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to explain the Angolan position with regard groups of Lunda nationality from Angola ciliation of the central Kinshasa authorities to Zaire and to gather information on the into Zaire and back, since the border be- with the Lunda nationality in order that forreal nature of the events in the Zairian prov- tween Angola and Zaire stretches out for eign monopolies might without resistance ince of Shaba. The delegations should once approximately two thousand kilometers. exploit the wealth of the province of Shaba. again underscore that neither Angola, nor P. Luvualu underscored that Mobutu, And, finally, the Western countries persist the Soviet Union, nor Cuba bear any rela- in every instance when an internal conflict in seeking the reconciliation of Zaire with tion to the events in the province of Shaba, arises, strives by using false pretexts, to in- Angola in order to renew the transport of and that these events are an internal Zairian ternationalize it. The Secretary of the CC natural resources from the province of Shaba problem.

MPLA-PT (referred to) the interference of along the Benguela railroad. The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT Western powers—the members of NATO in P. Luvualu remarked in this connection declared that there are objective factors the previous conflict in the province of that the president of the People's Republic which facilitate the continual occurrence of Shaba and their proposal to create an inter- of Angola, A. Neto, in his declaration of July conflicts and tension in this region. The African armed force which would be used 9, announced that the Zairian refugees will colonizers, when they drew the borders be- not only to resolve the current tasks of put- be led from the Zairian borders into the intween states, did not take into account the ting down the revolt of the Lunda national- terior of Angola, that Angola will disarm the ethnic make-up of the population. As a re- ity, [but also for] the preservation of the detachments of the FNLC (Front for the sult, the significant nationality of the Lunda Mobutu regime, and the possibility for for- National Liberation of the Congo) which was broken up and in the current time lives eign monopolies to continue to exploit the retreat from the province of Shaba into in three countries — Zaire, Angola and Zam- resources of the province of Shaba. Angola, and that the Angolan government bia. Moreover, at the current time there are The fact, declared P. Luvualu, that the proposes that Zaire, in turn, draw off the over 250,000 Zairian refugees in Angola, Republic of South Africa has expressed a UNITA, FNLA, and FLEC bases away from who are mainly of the Lunda nationality and desire to take part in the inter-African forces the Angolan border. The President of the among them from 20,000 to 30,000 are confirms our evaluation of the neo-colonial People's Republic of Angola in this anformer soldiers, the so-called Katanga gen- nature of these forces. This evaluation is nouncement also underscored that the refudarmes. After the war of independence, the also confirmed by the fact that China has gees may live in any country according to central authorities in Zaire began to perse- sent military instructors to Zaire and has of- their choice. This position, said P. Luvualu, cute members of the Lunda nationality who fered equipment for arming the inter-Afri- is in complete accordance with the charter lived in the province of Shaba. Unlawful can forces.

of the Organization of African Unity and arrests took place as well as the execution In the estimation of P. Luvualu, this international law. of Zairian soldiers of the Lunda nationality. issue concerns armed forces of international Then the Secretary of the CC MPLA

It is necessary to take into account the imperialism which are being created by PT raised the problem of Namibia. He infact that the province of Shaba is the richest NATO with the aim of supporting reaction- formed us that, in appraising the aggression of all Zairian provinces and provides a sig- ary, unpopular regimes in Africa as well as of the Republic of South Africa toward nificant part of the hard-currency goods supporting the struggle against progressive Angola at Cassinga, immediately following which enter the country, and that some of African countries and national liberation the important victory of SWAPO (Southwest the largest foreign monopolies have invested movements.

