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tions, well knowing that such a demili- Propaganda Department. 60
Angolan foreign policy in the future,” tarization of the conflict-albeit with a The transformation of the MPLA Raúl Castro told his Soviet colleagues. MPLA government in place—was what turned out to be an infinitely more dif- He instructed Risquet to "on all questhe Soviets had wanted all along. Ha- ficult task for the Soviets than the dis- tions inform the USSR embassy in vana knew how to placate the great semination of Lenin busts. Neto's in- Angola and maintain close contact with power, although, as we will see below, dependence of mind and his claim to the Soviet comrades.” Castro also casthey exacted their price for doing so.
be a Marxist theoretician in his own tigated some of the Angolan leaders The second lesson the Soviets be- right rankled the Russians and made it whom the Soviet distrusted; Lucio Lara lieved they had learnt from the Angolan increasingly difficult for them to con- "displays a certain restraint on questions adventure was that the Soviet Union can trol the MPLA as soon as the military [of] broadening the collaboration with and must rebuild and reform local anti- situation stabilized. Some of the the socialist countries. He is reserved capitalist groups in crisis areas. The Angolan leaders whom Moscow dis- and not frank . . . . [and] has avoided MPLA, local Soviet observers postu- liked, for instance FAPLA veteran com- us," Castro told Ponomarenko 63 lated in 1976, was saved from its own mander and defense minister Iko But even such measures could not follies by advice and assistance from Carreira and MPLA general secretary always convince the Soviets of Cuban Moscow, which not only helped it win Lucio Lara, who was strongly influ- loyalty. Reporting on Neto's visit to the war, but also laid the foundation for enced by the European left, strength- Havana in July 1976, the Soviet emthe building of a “vanguard party.” The ened their positions after the war was bassy noted with disapproval that Fidel Angolan movement had earlier been over. According to the embassy, the Castro had told the Angolans that Cuplagued by "careerists and fellow-trav- influence of such people delayed both ban troops would remain in Africa “as ellers," but, due to Soviet guidance, the the necessary changes in the MPLA and long as they are needed," and that Neto "internationalists" were in ascendance. the finalization of the development had asked for Cuba's assistance in These new leaders—men like Lopo do plans on which the Soviets and Cubans building a Marxist-Leninist party. Even Nascimento and Nito Alves—underwere advising. 61
worse, Castro had spoken of Angola, stood that the MPLA was part of an in- Differences between the Soviet and Cuba, and Vietnam as "the main antiternational revolutionary movement led Cuban perceptions of the political situ- imperialist core” of the world. That the by Moscow and that they therefore both ation in the MPLA did not make things Cuban president had also mentioned the then and in the future depended on So- easier for Moscow. Part of the price “central role” of the Soviet Union was viet support. 58
which Castro exacted for his general not sufficient to please the Soviet obIt was these “internationalists” who deference to the Soviets on the Angolan servers, particularly since Castro Moscow wanted to assist in building a issue was the right to argue for Angolan coupled his statement with an endorsenew MPLA, patterned on the experi- political solutions which were to his lik- ment of Neto's own “paramount role" ence of the CPSU. Noting the poor state ing. Preeminent in Castro's political in the MPLA. of the MPLA organization in many ar- equation was the leadership of As Philip Windsor has observed eas, the Soviet party-building experts Agostinho Neto: whom he considered about the Brezhnev Doctrine, the relasuggested that this was the field in a brilliant man and a great African tionship between the Soviet Union and which do Nascimento, Alves, and oth- leader, as well as a personal friend. The its allies approximated the roles of a ers should concentrate their activities. Cubans therefore missed no opportunity king and his vassals in medieval natuBy taking the lead in constructing the to impress the Soviets with their view ral law. The Cubans and the Angolans party organization they would also be that the MPLA president was the only could set their own agenda, so long as the future leaders of the Marxist- solution to Angola's leadership prob- they subordinated themselves to the Leninist party in Angola.59
lems, well knowing of Moscow's sus- general purpose of Soviet foreign policy The Soviets supplied very large picions of him. “We have the highest and used the proper code of address amounts of political propaganda to be regard for President Neto," Raúl Castro when reporting to Moscow's represendisseminated among MPLA supporters told Soviet Vice-Minister of Defense tatives. For Soviet cadre at the local and used in the training of cadre. The I.F. Ponomarenko. “Cuba wants to level the real character of the Moscowordinary embassy staff sometimes strengthen Neto's authority,” the head Havana-Luanda relationship complifound the amounts a bit difficult to of the Cuban party's International De- cated their efforts at reforming the handle-a plane-load of brochures with partment, Raúl Valdés Vivó, told the MPLA, as shown in excess by the specBrezhnev's speech at the 25th CPSU Soviet chargé in May.
