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"1. The English have officially appealed to us through their ambassador in Moscow and declared that they, being bound by the decision of the Security Council, cannot now make proposals regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, but if the Korean People's Democratic Republic withdraws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this could hasten a peaceful resolution of the Korean question.

The English ask the Soviet government to express its opinion.

We consider such a demand by the English to be impertinent and unacceptable.

We intend to reply that the Korean question has become too complicated after the armed foreign intervention and that such a complex question can be resolved only by the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea in order to hear their opinion.

Communicate your views.

As regards the statement of the Indian ambassador, we have decided not to answer him, since they made it clear that his statement is his personal opinion, in which the Indian government is not involved.

2. It is not known to us whether you have decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on the border with Korea. If you have made such a decision, then we are ready to send you a division of jet fighter planes-124 pieces for covering these troops.

We intend to train Chinese pilots in two to three months with the help of our pilots and then to transfer all equipment to your pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the aviation divisions in Shanghai.

Communicate your opinion."
Telegraph fulfillment.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 85 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 118]. A copy of the telegram was sent to Shtykov in Pyongyang the same day (APRF, Fond 45, Delo 346, Listy 149-150) The same note was sent to Kim Il Sung on July 13, but without the section about the Indian ambassador. [AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, U. 153-154]

23. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn

Si (Stalin) to Shtykov

8th Department of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 37219/sh
Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador.

Advise the Koreans immediately to reply to [UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie that the Korean army is strictly adhering to the Geneva convention with regard to prisoners, and [that they should] let the Koreans make a statement in the press exposing the slander of the American press regarding poor treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It would be good for someone among the prisoners to make a statement on the radio that the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is very good.

FYN-SI [Stalin]

No. 4.4781

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov. 13.7.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 148]

24. 14 July 1950, handwritten letter, Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government (via Shtykov)

To the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Comrade Shtykov, T.F.

I ask you to transmit to the Government of the USSR the following:

In connection with the appeal of the English to the Government of the USSR with a demand about the withdrawal of troops of the Korean People's Army to the 38th parallel, the Government of the DPRK considers, as does the Soviet Government, that such a demand of the English is impertinent and unacceptable.

We are in full agreement with the opinion of the Soviet Government that the Korean question [should be] discussed in the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea.

The Government of the DPRK [will take measures] quickly to clear the entire territory of Korea of American interventionists.

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK

Kim Il Sung.

14.7.50.

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SPECIAL

TOP PRIORITY

To Your No. 1503.

On the authorization of Filippov, transmit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we agree with the proposed procedure and time period for training Chinese pilots on jet planes.

Telegraph the fulfillment.
VYSHINSKY

25.VII.50

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 90]

26. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962
Beijing

To Comrade Kotov
To No. 1726.

Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the reply to his telegram about military advisers.

"To Comrade Zhou Enlai.

The Soviet Government has satisfied your request about sending Soviet military advisers-specialists in PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] and VVS [Air Force] to the Eastern and Northeastern military districts. 38 advisers will be sent to China, of which 10 will be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists in VVS.

As regards the remaining 26 advisers, we consider that there is no special need to send them, since the work of these advisers can be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can advise the work of the Chiefs of the opera

27. 28 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75021 Pyongyang Soviet Ambassador. Verbally transmit the following to Kim Il Sung. If he demands it in written form-give it to him in written form, but without my signature.

1. The CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] salutes Comrade Kim Il Sung and his friends for the great liberational struggle of the Korean people which comrade Kim Il Sung is leading with brilliant success. CC VKP(b) has no doubt that in the soonest time the interventionists will be driven out of Korea with ignominy.

2. Comrade Kim Il Sung should not be embarrassed by the fact that he does not have solid successes in the war against the interventionists, that the successes are sometimes interrupted by delays in the advance or even by some local set-backs. In such a war

continuous successes do not occur. The Russians also did not have continuous successes during the civil war and even more during the war with Germany. The greatest success of the Korean people is that Korea has now become the most popular country in the world and has turned into the banner of the movement in Asia for liberation from the imperialist yoke. The armies of all enslaved peoples will now learn from the Korean People's Army the art of bringing decisive blows to the Americans and to any imperialists. Moreover, Comrade Kim Il Sung should not forget that Korea is not alone now, that it has allies, who are rendering and will render it aid. The position of the Russians during the AngloFrench-American intervention in 1919 was several times worse than the position of the

Korean comrades at the present time.

3. Advise Comrade Kim Il Sung not to scatter the air force, but to concentrate it on the front. It is necessary that each attack by the People's Army on any portion of the front begin with a number of decisive blows by attack planes on the troops of the enemy, that the fighter planes defend the troops of the Peoples Army from the blows of the enemy planes as much as possible. If it is necessary, we can throw in additional assault aircraft and fighter aircraft for the Korean air force. FYN-SI [Stalin]

28 August 1950 No. 483/sh

Copy No. 1 To Stalin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 5-6, 10-11 (original copy); and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 155-156]

28. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From Pyongyang. Sent 31.8.50 11:32
Received 31.8 17:27

Sent to the 8th Department of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces 31.8 17:35
By telegraph
FYN-SI [Stalin]

To No. 483/sh.