African People's Organization) in the UN, capital in the exploitation of the natural re- The long term goals of the Western the Angolan leadership came to the conclusources of the province.

countries consist of strengthening the posi- sion that the aggressive actions of the ReThe catastrophic condition of the tion of NATO in the central part of Africa in public of South Africa were made in purZairian economy, the dizzying rise of prices, order to break through to the Indian Ocean, suit of the following goals: to weaken the corruption which has enveloped the i.e. for the neo-colonial conquest of Africa. SWAPO and force it to accept the plan of whole machinery of state, including the The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT the 5 Western powers for Namibia; to gain army, the unbearably serious condition of declared that the evaluation by the Angolan time, in order to create in Namibia a puppet the population, particularly of national mi- leadership of the events in Zaire is con- political force which would be able to norities and the greater part of the military, firmed likewise by the resolution of the counter SWAPO; to scare the People's Reaggravates the conflict between the Western countries to offer Kinshasa eco- public of Angola and weaken Angolan supKinshasa government and the Lunda nation- nomic assistance. The Western countries, port for SWAPO. ality, and lead to the revolts which occur as is well known, as a condition for grant- P. Luvualu remarked that events had from time to time among the soldiers of ing such assistance demanded, first, a re- fully confirmed the correctness of this apLunda nationality in the Zairian army. Dur- form of the management of the Zairian praisal of the Angolan leadership. For exing moments of acute conflict the Lunda economy and finances according to which ample, in the present time in Namibia, the refugees in Angola seek to assist their fel- representatives of the USA, France, Bel- Republic of South Africa has created the solow-tribesmen in the province of Shaba. gium, and the Federal Republic of Germany called democratic party with the help of the Moreover, all of the refugees in Angola, it would have full control over the economy, renegade (Andrea) Chipanga and the sogoes without saying, would like to return to finances, and the actions of the administra- called National Front of Namibia. Vorster their homeland in Zaire. It is practically tive apparatus from top to bottom. Secondly, feverishly attempts to prepare elections, impossible to control the movement of they put forward a demand for the recon- which are falsified from the very beginning,

copy no. 3

and to achieve an internal settlement on the the leadership of the People's Republic of we had received from our embassies in a model of the internal settlement of Rhode- Angola. He likewise expressed his gratitude number of African countries is of a subjecsia with the aid of puppets like Chipanga. for the gift of the CC CPSU.

tive nature. In this connection I (Valdes The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT In the course of our exchange of opin- Vivo) was given the task of becoming acdeclared that the People's Republic of ions on international problems P. Luvualu quainted with the situation on location, to Angola will continue to support SWAPO. asked that I give information about the situ- have discussions with the leaders of Angola, The Angolan leadership, he said, considers ation in South Yemen after the unsuccess- Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Nithat for the peaceful resolution of the ful government coup.

geria, and likewise with the Soviet ambasNamibian problem the Republic of South Embassy advisor S. S. Romanov was sadors in these countries, in order to receive Africa should: officially define a deadline present during this discussion.

more complete and more objective informafor the transfer of Walvis Bay to the authori

tion about the state of affairs in southern ties of Namibia, after declaring the indepen- USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE Africa. dence of that country; for a period of transi- PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

I was tasked, he said, to convey to tion draw off its troops, which are now con

/s/V. LOGINOV

J[oshua). Nkomo [leader of the Zimbabwe centrated on the border with Angola, to bases

African Political Union, ZAPU) and R. in the South of Namibia; immediately lib- (Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1148, II. Mugabe (leader of the Zimbabwe African erate all political prisoners in Namibia. P. 71-75: translated by Sally Kux; copy on file National Union, ZANU), that Cuba is unLuvualu likewise remarked that Angola con- at National Security Archive.)

able to satisfy their request to send pilots curs with the proposed role of the UN in the

for the repulsion of air attacks on the traintransitional period in Namibia.

Memorandum of Conversation between ing camps for the Patriotic Front armed In conclusion P. Luvualu underscored Minister-counselor of the Soviet forces; to clarify the possibility of unified that the maneuvers of Western countries Embassy in Havana M. Manasov and action between ZAPU and ZANU; to lay around Angola will not succeed in forcing Cuban Communist Party CC member out before their leaders and the leadership the MPLA-PT to turn from the path it has Raul Valdes Vivo, 7 May 1979 of the front-line governments the Cuban chosen. We, he declared, have made a firm

plan for the creation of a provisional govand final choice of friends. This is the So- From the journal of

SECRET ernment in Zimbabwe. viet Union, Cuba, and other socialist coun- M.A. Manasov

R.V. Vivo meanwhile remarked that in tries. With the assistance and support of

re: no 265

Angola at first there had not been clear cosocialist states, and first and foremost of the

“24” May 1979 operation between Cuba and the USSR, Soviet Union and Cuba, Angola will follow

whereas in Ethiopia our countries have its chosen path.