tacle of the May 1977 coup attempt congress, two plane-loads of anti- The Cubans were, however, always against Neto, when Nito Alves—a So
— Maoist literature—but in general the clever at sweetening their tough posi- viet favorite—found his bid to oust the embassy could put the materials to good tion in support of Neto by underlining president blocked by Cuban tanks.65 use (or so they claimed in reports to that the Soviet Union of course was The belief of many Soviet leaders Moscow). By summer 1976 they had Angola's primary international ally.
Angola's primary international ally. that they could control domestic politirun out of Lenin portraits, and had to “Relations with the Soviet Union will cal developments in Third World counrequest a new supply from the CPSU
become a more important aspect of tries was a misperception with fateful
consequences for Soviet foreign policy Angola if they had been convinced that come, in spite of much contrary inforin the late Brezhnev era. The Angolan Washington would respond in force. mation. In the case of Angola, this beintervention played an important part in The conventional realist approach to lief contributed significantly to the inupholding this misperception, as the interventions provides adequate expla- tervention and sustained the decision to reporting from Luanda shows. In hind- nation for this side of Soviet interven- commit additional men, money, and sight, one of the main managers of tionism: the Brezhnev leadership saw material to the country in subsequent Moscow's African and Asian policies an opportunity for unchecked expansion years. It even led Moscow's local repin the late 1970s, Karen Brutents, has and made use of it.68
resentatives to sum up Angola as a succlaimed that it was Angola which led On local factors, which were cru- cess, thereby over time encouraging to Ethiopia which led to Afghanistan, cial in the case of Angola, some schol- further Soviet “limited interventions” in not in terms of the circumstances and ars have argued that great power inter- Africa and Asia, culminating in the Afstructure of the interventions—which ventions are grounded not so much in ghanistan disaster. 71 certainly varied—but in terms of the misperceptions—the “slippery slope” We need much more evidence from inflated pretensions of control over for- theory of growing commitment—as in Russian and foreign sources in order to eign left-wing movements which were what Charles Kupchan calls the generalize about the nature of Soviet stimulated by the Angolan affair. "reputational and intrinsic interest," of Cold War involvement in Africa, Asia, Brutents' point is a good one, although the intervening power.69 This is an at- and Latin America. From what we see we should still be careful in generaliz- tempt to rescue the case for an interest- so far, the two faces of Soviet associaing about the direction of Soviet foreign driven decision-making process in cases tion with Third World radicals—revopolicy during that period until we have where there is a significant discrepancy lutionary patronage and distrustful caumore documentation on the discussions between the prior expectations of an tion—correspond closely with two of the Politburo and General Staff.
intervening power and the outcome of faces of Russian culture and history. On the other hand, as I have argued its action-an argument which of One is the elite tradition which has elsewhere, what Morton Kaplan terms course can only be tested through the sought to bring Russia into a Europethe “loose bipolar structure" of the Cold evidence.