In accordance with your order of 29.8.50 I visited KIM IL SUNG and communicated to him the contents of the telegram. KIM IL SUNG listened to my communication and asked permission to write down its contents, which I dictated to him.

KIM IL SUNG received your letter very well, thanking you several times, underscoring that it is a very good letter.

Afterwards he asked my agreement to summon [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon-Yong and read him your telegram.

After exchanging opinions with Pak Hon-Yong he asked my opinion about whether he can bring it to the notice of the members of the PolitSoviet [Political Council] of the CC, in connection with which he underscored that this is a very important letter and he needs to communicate its contents since some members of the PolitSoviet are in a poor state of mind. It will be useful to them to know the contents of this letter.

I replied that if he considers this neces

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"DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V.

We are deeply touched by your attention.

We bring to you, our dear teacher, gratitude for the warm sympathy and advice. In the decisive period of the struggle of the Korean people we have received great moral support from you. We have firmly resolved to win the final victory in the struggle against the American interventionists, who are trying anew to enslave Korea.

In the noble struggle for independence and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly care and assistance.

We wish you many years of life and health.

Yours faithfully,

KIM IL SUNG

(upon commission of the PolitSoviet of the CC [Central Committee] of the Labor Party of Korea)

city of PYONGYANG

31.8.1950."

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Sent to the 8th Department of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22.
By telegraph.
Extremely urgent.
Moscow-Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR.

In connection with the forthcoming session of the [UN] General Assembly, we consider it advisable to recommend to the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic to send a statement to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which, on the basis of documents found in the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Korean] government, to show how the clique of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack on the north, to set forth once again the position of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic on the question of the illegality of the American intervention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric acts of the American armed forces in Korea and to demand the adoption of measures for the immediate cessation of the American intervention and the withdrawal from Korea of the troops of the foreign interventionists.

In addition to this statement [we advise] to send to the General Assembly and the Security Council photocopies of the documents to which reference will be made in the statement of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

In such case as you agree to this proposal, we ask you to communicate when it would be convenient to send such a statement.

We would consider it advisable also to inform the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic about the position. which the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly will take on the Korean question. We ask your orders. SHTYKOV

No. 1154/sh.

13 September of this year

Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, File of 8th Depart

ment.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 18-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 163-164]

[documents from 21 September 1950 through 14 October 1950 appear following the article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov]

31. 25 October 1950, VKP(b) CC [AllUnion Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee Politburo decision with approved directives to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky (at the United Nations in New York) and to Soviet Ambassador in Washington

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353. Your proposal about the inadvisability of supporting in the General Assembly the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, which is using Japanese in the aggressive war against the Korean people, we consider incorrect. A statement by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly with a declaration of support for the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, cannot weaken our position with regard to this question in the Far Eastern Commission. Therefore it is necessary for you to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the Americans of Japanese servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts brought forth in the statement of Pak Hon

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Yong, in one of your next speeches in the

General Assembly at an appropriate moment, according to your discretion.

We are simultaneously giving an order to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far Eastern Commission] to make a corresponding statement on this question and to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the United States of Japanese in military operations in Korea.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO

To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78 TOP SECRET

Attachment 2

WASHINGTON

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

It is necessary for you the make the following statement at the next meeting of the Far Eastern Commission:

"As is known, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the chairman of the General Assembly and to the chairman of the Security Council a protest against the use of Japanese servicemen in military actions in Korea. In this protest it is shown that in the fundamental facts found in the decree of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, it is established that Japanese servicemen participated in battles in the area of Seoul together with American troops, that one Japanese company participated in battles in the area of Chkholvon and that a significant number of Japanese are found in the 7th and 8th divisions of the Rhee Syngmann troops.

The use by the United States of Japanese servicemen in military operations in Korea is a gross violation of the Potsdam declaration, and also of section III of the resolution of the Far Eastern Commission "Basic Policy in Relation to Japan after Capitulation" of June 19, 1947, and the resolution adopted on the basis of this document "Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Use of Japanese Military Equipment" of February 12, 1948. The Potsdam declaration and aforementioned resolution of the Far Eastern Commission provide for the full disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, forbid the reestablishment or possession of any kind of Japanese military formations.

The Soviet delegation supports the protest of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic against the use by the

USA of Japanese servicemen in the war against the Korean people. The Soviet delegation considers that the Far Eastern Commission must not disregard the aforementioned facts, which testify to the direct violation of the agreed-upon decision on the demilitarization of Japan."

Give the statement to the press.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827, Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157]

32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via Roshchin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - to Comrade Zakharov
For MAO ZEDONG

To Comrade MAO ZEDONG

I received your telegram about naval
matters. I agree to the trip to MOSCOW of
XIAO, JINGUANG and the other comrades.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin
From Beijing Received 19 hours 50 minutes Copies: Stalin, Bulganin
28.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

27 October I received the following telegram from Mao Zedong addressed to you: "Comrade Filippov!

In connection with the military situation that has developed in China at the present time, we urgently need to acquire from the Soviet Union the following armaments for the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress artillery and torpedo bomber planes.