RECORD OF DISCUSSION achieved the full coordination of our joint [I] thanked the Secretary of the CC

with member of the CC

actions. The policy of Cuba and the Soviet MPLA-PT for this information. From my Com[munist]Party of Cuba Union with regard to southern Africa should side I handed him the text of the Declara

comr. Raul Valdes Vivo

likewise be coordinated, he underscored. tion of the Soviet Government on Africa (in

My interlocutor laid out the essence of Portuguese). I underscored that this is an

7 May 1979 the Cuban plan, which is summarized as important political action in defense of the

follows. The declaration of a provisional independence of African governments, in I met with R.V. Vivo in the CC of the government in Zimbabwe is realized not in the solidarity of the USSR in the struggle of Party and, referring to the instructions of the exile, but in a part of the liberated territory the peoples of the continent against the im- Soviet ambassador, informed him of the dis- of the country; J. Nkomo is proposed for perialist interference in their affairs. I noted cussion in the International Section of the the post of president of the country, R. that the appraisal contained in it of the situ- CC CPSU with the members of the Execu- Mugabe for prime minister; the program ation in Africa coincides with the position tive Committee of the Jamaican People's platform of the provisional government proof the People's Republic of Angola. Then I National Party (PNP).

vides for the realization of a series of sogave him a translation into Portuguese of R.V. Vivo, having thanked me for the cial-economic transformations, secures the the Pravda article regarding the external information, noted the significance of this interests of those countries which recognize policies ofthe USA.

meeting, which will enable the development its government; the rights of the white part I handed (him) a film on the first con- of the connection between the CPSU and of the population are guaranteed, elections gress of the MPLA-PT and the sojourn in the PNP and, first and foremost, opens the are planned for the legislative organs of the the People's Republic of Angola of the So- possibility for the preparation of PNP cad- country; constitutional guarantees are proviet party delegation headed by Comrade res in the Soviet Union.

claimed, etc. A.P. Kirilenko.

Then, in the course of the discussion, According to the words of R.V. Vivo, P. Luvualu expressed his gratitude to R.V. Vivo spoke about his recent trip to sev- J. Nkomo and R. Mugabe have agreed with the Soviet government for its unflagging eral African countries, which was carried out this plan, as have the leaders of the frontsupport of progressive forces in Africa. He on the orders of F. Castro. This trip was line states. The provisional government, in said that he would immediately bring the undertaken, continued my interlocutor, be- the estimation of the Cuban side, would text of the Declaration to the attention of cause of the fact that the information which possibly be recognized at first by 30 coun

tries.

COUNSELLOR-MINISTER OF THE The active interference of England in

EMBASSY OF THE USSR the affairs of Zambia may ensure the vic- IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA tory of the puppet government, which would

/s/M. MANASOV possibly lead to a conflict between ZANU and ZAPU if the unity of their actions are (Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 834, Il. 82

ZUBOK, PLESHAKOV not achieved, noted my interlocutor. 84.]

WIN GELBER PRIZE He reported that the armed forces of the ZANU and the ZAPU include in total Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo The Cold War International History 24 thousand people (12 thousand in each Meeting, 18 October 1979 (excerpt)

Project congratulates Vladislav M. organization), but unfortunately, these forces

Zubok and Constantine M. Pleshakov, are as yet inactive. In the ranks of merce- [...]