anized society of states. The other is War international system often gave In the case presented here, would the tradition of defiance of the West, a Third World revolutionary parties a a clearer perception of the conditions radical and, in European terms, sectarchance to enter into alliances with one inside the MPLA—and of Soviet inabil- ian approach to Russia's international of the great powers, a chance which they ity to change these conditions—have role. Both are visible during the last may not have been offered in a more prevented an intervention? Possibly, not phase of the Soviet experiment: CPSU complex global constellation of states. least since much of Moscow's histori- officials seem to have felt as uncomAs the aspiring, anti-systemic power, cal experience pointed away from such fortable at meetings in the White House the Soviet Union was particularly likely an adventure. Soviet diplomacy was at as when visiting PLO training camps to be the candidate for such alliances most times
very cautious outside its own in Syria. Both for historians and politifrom a Third World perspective. The core area, preferring mutually advanta- cal scientists, the opening of Russian leaders of some African movements, geous links with established regimes archives offers opportunities to revisit including the MPLA, knew of these rather than with revolutionary move- these motives of Soviet foreign policy possibilities and sometimes knew how ments. Up to the Angolan intervention, and to expand our understanding of their to exploit them. In addition to its so- the Soviet Union never gave decisive role in the international history of the cial and economic message, this poten- support to a revolutionary movement Cold War. tial for a powerful ally was one of the outside its neighboring countries. One
1 assets of African communism during can indeed argue that the United States
I am grateful to Ilya Gaiduk and Maxim
Korobochkin for their assistance in locating mathe 1970s, an asset which increased in has supported more successful revolu
terials in Moscow. My thanks also to the former importance as their revolutions high- tionary movements, even since the mid- head of the State Archives Service of the Russian lighted the idea of a socialist victory in 1970s, for instance in Nicaragua and in Federation, Dr. Rudolf G. Pikhoia, and to the staff the Third World in Soviet foreign policy Afghanistan.70
of the Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi
dokumentatsii (Center for the Preservation of What prevented a “clear view” of
Contemporary Documentation; hereafter There is enough evidence in the the obstacles to long-term successful TsKhSD) in Moscow for their help during my materials on Angola, and elsewhere, to intervention was primarily Soviet for- archival research. Piero Gleijeses, Geir indicate that the Soviet leadership was eign policy ideology. Its mix of Rus
Lundestad, and lver B. Neumann offered helpful
comments on a draft version. very much aware of the strategic op- sian exceptionalism, Marxist-Leninist 2
See Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs portunities which the post-Vietnam theory, and the Soviet experience of to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991); anti-interventionist mood in the United economic and political development, Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: States afforded Moscow for activism in created a fertile ground for believing
Droemer Knaur, 1993); Francis Fukuyama,
Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the regional conflicts. It is likely that the that difficulties associated with the char
Third World. RAND report no. 3337-USDP Politburo would have been much less acter of the movements and societies
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986); Andrei inclined to interventions like the one in targeted for intervention could be over- Kolosov, “Pereosmysleniie politiki v 'tretiem
(ambassador, Brazzaville) to MO, 30 March 1974, political letter: “O polozhenii v ‘Narodnom dvizhenii za osvobozhdenie Angoli' (MPLA) (On the situation in ‘The People's Movement for the Liberaton of Angola' (MPLA)],” TsKhSD, f. 5, if. 67. d. 758, 11. 37-45, 40.
Iu.A. Iukalov (chargé d'affaires, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 22 May 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 70-71; E.I. Afanasenko to MO, 8 June 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 7881. 19 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 245
mire'” (Rethinking Policy in the Third World), Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' 4 (April 1990). 3
A classic summary is Hans J. Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs 45 (April 1967). George W. Breslauer has an excellent survey of recent literature on Soviet interventions in “Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics 44: 3 (July 1987), 429-448.
Karen N. Brutents, former first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter “Brutents interview"). For a discussion, see Steven R. David, "Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups," International Security 11 (Summer 1986), 3-36. 5 Celeste A. Wallander, “Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought,” World Politics 42:1 (October 1989), 31-37; Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36-59. See also Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention: Americans and Soviets in the Third World,” The National Interest (Spring 1987), 39-47. 6
Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention,” 43; on Soviet interest groups, see Jan S. Adams, “Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee," Slavic Review 48: 4 (Winter 1989), 614-30 and, for an insider's view of one of the institutions, former head of the KGB First Chief Directorate Leonid V. Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy: Zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi razvedki (Moscow: Tsentr-100, 1992). This article is in part based on the archives of the International Department, now kept in TsKhSD. The International Department archives contain a large collection of materials important to understanding Soviet foreign policy history-among them embassy reports, documents created for the Politburo or the party Secretariat, intelligence summaries, and records of conversations with foreign leaders. A small portion of this material-documents which the Politburo or the heads of the MO wanted to have available for reference purposesis held in so-called osobye papki or “special files,” most of which are still unavailable to scholars. 7