I therefore intend to send immediately to Moscow by plane the commander of the navy Xiao Jinguang together with adviser Comrade Kuz'min in order to conduct negotiations with the responsible comrades of the Soviet Navy on the question of the request for the above mentioned arms and on the question of the construction of the Chinese navy in the future.

Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang, two other comrades from the navy administration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy chief of the rear administration of the navy Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Moscow].

I ask you to review the aforementioned and give me a corresponding reply.

MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950."

29.10.50.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 64]

34. 1 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5222 TO SHTYKOV

You request that our officers and advisers remain in the disposition of the [North] Koreans for the formation of Korean divisions. Such a point of view of yours is well known to us. But we do not know the points of view of the [North] Korean government, we do not know whether it wishes to have Soviet officers and advisers in the future or prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not communicated the point of view of the Korean government on this subject. We cannot impose our advisers and officers on the Korean government. Let KIM IL SUNG communicate his point of view regarding this. FYN SI [STALIN]

1 November 1950

Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the General Staff to Shtykov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347,

List 84, and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 161]

35. 2 November 1950, ciphered telegram, S.E. Zakharov, Soviet military representative in Beijing, to Fyn Si (Stalin)

Second Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26416 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, Lomov From Beijing 15 hours 30 minutes 2.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY E
FYN SI [Stalin]

To No. 5228 of 2.11.50

I report: Through Colonel Petrachev, adviser to the Korean air force, I have obtained the following specific information:

1. By the first of November a regiment was formed using 26 Korean pilots that have been trained and 24 Yak-9 planes that are located in An'dun.

2. On November 1 of this year, 8 planes of this regiment went into battle for the first time, in the region of ANSIU. As a result of this flight 2 B-29 planes and a Mustang were downed. Two Yak-9's did not return from the battle.

The first report from comrade Belov to me about the loss of the two Yak-9 planes in a battle in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU was thus imprecise.

The losses relate to a battle in the region of ANSIU.

3. In a battle on November 1 of this year, in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU, two F-82 planes were downed by our pilots in MIG-15's and two planes were downed by anti-aircraft artillery. In all 4 planes [were downed].

We had no losses in the air battle. 4. MIG-15's of Comrade Belov flew from airbases at MUKDEN and AN'SHAN'. In all, 8 sorties were made from each airport.

5. At present there are 16 battle [as opposed to training] Yak-9's at the airbase at ANDONG. In an attack on the Andong airport on 1 November 1950 one Yak-9 was burned and 3 were put out of action, but it is possible to restore them. In addition, 2 planes were lost while patrolling.

In all 22 planes and 2 planes did not return from the region of ANSIU.

In addition to the Yak-9's there are:

a) 6 PO-2 planes, which are fully combat ready and are carrying out night missions. There are 14 pilots, and from the 15 PO-2 available, 5 planes crashed during landings and takeoffs at the airfield itself and 4 planes were lost while on missions.

b) 25 pilots for IL-10 planes, but up to now there are no planes for them

6. The command of the mixed air division of Koreans in ANDONG has been formed. It is headed by General LI FART. 7. Comrade PETRACHEV asks about the possibility of receiving 25 Il-10 planes and 10 PO-2 planes.

No. 2702 2.11.50

[S.E.] ZAKHAROV

Report: No. 5228 of 2.11.50 asked Comrade Zakharov about the fact that there are discrepancies between his report and Belov's report about the air battle in the region of Andong. He was ordered to elucidate this discrepancy and report about the participation of Korean planes in battles and about the fact that two of them did not return.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 71-72 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 187-188]

36. 8 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov )Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko From Beijing Received 02 hours 00 minutes 8.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] In view of the fact that the infantry arms of the People's Liberation Army are mainly trophies captured from the enemy, there is a great variety in the calibers of the rifles.

Such a situation creates great difficulty for the manufacture of ammunition, and in particular for the production of rifle and machine gun cartridges, especially as our factories can produce only very small quantities of these cartridges.

At present the troops of the volunteer army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) divisions of the twelve armies, which are taking

part in military operations in KOREA, have only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun cartridges. In the future, in connection with the development of military operations, we will have a very great need to supply the army with ammunition. If there is no change in military production, then the rearmament can be begun in the second half of 1951.

For overcoming the difficulties of the present time I ask you to review the question of the possibility of the delivery of small arms for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course of January and February 1951, according to the following list (name, quantity in pieces): 1. Soviet rifles 140,000.

2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000. 3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000. 4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns 80,000,000.

5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000. 6. Cartridges for light machine guns 37,000,000.

7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000. 8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns 20,000,000.

9. Pilots' handguns 1,000.

10. Cartridges for pilots' handguns 100,000.

11. TNT 1,000 tons.

I ask you to communicate to me the results of your review of my request. I wish you health. MAO ZEDONG

No. 2784 7.11.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 80-81]

37. 9 November 1950, VKB(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Roshchin with message for Zhou Enlai

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P78/448 To Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.

9 November 1950

Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]

Decision of 9 November 1950 448.- Question of MID USSR.

To confirm the attached draft of a telegram to Comrade Roshchin on the question

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