two Russian historians who have been naries there are 3 thousand blacks and 2 9. Telegram from Havana Spec[ial]. # associated with the Project since its inthousand whites. 741 and 744

ception, for receiving the 1996 Lionel R.V. Vivo briefly set forth the content

Gelber Prize for their book, Inside the of his discussion with the Soviet ambassa- SUSLOV. Comrades, you have read Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to dor in Mozambique. According to his these telegrams. In one of them a question Khrushchev, published by Harvard Uniwords, during the discussion of the situa- is raised that in a conversation with our am

versity Press. Zubok is currently based tion in southern Africa, our ambassador bassador, Raul Castro told about difficul

at the National Security Archive, a nonnoted that according to the theory of Marx- ties that had emerged with regard to replace

governmental research institute and ism-Leninism, it is impossible to accelerate ment of the Cuban troops in Ethiopia. In

declassified documents repository loevents in a country where there is not a revo- the second conversation Raul Castro said the

cated at George Washington University;

Pleshakov lives in Moscow, where he lutionary situation and where there is not Angolans in all probability would appeal civilization. “To that I responded in jest to (probably to us) with a request to take over

until recently worked as a researcher at

the USA/Canada Institute of the Rusthe Soviet ambassador,” said R. V. Vivo, the maintainance [i.e., costs—trans.) of the

sian Academy of Sciences. "that if comrades L.I. Brezhnev and F. Cuban troops in Angola. Secondly, he said

Established in 1989, the $50,000 Castro decide that our countries will take that the Angolans treat the Cuban represen

Lionel Gelber Prize, given by a Founpart in the operations in Rhodesia, then we tatives rather tactlessly.

dation named for the late Canadian dipwill participate in them."

The next question concerned the assis

lomat, historian, and writer, is awarded By my request R.V. Vivo briefly in- tance with arms to SWAPO. He remarked,

annually to the winning author of a nonformed me about the work of the last ple- that Soviet comrades assist SWAPO with

fiction book in the field of foreign relanum of the CC Comparty of Cuba. He re- arms but the SWAPO men absolutely do not tions. It was presented to Zubok and ported that the plenum summed up the ful- fight and do not want to fight. Then one Pleshakov in Toronto on 7 October fillment of the resolutions of the First Party wonders, why we should help them with 1996. The jury citation read: Congress, revealed the deficiencies in the weapons[?] In one word, there are a numdevelopment of the national economy of the ber of very important principled questions "Zubok and Pleshakov, two members country, and set its course to overcome them. which we should consider. I think that we of the young generation of Russian hisIn view of the fact that the project for the should order the Defense Ministry and the torians, have mined recently available resolution of the plenum on the given ques- International Department of the CC to con- documents to provide new insights into tion did not reflect all aspects of the eco- sider these questions advanced in these tele- the inner workings of the Kremlin durnomic situation, the corresponding section grams, taking into account the exchange of ing the critical postwar period. Theirs of the CC of the Party was tasked with its opinions that took place at the meeting of is a significant contribution to the litreworking and with its publication. the Politburo, [and] the proposals will be erature: a fresh and superbly researched With regard to the resolution of the ple- introduced to the CC.

appraisal of the ideological, strategic num of the CC concerning the appointment ALL. Agreed.

and human foundations of the Cold War,

from the Soviet side. This is a praiseof Lionel Soto (Prieto) as a member of the Secretariat of the CC of the Party, R.V. Vivo

worthy book in the best traditions of (Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 6, II.

what Lionel Gelber sought to encourspoke very highly of him ("He is no Garcia 1-1; copy obtained by David Wolff; trans

age on behalf of readers everywhere: Pelaes," he said) and reported, that L. Soto lation by Vladislav M. Zubok.)

impressive without being intimidating; will be occupied with the issues of the party

learned without being impenetrable; leadership of the country's economy; along

engaging without being superficial." the party line he is tasked with responsibility for Khuseplan, the National Bank, GKES [State Committee for Economic Cooperation), and other central organs of the national economy.