See the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the CWIAP Bulletin. 8
KGB to MO (International Department of the CPSU CC), 13 April 1970, TsKhSD, fond (f.) 5, opis' (op.) 62 delo (d.) 535, listy (11.) 7-9. This report, primarily an analysis of the preparations for the third summit conference of non-aligned nations in Lusaka, also notes that this conference will mean a step forward for Soviet diplomacy, that China's influence within the group is receding, and that the United States is increasingly isolated in the Third World. See also KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhŞD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 32-35. On the KGB's influence on Brezhnev's thinking: author's interview with Oleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassador, Moscow, 14 September 1992. 9 KGB to MO, 4 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, II. 73-76; KGB (Chebrikov) to MO, 26 November 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 115-118. The latter report is based on an evaluation of European policies toward Portugal, originating with an analysis of materials from the Brit
ish Conservative Party. The GRU, in a major report on U.S. strategies in Africa, noted that the continent had become more important for the Americans both strategically and in terms of its natural resources. “Capitalist states,” said the GRU, “are putting pressure on African countries to enter into base agreements and military assistance plans.” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 7190, 80. 10 General'nyi shtab voorushennykh sil SSSR (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR) (Glavnoe razvedivatelnoe upravlenie [Main intelligence directorate); hereafter GRU) to MO, 15 September 1970, TSKHSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 63-68; GRU to MO, “Po meropriiatiiam, napravlennym na oslablenie pozitsii KNR v Afrike (On Measures (and) Directions to Weaken the Positions of the PRC in Africa)," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 96-101. 11
KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 32-35, 35. 12
V.N. Bezukladnikov (counsellor, Lusaka) to MO and attached letter from Neto to CPSU CC concerning request for receiving MPLA members for military training, 24 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 99-102; D.Z. Belokolos to MO, 14 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, II. 195-200. 13 Belokolos to MO, 25 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 11. 215-218; Embassy, Lusaka to MO, political letter: “Perspektivy razvitiia borby naroda Angoly protiv portugalskikh kolonizatorov [Perspectives on the Development of the Angolan People's Struggle Against the Portuguese Colonizers,” n.d. (October 1970), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 11. 219-228, 224. The Soviet intelligence services still suspected that Neto kept the China option in reserve. See KGB to MO, 8 October 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 1. 212. 14
Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January 1973, "K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i MPLA (On the question of reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA)," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, 11. 4-9; Belokolos to MO, 10 October 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 11. 121-123. The CPSU CC archives hold large amounts of documents on Soviet relations with all liberation movements in Southern Africa, especially the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union in addition to the MPLA (see footnote 6). 15
John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution. Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 19621976 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 199. 16 MPLA (Pedro Van Dunem) to CC CPSU, 11 December 1972, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 1. 22; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January 1973, "K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i MPLA (On the question of reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, 11. 4-9; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 12 April 1973, “K voprosu ob otnosheniiakh mezhdu MPLA i FNLA (On the question of relations between the MPLA and the FNLA)," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, 11. 54-57; Neto to CC CPSU, 23 June 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 11.91; Belokolos to MO, 7 February 1974 (Conversation with Daniel Chipenda), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 5-8. 17
Belokolos to MO, 25 October 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 11. 118-120; E.I. Afanasenko
20 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 24950; George Wright, U.S. Policy Towards Angola: The Kissinger Years, 1974-1976 (Leeds: University of Leeds, 1990), 18-23. 21
Afanasenko to MO, 10 October 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 121-122; see also Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 251-253. 22 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 253; Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline (London: Zed, 1983), 109-122, presents the MPLA view of events. 23
Afanasenko to MO, 4 December 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 11-12. Raymond Garthoff correctly concludes that the Soviet decision “preceded the American funding in January 1975, although it probably followed the military efforts of the FNLA in November.” Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 507. 24
Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 25 December 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 10-21, 21, 17.
Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 25758; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 533-34. 26
S.A. Slipchenko (Soviet ambassador, Dar-esSalaam) to MO, 30 December 1974 (Conversation with Oscar Oramas, Cuban Foreign Ministry; later ambassador to Luanda), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 3-7; Afanasenko to MO, 10 January 1975 (Conversation with Cuban ambassador A. Columbio Alvarez), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 17-18, 18. See also Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 130-137; William M. LeoGrande, “Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa,” Cuban Studies 10:1 (January 1980), 1-48. 27
B. Putilin (first secretary, embassy Brazzaville) to MO, n.d. (late January, 1975), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 10-21; Afanasenko to MO, 30 January 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 26. U.S. support for Holden Roberto —with whom the CIA for several years had had "an intelligence gathering relationship”—was limited to “non-lethal equipment” up to July 1975; see "Talking points for secretary Kissinger. NSC meeting on Angola, Friday, June 27, 1975." National Security Archive (NSArchive Angola collection of documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (hereafter “National Security Archive Angola FOIA collection”). The Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository, is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.); Robert E. Gates,
From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 6569, has a useful account of CIA initiatives on Angola. 28
Slipchenko to MO, 6 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 48-54, 51; Slipchenko to MO, 24 August 1975, TSKHSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 238-246. 29
Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 50-53, 53. For the relationship among the Angolan groups, see Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola, 1974-76: An Essay in Political Sociology (Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautes etudes internationales, 1979). 30
V.V. Aldoshin (chargé d'affaires, embassy, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 20 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 153-156; Institut Afriki Akademija Nauk SSSR (Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) to MO, 19 June 1975, “Protsess dekolonizatsii v Angole i politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav [The Decolonization Process in Angola and the Policies of the Imperialist Powers)," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 87-110; Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 50-53. 31
Nina D. Howland, “The United States and Angola, 1974-88: A Chronology,” in Department of State Bulletin 89:2143 (February 1989), 1619; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), 40-57; Paul L. Moorcraft, African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010 (London: Brassey's, 1990), 76-81. See also Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis to Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, 12 July 1975, and Sisco to Deputy to the National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 15 July 1975, both in National Security Archive Angola FOIA collection. The American covert military aid was in addition to U.S. civilian assistance and military and financial aid procured by the United States from U.S. allies in the region, notably Zaire. (See Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, 25 May 1978; also Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev.ed.; (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 560-70). 32 Afanasenko to MO, 14 June 1975, TsKHSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 1. 137; Afanasenko to MO, ibid., 11. 180-82. 33 Afanasenko to MO, 4 July 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 8, d. 1962, 11. 136-38; Slipchenko to MO, 10 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, II. 44-47, 46. (For an alternate view based on Cuban sources, see the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) 34
lu. K. Naumov, (councellor, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 2 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 226-27; record of conversation, Afanasenko-Congolese Prime Minister Henri Lopez, 17 June 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68 , d. 1962 , Il. 113-14. On the Cuban role, see also Putilin to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 50-53. See also Klinghoffer and Edward Gonzalez, “Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa," in David E. Albright, ed. Communism in Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1980), and the aforementioned Gleijeses article. 35 M.A. Manasov (chargé d'affaires, embassy, Havana) to MO, 15 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 1. 122. This document is a record of the conversation between Manasov and Oscar Cienfuegos, an assistant to Fidel Castro, who brought the Cuban leader's message to the Soviet embassy. No copy of the message itself has been found in the MO records. Georgi M. Kornienko, former first vice-foreign minister, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter “Kornienko interview"); Brutents interview; Brutents in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Workshop on US-Soviet Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s, Oral history transcript, Lysebu, 1-3 October 1994 (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1994, hereafter “Lysebu transcript"), 68-69. 36
Afanasenko to MO, 17 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 196-203, 196. 37 Kornienko interview; Brutents interview. 38 Ibid. On the 1968 tensions in Soviet-Cuban relations, see Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, “Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech," CWIAP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 1, 81-85. 39
Georgi Kornienko, the deputy foreign minister, later recalled that the Soviet leadership tried to stop the Cubans: "I read a cable from our ambassador in Conakry (Guinea) which said, among many other things, that the Cuban ambassador had told him that the next day some planes with Cuban troops will land in Conakry for refueling on the way to Angola. I asked (Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei) Gromyko, do you know anything? He called Andropov, he called Grechko. Nobody knew anything. All of them were against it and reported it immediately to the Politburo and suggested that we stop Castro. It took some hours to write the report, to get the decision, and to send the message to Castro. By this time the planes were in the air. You could rightly ask: How could it be-Soviet planes, stationed on Cuba, but it was Soviet planes and we had quite a few military people there. . .I checked. Well, technically, our people were involved, our planes were there for Cuban use, our advisers were involved, but they were completely convinced that a political decision had been taken (in Moscow]” (Kornienko interview). See also Gabriel García Márquez, "Operation Carlota: Cuba's Role in Angolan Victory," Venceremos 4:5 (February 1977), 1-8; Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 109-20. 40
Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 11. 118-121; see Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 83-84. The military situation in Angola at the time of the Cuban intervention is still under dispute. Piero Gleijeses, who has studied the Angolan war based on Cuban documents, believes that through the first half of October the MPLA was winning the war (Gleijeses, personal communication to author). The MPLA reports to Moscow (and presumably also to Havana) are much less optimistic (see Naumov to MO, 3 and 20 October 1975, TsKASD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 268-270, 280-81). 41
Kornienko interview; Brutents interview; Slipchenko to MO, 30 October 1975 TsKhSD, f.
