is PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Republic of Angola B.S. Vorobiev, not entirely clear to Neto why the participa

/s/ B. VOROBIEV Memorandum of Conversation with tion and assistance of Kissinger is necesPresident A. Neto, 4 September 1976 sary. He also does not understand the in- (Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 65, d. 2513, II.

consistency of (Zambian] President (Ken- 100-101.) From the diary of

SECRET neth] Kaunda on the issue of the intermedi-
B.S. VOROBIEV

Copy No. 1 ating role of Kissinger in contacts with Soviet Ambassador to Angola,
Ser. No. 286 Vorster.

V.P. Loginov, Memorandum of Neto indicated further that, lacking a Conversation with candidate-member Record of Conversation with full understanding of the positions held by of the Politburo Secretary of the CC President of PRA A. NETO

Tanzania and the other participants in the MPLA-PT for international issues
conference, he is presently having difficulty

P. Luvualu, 27 June 1978
4 September 1976 articulating any concepts on these issues,
although after his return from the meeting, From the journal of

SECRET On 4 September 1976, I visited Presi- these issues will be clearer to him, and he V.P. Loginov

Copy no. 2 re: no. 222 dent A. Neto at his invitation. expects to be able to inform us about them,

20 July 1978 Neto inquired as to whether any infor- so they can be communicated to Moscow. mation had been received from Moscow In the course of our discussion I in- RECORD OF CONVERSATION regarding the Soviet position on issues re- formed the president about the response re- with candidate-member of the Politburo lating to the national liberation movement ceived from Moscow regarding the attitude Secretary of the CC of the MPLA-PT for in southern Africa, and whether that infor- of the Angolan side toward the issue of the

international issues mation could be imparted to him, if possible, situation in the South Atlantic, conveyed

P. LUVUALU in connection with the upcoming meeting through the Soviet Ambassador by of the presidents from five countries [Angolan] Prime Minister Lopo do

27 June 1978 (Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Nascimento. and Botswana), scheduled for September 15. President Neto expressed his apprecia- [I] visited candidate-member of the

I said to him in general that no infor- tion for the speedy response. He declared Politburo, Secretary of the CC of the MPLAmation had yet been received. Based on his full agreement with all of the positions PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation materials received from the center (Mos- held by the Soviet side and emphasized that, of Angola—Partido Trabajo) for internacow], I told him about the ongoing confer- in the recent past, new facts had emerged tional issues, P. Luvualu at his invitation. ence in Moscow of delegations from three indicating an increased interest by the USA P. Luvualu informed me that at the curnational liberation movements from south- in the ROZM [Republic of Cape Verde) and rent time the leadership of the People's Reern Africa.

by France in the DRSTP (Democratic Re- public of Angola has sent several delegaFor my part, I asked the president to public of Sao Tome and Principe).

tions to various African countries in order

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