ANATOMY OF A THIRD WORLD

COLD WAR CRISIS:
NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON
THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-1978

Editor's Note: The Russian and East German documents presented below illuminate the other side-other sides, reallyof one of the key events that hastened the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente in the mid-1970s: the Horn of Africa Crisis of 1977-78, in which a regional rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as domestic political instability in both countries, became entangled with superpower rivalry and competition for influence in the Third World. While Ethiopia and Somalia had a long-standing dispute over their borders, the immediate causes of the crisis dated to 1974, when a leftist revolution overthrew Ethiopian leader Emperor Haile Selassie, who had been a pillar of Western influence for decades, and to early February 1977, when the Ethiopian revolution took a more militant course when Haile Mengistu Mariam seized control of the ruling Derg" and eliminated his chief rivals for power, including Teferi Bante, the revolution's erstwhile leader.

The Ethiopian Revolution opened up new possibilities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region, where its chief ally had been Somalia, with whom it had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. As the documents show, the Soviet Union and its allies, notably Cuban leader Fidel Castro, attempted persistently to keep both Ethiopia and Somalia within the socialist camp. This, in practice, meant trying to damp down Ethiopian-Somali hostility and, in particular, the territorial ambitions of Somali leader Mohammed Siad Barre, who claimed that ethnic Somalis were being persecuted in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia and deserved liberation and incorporation into Somalia proper. In the course of trying to mediate the dispute, Moscow and Havana found that appeals to socialist international solidarity could only go so far in overcoming deep-seated national and even tribal disagreements.

Stillas demonstrated by a relatively cordial discussion between U.S. and Soviet diplomats in Addis Ababa in early 1977the simmering regional hot-spot did not erupt into a full-blown superpower clash until the late summer, when Somalia launched an offensive to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia. By then, sensing that the Ethiopian leadership was tilting toward Moscow, both the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu and the Carter Administration in Washington were exploring the possibility of improving U.S.-Somali ties to the detriment of the Soviet Union, and Siad Barre evidently believed that Washington had flashed him at least a dim green light to attack Ethiopia (a claim which U.S. officials denied).

The Somali attacks of July-August 1977, shattering a Soviet mediation effort then taking place in Moscow, quickly achieved major success at thrusting into Ethiopian territory; by September-October, Somali or Somali-backed forces had captured most of the Ogaden. The Somali advances prompted desperate pleas from Mengistu for Soviet-bloc military support, and at some point that fall the Soviet Union and Cuba, which had already been providing some weapons to the Derg, decided that it would be unacceptable to allow Ethiopiaa strategically significant country seemingly poised to become an important member of the socialist bloc10 suffer a military defeat at the hands of a country (Somalia) which despite protestations of socialist orientation seemed to be quickly shifting into the "imperialist" camp.

The decision by Moscow and Havana to come to Mengistu's rescue became evident between November 1977 and February 1978, as Soviet planes and ships transported roughly 15,000 Cuban troops and large supplies of Soviet weaponry, and a USSR military mission led by Gen. Vasilii I. Petrov helped direct Ethiopian-Cuban military activities. The massive Soviet-Cuban airlift spurred an Ethiopian counter-offensive which evicted Somali forces from the Ogaden and entrenched the Mengistu regime in power.

At the same time, these developments cemented both Somalia's defection from the Soviet-bloc (in November, Mogadishu abrogated a 1974 Somali-Soviet friendship treaty) and Ethiopia's dependence on that same Soviet-bloc for military aid, and elevated the conflict to a superpower crisis, as Washington charged Moscow with employing Cuban proxy forces to expand its influence in Africa. Moscow and Havana maintained that they had only helped Ethiopia defend itself from a U.S.-backed assault from Somalia (and various reactionaryArab countries supporting it), whereas Carter Administration hardliners (notably National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) asserted that the Horn crisis, coming on the heels of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, revealed a rising international assertiveness on the Kremlin's part, a danger requiring a tough American response-if not a direct military involvement to stem the Soviet-Cuban recapture of the Ogaden (or a perceived threat to Somalia), then in the form of a closer relationship with the People's Republic of China, the USSR's bitter communist foe.

This new dispute between the USSR and United States flared up in late 1977 just as it seemed that, after a rocky start, the Carter and Brezhnev leaderships were finally beginning to make some progress toward improving relations, and, most importantly, toward conclud

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