5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 313-320; lu.K. Naumov to MO, 20 October 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, II. 280-281. See also comments by Kornienko, Brutents and others in Lysebu transcript; and Jiri Valenta, “Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola,” in Albright, ed., Communism in Africa. Several of the MO documents dealing with this issue are not yet declassified. 42 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, 1. 118 (the Brazzaville station also underlined that the FNLA as late as August 1975 was still receiving assistance from Romania and North Korea); Kornienko interview. 43
Slipchenko to MO, 3 November 1975 (conversation with J. Nyerere), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 305-307. 44
Secretariat card index, 192 meeting, 5 November 1975, TsKhSD; Afanasenko to MO, 4 November 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 230-231. 45
Klinghoffer, Angolan War, 26-27; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 512. 46
G.A. Zverev (chargé d'affaires, Luanda) to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" (On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513 (hereafter “Zverev report”), appendix. In looking at Cuban documents, Piero Gleijeses finds no trace of Soviet support for the airlift before January 1976. 47
Ibid.; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 87-91. 48 Zverev report, appendix; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 90. 49 Zverev report, pp. 13-23; V.N. Rykov (ambassador, Algiers) to MO, 20 December 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 1-4; CPSU CC Secretariat card index, 197 meeting, 23 December 1975, TsKhSD. See also Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 90. The archive of the Soviet General Staff is still not open for scholarly research. 50
Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, “The Case of Angola: Four Power Intervention and Disengagement,” in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman, eds., Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 163-208. 51
B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 March 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA (On the Situation in the MPLA);” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 29-34; Klinghoffer, Angolan War, 61-71. 52
Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 227-248; Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (London: Coronet Books, 1988), 174-181. 53
Brutents in Lysebu transcript, pp. 76-77. 54
Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 May 1976, report on discussions during meeting between Raul Castro and Jorge Risquet (Cuba) and I.F. Ponomarenko and A.I. Dubenko (USSR Ministry of Defense), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513 (hereafter “Castro discussions"), 11, 42-48; on Vietnam, Mikhail Kapitsa, former vice-foreign minister, author's interview, Moscow, 7 September 1992. See also Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Mark
SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON
Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought Brutents in Lysebu transcript, p. 77. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
Morton Kaplan, “Intervention in Internal 1982); Neil Matheson, The “Rules of the Game" War," in James N. Rosenau, ed. International of Superpower Military Intervention in the Third Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton UniWorld, 1975-1980 (Washington, DC: University versity Press, 1967), 110-11; Odd Arne Westad, Press of America, 1982).
“Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the 55 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political Third World,” Journal of Peace Research 29:4 report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi (1992), 455-64. See also Edward Kick and David i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" (On Kiefer, “The Influence of the World System on Some Questions Concerning the Military-Politi- War in the Third World," International Journal cal and Economic Situation in Angola), TsKhSD, of Sociology and Social Policy 7 (1987), 34-48; f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, 11. 13-23, 15-16.
and Kick, “World System Properties and Mili56 Ibid., 23; Castro discussions, 11. 42-48. For tary Intervention-Internal War Linkages,” Jourthe history of the Cuban-Soviet relationship, see nal of Political and Military Sociology 11 (1983), Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu- 185-208; Oran R. Young, “Intervention and Intion, 78-84.
ternational Systems," Journal of International Af57 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political fairs 22:2 (1968).
68 report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi For other examples, see Alexei Vassiliev, Rusi ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On sian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism Some Questions Concerning the Military-Politi- to Pragmatism (Reading: Ithaca, 1993), and cal and Economic Situation in Angola), TsKhSD, Margot Light, ed., Troubled Friendships: f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, 11. 13-14; G.A. Zverev to MO, Moscow's Third World Ventures (London: Britreport on conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó (Head, ish Academic Press, 1993). General Department for International Relations,
Charles Kupchan, "Getting In: The Initial Cuban Communist Party) - Zverev, 28 May 1976, Stage of Military Intervention,” in Levite et al., TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 53-54; Castro eds., Foreign Military Intervention, 259. For Afdiscussion, 1. 45.
ghanistan, see Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to In58
B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 vasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan ComMarch 1976, report: "O polozhenii v MPLA (On munists, 1978-1979,"International History Rethe Situation in the MPLA)," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. view 1:1 (February 1994), 49-69. 69, d. 2513, 11. 29-34.
The possible exception is of course Vietnam,
but even there it is unlikely that Soviet aid was 60
Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 21 June 1976, decisive for the outcome (see Marilyn Young, The Report: “Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoi Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: rabote za II kvartal 1976 g." (On Information and HarperCollins, 1991), 232-253). On perceptions, Propaganda Work in the Second Quarter of 1976), see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 60-62. The em- in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton bassy did, however, find it difficult to dispose of University Press, 1976). "several" sets of Lenin's collected works in
On Soviet foreign policy ideology, see Stephen French—not surprisingly, since more than 90 per- Shenfield in Ideology and Soviet Politics, edited cent of all Angolans were illiterate and those who by Stephen White and Alex Pravda (London: were able to read mostly did so in Portuguese. Macmillan, 1988), 203-24. 61
Castro discussions; F.D. Kudashkin (councellor, Luanda) to MO, 30 July 1976, CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 82-83. By the end of 1976 Soviet authorities were hard-pressed
The Cold War International History to find the Marxist-Leninist avant-garde in Angola. See N.P. Tolubeev (Soviet ambassador,
Project awards a limited number of fellowHavana) to MO, 10 December 1976, memoran
ship for scholars from countries on “the dum of conversation Jorge Risquet - Tolubeev,
other side” of the Cold War to conduct up to TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 121-123. one year of archival research in the United 62
On Fidel Castro: Marquez, “Operation States. Recipients are based at the Institute Carlota," 1-2; Castro discussions, I. 46; G.A.
for European, Russian, and Eurasian StudZverev to MO, 28 May 1976, memorandum of
ies, George Washington University, Washconversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó - Zverev,
ington, D.C. Applications should include: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 49-54. 63 Castro discussions, 11. 43, 47.
CV; letter of nomination and three letters of 64 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 August
recommendation; research proposal, indi1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513.
cating topic to be investigated and sources to Philip Windsor, “Superpower Intervention," be utilized; writing samples in English welin Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Poli- comed, though not required. Applicans tics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54. Michael should have a working ability in English. Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front
Preference will be given to scholars who Line (London: Zed, 1983), 85-99, is a generally
have not previously had an opportunity to do reliable account of the Alves coup. 66 George W. Breslauer, “Ideology and Learn
research in the United States. Applications ing in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics
may be sent or faxed to: David Wolff, Direc39 (April 1987), 429-48; Richard F. Herrmann, tor; Cold War International History Project; “Soviet Behavior In Regional Conflicts: Old Woodrow Wilson Center; 1000 Jefferson Questions, New Strategies, and Important Les- Dr. SW; Washington, D.C. 20560 USA; sons,” World Politics 44: 3 (April 1992), 432-65; fax: (202) 357-4439.
Ed. note: Following are illustrations of Russian archival documents on Soviet policy toward Angola and Southern Africa in the 1970s. Most were culled from the files of the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow (TsKhSD; the repository for records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) from 1952 thru 1991) and declassified in early 1995 in connection with the “Carter-Brezhnev Project."
This international project, led by the the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, organized a series of conferences bringing together former U.S. and Soviet officials, scholars, and newly-declassified documents to explore the reasons behind the collapse of superpower detente in the 1970s and its possible lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. (These documents were among a much larger collection specifically declassified by Russian authorities in preparation for a conference on superpower rivalry in the Third World held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, in March 1995.)
The Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archivea non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University-cooperated with the Carter-Brezhnev Project and played a major role in obtaining the release of these Russian documents and supporting the translation of some of them into English. The full set of photocopies of Russian, American, and East German documents obtained by the Project may be examined by interested researchers at the National Security Archive, which is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, George Washington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005.
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Soviet Ambassador to the People's
Popular Liberation of Angola